draft-thomassen-dnsop-dnssec-bootstrapping-01.txt

DNSOP Working Group                                         P. Thomassen
Internet-Draft                         deSEC, Secure Systems Engineering
Intended status: Standards Track                               N. Wisiol
Expires: 27 March 2022              deSEC, Technische Universität Berlin
                                                       23 September 2021


Automatic Commissioning of New Signers: Solving the DNSSEC Bootstrapping
      Problem using Authenticated Signals from the Zone's Operator
             draft-thomassen-dnsop-dnssec-bootstrapping-01

Abstract

   This document describes an authenticated in-band method for automatic
   signaling of a Child DNS zone's delegation signer information from
   the zone's DNS operator(s).  The zone's registrar or registry may
   subsequently use this signal for automatic DS record provisioning in
   the parent zone.  The protocol is particularly useful in case of
   managed DNS providers hosting registrant's domains, where DS
   provisioning has so far been cumbersome.

   The signaling channel is not specific to the DS bootstrapping use
   case, but equally suitable for announcing other zone-specific
   information from the DNS Operator in an authenticated fashion.
   Further potential applications thus include, for example, key
   exchange between parties in an [RFC8901] multisigner setup.

   [ Ed note: Text inside square brackets ([]) is additional background
   information, answers to frequently asked questions, general musings,
   etc.  They will be removed before publication.  This document is
   being collaborated on at https://github.com/desec-io/draft-thomassen-
   dnsop-dnssec-bootstrapping/ (https://github.com/desec-io/draft-
   thomassen-dnsop-dnssec-bootstrapping/).  The most recent version of
   the document, open issues, etc. should all be available there.  The
   authors gratefully accept pull requests. ]

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.






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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 March 2022.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Preconditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.1.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Signaling Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Bootstrapping a DNSSEC Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Signaling Intent to Act as the Child's Signer . . . . . .   7
       3.1.1.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Steps Taken by the Parental Agent . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.2.1.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  Opt-out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.4.  Triggers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.1.  Child DNS Operator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  Parental Agent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.1.  Child DNS Operator-side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.2.  Parental Agent-side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  Possible Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14



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     A.1.  Multi-Signer Setups: Onboarding a Signing Party . . . . .  15
       A.1.1.  Signaling Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       A.1.2.  Import  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Appendix B.  Change History (to be removed before final
           publication)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   *TODO remove*: this section is inspired by [RFC7344], Section 1.

   The first time a Child DNS Operator signs a zone, they need to
   communicate the keying material to the Parent.  Depending on the
   desires of the Parent, the Child might send their DNSKEY record, a DS
   record, or both.

   So far, out-of-band methods are typically used to complete the chain
   of trust.  In-band methods exist, in particular based on the CDS and
   CDNSKEY record types as specified in [RFC7344] and [RFC8078].
   However, such communication is only authenticated when performing a
   rollover of the Child's keys represented in the parent.  An
   authenticated in-band channel for enabling DNSSEC so far has been
   missing.

   How the keying material is conveyed to the Parent during initial
   DNSSEC bootstrapping depends on the relationship the Child has with
   the Parent.  The communication has to occur between the Child DNS
   Operator and, depending on the circumstances, the Registry or the
   Registrar, possibly via the Registrant (for details, see [RFC7344],
   Appendix A).  In many cases, this is a manual process -- and not an
   easy one.  Any manual process is susceptible to mistakes and/or
   errors.  In addition, due to the annoyance factor of the process,
   involved parties may avoid the process of getting a DS record set
   published at the Parent.

   DNSSEC provides data integrity to information published in DNS; thus,
   DNS publication can be used to automate maintenance of delegation
   information.  This document describes a method to automate
   publication of initial DS records for a hitherto insecure delegation.

   Readers are expected to be familiar with DNSSEC, including [RFC4033],
   [RFC4034], [RFC4035], [RFC6781], [RFC7344], and [RFC8078].

