From ba8c79a9f8aab9254d81f94fe52cffe7adfbab8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zippo-Wang <852420284@qq.com> Date: Sun, 27 Apr 2025 09:48:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] feat(gm): support GM --- go.mod | 2 + go.sum | 6 + pkg/common/transport/gm_round_tripper.go | 43 + pkg/common/transport/gm_round_tripper_test.go | 159 + .../transport}/logroundtripper.go | 8 +- .../transport}/logroundtripper_test.go | 50 +- pkg/common/transport/transport.go | 27 + pkg/config/cloud.go | 27 +- pkg/evs/server.go | 3 +- pkg/obs/server.go | 3 +- pkg/sfs/config/cloud.go | 8 +- pkg/sfs/server.go | 3 +- pkg/sfsturbo/server.go | 3 +- vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/LICENSE | 201 ++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/alert.go | 106 + vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/auth.go | 144 + .../tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/auto_handshake_server.go | 533 ++++ .../tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/auto_switch_config.go | 38 + .../tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/cipher_suites.go | 406 +++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/common.go | 1021 +++++++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/conn.go | 1379 +++++++++ .../tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_client.go | 666 ++++ .../gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_client_double.go | 667 ++++ .../tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_messages.go | 122 + .../tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_server.go | 764 +++++ .../gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_server_double.go | 745 +++++ .../tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_key_agreement.go | 451 +++ .../github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_support.go | 489 +++ .../tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/handshake_client.go | 897 ++++++ .../tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/handshake_messages.go | 1566 ++++++++++ .../tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/handshake_server.go | 805 +++++ .../tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/http_client.go | 84 + .../tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/key_agreement.go | 414 +++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/prf.go | 419 +++ .../tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/simple_round_trip.go | 87 + vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/ticket.go | 211 ++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/tls.go | 314 ++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2/p256.go | 1182 ++++++++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2/sm2.go | 683 +++++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2/utils.go | 60 + vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm3/ifile | 1 + vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm3/sm3.go | 259 ++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4/sm4.go | 492 +++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4/sm4_gcm.go | 355 +++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4/utils.go | 86 + vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/ber.go | 248 ++ .../github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/cert_pool.go | 229 ++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/pkcs1.go | 132 + vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/pkcs7.go | 1075 +++++++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/pkcs8.go | 371 +++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/utils.go | 295 ++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/verify.go | 568 ++++ vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/x509.go | 2609 ++++++++++++++++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/LICENSE | 27 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/PATENTS | 22 + .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go | 17 + .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s | 308 ++ .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go | 398 +++ .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go | 14 + .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go | 17 + .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s | 450 +++ .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go | 28 + .../x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s | 225 ++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go | 42 + .../chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305.go | 98 + .../chacha20poly1305_amd64.go | 87 + .../chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_amd64.s | 2696 +++++++++++++++++ .../chacha20poly1305_generic.go | 81 + .../chacha20poly1305_noasm.go | 16 + .../chacha20poly1305/xchacha20poly1305.go | 86 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1.go | 824 +++++ .../x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1/asn1.go | 46 + .../golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/builder.go | 350 +++ .../golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/string.go | 183 ++ .../x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go | 59 + .../x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_compat.go | 105 + .../x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_go120.go | 46 + .../x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/README | 7 + .../x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe.go | 416 +++ .../curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.go | 16 + .../curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.s | 379 +++ .../internal/field/fe_amd64_noasm.go | 12 + .../curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.go | 16 + .../curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.s | 43 + .../internal/field/fe_arm64_noasm.go | 12 + .../curve25519/internal/field/fe_generic.go | 264 ++ .../curve25519/internal/field/sync.checkpoint | 1 + .../crypto/curve25519/internal/field/sync.sh | 19 + .../x/crypto/internal/alias/alias.go | 32 + .../x/crypto/internal/alias/alias_purego.go | 35 + .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_compat.go | 40 + .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go | 22 + .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/mac_noasm.go | 10 + .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/poly1305.go | 99 + .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.go | 48 + .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.s | 109 + .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_generic.go | 309 ++ .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go | 48 + .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s | 182 ++ .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.go | 77 + .../x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.s | 504 +++ .../x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160.go | 124 + .../x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160block.go | 165 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/doc.go | 62 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/hashes.go | 97 + .../x/crypto/sha3/hashes_generic.go | 28 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf.go | 415 +++ .../golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf_amd64.go | 14 + .../golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf_amd64.s | 391 +++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/register.go | 19 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3.go | 197 ++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3_s390x.go | 289 ++ vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3_s390x.s | 34 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/shake.go | 172 ++ .../golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/shake_generic.go | 20 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor.go | 24 + .../golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor_generic.go | 28 + .../golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor_unaligned.go | 68 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_aix_ppc64.s | 17 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/byteorder.go | 66 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu.go | 290 ++ vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_aix.go | 33 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm.go | 73 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.go | 172 ++ vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.s | 31 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_arm64.go | 11 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_s390x.go | 21 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.go | 15 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_arm64.go | 11 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_s390x.go | 22 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.c | 37 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.go | 31 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux.go | 15 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm.go | 39 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm64.go | 111 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_mips64x.go | 22 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_noinit.go | 9 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_ppc64x.go | 30 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_s390x.go | 40 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.go | 12 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mips64x.go | 15 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mipsx.go | 11 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_netbsd_arm64.go | 173 ++ .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.go | 65 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.s | 11 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm.go | 9 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm64.go | 9 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_mips64x.go | 11 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_ppc64x.go | 12 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_riscv64.go | 11 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_ppc64x.go | 16 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_riscv64.go | 11 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.go | 172 ++ vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.s | 57 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_wasm.go | 17 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.go | 151 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.s | 26 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_zos.go | 10 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_zos_s390x.go | 25 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/endian_big.go | 10 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/endian_little.go | 10 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/hwcap_linux.go | 71 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/parse.go | 43 + .../x/sys/cpu/proc_cpuinfo_linux.go | 53 + vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv.go | 16 + .../x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv_go121.go | 18 + .../golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_gccgo.go | 26 + .../x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_ppc64_gc.go | 35 + vendor/modules.txt | 20 + 169 files changed, 34768 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) create mode 100644 pkg/common/transport/gm_round_tripper.go create mode 100644 pkg/common/transport/gm_round_tripper_test.go rename pkg/{utils => common/transport}/logroundtripper.go (97%) rename pkg/{utils => common/transport}/logroundtripper_test.go (90%) create mode 100644 pkg/common/transport/transport.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/LICENSE create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/alert.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/auth.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/auto_handshake_server.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/auto_switch_config.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/cipher_suites.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/common.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/conn.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_client.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_client_double.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_messages.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_server.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_server_double.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_key_agreement.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_support.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/handshake_client.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/handshake_messages.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/handshake_server.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/http_client.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/key_agreement.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/prf.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/simple_round_trip.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/ticket.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/tls.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2/p256.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2/sm2.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2/utils.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm3/ifile create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm3/sm3.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4/sm4.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4/sm4_gcm.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4/utils.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/ber.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/cert_pool.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/pkcs1.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/pkcs7.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/pkcs8.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/utils.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/verify.go create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/x509.