-
Upgraded various dependencies, resolving two security alerts from GitHub.
-
fscrypt
now requires Go 1.18 or later to build. -
fscrypt
now provides a better error message when it's asked to operate on a locked regular file. -
Made some improvements to the documentation.
-
fscrypt
now requires Go 1.16 or later to build. -
pam_fscrypt
now supports the optionunlock_only
to disable locking of directories on logout. -
Fixed a bug where the number of CPUs used in the passphrase hash would be calculated incorrectly on systems with more than 255 CPUs.
-
Added support for AES-256-HCTR2 filenames encryption.
-
Directories are now synced immediately after an encryption policy is applied, reducing the chance of an inconsistency after a sudden crash.
-
Added Lustre to the list of allowed filesystems.
-
Added a NEWS.md file that contains the release notes, and backfilled it from the GitHub release notes.
This release contains fixes for three security vulnerabilities and related security hardening:
-
Correctly handle malicious mountpoint paths in the
fscrypt
bash completion script (CVE-2022-25328, command injection). -
Validate the size, type, and owner (for login protectors) of policy and protector files (CVE-2022-25327, denial of service).
-
Make the
fscrypt
metadata directories non-world-writable by default (CVE-2022-25326, denial of service). -
When running as a non-root user, ignore policy and protector files that aren't owned by the user or by root.
-
Also require that the metadata directories themselves and the mountpoint root directory be owned by the user or by root.
-
Make policy and protector files mode
0600
rather than0644
. -
Make all relevant files owned by the user when
root
encrypts a directory with a user's login protector, not just the login protector itself. -
Make
pam_fscrypt
ignore system users completely.
Thanks to Matthias Gerstner (SUSE) for reporting the above vulnerabilities and suggesting additional hardening.
Note: none of these vulnerabilities or changes are related to the cryptography
used. The main issue was that it wasn't fully considered how fscrypt
's
metadata storage method could lead to denial-of-service attacks if a local user
is malicious.
Although upgrading to v0.3.3 shouldn't break existing users, there may be some edge cases where users were relying on functionality in ways we didn't anticipate. If you encounter any issues, please report them as soon as possible so that we can find a solution for you.
-
Made linked protectors (e.g., login protectors used on a non-root filesystem) more reliable when a filesystem UUID changes.
-
Made login protectors be owned by the user when they are created as root, so that the user has permission to update them later.
-
Made
fscrypt
work when the root directory is on a btrfs filesystem. -
Made
pam_fscrypt
start warning when a user's login protector is getting de-synced due to their password being changed by root. -
Support reading the key for raw key protectors from standard input.
-
Made
fscrypt metadata remove-protector-from-policy
work even if the protector is no longer accessible. -
Made
fscrypt
stop trying to access irrelevant filesystems. -
Improved the documentation.
-
Slightly decreased the amount of memory that
fscrypt
uses for password hashing, to avoid out-of-memory situations. -
Made recovery passphrase generation happen without a prompt by default, and improved the explanation given.
-
Made many improvements to the README file.
-
Various other minor fixes
While this release includes some potentially breaking changes, we don't expect this to break users in practice.
-
Potentially breaking changes to
pam_fscrypt
module:- Remove the
drop_caches
andlock_policies
options. Thelock_policies
behavior is now unconditional, while the correctdrop_caches
setting is now auto-detected. Existing PAM files that specify these options will continue to work, but these options will now be ignored. - Prioritize over other session modules. The
pam_fscrypt
session hook is now inserted into the correct place in the PAM stack whenpam_fscrypt
is configured using Debian's / Ubuntu's PAM configuration framework.
- Remove the
-
Non-breaking changes:
- Add Bash completions for
fscrypt
. - Fix an error message.
- Correctly detect "incompletely locked" v1-encrypted directories on kernel versions 5.10 and later.
- Add Bash completions for
-
Other:
- Improve Ubuntu installation instructions.
- Minor README updates
- CI updates, including switching from Travis CI to GitHub Actions
This release includes:
-
Fix 32-bit build. This was supposed to be fixed in v0.2.8, but another breakage was added in the same release.
-
Clarify output of
fscrypt status DIR
on v1-encrypted directories in some cases. -
[Developers]
- Add 32-bit build to presubmit checks.
- Fix
cli-tests/t_v1_policy
to not be flaky.
-
Build fixes
- Fix build on 32-bit platforms.
- Fix build with gcc 10.
-
Allow
fscrypt
to work in containers. -
Usability improvements
- Improve many error messages and suggestions. For example, if the
encrypt
feature flag needs to be enabled on an ext4 filesystem,fscrypt
will now show thetune2fs
command to run. - Document how to securely use login protectors, and link to that documentation when creating a new login protector.