1.1.  Terminology

   The terminology we use is defined in this section.  The highlighted
   roles are as follows:




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   Child  The entity on record that has the delegation of the domain
      from the Parent.

   Parent  The zone that contains the Child's delegation records.

   Child DNS Operator  The entity that maintains and publishes the zone
      information for the Child DNS.

   Parental Agent  The entity that the Child has a relationship with to
      change its delegation information.

   Signaling Domain(s)  For any given authoritative nameserver hostname
      from the Child's NS record set, the hostname prefixed with the
      label "_boot" is one of the Signaling Domains for the Child Zone.

   Signaling Zone  The zone which is authoritative for a given Signaling
      Domain.

   Signaling Name  A name under a Signaling Domain that can be mapped
      onto the Child zone's name.

   Signaling Record  A DNS record located at a Signaling Name under a
      Signaling Domain.  Signaling Records are used by the Child DNS
      Operator to publish information about the Child.

   CDS/CDNSKEY  This notation refers to CDS and/or CDNSKEY, i.e., one or
      both.

   Base32hex Encoding  "Base 32 Encoding with Extended Hex Alphabet" as
      per [RFC4648].

1.2.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Signaling

   When setting up initial trust, the child generally wants to enable
   global validation.  As long as the child is insecure, DNS answers can
   be forged.  The goal is to promote the child from insecure to secure
   as soon as reasonably possible by the parent.  This means that the
   period from the child's publication of CDS/CDNSKEY RRset to the
   parent publishing the synchronized DS RRset should be as short as
   possible.



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   This goal is achieved by transferring trust from the Child DNS
   Operator by publishing an authenticated signal that can be discovered
   and processed by the Parent.  Implementation by Child DNS Operators
   and Parental Agents is RECOMMENDED.

2.1.  Preconditions

   If a Child DNS Operator implements the protocol, the following
   conditions have to be met:

   1.  Each Signaling Zone MUST be securely delegated, i.e. have a valid
       DNSSEC chain of trust from the root.

   2.  The Child DNS Operator MUST publish CDS/CDNSKEY records at the
       Child's apex, as described in [RFC7344].

   [ In the course of the bootstrapping protocol, the Parental Agent
   will fetch the CDS/CDNSKEY records from another source.  The second
   condition ensures that the Parental Agent can validate these records
   against the customary CDS/CDNSKEY records from the Child.  The
   bootstrapping protocol is thus an extension of the existing CDS/
   CDNSKEY protocol, and therefore provides strictly stronger guarantees
   than the traditional model. ]

   [ Requiring presence of CDS/CDNSKEY records in the Child also
   faciliates simple opt-out by the zone administrator, protects against
   synchronization errors, and -- if CDS is used, whose value depends on
   the Child's name -- allows detecting situations of Child name
   confusion due to hash collisions (see Section 2.2). ]

2.1.1.  Example

   When performing DNSSEC bootstrapping for the Child zone
   "example.co.uk" using NS records "ns1.example.net" and
   "ns2.example.net", the Child DNS Operator

   1.  needs to ensure that a valid DNSSEC chain of trust exists for the
       zone(s) that are authoritative for the Signaling Domains
       "_boot.ns1.example.net" and "_boot.ns2.example.net";

   2.  publishes CDS/CDNSKEY records at "example.co.uk".

2.2.  Signaling Names

   To publish a piece of information about the Child zone in an
   authenticated fashion, the Child DNS Operator MUST publish one or
   more Signaling Records at the Child's Signaling Name under each
   Signaling Domain.



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   Signaling Records MUST be accompanied by RRSIG records created with
   the corresponding Signaling Zone's key(s).  The type and contents of
   these Signaling Records depend on the specific use case as described
   below.