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/LICENSE create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/PATENTS create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_amd64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_amd64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_generic.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_noasm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/xchacha20poly1305.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1/asn1.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/builder.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/string.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_compat.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_go120.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/README create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64_noasm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64_noasm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_generic.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/sync.checkpoint create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/sync.sh create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias_purego.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_compat.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/mac_noasm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/poly1305.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_generic.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160block.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/doc.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/hashes.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/hashes_generic.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf_amd64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf_amd64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/register.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3_s390x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3_s390x.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/shake.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/shake_generic.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor_generic.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor_unaligned.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_aix_ppc64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/byteorder.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_aix.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_s390x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_s390x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.c create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_mips64x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_noinit.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_ppc64x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_s390x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mips64x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mipsx.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_netbsd_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_mips64x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_ppc64x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_riscv64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_ppc64x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_riscv64.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_wasm.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.s create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_zos.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_zos_s390x.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/endian_big.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/endian_little.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/hwcap_linux.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/parse.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/proc_cpuinfo_linux.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv_go121.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_gccgo.go create mode 100644 vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_ppc64_gc.go diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod index 5818300c..32dfdac9 100644 --- a/go.mod +++ b/go.mod @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ require ( github.com/spf13/cobra v1.6.1 github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.5 github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.0 + github.com/tjfoc/gmsm v1.4.2-0.20220114090716-36b992c51540 golang.org/x/net v0.17.0 golang.org/x/sync v0.4.0 golang.org/x/sys v0.14.0 @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ require ( github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 // indirect github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 // indirect github.com/spf13/afero v1.8.0 // indirect + golang.org/x/crypto v0.14.0 // indirect golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.11.0 // indirect golang.org/x/term v0.14.0 // indirect golang.org/x/text v0.14.0 // indirect diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum index 47f23a95..8026b6a9 100644 --- a/go.sum +++ b/go.sum @@ -319,6 +319,8 @@ github.com/stretchr/testify v1.7.0/go.mod h1:6Fq8oRcR53rry900zMqJjRRixrwX3KX962/ github.com/stretchr/testify v1.7.1/go.mod h1:6Fq8oRcR53rry900zMqJjRRixrwX3KX962/h/Wwjteg= github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.0 h1:pSgiaMZlXftHpm5L7V1+rVB+AZJydKsMxsQBIJw4PKk= github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.0/go.mod h1:yNjHg4UonilssWZ8iaSj1OCr/vHnekPRkoO+kdMU+MU= +github.com/tjfoc/gmsm v1.4.2-0.20220114090716-36b992c51540 h1:Q7nxhP4rDahaXbLofX2fRX1dcEoQRvlJA0Hd2hGgh9k= +github.com/tjfoc/gmsm v1.4.2-0.20220114090716-36b992c51540/go.mod h1:j4INPkHWMrhJb38G+J6W4Tw0AbuN8Thu3PbdVYhVcTE= github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.1.25/go.mod h1:3hX8gzYuyVAZsxl0MRgGTJEmQBFcNTphYh9decYSb74= github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.1.27/go.mod h1:3hX8gzYuyVAZsxl0MRgGTJEmQBFcNTphYh9decYSb74= github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.1.32/go.mod h1:3hX8gzYuyVAZsxl0MRgGTJEmQBFcNTphYh9decYSb74= @@ -340,8 +342,11 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191011191535-87dc89f01550/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8U golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191206172530-e9b2fee46413/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20200622213623-75b288015ac9/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20200820211705-5c72a883971a/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto= +golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20201012173705-84dcc777aaee/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210421170649-83a5a9bb288b/go.mod h1:T9bdIzuCu7OtxOm1hfPfRQxPLYneinmdGuTeoZ9dtd4= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20211108221036-ceb1ce70b4fa/go.mod h1:GvvjBRRGRdwPK5ydBHafDWAxML/pGHZbMvKqRZ5+Abc= +golang.org/x/crypto v0.14.0 h1:wBqGXzWJW6m1XrIKlAH0Hs1JJ7+9KBwnIO8v66Q9cHc= +golang.org/x/crypto v0.14.0/go.mod h1:MVFd36DqK4CsrnJYDkBA3VC4m2GkXAM0PvzMCn4JQf4= golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190121172915-509febef88a4/go.mod h1:CJ0aWSM057203Lf6IL+f9T1iT9GByDxfZKAQTCR3kQA= golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190306152737-a1d7652674e8/go.mod h1:CJ0aWSM057203Lf6IL+f9T1iT9GByDxfZKAQTCR3kQA= golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190510132918-efd6b22b2522/go.mod h1:ZjyILWgesfNpC6sMxTJOJm9Kp84zZh5NQWvqDGG3Qr8= @@ -405,6 +410,7 @@ golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200520182314-0ba52f642ac2/go.mod h1:qpuaurCH72eLCgpAm/ golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200625001655-4c5254603344/go.mod h1:/O7V0waA8r7cgGh81Ro3o1hOxt32SMVPicZroKQ2sZA= golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200707034311-ab3426394381/go.mod h1:/O7V0waA8r7cgGh81Ro3o1hOxt32SMVPicZroKQ2sZA= golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200822124328-c89045814202/go.mod h1:/O7V0waA8r7cgGh81Ro3o1hOxt32SMVPicZroKQ2sZA= +golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20201010224723-4f7140c49acb/go.mod h1:sp8m0HH+o8qH0wwXwYZr8TS3Oi6o0r6Gce1SSxlDquU= golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20201021035429-f5854403a974/go.mod h1:sp8m0HH+o8qH0wwXwYZr8TS3Oi6o0r6Gce1SSxlDquU= golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20201031054903-ff519b6c9102/go.mod h1:sp8m0HH+o8qH0wwXwYZr8TS3Oi6o0r6Gce1SSxlDquU= golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20201209123823-ac852fbbde11/go.mod h1:m0MpNAwzfU5UDzcl9v0D8zg8gWTRqZa9RBIspLL5mdg= diff --git a/pkg/common/transport/gm_round_tripper.go b/pkg/common/transport/gm_round_tripper.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dfa91d6c --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/common/transport/gm_round_tripper.go @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +package transport + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/tls" + "net" + "net/http" + "time" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls" +) + +func NewGMRoundTripper(cfg *gmtls.Config) WrapperFunc { + return func(inner http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper { + return &http.Transport{ + Proxy: http.ProxyFromEnvironment, + TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{ + InsecureSkipVerify: cfg.InsecureSkipVerify, + }, + DialTLSContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { + dialer := &net.Dialer{} + conn, err := gmtls.DialWithDialer(dialer, network, addr, cfg) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return conn, nil + }, + DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { + dialer := &net.Dialer{ + Timeout: 10 * time.Second, + KeepAlive: 60 * time.Second, + } + conn, err := gmtls.DialWithDialer(dialer, network, addr, cfg) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return conn, nil + }, + TLSHandshakeTimeout: 15 * time.Second, + IdleConnTimeout: 30 * time.Second, + } + } +} diff --git a/pkg/common/transport/gm_round_tripper_test.go b/pkg/common/transport/gm_round_tripper_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..932d1800 --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/common/transport/gm_round_tripper_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +package transport + +import ( + "net/http" + "testing" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls" + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509" +) + +func TestNewGMRoundTripper(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + name string + description string + cfg *gmtls.Config + request *http.Request + expected bool + }{ + { + name: "test1", + description: "support both GM and no-GM encryption algorithm", + cfg: &gmtls.Config{ + InsecureSkipVerify: true, + }, + request: httpNewRequest("GET", "https://sm2test.ovssl.cn", nil, t), + expected: false, + }, + { + name: "test2", + description: "support both GM and no-GM encryption algorithm", + cfg: &gmtls.Config{ + GMSupport: &gmtls.GMSupport{WorkMode: gmtls.ModeAutoSwitch}, + InsecureSkipVerify: true, + }, + request: httpNewRequest("GET", "https://sm2test.ovssl.cn", nil, t), + expected: false, + }, + { + name: "test3", + description: "support both GM and no-GM encryption algorithm", + cfg: &gmtls.Config{ + GMSupport: &gmtls.GMSupport{WorkMode: gmtls.ModeGMSSLOnly}, + InsecureSkipVerify: true, + }, + request: httpNewRequest("GET", "https://sm2test.ovssl.cn", nil, t), + expected: false, + }, + { + name: "test4", + description: "support both GM and no-GM encryption algorithm", + cfg: &gmtls.Config{ + GMSupport: &gmtls.GMSupport{WorkMode: gmtls.ModeAutoSwitch}, + InsecureSkipVerify: true, + VerifyPeerCertificate: func(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error { + for _, v := range rawCerts { + _, err := x509.ParseCertificate(v) + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + return nil + }, + }, + request: httpNewRequest("GET", "https://sm2test.ovssl.cn", nil, t), + expected: false, + }, + { + name: "test5", + description: "support both GM and no-GM encryption algorithm", + cfg: &gmtls.Config{ + GMSupport: &gmtls.GMSupport{WorkMode: gmtls.ModeGMSSLOnly}, + InsecureSkipVerify: true, + VerifyPeerCertificate: func(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error { + for _, v := range rawCerts { + _, err := x509.ParseCertificate(v) + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + return nil + }, + }, + request: httpNewRequest("GET", "https://sm2test.ovssl.cn", nil, t), + expected: false, + }, + + { + name: "test6", + description: "don not support GM", + cfg: &gmtls.Config{ + InsecureSkipVerify: true, + }, + request: httpNewRequest("GET", "https://baidu.com", nil, t), + expected: true, + }, + { + name: "test7", + description: "don not support GM", + cfg: &gmtls.Config{ + GMSupport: &gmtls.GMSupport{WorkMode: gmtls.ModeAutoSwitch}, + InsecureSkipVerify: true, + }, + request: httpNewRequest("GET", "https://baidu.com", nil, t), + expected: true, + }, + { + name: "test8", + description: "don not support GM", + cfg: &gmtls.Config{ + GMSupport: &gmtls.GMSupport{WorkMode: gmtls.ModeGMSSLOnly}, + InsecureSkipVerify: true, + }, + request: httpNewRequest("GET", "https://baidu.com", nil, t), + expected: true, + }, + { + name: "test9", + description: "don not support GM", + cfg: &gmtls.Config{ + GMSupport: &gmtls.GMSupport{WorkMode: gmtls.ModeAutoSwitch}, + InsecureSkipVerify: true, + VerifyPeerCertificate: func(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error { + for _, v := range rawCerts { + _, err := x509.ParseCertificate(v) + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + return nil + }, + }, + request: httpNewRequest("GET", "https://baidu.com", nil, t), + expected: true, + }, + } + + for _, testCase := range tests { + t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) { + wrapper := NewGMRoundTripper(testCase.cfg) + wrappedTransport := wrapper(http.DefaultTransport) + client := &http.Client{ + Transport: wrappedTransport, + } + + resp, err := client.Do(testCase.request) + + if testCase.expected && err == nil { + t.Errorf("expected error but got none") + } + if !testCase.expected && err != nil { + t.Errorf("expected: %v, but got err: %v", testCase.expected, err) + } + + if resp != nil && resp.Body != nil { + resp.Body.Close() + } + }) + } +} diff --git a/pkg/utils/logroundtripper.go b/pkg/common/transport/logroundtripper.go similarity index 97% rename from