- Try to detect incomplete locking of v1-encrypted directory.
- Several other small improvements
- Improve many error messages and suggestions. For example, if the
-
[Developers] Added command-line interface tests.
The main addition in this release is that we now automatically detect support
for V2 policies when running fscrypt setup
and configure /etc/fscrypt.conf
appropriately. This allows users on newer kernels to automatically start using
V2 policies without manually changing /etc/fscrypt.conf
. To use these new
policies, simply run sudo fscrypt setup
and your /etc/fscrypt.conf
will be
automatically updated.
We also made changes to make the build of fscrypt
reproducible:
- Simplify
fscrypt --version
output. - Use
-trimpath
.
Finally, we added improved documentation and fixed up the Makefile.
The big feature in this release is support for v2 kernel encryption policies.
With the release of Linux 5.4, the kernel added a new type of
policy that
makes fscrypt
much easier to use. For directories using these new policies:
-
fscrypt unlock
makes the plaintext version of the directory visible to all users (if they have permission). This makes sharing encrypted folders between users (or a user and root) much easier. -
fscrypt lock
(also new in this release) can be run as a non-root user. -
The policies are no longer tied to the buggy kernel keyring API.
- This removes the need for users to run
keyctl link
or to reconfigurepam_keyinit
. - Some systemd related bugs will no longer be an issue.
- This removes the need for users to run
-
Denial-of-Service attacks possible with the v1 API can no longer be used.
To use this new functionality, make sure you are on Linux 5.4 or later. Then,
add "policy_version": "2"
to "options"
in /etc/fscrypt.conf
. After this,
all new directories will encrypted with v2 polices. See the README.md
for
more information, including how to use some of the new kernel features with
existing directories.
Many thanks to @ebiggers for the herculean effort to get this code (and the kernel code) tested and merged.
Other new features in this release:
- The
.fscrypt
directory can now be a symlink. - When an encrypted directory and a protector reside on different filesystems, we now automatically create a recovery password.
Bug fixes in this release:
- Bind mounts are now handled correctly.
- Cleanup polices/protectors on failure.
- Config file is created with the correct mode.
fscrypt setup
now properly creates/.fscrypt
.- Work around strange Go interaction with process keyrings.
- Misc Optimizations
- Build and CI improvements
- Doc updates
A special thanks to @ebiggers for most of the changes in this release.
With the release of 1.13 recently, the minimum supported version of Go for
fscrypt
is now 1.12.
fscrypt
now uses go modules (and no longer uses dep
).
New Features:
- Adiantum support
- Display encryption options in
fscrypt status DIR
.
Changes to improve stability of fscrypt
:
- Ensure
fscrypt
file updates are always atomic. - Use sane defaults for newly encrypted directories.
- Install PAM modules/configs correctly.
The remaining changes include numerous fixes to the Documentation and CI.
This release contains multiple bug fixes, including a fix for
CVE-2018-6558,
which allowed for privilege escalation. Please update fscrypt
as soon as
possible. Debian and Ubuntu updates should be available soon.
This small release makes fscrypt
much easier to build and use.
-
PasswordHash
has completely moved tox/crypto/argon2
, eliminating thelibargon2
build and runtime dependency. Now the dependencies to buildfscrypt
arego
,make
,gcc
, and some system headers. That's it! -
PasswordHash
will only use at most 128MiB. This allows users to encrypt files on removable media and rest assured that it will still work when plugged into another system with less memory. -
fscrypt
's build and CI systems have been greatly improved. All dependencies are now vendored withdep
allowing for reproducible builds. Building, testing, and changingfscrypt
is now much more straightforward. -
Other minor fixes
This release improves the process of purging keyrings by:
- Fixing a bug where keys would not be cleared on logout if the session keyring was misconfigured
- Always syncing the filesystem metadata when purging keys
Minor features include:
- Added cryptographic algorithms from the 4.13 kernel.
- Improved our Travis CI processes.
Features coming in 0.3:
- Major Documentation rewrite
- Commands to automatically handle ext4 feature flags
- UI refactoring
See the Pull Requests and Closed Issues for more detailed information.
- The PAM module now works without crashing the login process.
- Keys work properly when switching between root and non-root users.
- Finalized how the keys will be provisioned into the kernel keyring.
This release introduces the PAM Module and associated documentation.
It also includes numerous bug fixes.
This is the version of fscrypt
which was first made public on Github.
The redacted commit history from internal development is maintained.