   The Signaling Name MUST consist of the following two labels:

   1.  the first label of the Child name;

   2.  a label equal to the SHA-256 hash digest of the fully qualified
       domain name of the Child's immediate ancestor in the DNS tree
       (one level up), using wire format for the hash input and "Base 32
       Encoding with Extended Hex Alphabet" as specified in [RFC4648]
       for the output.  Trailing padding characters ("=") MUST be
       dropped.

   Note that the "fully qualified domain name of the Child's immediate
   ancestor in the DNS tree" coincides with the Parent's FQDN only when
   the delegation is directly (one level) under the Parent's apex.  For
   deeper delegations, it also contains the labels between the Parent
   and the Child.

   [ The purpose of the hash function is to avoid the possibility of
   exceeding the maximum length of a DNS name, and to normalize the
   number of labels in a Signaling Name.  The encoding choice is like in
   NSEC3, except that SHA-256 is used instead of SHA-1.  This is to
   prevent other tenants in shared hosting environments from creating
   collisions. ]

   [ Prefixing the first label verbatim minimizes the number of hash
   calculations that need to be performed by the Child DNS Operator and
   the Parental Agent, and also facilitates discovery of unprocessed
   Signaling Records by the Parental Agent by means of NSEC walking the
   Signaling Domain.  (If the first label was part of the hash, the
   Parental Agent would not be able to infer the Child's name.) ]

   [ *Example code* (Python, with "dnspython" package):














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from base64 import b32encode
from hashlib import sha256

import dns.name
from dns.rdtypes.ANY.NSEC3 import b32_normal_to_hex

child = 'example.co.uk.'
prefix, suffix = child.split('.', 1)
suffix_wire_format = dns.name.from_text(suffix).to_wire()
suffix_digest = sha256(suffix_wire_format).digest()
suffix_digest = b32encode(suffix_digest).translate(b32_normal_to_hex).rstrip(b'=')
signaling_name = prefix + '.' + suffix_digest.lower().decode()
print(signaling_name)
# >>> 'example.bge2bvlnqt4ei2oq3v9nr8a0lh9nkf6b4lh6c3j51k5kd67helmg'

   ]

3.  Bootstrapping a DNSSEC Delegation

3.1.  Signaling Intent to Act as the Child's Signer

   To announce its willingness to act as the Child's delegated signer,
   the Child DNS operator co-publishes the Child's CDS/CDNSKEY records
   at the corresponding Signaling Name under each Signaling Domain as
   defined in Section 2.2.

   Previous use of CDS/CDNSKEY records is specified at the apex only
   ([RFC7344], Section 4.1).  This protocol extends the use of these
   record types at non-apex owner names for the purpose of DNSSEC
   bootstrapping.  To exclude the possibility of semantic collision,
   there MUST NOT be a zone cut at a Signaling Name.

   Unlike the CDS/CDNSKEY records at the Child's apex, Signaling Records
   MUST be signed with the corresponding Signaling Zone's key(s).  Their
   contents MUST be identical to the corresponding records published at
   the Child's apex.

3.1.1.  Example

   For the purposes of bootstrapping the Child zone "example.co.uk" with
   NS records "ns1.example.net" and "ns2.example.net", the required
   Signaling Domains are "_boot.ns1.example.net" and
   "_boot.ns2.example.net".

   In the zones containing these domains, the Child DNS Operator
   publishes the Child's CDS/CDNSKEY records at the names





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example.bge2bvlnqt4ei2oq3v9nr8a0lh9nkf6b4lh6c3j51k5kd67helmg._boot.ns1.example.net
example.bge2bvlnqt4ei2oq3v9nr8a0lh9nkf6b4lh6c3j51k5kd67helmg._boot.ns2.example.net

   where "example.bge2bvlnqt4ei2oq3v9nr8a0lh9nkf6b4lh6c3j51k5kd67helmg"
   is derived from the DNS Child Zone's name "example.co.uk" as
   described in Section 2.2.  The records are accompanied by RRSIG
   records created using the key(s) of the respective Signaling Zone.