pkg/utils/logroundtripper.go rename to pkg/common/transport/logroundtripper.go index afcd7af8..0f19ebff 100644 --- a/pkg/utils/logroundtripper.go +++ b/pkg/common/transport/logroundtripper.go @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ See the License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations under the License. */ -package utils +package transport import ( "bytes" @@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ var ( serverGRPCEndpointCallCounter uint64 ) +func NewLogRoundTripper() WrapperFunc { + return func(rt http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper { + return &LogRoundTripper{Rt: rt} + } +} + // LogRoundTripper satisfies the http.RoundTripper interface and is used to // customize the default http client RoundTripper to allow for logging. type LogRoundTripper struct { diff --git a/pkg/utils/logroundtripper_test.go b/pkg/common/transport/logroundtripper_test.go similarity index 90% rename from pkg/utils/logroundtripper_test.go rename to pkg/common/transport/logroundtripper_test.go index ed967a5d..bdfb4893 100644 --- a/pkg/utils/logroundtripper_test.go +++ b/pkg/common/transport/logroundtripper_test.go @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -package utils +package transport import ( "io" @@ -20,9 +20,9 @@ func TestRoundTrip(t *testing.T) { response: &http.Response{ Status: "200 OK", StatusCode: http.StatusOK, - Proto: "HTTP/1.1", - ProtoMajor: 1, - ProtoMinor: 1, + Proto: "HTTP/2.0", + ProtoMajor: 2, + ProtoMinor: 0, }, expected: true, description: "request and response are real entities", @@ -67,11 +67,11 @@ func TestRoundTrip(t *testing.T) { name: "test6", request: httpNewRequest("POST", "https://hub.docker.com/", nil, t), response: &http.Response{ - Status: "404 Not Found", - StatusCode: http.StatusNotFound, - Proto: "HTTP/1.1", - ProtoMajor: 1, - ProtoMinor: 1, + Status: "405 Method Not Allowed", + StatusCode: http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, + Proto: "HTTP/2.0", + ProtoMajor: 2, + ProtoMinor: 0, }, expected: true, description: "the method of request is POST and url is real entity", @@ -80,11 +80,11 @@ func TestRoundTrip(t *testing.T) { name: "test7", request: httpNewRequest("PUT", "https://hub.docker.com/", nil, t), response: &http.Response{ - Status: "404 Not Found", - StatusCode: http.StatusNotFound, - Proto: "HTTP/1.1", - ProtoMajor: 1, - ProtoMinor: 1, + Status: "405 Method Not Allowed", + StatusCode: http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, + Proto: "HTTP/2.0", + ProtoMajor: 2, + ProtoMinor: 0, }, expected: true, description: "the method of request is PUT and url is real entity", @@ -93,11 +93,11 @@ func TestRoundTrip(t *testing.T) { name: "test8", request: httpNewRequest("DELETE", "https://hub.docker.com/", nil, t), response: &http.Response{ - Status: "404 Not Found", - StatusCode: http.StatusNotFound, - Proto: "HTTP/1.1", - ProtoMajor: 1, - ProtoMinor: 1, + Status: "405 Method Not Allowed", + StatusCode: http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, + Proto: "HTTP/2.0", + ProtoMajor: 2, + ProtoMinor: 0, }, expected: true, description: "the method of request is DELETE and url is real entity", @@ -130,9 +130,9 @@ func TestRoundTrip(t *testing.T) { response: &http.Response{ Status: "200 OK", StatusCode: http.StatusOK, - Proto: "HTTP/1.1", - ProtoMajor: 1, - ProtoMinor: 1, + Proto: "HTTP/2.0", + ProtoMajor: 2, + ProtoMinor: 0, }, expected: true, description: "the ProtoMajor of customized response is 1", @@ -143,9 +143,9 @@ func TestRoundTrip(t *testing.T) { response: &http.Response{ Status: "200 OK", StatusCode: http.StatusOK, - Proto: "HTTP/1.1", - ProtoMajor: 1, - ProtoMinor: 1, + Proto: "HTTP/2.0", + ProtoMajor: 2, + ProtoMinor: 0, }, expected: true, description: "the ProtoMinor of customized response is 1", diff --git a/pkg/common/transport/transport.go b/pkg/common/transport/transport.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1456c203 --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/common/transport/transport.go @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +package transport + +import ( + "net/http" +) + +type WrapperFunc func(rt http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper + +func Wrappers(fns ...WrapperFunc) WrapperFunc { + if len(fns) == 0 { + return nil + } + // optimize the common case of wrapping a possibly nil tr wrapper + // with an additional wrapper + if len(fns) == 2 && fns[0] == nil { + return fns[1] + } + return func(rt http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper { + base := rt + for _, fn := range fns { + if fn != nil { + base = fn(base) + } + } + return base + } +} diff --git a/pkg/config/cloud.go b/pkg/config/cloud.go index 96653755..1fdb2b44 100644 --- a/pkg/config/cloud.go +++ b/pkg/config/cloud.go @@ -7,8 +7,9 @@ import ( "github.com/chnsz/golangsdk" "github.com/chnsz/golangsdk/openstack" + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls" - "github.com/huaweicloud/huaweicloud-csi-driver/pkg/utils" + "github.com/huaweicloud/huaweicloud-csi-driver/pkg/common/transport" ) const ( @@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ type CloudCredentials struct { SecretKey string `gcfg:"secret-key"` ProjectID string `gcfg:"project-id"` Idc bool `gcfg:"idc"` + GMSupport bool `gcfg:"gm-support"` } Vpc struct { @@ -82,8 +84,8 @@ func newServiceClient(cc *CloudCredentials, catalogName, region string) (*golang if !ok { return nil, fmt.Errorf("service type %s is invalid or not supportted", catalogName) } - client := cc.CloudClient + // update ProjectID and region in ProviderClient clone := new(golangsdk.ProviderClient) *clone = *client @@ -137,7 +139,7 @@ func (c *CloudCredentials) newCloudClient() error { return err } - transport := &http.Transport{ + defaultTransport := &http.Transport{ Proxy: http.ProxyFromEnvironment, TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{ MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12, @@ -145,19 +147,28 @@ func (c *CloudCredentials) newCloudClient() error { }, } + wrappers := []transport.WrapperFunc{ + transport.NewLogRoundTripper(), + } + if c.Global.GMSupport { + gmCfg := &gmtls.Config{ + GMSupport: &gmtls.GMSupport{WorkMode: gmtls.ModeAutoSwitch}, + InsecureSkipVerify: c.Global.Insecure, + } + wrappers = append(wrappers, transport.NewGMRoundTripper(gmCfg)) + } + client.HTTPClient = http.Client{ - Transport: &utils.LogRoundTripper{ - Rt: transport, - }, + Transport: transport.Wrappers(wrappers...)(defaultTransport), } - err = openstack.Authenticate(client, ao) - if err != nil { + if err := openstack.Authenticate(client, ao); err != nil { return err } c.CloudClient = client c.CloudClient.UserAgent.Prepend(UserAgent) + return nil } diff --git a/pkg/evs/server.go b/pkg/evs/server.go index 7793af03..eb9a03d1 100644 --- a/pkg/evs/server.go +++ b/pkg/evs/server.go @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import ( "google.golang.org/grpc" "k8s.io/klog/v2" + "github.com/huaweicloud/huaweicloud-csi-driver/pkg/common/transport" "github.com/huaweicloud/huaweicloud-csi-driver/pkg/utils" ) @@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ func (s *nonBlockingGRPCServer) serve(endpoint string, ids csi.IdentityServer, c } opts := []grpc.ServerOption{ - grpc.UnaryInterceptor(utils.LogGRPC), + grpc.UnaryInterceptor(transport.LogGRPC), } server := grpc.NewServer(opts...) s.server = server diff --git a/pkg/obs/server.go b/pkg/obs/server.go index 68e4fd33..6abd1c0e 100644 --- a/pkg/obs/server.go +++ b/pkg/obs/server.go @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import ( "google.golang.org/grpc" "k8s.io/klog/v2" + "github.com/huaweicloud/huaweicloud-csi-driver/pkg/common/transport" "github.com/huaweicloud/huaweicloud-csi-driver/pkg/utils" ) @@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ func (s *nonBlockingGRPCServer) serve(endpoint string, ids csi.IdentityServer, c } opts := []grpc.ServerOption{ - grpc.UnaryInterceptor(utils.LogGRPC), + grpc.UnaryInterceptor(transport.LogGRPC), } server := grpc.NewServer(opts...) s.server = server diff --git a/pkg/sfs/config/cloud.go b/pkg/sfs/config/cloud.go index c577201a..8abbf772 100644 --- a/pkg/sfs/config/cloud.go +++ b/pkg/sfs/config/cloud.go @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import ( "github.com/chnsz/golangsdk" "github.com/chnsz/golangsdk/openstack" - "github.com/huaweicloud/huaweicloud-csi-driver/pkg/utils" + "github.com/huaweicloud/huaweicloud-csi-driver/pkg/common/transport" ) const ( @@ -134,10 +134,10 @@ func (c *CloudCredentials) Validate() error { return err } - transport := &http.Transport{Proxy: http.ProxyFromEnvironment} + newTransport := &http.Transport{Proxy: http.ProxyFromEnvironment} client.HTTPClient = http.Client{ - Transport: &utils.LogRoundTripper{ - Rt: transport, + Transport: &transport.LogRoundTripper{ + Rt: newTransport, }, } diff --git a/pkg/sfs/server.go b/pkg/sfs/server.go index 43ab6fd8..7cebc950 100644 --- a/pkg/sfs/server.go +++ b/pkg/sfs/server.go @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import ( "google.golang.org/grpc" "k8s.io/klog" + "github.com/huaweicloud/huaweicloud-csi-driver/pkg/common/transport" "github.com/huaweicloud/huaweicloud-csi-driver/pkg/utils" ) @@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ func (s *nonBlockingGRPCServer) serve(endpoint string, ids csi.IdentityServer, c } opts := []grpc.ServerOption{ - grpc.UnaryInterceptor(utils.LogGRPC), + grpc.UnaryInterceptor(transport.LogGRPC), } server := grpc.NewServer(opts...) s.server = server diff --git a/pkg/sfsturbo/server.go b/pkg/sfsturbo/server.go index eba572d9..caf18fb3 100644 --- a/pkg/sfsturbo/server.go +++ b/pkg/sfsturbo/server.go @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import ( "google.golang.org/grpc" "k8s.io/klog/v2" + "github.com/huaweicloud/huaweicloud-csi-driver/pkg/common/transport" "github.com/huaweicloud/huaweicloud-csi-driver/pkg/utils" ) @@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ func (s *nonBlockingGRPCServer) serve(endpoint string, ids csi.IdentityServer, c } opts := []grpc.ServerOption{ - grpc.UnaryInterceptor(utils.LogGRPC), + grpc.UnaryInterceptor(transport.LogGRPC), } server := grpc.NewServer(opts...) s.server = server diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/LICENSE b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/LICENSE new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8dada3ed --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/LICENSE @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ + Apache License + Version 2.0, January 2004 + http://www.apache.org/licenses/ + + TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION + + 1. Definitions. + + "License" shall mean the terms and conditions for use, reproduction, + and distribution as defined by Sections 1 through 9 of this document. + + "Licensor" shall mean the copyright owner or entity authorized by + the copyright owner that is granting the License. + + "Legal Entity" shall mean the union of the acting entity and all + other entities that control, are controlled by, or are under common + control with that entity. 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However, in accepting such obligations, You may act only + on Your own behalf and on Your sole responsibility, not on behalf + of any other Contributor, and only if You agree to indemnify, + defend, and hold each Contributor harmless for any liability + incurred by, or claims asserted against, such Contributor by reason + of your accepting any such warranty or additional liability. + + END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS + + APPENDIX: How to apply the Apache License to your work. + + To apply the Apache License to your work, attach the following + boilerplate notice, with the fields enclosed by brackets "{}" + replaced with your own identifying information. (Don't include + the brackets!) The text should be enclosed in the appropriate + comment syntax for the file format. We also recommend that a + file or class name and description of purpose be included on the + same "printed page" as the copyright notice for easier + identification within third-party archives. + + Copyright {yyyy} {name of copyright owner} + + Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + + Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + limitations under the License. diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/alert.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/alert.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5ca584f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/alert.go @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package gmtls + +import "strconv" + +type alert uint8 + +const ( + // alert level + alertLevelWarning = 1 + alertLevelError = 2 +) + +const ( + alertCloseNotify alert = 0 + alertUnexpectedMessage alert = 10 + alertBadRecordMAC alert = 20 + alertDecryptionFailed alert = 21 + alertRecordOverflow alert = 22 + alertDecompressionFailure alert = 30 + alertHandshakeFailure alert = 40 + alertBadCertificate alert = 42 + alertUnsupportedCertificate alert = 43 + alertCertificateRevoked alert = 44 + alertCertificateExpired alert = 45 + alertCertificateUnknown alert = 46 + alertIllegalParameter alert = 47 + alertUnknownCA alert = 48 + alertAccessDenied alert = 49 + alertDecodeError alert = 50 + alertDecryptError alert = 51 + alertProtocolVersion alert = 70 + alertInsufficientSecurity alert = 71 + alertInternalError alert = 80 + alertInappropriateFallback alert = 86 + alertUserCanceled alert = 90 + alertNoRenegotiation alert = 100 + alertNoApplicationProtocol alert = 120 + //GMT0024 + alertUnspporttedSite2Site alert = 200 + alertNoArea alert = 201 + alertUnspportedAreaType alert = 202 + alertBadIBCParam alert = 203 + alertUnspportedIBCParam alert = 204 + alertIdentityNeed alert = 205 +) + +var alertText = map[alert]string{ + alertCloseNotify: "close notify", + alertUnexpectedMessage: "unexpected message", + alertBadRecordMAC: "bad record MAC", + alertDecryptionFailed: "decryption failed", + alertRecordOverflow: "record overflow", + alertDecompressionFailure: "decompression failure", + alertHandshakeFailure: "handshake failure", + alertBadCertificate: "bad certificate", + alertUnsupportedCertificate: "unsupported certificate", + alertCertificateRevoked: "revoked certificate", + alertCertificateExpired: "expired certificate", + alertCertificateUnknown: "unknown certificate", + alertIllegalParameter: "illegal parameter", + alertUnknownCA: "unknown certificate authority", + alertAccessDenied: "access denied", + alertDecodeError: "error decoding message", + alertDecryptError: "error decrypting message", + alertProtocolVersion: "protocol version not supported", + alertInsufficientSecurity: "insufficient security level", + alertInternalError: "internal error", + alertInappropriateFallback: "inappropriate fallback", + alertUserCanceled: "user canceled", + alertNoRenegotiation: "no renegotiation", + alertNoApplicationProtocol: "no application protocol", + //GMT0024 + alertUnspporttedSite2Site: "不支持site2site", + alertNoArea : "没有保护域", + alertUnspportedAreaType : "不支持的保护域类型", + alertBadIBCParam : "接收到一个无效的ibc公共参数", + alertUnspportedIBCParam : "不支持ibc参数中定义的信息", + alertIdentityNeed : "缺少对方的ibc标识", +} + +func (e alert) String() string { + s, ok := alertText[e] + if ok { + return "tls: " + s + } + return "tls: alert(" + strconv.Itoa(int(e)) + ")" +} + +func (e alert) Error() string { + return e.String() +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/auth.