From 37b61bbaf6ebe8eb5dfe3528c1f031ddf149c73d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carsten Bormann Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 11:22:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1/5] BCP14 boilerplate housekeeping --- draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md b/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md index a9b9e73..8e9b2b9 100644 --- a/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md +++ b/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md @@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ author: normative: RFC1122: - RFC2119: RFC3376: RFC4443: RFC4944: @@ -55,7 +54,6 @@ normative: RFC7959: RFC8075: RFC8132: - RFC8174: RFC8613: RFC9052: RFC9053: @@ -135,7 +133,7 @@ Furthermore, this document defines Group OSCORE {{I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm ## Terminology ## {#terminology} -{::boilerplate bcp14} +{::boilerplate bcp14-tagged} This specification requires readers to be familiar with CoAP terminology {{RFC7252}}. Terminology related to group communication is defined in {{sec-groupdef}}. @@ -1097,7 +1095,7 @@ To illustrate where and how CoAP-based group communication can be used, this sec Discovery of physical devices in a network, or discovery of information entities hosted on network devices, are operations that are usually required in a system during the phases of setup or (re)configuration. When a discovery use case involves devices that need to interact without having been configured previously with a common security context, unsecured CoAP communication is typically used. Discovery may involve a request to a directory server, which provides services to aid clients in the discovery process. One particular type of directory server is the CoRE Resource Directory {{RFC9176}}; and there may be other types of directories that can be used with CoAP. ### Distributed Device Discovery ### {#sec-uc-dd} -Device discovery is the discovery and identification of networked devices -- optionally only devices of a particular class, type, model, or brand. Group communication is used for distributed device discovery, if a central directory server is not used. Typically in distributed device discovery, a multicast request is sent to a particular address (or address range) and multicast scope of interest, and any devices configured to be discoverable will respond back. For the alternative solution of centralized device discovery a central directory server is accessed through unicast, in which case group communication is not needed. This requires that the address of the central directory is either preconfigured in each device or configured during operation using a protocol. +Device discovery is the discovery and identification of networked devices -- optionally only devices of a particular class, type, model, or brand. Group communication is used for distributed device discovery, if a central directory server is not used. Typically, in distributed device discovery, a multicast request is sent to a particular address (or address range) and multicast scope of interest, and any devices configured to be discoverable will respond back. For the alternative solution of centralized device discovery a central directory server is accessed through unicast, in which case group communication is not needed. This requires that the address of the central directory is either preconfigured in each device or configured during operation using a protocol. In CoAP, device discovery can be implemented by CoAP resource discovery requesting (GET) a particular resource that the sought device class, type, model, or brand is known to respond to. It can also be implemented using CoAP resource discovery ({{Section 7 of RFC7252}}) and the CoAP query interface defined in {{Section 4 of RFC6690}} to find these particular resources. From ce0b4d2f18bab09f1b47faf81837ac9704d4a4fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carsten Bormann Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 11:24:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 2/5] comma --- draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md b/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md index 8e9b2b9..3d05577 100644 --- a/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md +++ b/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md @@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ For example, early link-local discovery of devices and resources as part of an o As a further example, the NoSec mode may be useful in simple applications that neither involve nor may have an impact on sensitive data and personal information. These include, e.g., read-only temperature sensors deployed in an environment where a client reads temperature values but does not use this data to control actuators or to perform other automated actions. -In the exception cases where NoSec mode is used, high-volume and harmful amplifications need to be prevented through appropriate and conservative device configurations: taking the early discovery query as an example, only a few CoAP servers are expected to be configured for responding to multicast group requests that are sent for discovery. And the time window during which such unsecured