3.2.  Steps Taken by the Parental Agent

   To complete the bootstrapping process, Parental Agents implementing
   this protocol can act based upon a number of triggers (see
   Section 3.4).  Once trigger conditions are fulfilled, the Parental
   Agent, knowing both the Child zone name and its NS hostnames, MUST

   1.  verify that the Child is not currently securely delegated;

   2.  query the CDS/CDNSKEY records at the Child zone apex directly
       from each of the authoritative servers as listed in the NS record
       set;

   3.  query the CDS/CDNSKEY records located at each of the Signaling
       Names using a trusted validating DNS resolver;

   4.  check (separately by record type) that all record sets retrieved
       in Steps 2 and 3 have equal contents;

   If the above steps succeeded without error, the Parental Agent MUST
   construct a tentative DS record set either by copying the CDS record
   contents or by computing DS records from the CDNSKEY record set, or
   by doing both (i.e. amending the set of records copied from the CDS
   record set).

   The Parental Agent then MUST verify that for each signature algorithm
   present, (at least) one of the keys referenced in the tentative DS
   record set signs the Child's DNSKEY record set. [ TODO Which other
   checks are needed to not break anything? ]

   If this is the case, the Parental Agent SHOULD publish the DS record
   set in the Parent zone, so as to secure the Child's delegation.

   If, however, an error condition occurs, in particular:

   *  in Step 1: the Child is already securely delegated;

   *  in Step 2: any failure during the retrieval of the CDS/CDNSKEY
      records located at the Child apex from any of the authoritative
      nameservers, with an empty record set qualifying as a failure;



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   *  in Step 3: DNS resolution failure during retrieval of CDS/CDNSKEY
      records from any Signaling Name, including failure of DNSSEC
      validation or unauthenticated data (AD bit not set);

   *  in Step 4: inconsistent responses;

   *  the tentative DS record set includes a signature algorithm without
      referencing a key of that algorithm which signs the Child's DNSKEY
      record set;

   the Parental Agent MUST abort the procedure.

   [ This level of rigor is needed for various reasons, including that
   it prevents one operator from screwing up the zone in a multi-homed
   setup (where several operators serve the same zone). ]

3.2.1.  Example

   To bootstrap the Child zone "example.co.uk" using NS records
   "ns1.example.net" and "ns2.example.net", the Parental Agent

   1.  checks that the Child zone is not yet securely delegated;

   2.  queries CDS/CDNSKEY records for "example.co.uk" directly from
       "ns1.example.net" and "ns2.example.net";

   3.  queries the CDS/CDNSKEY records located at the Signaling Names
       (see Section 2.2)

example.bge2bvlnqt4ei2oq3v9nr8a0lh9nkf6b4lh6c3j51k5kd67helmg._boot.ns1.example.net
example.bge2bvlnqt4ei2oq3v9nr8a0lh9nkf6b4lh6c3j51k5kd67helmg._boot.ns2.example.net

   4.  checks that the CDS/CDNSKEY record sets retrieved in Steps 2 and
       3 agree across responses.

   The Parental Agent then publishes a DS record set according to the
   information retrieved in the previous steps.

3.3.  Opt-out

   As a special case of Step 2 failure, the Child MAY opt out from
   DNSSEC bootstrapping by publishing a CDS/CDNSKEY record with
   algorithm 0 and other fields as specified in [RFC8078], Section 4, at
   its apex.







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   This mechanism is workable without regard to whether the Child zone's
   signatures are managed by the Child DNS Operator or by the zone
   owner, and without regard to what the Child DNS Operator decides to
   signal under the Signaling Domain.

3.4.  Triggers

   [ Clarity of this section needs to be improved. ]

   Parental Agents SHOULD trigger the procedure described in Section 3.2
   once one of the following conditions is fulfilled:

   *  The Parental Agent receives a new or updated NS record set for a
      Child;

   *  The Parental Agent encounters Signaling Records for its Children
      during a scan (e.g. daily) of known Signaling Domains (derived
      from the NS records used in its delegations).