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/auth.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f6852e69 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/auth.go @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package gmtls + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/rsa" + "encoding/asn1" + "errors" + "fmt" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2" +) + +// pickSignatureAlgorithm selects a signature algorithm that is compatible with +// the given public key and the list of algorithms from the peer and this side. +// The lists of signature algorithms (peerSigAlgs and ourSigAlgs) are ignored +// for tlsVersion < VersionTLS12. +// +// The returned SignatureScheme codepoint is only meaningful for TLS 1.2, +// previous TLS versions have a fixed hash function. +func pickSignatureAlgorithm(pubkey crypto.PublicKey, peerSigAlgs, ourSigAlgs []SignatureScheme, tlsVersion uint16) (sigAlg SignatureScheme, sigType uint8, hashFunc crypto.Hash, err error) { + if tlsVersion < VersionTLS12 || len(peerSigAlgs) == 0 { + // For TLS 1.1 and before, the signature algorithm could not be + // negotiated and the hash is fixed based on the signature type. + // For TLS 1.2, if the client didn't send signature_algorithms + // extension then we can assume that it supports SHA1. See + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 + switch pubkey.(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey: + if tlsVersion < VersionTLS12 { + return 0, signaturePKCS1v15, crypto.MD5SHA1, nil + } else { + return PKCS1WithSHA1, signaturePKCS1v15, crypto.SHA1, nil + } + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + return ECDSAWithSHA1, signatureECDSA, crypto.SHA1, nil + case *sm2.PublicKey: + return SM2WITHSM3, signatureSM2, crypto.SHA1, nil + default: + return 0, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported public key: %T", pubkey) + } + } + for _, sigAlg := range peerSigAlgs { + if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg, ourSigAlgs) { + continue + } + hashAlg, err := lookupTLSHash(sigAlg) + if err != nil { + panic("tls: supported signature algorithm has an unknown hash function") + } + sigType := signatureFromSignatureScheme(sigAlg) + switch pubkey.(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey: + if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS { + return sigAlg, sigType, hashAlg, nil + } + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + if sigType == signatureECDSA { + return sigAlg, sigType, hashAlg, nil + } + case *sm2.PublicKey: + if sigType == signatureECDSA { + return sigAlg, sigType, hashAlg, nil + } + default: + return 0, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported public key: %T", pubkey) + } + } + return 0, 0, 0, errors.New("tls: peer doesn't support any common signature algorithms") +} + +// verifyHandshakeSignature verifies a signature against pre-hashed handshake +// contents. +func verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType uint8, pubkey crypto.PublicKey, hashFunc crypto.Hash, digest, sig []byte) error { + switch sigType { + case signatureECDSA: + pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey) + if !ok { + return errors.New("tls: ECDSA signing requires a ECDSA public key") + } + ecdsaSig := new(ecdsaSignature) + if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(sig, ecdsaSig); err != nil { + return err + } + if ecdsaSig.R.Sign() <= 0 || ecdsaSig.S.Sign() <= 0 { + return errors.New("tls: ECDSA signature contained zero or negative values") + } + if pubKey.Curve == sm2.P256Sm2() { + sm2Public := sm2.PublicKey{ + Curve: pubKey.Curve, + X: pubKey.X, + Y: pubKey.Y, + } + if !sm2Public.Verify(digest, sig) { + return errors.New("tls: SM2 verification failure") + } + } else if !ecdsa.Verify(pubKey, digest, ecdsaSig.R, ecdsaSig.S) { + return errors.New("tls: ECDSA verification failure") + } + case signaturePKCS1v15: + pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey) + if !ok { + return errors.New("tls: RSA signing requires a RSA public key") + } + if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pubKey, hashFunc, digest, sig); err != nil { + return err + } + case signatureRSAPSS: + pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey) + if !ok { + return errors.New("tls: RSA signing requires a RSA public key") + } + signOpts := &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash} + if err := rsa.VerifyPSS(pubKey, hashFunc, digest, sig, signOpts); err != nil { + return err + } + case signatureSM2: + pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*sm2.PublicKey) + if !ok { + return errors.New("tls: SM2 signing requires a SM2 public key") + } + if ok := pubKey.Verify(digest, sig); !ok { + return errors.New("verify sm2 signature error") + } + default: + return errors.New("tls: unknown signature algorithm") + } + return nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/auto_handshake_server.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/auto_handshake_server.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eac3ab12 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/auto_handshake_server.go @@ -0,0 +1,533 @@ +// GMTLS 和 TLS 自动切换 + +package gmtls + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/rsa" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "sync/atomic" + "time" +) + +// 服务服务端的混合握手 +// 根据客户端协议类型自动选择GMSSL协议或TLS系列协议 +func (c *Conn) serverHandshakeAutoSwitch() error { + // If this is the first server handshake, we generate a random key to + // encrypt the tickets with. + c.config.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { c.config.serverInit(nil) }) + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg) + if !ok { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError("Client Hello Msg", msg) + } + + // + // 根据客户端Hello消息的版本选择使用的 + // GMSSL协议 或 TLS 协议 + // + switch clientHello.vers { + case VersionGMSSL: + // 构造 国密SSL握手 状态上下文 + hs := &serverHandshakeStateGM{ + c: c, + clientHello: clientHello, + } + // 处理读取到 客户端Hello 消息 + isResume, err := processClientHelloGM(c, hs) + if err != nil { + return err + } + // 运行 GMSSL 握手流程 + return runServerHandshakeGM(c, hs, isResume) + case VersionSSL30, VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11, VersionTLS12: + // SSL v3.0 - TLS 1.3 + // 构造 TLS 状态上下文 + hs := &serverHandshakeState{ + c: c, + clientHello: clientHello, + } + // 处理读取到 客户端Hello 消息 + isResume, err := processClientHello(c, hs) + if err != nil { + return err + } + // 运行 TLS 握手流程 + return runServerHandshake(c, hs, isResume) + default: + _ = c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: mix server handshake unsupport client protocol version: %X", clientHello.vers) + } +} + +// 处理 GMSSL 客户端 Hello消息 +// Code segment copy from: gmtls/gm_handshake_server_double.go:114 +// +// c: 连接对象 +// hs: GMSSL服务端握手状态 +// +// return: +// 是否重用会话，true/false 重用/不重用 +// 错误信息 +func processClientHelloGM(c *Conn, hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) (isResume bool, err error) { + if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil { + if newConfig, err := c.config.GetConfigForClient(hs.clientHelloInfo()); err != nil { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, err + } else if newConfig != nil { + newConfig.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { newConfig.serverInit(c.config) }) + c.config = newConfig + } + } + var ok bool + c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(hs.clientHello.vers) + if !ok { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) + return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered an unsupported, maximum protocol version of %x", hs.clientHello.vers) + } + c.haveVers = true + + hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg) + + foundCompression := false + // We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it. + for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods { + if compression == compressionNone { + foundCompression = true + break + } + } + + if !foundCompression { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections") + } + + hs.hello.vers = c.vers + hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32) + _, err = io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hs.hello.random) + if err != nil { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, err + } + // Edit: 根据 GMT 0024 6.4.4.1.1 Client Hello 消息 b) random 描述 + // 客户端产生的随机信息，其内容包括时钟和随机数。 + gmtRandom(&(hs.hello.random)) + + if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension") + } + + hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported + hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone + if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 { + c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName + } + + if len(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) > 0 { + if selectedProto, fallback := mutualProtocol(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, c.config.NextProtos); !fallback { + hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto + c.clientProtocol = selectedProto + } + } else { + // Although sending an empty NPN extension is reasonable, Firefox has + // had a bug around this. Best to send nothing at all if + // c.config.NextProtos is empty. See + // https://golang.org/issue/5445. + if hs.clientHello.nextProtoNeg && len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0 { + hs.hello.nextProtoNeg = true + hs.hello.nextProtos = c.config.NextProtos + } + } + + // Edit: + // 通过获取证书方法获取 签名证书(含私钥) + // 通过获取证书方法获取 加密证书(含私钥) + sigCert, err := c.config.getCertificate(hs.clientHelloInfo()) + if err != nil { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, err + } + encCert, err := c.config.GetKECertificate(hs.clientHelloInfo()) + if err != nil { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, err + } + // GMT0024 + if encCert == nil || sigCert == nil { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: amount of server certificates must be greater than 2, which will sign and encipher respectively") + } + // 第1张证书为 签名证书、第2张为加密证书（用于密钥交换） + hs.cert = []Certificate{*sigCert, *encCert} + + if hs.clientHello.scts { + hs.hello.scts = hs.cert[0].SignedCertificateTimestamps + } + + if hs.checkForResumption() { + return true, nil + } + + var preferenceList, supportedList []uint16 + if c.config.PreferServerCipherSuites { + preferenceList = getCipherSuites(c.config) + supportedList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites + } else { + preferenceList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites + supportedList = getCipherSuites(c.config) + } + + for _, id := range preferenceList { + if hs.setCipherSuite(id, supportedList, c.vers) { + break + } + } + + if hs.suite == nil { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server") + } + + // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7507. + for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites { + if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV { + // The client is doing a fallback connection. + if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxVersion() { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback) + return false, errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback") + } + break + } + } + return false, nil +} + +// 运行GMSSL服务端握手流程 +// Code segment copy from: gmtls/gm_handshake_server_double.go:39 +// +// c: 连接对象 +// hs: GMSSL服务端握手状态 +// isResume: 是否重新启用会话 +// +// return: +// 错误信息 +func runServerHandshakeGM(c *Conn, hs *serverHandshakeStateGM, isResume bool) error { + // For an overview of TLS handshaking, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.3 + c.buffering = true + if isResume { + // The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake. + if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + // ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the + // ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session + // ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent. + if hs.hello.ticketSupported { + if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false + if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil { + return err + } + c.didResume = true + } else { + // The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't + // valid so we do a full handshake. + if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true + c.buffering = true + if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random) + atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1) + + return nil +} + +// 处理 TLS 客户端 Hello消息 +// Code segment copy from: gmtls/handshake_server.go:122 +// +// c: 连接对象 +// hs: TLS服务端握手状态 +// +// return: +// 是否重用会话，true/false 重用/不重用 +// 错误信息 +func processClientHello(c *Conn, hs *serverHandshakeState) (bool, error) { + if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil { + if newConfig, err := c.config.GetConfigForClient(hs.clientHelloInfo()); err != nil { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, err + } else if newConfig != nil { + newConfig.