requests are accepted, can be limited as well. Furthermore the scope is also limited: only link-local requests are accepted. +In the exception cases where NoSec mode is used, high-volume and harmful amplifications need to be prevented through appropriate and conservative device configurations: taking the early discovery query as an example, only a few CoAP servers are expected to be configured for responding to multicast group requests that are sent for discovery. And the time window during which such unsecured requests are accepted, can be limited as well. Furthermore, the scope is also limited: only link-local requests are accepted. Except for the class of applications discussed above, and all the more so in applications that obviously have hard security requirements (e.g., health monitoring systems and alarm monitoring systems), CoAP group communication MUST NOT be used in NoSec mode. @@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ A proposed mitigation is to only allow this option to relax the standard suppres ## 6LoWPAN and MPL ## {#sec-security-considerations-6lowpan-mpl} In a 6LoWPAN network, the MPL {{RFC7731}} protocol may be used to forward multicast packets throughout the network. A 6LoWPAN Router that forwards a large IPv6 packet may have a relatively high impact on the occupation of the wireless channel because sending a large packet consists of the transmission of multiple link-layer IEEE 802.15.4 frames. Also, a constrained 6LoWPAN Router may experience a high memory load due to buffering of the large packet -- MPL requires an MPL Forwarder to store the packet for a longer duration, to allow multiple forwarding transmissions to neighboring Forwarders. This could allow an attacker on the 6LoWPAN network or outside the 6LoWPAN network to execute a Denial of Service (DoS) attack by sending large IPv6 multicast packets. This is also an amplification attack in general, because each of potentially multiple MPL Forwarder(s) repeats the transmission of the IPv6 packet potentially multiple times, hence amplifying the original amount of data sent by the attacker considerably. -The amplification factor may be even further increased by the loss of link-layer frames. If one or more of the fragments are not received correctly by an MPL Forwarder during its packet reassembly time window, the Forwarder discards all received fragments and it will likely at a future point in time trigger a neighboring MPL Forwarder to send the IPv6 packet (fragments) again, because its internal state marks this packet (that it failed to received previously) still as a "new" IPv6 packet. Hence this leads to an MPL Forwarder signaling to neighbors its "old" state, triggering additional transmission(s) of all packet fragments. +The amplification factor may be even further increased by the loss of link-layer frames. If one or more of the fragments are not received correctly by an MPL Forwarder during its packet reassembly time window, the Forwarder discards all received fragments and it will likely at a future point in time trigger a neighboring MPL Forwarder to send the IPv6 packet (fragments) again, because its internal state marks this packet (that it failed to received previously) still as a "new" IPv6 packet. Hence, this leads to an MPL Forwarder signaling to neighbors its "old" state, triggering additional transmission(s) of all packet fragments. For these reasons, a large IPv6 multicast packet is a possible attack vector in a Denial of Service (DoS) amplification attack on a 6LoWPAN network. See {{ssec-amplification}} of this document and {{Section 11.3 of RFC7252}} for more details on amplification. To mitigate the risk, applications sending multicast IPv6 requests to 6LoWPAN hosted CoAP servers SHOULD limit the size of the request to avoid 6LoWPAN fragmentation of the request packet. A 6LoWPAN Router or (MPL) multicast forwarder SHOULD deprioritize forwarding for multi-fragment 6LoWPAN multicast packets. 6LoWPAN Border Routers are typical ingress points where multicast traffic enters into a 6LoWPAN network. Specific MPL Forwarders (whether located on a 6LBR or not) may also be configured as ingress points. Any such ingress point SHOULD implement multicast packet filtering to prevent unwanted multicast traffic from entering a 6LoWPAN network from the outside. For example, it could filter out all multicast packets for which there is no known multicast listener on the 6LoWPAN network. See {{sec-other-protocols}} for protocols that allow multicast listeners to signal which groups they would like to listen to. As part of multicast packet filtering, the ingress point SHOULD implement a filtering criterion based on the size of the multicast packet. Ingress multicast packets above a defined size may then be dropped or deprioritized. @@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ Also note that the Uri-Port Option does not appear in the examples, since the po ~~~~~~~~~~~ {: #fig-gname-path-example title="Example of application group name in URI path (1/2)"} -{{fig-gname-path-example-2}} provides a different example, where an IPv6 literal address and the default CoAP port number 5683 are used in the authority component, which yields a compact CoAP request. Also the resource structure