      To perform such a scan, the Parental Agent iterates over some or
      all of its delegations and strips the first label off each one to
      construct the set of immediate ancestors of its children.  (For
      delegations one level below the Parent, such as second-level
      domain registrations, this will simply be the Parent's name.)  The
      Parental Agent then uses these names to compute the second label
      of the Signaling Names.  The scan is completed by either

      -  performing a targeted NSEC walk starting one level below the
         Signaling Domain, at the label that encodes the Child's
         ancestor; or

      -  by performing a zone transfer of the zone containing the
         (relevant part of the) Signaling Domain, if the Signaling Zone
         operator allows it, and iterating over its contents.

      The Child's name is constructed by prepending the first label of
      the encountered Signaling Names to the ancestor from which the
      Signaling Name's second label was computed;

   *  The Parental Agent performs an active (e.g. daily) scan by
      opportunistically querying the Signaling Records for some or all
      of its delegations;

   *  Any other condition as deemed appropriate by local policy.







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4.  Operational Recommendations

4.1.  Child DNS Operator

   Signaling Domains SHOULD be delegated as zones of their own, so that
   the Signaling Zone's apex coincides with the Signaling Domain (such
   as "_boot.ns1.example.net").  While it is permissible for the
   Signaling Domain to be contained in a Signaling Zone of fewer labels
   (such as "example.net"), a zone cut ensures that bootstrapping
   activities do not require modifications of the zone containing the
   nameserver hostname.

   In addition, Signaling Zones SHOULD use NSEC to allow consumers to
   efficiently discover pending bootstrapping operations by means of
   zone walking (see Section 3.4).  This is especially useful for bulk
   processing after a Child DNS Operator has enabled the protocol.

   To keep the size of the Signaling Zones minimal, Child DNS Operators
   SHOULD remove Signaling Records which are found to have been acted
   upon.  This is particularly important when the Child DNS Operator
   allows Parental Agents to perform scans of the Signaling Zone, either
   by allowing zone transfers or by permitting zone walks via NSEC, so
   that bulk processing remains efficient.

4.2.  Parental Agent

   It is RECOMMENDED to perform queries within Signaling Domains
   (Section 3.2) with an (initially) cold resolver cache as to retrieve
   the most current information regardless of TTL.  (When a batch job is
   used to attempt bootstrapping for a large number of delegations, the
   cache does not need to get cleared in between.)

   [It is expected that Signaling Records have few consumers only, so
   that caching would not normally have a performance benefit.  On the
   other hand, perhaps it is better to RECOMMEND low TTLs instead?]

5.  Implementation Status

   *Note to the RFC Editor*: please remove this entire section before
   publication.

5.1.  Child DNS Operator-side

   *  Knot DNS supports manual creation of non-apex CDS/CDNSKEY/DNSKEY
      records.

   *  PowerDNS supports manual creation of non-apex CDS/CDNSKEY/DNSKEY
      records.



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   *  Proof-of-concept Signaling Domains with several thousand Signaling
      Names exist at "_boot.ns1.desec.io" and "_boot.ns2.desec.org".
      Signaling Names can be discovered via NSEC walking.

   *  A tool to automatically generate signaling records for
      bootstrapping purposes is under development by the authors.

5.2.  Parental Agent-side

   *  A tool to retrieve and process Signaling Records for bootstrapping
      purposes, either directly or via zone walking, is available at
      https://github.com/desec-io/dsbootstrap (https://github.com/desec-
      io/dsbootstrap).  The tool implements outputs the validated DS
      records which then can be added to the parent zone.

6.  Security Considerations

   Thoughts:

   *  We use at least one established chain of trust (via the secure
      delegations of the zones containing the NS hostnames).  As a
      result,

      -  communication is authenticated;

      -  process is immediate (no need for observing CDS/CDNSKEY records
         via TCP for several days);

      -  an active on-wire attacker cannot tamper with the delegation.