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { newConfig.serverInit(c.config) }) + c.config = newConfig + } + } + var ok bool + var err error + c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(hs.clientHello.vers) + if !ok { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) + return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered an unsupported, maximum protocol version of %x", hs.clientHello.vers) + } + c.haveVers = true + + hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg) + + supportedCurve := false + preferredCurves := c.config.curvePreferences() +Curves: + for _, curve := range hs.clientHello.supportedCurves { + for _, supported := range preferredCurves { + if supported == curve { + supportedCurve = true + break Curves + } + } + } + + supportedPointFormat := false + for _, pointFormat := range hs.clientHello.supportedPoints { + if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed { + supportedPointFormat = true + break + } + } + hs.ellipticOk = supportedCurve && supportedPointFormat + + foundCompression := false + // We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it. + for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods { + if compression == compressionNone { + foundCompression = true + break + } + } + + if !foundCompression { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections") + } + + hs.hello.vers = c.vers + hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32) + _, err = io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hs.hello.random) + if err != nil { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, err + } + + if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension") + } + + hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported + hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone + if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 { + c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName + } + + if len(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) > 0 { + if selectedProto, fallback := mutualProtocol(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, c.config.NextProtos); !fallback { + hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto + c.clientProtocol = selectedProto + } + } else { + // Although sending an empty NPN extension is reasonable, Firefox has + // had a bug around this. Best to send nothing at all if + // c.config.NextProtos is empty. See + // https://golang.org/issue/5445. + if hs.clientHello.nextProtoNeg && len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0 { + hs.hello.nextProtoNeg = true + hs.hello.nextProtos = c.config.NextProtos + } + } + + hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(hs.clientHelloInfo()) + if err != nil { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, err + } + if hs.clientHello.scts { + hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps + } + + if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok { + switch priv.Public().(type) { + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + hs.ecdsaOk = true + case *rsa.PublicKey: + hs.rsaSignOk = true + default: + _ = c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signing key type (%T)", priv.Public()) + } + } + if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok { + switch priv.Public().(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey: + hs.rsaDecryptOk = true + default: + _ = c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported decryption key type (%T)", priv.Public()) + } + } + + if hs.checkForResumption() { + return true, nil + } + + var preferenceList, supportedList []uint16 + if c.config.PreferServerCipherSuites { + preferenceList = c.config.cipherSuites() + supportedList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites + } else { + preferenceList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites + supportedList = c.config.cipherSuites() + } + + for _, id := range preferenceList { + if hs.setCipherSuite(id, supportedList, c.vers) { + break + } + } + + if hs.suite == nil { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server") + } + + // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7507. + for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites { + if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV { + // The client is doing a fallback connection. + if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxVersion() { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback) + return false, errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback") + } + break + } + } + + return false, nil +} + +// 运行TLS服务端握手流程 +// Code segment copy from: gmtls/handshake_server.go:51 +// +// c: 连接对象 +// hs: TLS服务端握手状态 +// isResume: 是否重新启用会话 +// +// return: +// 错误信息 +func runServerHandshake(c *Conn, hs *serverHandshakeState, isResume bool) error { + // For an overview of TLS handshaking, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.3 + c.buffering = true + if isResume { + // The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake. + if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + // ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the + // ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session + // ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent. + if hs.hello.ticketSupported { + if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false + if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil { + return err + } + c.didResume = true + } else { + // The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't + // valid so we do a full handshake. + if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true + c.buffering = true + if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random) + atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1) + return nil +} + +// 国密类型的随机数 4 byte unix time 28 byte random +func gmtRandom(raw *[]byte) uint32 { + rd := *raw + unixTime := time.Now().Unix() + rd[0] = uint8(unixTime >> 24) + rd[1] = uint8(unixTime >> 16) + rd[2] = uint8(unixTime >> 8) + rd[3] = uint8(unixTime) + return uint32(unixTime) +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/auto_switch_config.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/auto_switch_config.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5e4a419f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/auto_switch_config.go @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +package gmtls + +// NewBasicAutoSwitchConfig 返回一个实现了GMSSL/TLS自动切换的配置 +// +// sm2SigCert: SM2 签名密钥对、证书 +// sm2EncCert: SM2 加密密钥对、证书 +// stdCert: RSA/ECC 标准的密钥对、证书 +// +// return: 最基础的Config对象 +func NewBasicAutoSwitchConfig(sm2SigCert, sm2EncCert, stdCert *Certificate) (*Config, error) { + fncGetSignCertKeypair := func(info *ClientHelloInfo) (*Certificate, error) { + gmFlag := false + // 检查支持协议中是否包含GMSSL + for _, v := range info.SupportedVersions { + if v == VersionGMSSL { + gmFlag = true + break + } + } + + if gmFlag { + return sm2SigCert, nil + } else { + return stdCert, nil + } + } + + fncGetEncCertKeypair := func(info *ClientHelloInfo) (*Certificate, error) { + return sm2EncCert, nil + } + support := NewGMSupport() + support.EnableMixMode() + return &Config{ + GMSupport: support, + GetCertificate: fncGetSignCertKeypair, + GetKECertificate: fncGetEncCertKeypair, + }, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/cipher_suites.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/cipher_suites.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ed3f3188 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/cipher_suites.go @@ -0,0 +1,406 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package gmtls + +import ( + "crypto/aes" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/des" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/rc4" + "crypto/sha1" + "crypto/sha256" + "hash" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305" +) + +// a keyAgreement implements the client and server side of a TLS key agreement +// protocol by generating and processing key exchange messages. +type keyAgreement interface { + // On the server side, the first two methods are called in order. + + // In the case that the key agreement protocol doesn't use a + // ServerKeyExchange message, generateServerKeyExchange can return nil, + // nil. + generateServerKeyExchange(*Config, *Certificate, *Certificate, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) + processClientKeyExchange(*Config, *Certificate, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, uint16) ([]byte, error) + + // On the client side, the next two methods are called in order. + + // This method may not be called if the server doesn't send a + // ServerKeyExchange message. + processServerKeyExchange(*Config, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate, *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error + generateClientKeyExchange(*Config, *clientHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) +} + +const ( + // suiteECDH indicates that the cipher suite involves elliptic curve + // Diffie-Hellman. This means that it should only be selected when the + // client indicates that it supports ECC with a curve and point format + // that we're happy with. + suiteECDHE = 1 << iota + // suiteECDSA indicates that the cipher suite involves an ECDSA + // signature and therefore may only be selected when the server's + // certificate is ECDSA. If this is not set then the cipher suite is + // RSA based. + suiteECDSA + // suiteTLS12 indicates that the cipher suite should only be advertised + // and accepted when using TLS 1.2. + suiteTLS12 + // suiteSHA384 indicates that the cipher suite uses SHA384 as the + // handshake hash. + suiteSHA384 + // suiteDefaultOff indicates that this cipher suite is not included by + // default. + suiteDefaultOff +) + +// A cipherSuite is a specific combination of key agreement, cipher and MAC +// function. All cipher suites currently assume RSA key agreement. +type cipherSuite struct { + id uint16 + // the lengths, in bytes, of the key material needed for each component. + keyLen int + macLen int + ivLen int + ka func(version uint16) keyAgreement + // flags is a bitmask of the suite* values, above. + flags int + cipher func(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} + mac func(version uint16, macKey []byte) macFunction + aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD +} + +var cipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{ + // Ciphersuite order is chosen so that ECDHE comes before plain RSA and + // AEADs are the top preference. + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteTLS12 | suiteDefaultOff, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteDefaultOff, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, rsaKA, 0, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil}, + + // RC4-based cipher suites are disabled by default. + {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, rsaKA, suiteDefaultOff, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteDefaultOff, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteDefaultOff, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil}, +} + +func cipherRC4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} { + cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(key) + return cipher +} + +func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} { + block, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key) + if isRead { + return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv) + } + return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv) +} + +func cipherAES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} { + block, _ := aes.NewCipher(key) + if isRead { + return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv) + } + return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv) +} + +// macSHA1 returns a macFunction for the given protocol version. +func macSHA1(version uint16, key []byte) macFunction { + if version == VersionSSL30 { + mac := ssl30MAC{ + h: sha1.New(), + key: make([]byte, len(key)), + } + copy(mac.key, key) + return mac + } + return tls10MAC{hmac.New(newConstantTimeHash(sha1.New), key)} +} + +// macSHA256 returns a SHA-256 based MAC. These are only supported in TLS 1.2 +// so the given version is ignored. +func macSHA256(version uint16, key []byte) macFunction { + return tls10MAC{hmac.New(sha256.New, key)} +} + +type macFunction interface { + Size() int + MAC(digestBuf, seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte +} + +type aead interface { + cipher.AEAD + + // explicitIVLen returns the number of bytes used by the explicit nonce + // that is included in the record. This is eight for older AEADs and + // zero for modern ones. + explicitNonceLen() int +} + +// fixedNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD and prefixes a fixed portion of the nonce to +// each call. +type fixedNonceAEAD struct { + // nonce contains the fixed part of the nonce in the first four bytes. + nonce [12]byte + aead cipher.AEAD +} + +func (f *fixedNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return 8 } +func (f *fixedNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() } +func (f *fixedNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return 8 } + +func (f *fixedNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { + copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce) + return f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonce[:], plaintext, additionalData) +} + +func (f *fixedNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { + copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce) + return f.aead.Open(out, f.nonce[:], plaintext, additionalData) +} + +// xoredNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD by XORing in a fixed pattern to the nonce +// before each call. +type xorNonceAEAD struct { + nonceMask [12]byte + aead cipher.AEAD +} + +func (f *xorNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return 8 } +func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() } +func (f *xorNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return 0 } + +func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { + for i, b := range nonce { + f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b + } + result := f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonceMask[:], plaintext, additionalData) + for i, b := range nonce { + f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b + } + + return result +} + +func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { + for i, b := range nonce { + f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b + } + result, err := f.aead.Open(out, f.nonceMask[:], plaintext, additionalData) + for i, b := range nonce { + f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b + } + + return result, err +} + +func aeadAESGCM(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD { + aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + + ret := &fixedNonceAEAD{aead: aead} + copy(ret.nonce[:], fixedNonce) + return ret +} + +func aeadChaCha20Poly1305(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD { + aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(key) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + + ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead} + copy(ret.nonceMask[:], fixedNonce) + return ret +} + +// ssl30MAC implements the SSLv3 MAC function, as defined in +// www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft302.txt section 5.2.3.1 +type ssl30MAC struct { + h hash.Hash + key []byte +} + +func (s ssl30MAC) Size() int { + return s.h.Size() +} + +var ssl30Pad1 = [48]byte{0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36} + +var ssl30Pad2 = [48]byte{0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c} + +// MAC does not offer constant timing guarantees for SSL v3.0, since it's deemed +// useless considering the similar, protocol-level POODLE vulnerability. +func (s ssl30MAC) MAC(digestBuf, seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte { + padLength := 48 + if s.h.Size() == 20 { + padLength = 40 + } + + s.h.Reset() + s.h.Write(s.key) + s.h.Write(ssl30Pad1[:padLength]) + s.h.Write(seq) + s.h.Write(header[:1]) + s.h.Write(header[3:5]) + s.h.Write(data) + digestBuf = s.h.Sum(digestBuf[:0]) + + s.h.Reset() + s.h.Write(s.key) + s.h.Write(ssl30Pad2[:padLength]) + s.h.Write(digestBuf) + return s.h.Sum(digestBuf[:0]) +} + +type constantTimeHash interface { + hash.Hash + ConstantTimeSum(b []byte) []byte +} + +// cthWrapper wraps any hash.Hash that implements ConstantTimeSum, and replaces +// with that all calls to Sum. It's used to obtain a ConstantTimeSum-based HMAC. +type cthWrapper struct { + h constantTimeHash +} + +func (c *cthWrapper) Size() int { return c.h.Size() } +func (c *cthWrapper) BlockSize() int { return c.h.BlockSize() } +func (c *cthWrapper) Reset() { c.h.Reset() } +func (c *cthWrapper) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return c.h.Write(p) } +func (c *cthWrapper) Sum(b []byte) []byte { return c.h.ConstantTimeSum(b) } + +func newConstantTimeHash(h func() hash.Hash) func() hash.Hash { + return func() hash.Hash { + return &cthWrapper{h().(constantTimeHash)} + } +} + +// tls10MAC implements the TLS 1.0 MAC function. RFC 2246, section 6.2.3. +type tls10MAC struct { + h hash.Hash +} + +func (s tls10MAC) Size() int { + return s.h.Size() +} + +// MAC is guaranteed to take constant time, as long as +// len(seq)+len(header)+len(data)+len(extra) is constant. extra is not fed into +// the MAC, but is only provided to make the timing profile constant. +func (s tls10MAC) MAC(digestBuf, seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte { + s.h.Reset() + s.h.Write(seq) + s.h.Write(header) + s.h.Write(data) + res := s.h.Sum(digestBuf[:0]) + if extra != nil { + s.h.Write(extra) + } + return res +} + +func rsaKA(version uint16) keyAgreement { + return rsaKeyAgreement{} +} + +func ecdheECDSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement { + return &ecdheKeyAgreement{ + isRSA: false, + version: version, + } +} + +func ecdheRSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement { + return &ecdheKeyAgreement{ + isRSA: true, + version: version, + } +} + +// mutualCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite given a list of supported +// ciphersuites and the id requested by the peer. +func mutualCipherSuite(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite { + for _, id := range have { + if id == want { + for _, suite := range cipherSuites { + if suite.id == want { + return suite + } + } + return nil + } + } + return nil +} + +// A list of cipher suite IDs that are, or have been, implemented by this +// package. +// +// Taken from https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml +const ( + TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0005 + TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000a + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x002f + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0035 + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003c + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x009c + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x009d + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc007 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc009 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc00a + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc011 + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc012 + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc013 + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc014 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc023 + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc027 + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02f + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02b + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc030 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc02c + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 uint16 = 0xcca8 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 uint16 = 0xcca9 + + // TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV isn't a standard cipher suite but an indicator + // that the client is doing version fallback. See + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7507. + TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV uint16 = 0x5600 +) diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/common.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/common.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f02c243a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/common.go @@ -0,0 +1,1021 @@ +/*Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package gmtls + +import ( + "container/list" + "crypto" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/sha512" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "math/big" + "net" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509" +) + +const ( + VersionSSL30 = 0x0300 + VersionTLS10 = 0x0301 + VersionTLS11 = 0x0302 + VersionTLS12 = 0x0303 +) + +const ( + maxPlaintext = 16384 // maximum plaintext payload length + maxCiphertext = 16384 + 2048 // maximum ciphertext payload length + recordHeaderLen = 5 // record header length + maxHandshake = 65536 // maximum handshake we support (protocol max is 16 MB) + maxWarnAlertCount = 5 // maximum number of consecutive warning alerts + + minVersion = VersionGMSSL + maxVersion = VersionTLS12 +) + +// TLS record types. +type recordType uint8 + +const ( + recordTypeChangeCipherSpec recordType = 20 + recordTypeAlert recordType = 21 + recordTypeHandshake recordType = 22 + recordTypeApplicationData recordType = 23 +) + +// TLS handshake message types. +const ( + typeHelloRequest uint8 = 0 + typeClientHello uint8 = 1 + typeServerHello uint8 = 2 + typeNewSessionTicket uint8 = 4 + typeCertificate uint8 = 11 + typeServerKeyExchange uint8 = 12 + typeCertificateRequest uint8 = 13 + typeServerHelloDone uint8 = 14 + typeCertificateVerify uint8 = 15 + typeClientKeyExchange uint8 = 16 + typeFinished uint8 = 20 + typeCertificateStatus uint8 = 22 + typeNextProtocol uint8 = 67 // Not IANA assigned +) + +// TLS compression types. +const ( + compressionNone uint8 = 0 +) + +// TLS extension numbers +const ( + extensionServerName uint16 = 0 + extensionStatusRequest uint16 = 5 + extensionSupportedCurves uint16 = 10 + extensionSupportedPoints uint16 = 11 + extensionSignatureAlgorithms uint16 = 13 + extensionALPN uint16 = 16 + extensionSCT uint16 = 18 // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-6 + extensionSessionTicket uint16 = 35 + extensionNextProtoNeg uint16 = 13172 // not IANA assigned + extensionRenegotiationInfo uint16 = 0xff01 +) + +// TLS signaling cipher suite values +const ( + scsvRenegotiation uint16 = 0x00ff +) + +// CurveID is the type of a TLS identifier for an elliptic curve. See +// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-8 +type CurveID uint16 + +const ( + CurveP256 CurveID = 23 + CurveP384 CurveID = 24 + CurveP521 CurveID = 25 + X25519 CurveID = 29 +) + +// TLS Elliptic Curve Point Formats +// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-9 +const ( + pointFormatUncompressed uint8 = 0 +) + +// TLS CertificateStatusType (RFC 3546) +const ( + statusTypeOCSP uint8 = 1 +) + +// Certificate types (for certificateRequestMsg) +const ( + certTypeRSASign = 1 // A certificate containing an RSA key + certTypeDSSSign = 2 // A certificate containing a DSA key + certTypeRSAFixedDH = 3 // A certificate containing a static DH key + certTypeDSSFixedDH = 4 // A certificate containing a static DH key + + // See RFC 4492 sections 3 and 5.5. + certTypeECDSASign = 64 // A certificate containing an ECDSA-capable public key, signed with ECDSA. + certTypeRSAFixedECDH = 65 // A certificate containing an ECDH-capable public key, signed with RSA. + certTypeECDSAFixedECDH = 66 // A certificate containing an ECDH-capable public key, signed with ECDSA. + + // Rest of these are reserved by the TLS spec +) + +// Signature algorithms (for internal signaling use). Starting at 16 to avoid overlap with +// TLS 1.2 codepoints (RFC 5246, section A.4.1), with which these have nothing to do. +const ( + signaturePKCS1v15 uint8 = iota + 16 + signatureECDSA + signatureRSAPSS + signatureSM2 +) + +// supportedSignatureAlgorithms contains the signature and hash algorithms that +// the code advertises as supported in a TLS 1.2 ClientHello and in a TLS 1.2 +// CertificateRequest. The two fields are merged to match with TLS 1.3. +// Note that in TLS 1.2, the ECDSA algorithms are not constrained to P-256, etc. +var supportedSignatureAlgorithms = []SignatureScheme{ + PKCS1WithSHA256, + ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, + PKCS1WithSHA384, + ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, + PKCS1WithSHA512, + ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512, + PKCS1WithSHA1, + ECDSAWithSHA1, +} + +// ConnectionState records basic TLS details about the connection. +type ConnectionState struct { + Version uint16 // TLS version used by the connection (e.g. VersionTLS12) + HandshakeComplete bool // TLS handshake is complete + DidResume bool // connection resumes a previous TLS connection + CipherSuite uint16 // cipher suite in use (TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ...) + NegotiatedProtocol string // negotiated next protocol (not guaranteed to be from Config.NextProtos) + NegotiatedProtocolIsMutual bool // negotiated protocol was advertised by server (client side only) + ServerName string // server name requested by client, if any (server side only) + PeerCertificates []*x509.Certificate // certificate chain presented by remote peer + VerifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate // verified chains built from PeerCertificates + SignedCertificateTimestamps [][]byte // SCTs from the server, if any + OCSPResponse []byte // stapled OCSP response from server, if any + + // ekm is a closure exposed via ExportKeyingMaterial. + ekm func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) + + // TLSUnique contains the "tls-unique" channel binding value (see RFC + // 5929, section 3). For resumed sessions this value will be nil + // because resumption does not include enough context (see + // https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE#channelbindings). This will + // change in future versions of Go once the TLS master-secret fix has + // been standardized and implemented. + TLSUnique []byte +} + +// ExportKeyingMaterial returns length bytes of exported key material in a new +// slice as defined in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5705. If context is nil, +// it is not used as part of the seed. If the connection was set to allow +// renegotiation via Config.Renegotiation, this function will return an error. +func (cs *ConnectionState) ExportKeyingMaterial(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) { + return cs.ekm(label, context, length) +} + +// ClientAuthType declares the policy the server will follow for +// TLS Client Authentication. +type ClientAuthType int + +const ( + NoClientCert ClientAuthType = iota + RequestClientCert + RequireAnyClientCert + VerifyClientCertIfGiven + RequireAndVerifyClientCert +) + +// ClientSessionState contains the state needed by clients to resume TLS +// sessions. +type ClientSessionState struct { + sessionTicket []uint8 // Encrypted ticket used for session resumption with server + vers uint16 // SSL/TLS version negotiated for the session + cipherSuite uint16 // Ciphersuite negotiated for the session + masterSecret []byte // MasterSecret generated by client on a full handshake + serverCertificates []*x509.Certificate // Certificate chain presented by the server + verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate // Certificate chains we built for verification +} + +// ClientSessionCache is a cache of ClientSessionState objects that can be used +// by a client to resume a TLS session with a given server. ClientSessionCache +// implementations should expect to be called concurrently from different +// goroutines. Only ticket-based resumption is supported, not SessionID-based +// resumption. +type ClientSessionCache interface { + // Get searches for a ClientSessionState associated with the given key. + // On return, ok is true if one was found. + Get(sessionKey string) (session *ClientSessionState, ok bool) + + // Put adds the ClientSessionState to the cache with the given key. + Put(sessionKey string, cs *ClientSessionState) +} + +// SignatureScheme identifies a signature algorithm supported by TLS. See +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.3. +type SignatureScheme uint16 + +const ( + PKCS1WithSHA1 SignatureScheme = 0x0201 + PKCS1WithSHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0401 + PKCS1WithSHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0501 + PKCS1WithSHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0601 + + PSSWithSHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0804 + PSSWithSHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0805 + PSSWithSHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0806 + + ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0403 + ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0503 + ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0603 + + // Legacy signature and hash algorithms for TLS 1.2. + ECDSAWithSHA1 SignatureScheme = 0x0203 + SM2WITHSM3 SignatureScheme = 0x0204 +) + +// ClientHelloInfo contains information from a ClientHello message in order to +// guide certificate selection in the GetCertificate callback. +type ClientHelloInfo struct { + // CipherSuites lists the CipherSuites supported by the client (e.g. + // TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA). + CipherSuites []uint16 + + // ServerName indicates the name of the server requested by the client + // in order to support virtual hosting. ServerName is only set if the + // client is using SNI (see + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4366#section-3.1). + ServerName string + + // SupportedCurves lists the elliptic curves supported by the client. + // SupportedCurves is set only if the Supported Elliptic Curves + // Extension is being used (see + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.1). + SupportedCurves []CurveID + + // SupportedPoints lists the point formats supported by the client. + // SupportedPoints is set only if the Supported Point Formats Extension + // is being used (see + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2). + SupportedPoints []uint8 + + // SignatureSchemes lists the signature and hash schemes that the client + // is willing to verify. SignatureSchemes is set only if the Signature + // Algorithms Extension is being used (see + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1). + SignatureSchemes []SignatureScheme + + // SupportedProtos lists the application protocols supported by the client. + // SupportedProtos is set only if the Application-Layer Protocol + // Negotiation Extension is being used (see + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301#section-3.1). + // + // Servers can select a protocol by setting Config.NextProtos in a + // GetConfigForClient return value. + SupportedProtos []string + + // SupportedVersions lists the TLS versions supported by the client. + // For TLS versions less than 1.3, this is extrapolated from the max + // version advertised by the client, so values other than the greatest + // might be rejected if used. + SupportedVersions []uint16 + + // Conn is the underlying net.Conn for the connection. Do not read + // from, or write to, this connection; that will cause the TLS + // connection to fail. + Conn net.Conn +} + +// CertificateRequestInfo contains information from a server's +// CertificateRequest message, which is used to demand a certificate and proof +// of control from a client. +type CertificateRequestInfo struct { + // AcceptableCAs contains zero or more, DER-encoded, X.501 + // Distinguished Names. These are the names of root or intermediate CAs + // that the server wishes the returned certificate to be signed by. An + // empty slice indicates that the server has no preference. + AcceptableCAs [][]byte + + // SignatureSchemes lists the signature schemes that the server is + // willing to verify. + SignatureSchemes []SignatureScheme +} + +// RenegotiationSupport enumerates the different levels of support for TLS +// renegotiation. TLS renegotiation is the act of performing subsequent +// handshakes on a connection after the first. This significantly complicates +// the state machine and has been the source of numerous, subtle security +// issues. Initiating a renegotiation is not supported, but support for +// accepting renegotiation requests may be enabled. +// +// Even when enabled, the server may not change its identity between handshakes +// (i.e. the leaf certificate must be the same). Additionally, concurrent +// handshake and application data flow is not permitted so renegotiation can +// only be used with protocols that synchronise with the renegotiation, such as +// HTTPS. +type RenegotiationSupport int + +const ( + // RenegotiateNever disables renegotiation. + RenegotiateNever RenegotiationSupport = iota + + // RenegotiateOnceAsClient allows a remote server to request + // renegotiation once per connection. + RenegotiateOnceAsClient + + // RenegotiateFreelyAsClient allows a remote server to repeatedly + // request renegotiation. + RenegotiateFreelyAsClient +) + +// A Config structure is used to configure a TLS client or server. +// After one has been passed to a TLS function it must not be +// modified. A Config may be reused; the tls package will also not +// modify it. +type Config struct { + //if not nil, will support GMT0024 + GMSupport *GMSupport + + // Rand provides the source of entropy for nonces and RSA blinding. + // If Rand is nil, TLS uses the cryptographic random reader in package + // crypto/rand. + // The Reader must be safe for use by multiple goroutines. + Rand io.Reader + + // Time returns the current time as the number of seconds since the epoch. + // If Time is nil, TLS uses time.Now. + Time func() time.Time + + // Certificates contains one or more certificate chains to present to + // the other side of the connection. Server configurations must include + // at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate. Clients doing + // client-authentication may set either Certificates or + // GetClientCertificate. + Certificates []Certificate + + // NameToCertificate maps from a certificate name to an element of + // Certificates. Note that a certificate name can be of the form + // '*.example.com' and so doesn't have to be a domain name as such. + // See Config.BuildNameToCertificate + // The nil value causes the first element of Certificates to be used + // for all connections. + NameToCertificate map[string]*Certificate + + // GetCertificate returns a Certificate based on the given + // ClientHelloInfo. It will only be called if the client supplies SNI + // information or if Certificates is empty. + // + // If GetCertificate is nil or returns nil, then the certificate is + // retrieved from NameToCertificate. If NameToCertificate is nil, the + // first element of Certificates will be used. + GetCertificate func(*ClientHelloInfo) (*Certificate, error) + + // GetKECertificate 获取密钥交换证书（加密证书） + // 这个方法只有在使用Config中Certificates为空或长度小于2时，才会被调用。 + // 如果该方法为空，则默认从证书列表中 Certificates 取出第二个位置的证书，也就是加密证书。 + // 该方法只有GMSSL流程中才会调用。 + GetKECertificate func(*ClientHelloInfo) (*Certificate, error) + + // GetClientCertificate, if not nil, is called when a server requests a + // certificate from a client. If set, the contents of Certificates will + // be ignored. + // + // If GetClientCertificate returns an error, the handshake will be + // aborted and that error will be returned. Otherwise + // GetClientCertificate must return a non-nil Certificate. If + // Certificate.Certificate is empty then no certificate will be sent to + // the server. If this is unacceptable to the server then it may abort + // the handshake. + // + // GetClientCertificate may be called multiple times for the same + // connection if renegotiation occurs or if TLS 1.3 is in use. + GetClientCertificate func(*CertificateRequestInfo) (*Certificate, error) + + // GetConfigForClient, if not nil, is called after a ClientHello is + // received from a client. It may return a non-nil Config in order to + // change the Config that will be used to handle this connection. If + // the returned Config is nil, the original Config will be used. The + // Config returned by this callback may not be subsequently modified. + // + // If GetConfigForClient is nil, the Config passed to Server() will be + // used for all connections. + // + // Uniquely for the fields in the returned Config, session ticket keys + // will be duplicated from the original Config if not set. + // Specifically, if SetSessionTicketKeys was called on the original + // config but not on the returned config then the ticket keys from the + // original config will be copied into the new config before use. + // Otherwise, if SessionTicketKey was set in the original config but + // not in the returned config then it will be copied into the returned + // config before use. If neither of those cases applies then the key + // material from the returned config will be used for session tickets. + GetConfigForClient func(*ClientHelloInfo) (*Config, error) + + // VerifyPeerCertificate, if not nil, is called after normal + // certificate verification by either a TLS client or server. It + // receives the raw ASN.1 certificates provided by the peer and also + // any verified chains that normal processing found. If it returns a + // non-nil error, the handshake is aborted and that error results. + // + // If normal verification fails then the handshake will abort before + // considering this callback. If normal verification is disabled by + // setting InsecureSkipVerify, or (for a server) when ClientAuth is + // RequestClientCert or RequireAnyClientCert, then this callback will + // be considered but the verifiedChains argument will always be nil. + VerifyPeerCertificate func(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error + + // RootCAs defines the set of root certificate authorities + // that clients use when verifying server certificates. + // If RootCAs is nil, TLS uses the host's root CA set. + RootCAs *x509.CertPool + + // NextProtos is a list of supported, application level protocols. + NextProtos []string + + // ServerName is used to verify the hostname on the returned + // certificates unless InsecureSkipVerify is given. It is also included + // in the client's handshake to support virtual hosting unless it is + // an IP address. + ServerName string + + // ClientAuth determines the server's policy for + // TLS Client Authentication. The default is NoClientCert. + ClientAuth ClientAuthType + + // ClientCAs defines the set of root certificate authorities + // that servers use if required to verify a client certificate + // by the policy in ClientAuth. + ClientCAs *x509.CertPool + + // InsecureSkipVerify controls whether a client verifies the + // server's certificate chain and host name. + // If InsecureSkipVerify is true, TLS accepts any certificate + // presented by the server and any host name in that certificate. + // In this mode, TLS is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. + // This should be used only for testing. + InsecureSkipVerify bool + + // CipherSuites is a list of supported cipher suites. If CipherSuites + // is nil, TLS uses a list of suites supported by the implementation. + CipherSuites []uint16 + + // PreferServerCipherSuites controls whether the server selects the + // client's most preferred ciphersuite, or the server's most preferred + // ciphersuite. If true then the server's preference, as expressed in + // the order of elements in CipherSuites, is used. + PreferServerCipherSuites bool + + // SessionTicketsDisabled may be set to true to disable session ticket + // (resumption) support. Note that on clients, session ticket support is + // also disabled if ClientSessionCache is nil. + SessionTicketsDisabled bool + + // SessionTicketKey is used by TLS servers to provide session + // resumption. See RFC 5077. If zero, it will be filled with + // random data before the first server handshake. + // + // If multiple servers are terminating connections for the same host + // they should all have the same SessionTicketKey. If the + // SessionTicketKey leaks, previously recorded and future TLS + // connections using that key are compromised. + SessionTicketKey [32]byte + + // ClientSessionCache is a cache of ClientSessionState entries for TLS + // session resumption. It is only used by clients. + ClientSessionCache ClientSessionCache + + // MinVersion contains the minimum SSL/TLS version that is acceptable. + // If zero, then TLS 1.0 is taken as the minimum. + MinVersion uint16 + + // MaxVersion contains the maximum SSL/TLS version that is acceptable. + // If zero, then the maximum version supported by this package is used, + // which is currently TLS 1.2. + MaxVersion uint16 + + // CurvePreferences contains the elliptic curves that will be used in + // an ECDHE handshake, in preference order. If empty, the default will + // be used. + CurvePreferences []CurveID + + // DynamicRecordSizingDisabled disables adaptive sizing of TLS records. + // When true, the largest possible TLS record size is always used. When + // false, the size of TLS records may be adjusted in an attempt to + // improve latency. + DynamicRecordSizingDisabled bool + + // Renegotiation controls what types of renegotiation are supported. + // The default, none, is correct for the vast majority of applications. + Renegotiation RenegotiationSupport + + // KeyLogWriter optionally specifies a destination for TLS master secrets + // in NSS key log format that can be used to allow external programs + // such as Wireshark to decrypt TLS connections. + // See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Format. + // Use of KeyLogWriter compromises security and should only be + // used for debugging. + KeyLogWriter io.Writer + + serverInitOnce sync.Once // guards calling (*Config).serverInit + + // mutex protects sessionTicketKeys. + mutex sync.RWMutex + // sessionTicketKeys contains zero or more ticket keys. If the length + // is zero, SessionTicketsDisabled must be true. The first key is used + // for new tickets and any subsequent keys can be used to decrypt old + // tickets. + sessionTicketKeys []ticketKey +} + +// ticketKeyNameLen is the number of bytes of identifier that is prepended to +// an encrypted session ticket in order to identify the key used to encrypt it. +const ticketKeyNameLen = 16 + +// ticketKey is the internal representation of a session ticket key. +type ticketKey struct { + // keyName is an opaque byte string that serves to identify the session + // ticket key. It's exposed as plaintext in every session ticket. + keyName [ticketKeyNameLen]byte + aesKey [16]byte + hmacKey [16]byte +} + +// ticketKeyFromBytes converts from the external representation of a session +// ticket key to a ticketKey. Externally, session ticket keys are 32 random +// bytes and this function expands that into sufficient name and key material. +func ticketKeyFromBytes(b [32]byte) (key ticketKey) { + hashed := sha512.Sum512(b[:]) + copy(key.keyName[:], hashed[:ticketKeyNameLen]) + copy(key.aesKey[:], hashed[ticketKeyNameLen:ticketKeyNameLen+16]) + copy(key.hmacKey[:], hashed[ticketKeyNameLen+16:ticketKeyNameLen+32]) + return key +} + +// Clone returns a shallow clone of c. It is safe to clone a Config that is +// being used concurrently by a TLS client or server. +func (c *Config) Clone() *Config { + // Running serverInit ensures that it's safe to read + // SessionTicketsDisabled. + c.