is different in this example. +{{fig-gname-path-example-2}} provides a different example, where an IPv6 literal address and the default CoAP port number 5683 are used in the authority component, which yields a compact CoAP request. Also, the resource structure is different in this example. ~~~~~~~~~~~ From 4ac4696d914b737a6270fa7751c18a604ca17910 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carsten Bormann Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 11:24:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Use "acknowledgements" consistent with RFC 7322 --- draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md b/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md index 3d05577..4c01334 100644 --- a/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md +++ b/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md @@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ Thus, consistently with {{Section 11.3 of RFC7252}}, a server in a CoAP group: Amplification attacks using CoAP are further discussed in {{I-D.irtf-t2trg-amplification-attacks}}, which also highlights how the amplification factor would become even higher when CoAP group communication is combined with resource observation {{RFC7641}}. That is, a single group request may result in multiple notification responses from each of the responding servers, throughout the observation lifetime. -Thus, consistently with {{Section 7 of RFC7641}}, a server in a CoAP group MUST strictly limit the number of notifications it sends between receiving acknowledgments that confirm the actual interest of the client in continuing the observation. +Thus, consistently with {{Section 7 of RFC7641}}, a server in a CoAP group MUST strictly limit the number of notifications it sends between receiving acknowledgements that confirm the actual interest of the client in continuing the observation. Moreover, it is especially easy to perform an amplification attack when the NoSec mode is used. Therefore, also in order to prevent an easy proliferation of high-volume amplification attacks, it is generally NOT RECOMMENDED to use CoAP group communication in NoSec mode (see {{chap-security-considerations-nosec-mode}}). @@ -1898,7 +1898,7 @@ RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION. * Editorial improvements. -# Acknowledgments # {#acknowledgments} +# Acknowledgements # {#acknowledgements} {: numbered="no"} The authors sincerely thank {{{Christian Amsüss}}}, {{{Carsten Bormann}}}, {{{Thomas Fossati}}}, {{{Rikard Höglund}}}, {{{Jaime Jiménez}}}, {{{John Preuß Mattsson}}}, {{{Jim Schaad}}}, and {{{Jon Shallow}}} for their comments and feedback. From 0de44113acb3ff748a115bd8bfc7004ddd38b18e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carsten Bormann Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 11:24:59 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 4/5] typo --- draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md b/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md index 4c01334..3a90318 100644 --- a/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md +++ b/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md @@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ Because it supports unicast only, {{RFC8323}} (CoAP over TCP, TLS, and WebSocket That is, after the first group request including the Block2 Option and sent over UDP, the following unicast CoAP requests targeting individual servers to retrieve further blocks may be sent over TCP or WebSockets, possibly protected with TLS. -This requires the individually addressed servers to also support CoAP over TCP/TLS/WebSockests for the targeted resource. A server can indicate its support for multiple alternative transports, and practically enable access to its resources through either of them, by using the method defined in {{I-D.ietf-core-transport-indication}}. +This requires the individually addressed servers to also support CoAP over TCP/TLS/WebSockets for the targeted resource. A server can indicate its support for multiple alternative transports, and practically enable access to its resources through either of them, by using the method defined in {{I-D.ietf-core-transport-indication}}. ### Other Transports ### CoAP group communication may be used over transports other than UDP/IP multicast. For example broadcast, non-UDP multicast, geocast, serial unicast, etc. In such cases the particular considerations for UDP/IP multicast in this document may need to be applied to that particular transport. From 5311a4daaa062519229317bcc3e56dc6c3b2b374 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carsten Bormann Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 13:31:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Add venue information --- draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md b/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md index 3a90318..3126fa0 100644 --- a/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md +++ b/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis.md @@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ updates: 7252, 7641 coding: utf-8 +venue: + group: Constrained RESTful Environments + mail: core@ietf.org + github: core-wg/groupcomm-bis + author: - ins: E. Dijk