   *  The security level of the method is strictly higher than the
      "accept CDS/CDNSKEY after a while"-approach that is already in use
      at several ccTLD registries ("Accept after Delay", [RFC8078],
      Section 3.3).  This is because the method described here adds
      stronger guarantees, but removes nothing.

   *  Actors in the chain(s) of trust of the zone(s) used for
      bootstrapping (the DNS Operator themselves, plus entities further
      up in the chain) can undermine the protocol.  However,

      -  that's also possible in the case of CDS/CDNSKEY (see previous
         point);

      -  if the Child DNS Operator doesn't control the zones in which
         its NS hostnames live (including their nameservers' A records)
         because the path from the root is untrusted, you probably don't
         want to trust that operator as a whole;




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      -  when bootstrapping is done upon receipt of a new NS record set,
         the window of opportunity is very small;

      -  mitigation exists by diversifying e.g. the nameserver
         hostname's TLDs, which is advisable anyways;

      -  correct bootstrapping is easily monitored by the Child DNS
         operator.

   *  Prevention of accidental misprovisioning / enforcing explicit
      provisioning:

      -  In case of a hash collision, two distinct child zones may be
         associated with the same signaling name so that their keys may
         get mixed up.  While not currently feasible, malicious
         customers in shared hosting environments may attempt to produce
         such a collision.  Is it worth mitigating this by introducing a
         salt, e.g. stored in a TXT record located at the Signaling
         Domain?  (In case of a collision, one can set a new salt.)

7.  IANA Considerations

   *TODO:* reserve "_boot"?

   This document has no IANA actions.

8.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Brian Dickson, John R.  Levine, and Ondřej Caletka for
   reviewing draft proposals and offering comments and suggestions.

   Thanks also to Steve Crocker, Hugo Salgado, and Ulrich Wisser for
   early-stage brainstorming.

9.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.






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   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

   [RFC6781]  Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC
              Operational Practices, Version 2", RFC 6781,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6781, December 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6781>.

   [RFC7344]  Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
              DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>.

   [RFC7477]  Hardaker, W., "Child-to-Parent Synchronization in DNS",
              RFC 7477, DOI 10.17487/RFC7477, March 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7477>.

   [RFC8078]  Gudmundsson, O. and P. Wouters, "Managing DS Records from
              the Parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", RFC 8078,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8078, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8078>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8901]  Huque, S., Aras, P., Dickinson, J., Vcelak, J., and D.
              Blacka, "Multi-Signer DNSSEC Models", RFC 8901,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8901, September 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8901>.

Appendix A.  Possible Extensions

   The mechanism described in Section 2.2 provides a public,
   authenticated, in-band, unidirectional channel through which the
   Child DNS Operator can publish information on the zones it serves.




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   By provisioning other types of Signaling Records, the Child DNS
   Operator can therefore convey signals that pertain to use cases other
   than bootstrapping a DNSSEC delegation.

A.1.  Multi-Signer Setups: Onboarding a Signing Party

   [RFC8901] describes multi-signer models in which several Child DNS
   Operators serve the same Child zone.  In one of these scenarios
   (Model 2, [RFC8901], Section 2.1.2), each Child DNS Operator holds a
   unique KSK set and ZSK set to sign the zone.

   To ensure smooth resolution of Child zone queries, this scheme
   demands that participating Child DNS Operators import the ZSK sets of
   the other providers into their DNSKEY RRset.  Further, each
   operator's KSK(s) need to be included in the DS record set at the
   delegation point in the Parent zone.  When a new Child DNS Operator
   is joining the scheme, these synchronization processes have to occur
   before the new operator's nameserver hostnames are included in the
   Child's NS record set.

   So far, it has been assumed that the KSK and ZSK extraction and
   provisioning would happen through some proprietary API at each DNS
   operator ([RFC8901], Section 9).  We now describe how a Child DNS
   Operator can instead use Signaling Records to make its own set of
   DNSKEY records available for querying by other signing parties, so
   that they can retrieve, validate, and process them.

A.1.1.  Signaling Records

   Given a Child zone "example.co.uk" that is already securely delegated
   with authoritative nameservers "ns1.example.net" and
   "ns2.example.net", we consider how a new Child DNS Operator using
   nameservers "ns3.example.org" and "ns4.example.org" can distribute
   its DNSKEY record set to the existing signing parties, in order to
   join the multi-signer group.

   The Signaling Domains corresponding to the new Child DNS Operator's
   nameservers are "_boot.ns3.example.org" and "_boot.ns4.example.org".

   In the zones containing these domains, the new Child DNS Operator
   publishes a DNSKEY record set containing the keys used by the
   operator when operating the Child zone, at the Signaling Names

example.bge2bvlnqt4ei2oq3v9nr8a0lh9nkf6b4lh6c3j51k5kd67helmg._boot.ns3.example.org
example.bge2bvlnqt4ei2oq3v9nr8a0lh9nkf6b4lh6c3j51k5kd67helmg._boot.ns4.example.org






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   where the first label is calculated as described in Section 2.2.  The
   records are accompanied by RRSIG records created using the key(s) of
   the respective Signaling Zone.

   Note that DNSKEY records are not restricted to apex owner names
   ([RFC4035], Section 2.1).  However, only apex DNSKEY records are used
   for DNSSEC validation ([RFC4035], Section 5).  As Signaling Names do
   not occur on zone cuts (see Section 3.1), the use of DNSKEY records
   described here does not interfere with existing DNSKEY uses.

A.1.2.  Import

   With the Signaling Records in place, an algorithm similar to the one
   given in Section 3.2 can be used to query and validate the joining
   operator's DNSKEY set.  The required steps can either be taken
   autonomously by each participating operator (query, validate, update
   local zone copy with imported information), or be subject to central
   coordination using "Multisigner Controller" tooling which interfaces
   with each operator.

   The new KSKs can then be added to the delegation's DS record set as
   described in [RFC8901], Section 8 (i.e. via an [RFC7344] rollover
   using CDS/CDNSKEY records), followed by the inclusion of the new ZSKs
   in the other operators' DNSKEY record sets.  Similarly, the new
   operator can import the other operators' DNSKEYs into its local copy
   of the Child zone (either autonomously, or via central coordination).

   [ Note that the DNSKEY record set in the Child zone contains keys
   from all operators, whereas the DNSKEY record set published under the
   Signaling Domain is restricted to keys actively used by the
   publishing operator. ]

   After convergence on the served DNSKEY record sets has been achieved,
   the joining process is completed by amending the Child's NS record
   set to include the new operator's authoritative nameservers, followed
   by a corresponding update of the NS delegation records at the Parent
   (e.g. using CSYNC [RFC7477]).

Appendix B.  Change History (to be removed before final publication)

   *  draft-thomassen-dnsop-dnssec-bootstrapping-01

   |  Add section on Triggers.
   |  
   |  Clarified title.
   |  
   |  Improved abstract.
   |  



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   |  Require CDS/CDNSKEY records at the Child.
   |  
   |  Reworked Signaling Name scheme.
   |  
   |  Recommend using cold cache for consumption.
   |  
   |  Updated terminology (replace "Bootstrapping" by "Signaling").
   |  
   |  Added NSEC recommendation for Bootstrapping Zones.
   |  
   |  Added multi-signer use case.
   |  
   |  Editorial changes.

   *  draft-thomassen-dnsop-dnssec-bootstrapping-00

   |  Initial public draft.

Authors' Addresses

   Peter Thomassen
   deSEC, Secure Systems Engineering
   Berlin
   Germany

   Email: peter@desec.io


   Nils Wisiol
   deSEC, Technische Universität Berlin
   Berlin
   Germany

   Email: nils@desec.io

















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