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { c.serverInit(nil) }) + + var sessionTicketKeys []ticketKey + c.mutex.RLock() + sessionTicketKeys = c.sessionTicketKeys + c.mutex.RUnlock() + + return &Config{ + GMSupport: c.GMSupport, + Rand: c.Rand, + Time: c.Time, + Certificates: c.Certificates, + NameToCertificate: c.NameToCertificate, + GetCertificate: c.GetCertificate, + GetKECertificate: c.GetKECertificate, + GetClientCertificate: c.GetClientCertificate, + GetConfigForClient: c.GetConfigForClient, + VerifyPeerCertificate: c.VerifyPeerCertificate, + RootCAs: c.RootCAs, + NextProtos: c.NextProtos, + ServerName: c.ServerName, + ClientAuth: c.ClientAuth, + ClientCAs: c.ClientCAs, + InsecureSkipVerify: c.InsecureSkipVerify, + CipherSuites: c.CipherSuites, + PreferServerCipherSuites: c.PreferServerCipherSuites, + SessionTicketsDisabled: c.SessionTicketsDisabled, + SessionTicketKey: c.SessionTicketKey, + ClientSessionCache: c.ClientSessionCache, + MinVersion: c.MinVersion, + MaxVersion: c.MaxVersion, + CurvePreferences: c.CurvePreferences, + DynamicRecordSizingDisabled: c.DynamicRecordSizingDisabled, + Renegotiation: c.Renegotiation, + KeyLogWriter: c.KeyLogWriter, + sessionTicketKeys: sessionTicketKeys, + } +} + +// serverInit is run under c.serverInitOnce to do initialization of c. If c was +// returned by a GetConfigForClient callback then the argument should be the +// Config that was passed to Server, otherwise it should be nil. +func (c *Config) serverInit(originalConfig *Config) { + if c.SessionTicketsDisabled || len(c.ticketKeys()) != 0 { + return + } + + alreadySet := false + for _, b := range c.SessionTicketKey { + if b != 0 { + alreadySet = true + break + } + } + + if !alreadySet { + if originalConfig != nil { + copy(c.SessionTicketKey[:], originalConfig.SessionTicketKey[:]) + } else if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.rand(), c.SessionTicketKey[:]); err != nil { + c.SessionTicketsDisabled = true + return + } + } + + if originalConfig != nil { + originalConfig.mutex.RLock() + c.sessionTicketKeys = originalConfig.sessionTicketKeys + originalConfig.mutex.RUnlock() + } else { + c.sessionTicketKeys = []ticketKey{ticketKeyFromBytes(c.SessionTicketKey)} + } +} + +func (c *Config) ticketKeys() []ticketKey { + c.mutex.RLock() + // c.sessionTicketKeys is constant once created. SetSessionTicketKeys + // will only update it by replacing it with a new value. + ret := c.sessionTicketKeys + c.mutex.RUnlock() + return ret +} + +// SetSessionTicketKeys updates the session ticket keys for a server. The first +// key will be used when creating new tickets, while all keys can be used for +// decrypting tickets. It is safe to call this function while the server is +// running in order to rotate the session ticket keys. The function will panic +// if keys is empty. +func (c *Config) SetSessionTicketKeys(keys [][32]byte) { + if len(keys) == 0 { + panic("tls: keys must have at least one key") + } + + newKeys := make([]ticketKey, len(keys)) + for i, bytes := range keys { + newKeys[i] = ticketKeyFromBytes(bytes) + } + + c.mutex.Lock() + c.sessionTicketKeys = newKeys + c.mutex.Unlock() +} + +func (c *Config) rand() io.Reader { + r := c.Rand + if r == nil { + return rand.Reader + } + return r +} + +func (c *Config) time() time.Time { + t := c.Time + if t == nil { + t = time.Now + } + return t() +} + +func (c *Config) cipherSuites() []uint16 { + s := c.CipherSuites + if s == nil { + s = defaultCipherSuites() + } + return s +} + +func (c *Config) minVersion() uint16 { + if c == nil || c.MinVersion == 0 { + return minVersion + } + return c.MinVersion +} + +func (c *Config) maxVersion() uint16 { + if c == nil || c.MaxVersion == 0 { + return maxVersion + } + return c.MaxVersion +} + +var defaultCurvePreferences = []CurveID{X25519, CurveP256, CurveP384, CurveP521} + +func (c *Config) curvePreferences() []CurveID { + if c == nil || len(c.CurvePreferences) == 0 { + return defaultCurvePreferences + } + return c.CurvePreferences +} + +// mutualVersion returns the protocol version to use given the advertised +// version of the peer. +func (c *Config) mutualVersion(vers uint16) (uint16, bool) { + minVersion := c.minVersion() + maxVersion := c.maxVersion() + + if vers < minVersion { + return 0, false + } + if vers > maxVersion { + vers = maxVersion + } + return vers, true +} + +// getCertificate 返回密钥交换使用的证书及密钥 +// 该方法只有GMSSL会调用 +// 如果 Certificates 长度大于等于2时，默认返回第2个证书密钥 +// 如果 Certificates 为空或不足2时，调用 GetEKCertificate 方法获取。 +func (c *Config) getEKCertificate(clientHello *ClientHelloInfo) (*Certificate, error) { + if c.GetKECertificate != nil && (len(c.Certificates) < 2) { + cert, err := c.GetKECertificate(clientHello) + if cert != nil || err != nil { + return cert, err + } + } + if len(c.Certificates) >= 2 { + return &c.Certificates[1], nil + } + return nil, errors.New("tls: no key exchange (encrypt) certificate configured") +} + +// getCertificate returns the best certificate for the given ClientHelloInfo, +// defaulting to the first element of c.Certificates. +func (c *Config) getCertificate(clientHello *ClientHelloInfo) (*Certificate, error) { + if c.GetCertificate != nil && + (len(c.Certificates) == 0 || len(clientHello.ServerName) > 0) { + cert, err := c.GetCertificate(clientHello) + if cert != nil || err != nil { + return cert, err + } + } + + if len(c.Certificates) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("tls: no certificates configured") + } + + if len(c.Certificates) == 1 || c.NameToCertificate == nil { + // There's only one choice, so no point doing any work. + return &c.Certificates[0], nil + } + + name := strings.ToLower(clientHello.ServerName) + for len(name) > 0 && name[len(name)-1] == '.' { + name = name[:len(name)-1] + } + + if cert, ok := c.NameToCertificate[name]; ok { + return cert, nil + } + + // try replacing labels in the name with wildcards until we get a + // match. + labels := strings.Split(name, ".") + for i := range labels { + labels[i] = "*" + candidate := strings.Join(labels, ".") + if cert, ok := c.NameToCertificate[candidate]; ok { + return cert, nil + } + } + + // If nothing matches, return the first certificate. + return &c.Certificates[0], nil +} + +// BuildNameToCertificate parses c.Certificates and builds c.NameToCertificate +// from the CommonName and SubjectAlternateName fields of each of the leaf +// certificates. +func (c *Config) BuildNameToCertificate() { + c.NameToCertificate = make(map[string]*Certificate) + for i := range c.Certificates { + cert := &c.Certificates[i] + x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert.Certificate[0]) + if err != nil { + continue + } + if len(x509Cert.Subject.CommonName) > 0 { + c.NameToCertificate[x509Cert.Subject.CommonName] = cert + } + for _, san := range x509Cert.DNSNames { + c.NameToCertificate[san] = cert + } + } +} + +// writeKeyLog logs client random and master secret if logging was enabled by +// setting c.KeyLogWriter. +func (c *Config) writeKeyLog(clientRandom, masterSecret []byte) error { + if c.KeyLogWriter == nil { + return nil + } + + logLine := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("CLIENT_RANDOM %x %x\n", clientRandom, masterSecret)) + + writerMutex.Lock() + _, err := c.KeyLogWriter.Write(logLine) + writerMutex.Unlock() + + return err +} + +// writerMutex protects all KeyLogWriters globally. It is rarely enabled, +// and is only for debugging, so a global mutex saves space. +var writerMutex sync.Mutex + +// A Certificate is a chain of one or more certificates, leaf first. +type Certificate struct { + Certificate [][]byte + // PrivateKey contains the private key corresponding to the public key + // in Leaf. For a server, this must implement crypto.Signer and/or + // crypto.Decrypter, with an RSA or ECDSA PublicKey. For a client + // (performing client authentication), this must be a crypto.Signer + // with an RSA or ECDSA PublicKey. + PrivateKey crypto.PrivateKey + // OCSPStaple contains an optional OCSP response which will be served + // to clients that request it. + OCSPStaple []byte + // SignedCertificateTimestamps contains an optional list of Signed + // Certificate Timestamps which will be served to clients that request it. + SignedCertificateTimestamps [][]byte + // Leaf is the parsed form of the leaf certificate, which may be + // initialized using x509.ParseCertificate to reduce per-handshake + // processing for TLS clients doing client authentication. If nil, the + // leaf certificate will be parsed as needed. + Leaf *x509.Certificate +} + +type handshakeMessage interface { + marshal() []byte + unmarshal([]byte) bool +} + +// lruSessionCache is a ClientSessionCache implementation that uses an LRU +// caching strategy. +type lruSessionCache struct { + sync.Mutex + + m map[string]*list.Element + q *list.List + capacity int +} + +type lruSessionCacheEntry struct { + sessionKey string + state *ClientSessionState +} + +// NewLRUClientSessionCache returns a ClientSessionCache with the given +// capacity that uses an LRU strategy. If capacity is < 1, a default capacity +// is used instead. +func NewLRUClientSessionCache(capacity int) ClientSessionCache { + const defaultSessionCacheCapacity = 64 + + if capacity < 1 { + capacity = defaultSessionCacheCapacity + } + return &lruSessionCache{ + m: make(map[string]*list.Element), + q: list.New(), + capacity: capacity, + } +} + +// Put adds the provided (sessionKey, cs) pair to the cache. +func (c *lruSessionCache) Put(sessionKey string, cs *ClientSessionState) { + c.Lock() + defer c.Unlock() + + if elem, ok := c.m[sessionKey]; ok { + entry := elem.Value.(*lruSessionCacheEntry) + entry.state = cs + c.q.MoveToFront(elem) + return + } + + if c.q.Len() < c.capacity { + entry := &lruSessionCacheEntry{sessionKey, cs} + c.m[sessionKey] = c.q.PushFront(entry) + return + } + + elem := c.q.Back() + entry := elem.Value.(*lruSessionCacheEntry) + delete(c.m, entry.sessionKey) + entry.sessionKey = sessionKey + entry.state = cs + c.q.MoveToFront(elem) + c.m[sessionKey] = elem +} + +// Get returns the ClientSessionState value associated with a given key. It +// returns (nil, false) if no value is found. +func (c *lruSessionCache) Get(sessionKey string) (*ClientSessionState, bool) { + c.Lock() + defer c.Unlock() + + if elem, ok := c.m[sessionKey]; ok { + c.q.MoveToFront(elem) + return elem.Value.(*lruSessionCacheEntry).state, true + } + return nil, false +} + +// TODO(jsing): Make these available to both crypto/x509 and crypto/tls. +type dsaSignature struct { + R, S *big.Int +} + +type ecdsaSignature dsaSignature + +var emptyConfig Config + +func defaultConfig() *Config { + return &emptyConfig +} + +var ( + once sync.Once + varDefaultCipherSuites []uint16 +) + +func defaultCipherSuites() []uint16 { + once.Do(initDefaultCipherSuites) + return varDefaultCipherSuites +} + +func initDefaultCipherSuites() { + // Without AES-GCM hardware, we put the ChaCha20-Poly1305 + // cipher suites first. + topCipherSuites := []uint16{ + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + } + + varDefaultCipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(cipherSuites)) + varDefaultCipherSuites = append(varDefaultCipherSuites, topCipherSuites...) + +NextCipherSuite: + for _, suite := range cipherSuites { + if suite.flags&suiteDefaultOff != 0 { + continue + } + for _, existing := range varDefaultCipherSuites { + if existing == suite.id { + continue NextCipherSuite + } + } + varDefaultCipherSuites = append(varDefaultCipherSuites, suite.id) + } +} + +func unexpectedMessageError(wanted, got interface{}) error { + return fmt.Errorf("tls: received unexpected handshake message of type %T when waiting for %T", got, wanted) +} + +func isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg SignatureScheme, supportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme) bool { + for _, s := range supportedSignatureAlgorithms { + if s == sigAlg { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// signatureFromSignatureScheme maps a signature algorithm to the underlying +// signature method (without hash function). +func signatureFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme) uint8 { + switch signatureAlgorithm { + case PKCS1WithSHA1, PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512: + return signaturePKCS1v15 + case PSSWithSHA256, PSSWithSHA384, PSSWithSHA512: + return signatureRSAPSS + case ECDSAWithSHA1, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512: + return signatureECDSA + default: + return 0 + } +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/conn.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/conn.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ac3f99a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/conn.go @@ -0,0 +1,1379 @@ +/*Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package gmtls + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/subtle" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "sync" + "sync/atomic" + "time" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509" +) + +// A Conn represents a secured connection. +// It implements the net.Conn interface. +type Conn struct { + // constant + conn net.Conn + isClient bool + + // handshakeStatus is 1 if the connection is currently transferring + // application data (i.e. is not currently processing a handshake). + // This field is only to be accessed with sync/atomic. + handshakeStatus uint32 + // constant after handshake; protected by handshakeMutex + handshakeMutex sync.Mutex + handshakeErr error // error resulting from handshake + vers uint16 // TLS version + haveVers bool // version has been negotiated + config *Config // configuration passed to constructor + // handshakes counts the number of handshakes performed on the + // connection so far. If renegotiation is disabled then this is either + // zero or one. + handshakes int + didResume bool // whether this connection was a session resumption + cipherSuite uint16 + ocspResponse []byte // stapled OCSP response + scts [][]byte // signed certificate timestamps from server + peerCertificates []*x509.Certificate + // verifiedChains contains the certificate chains that we built, as + // opposed to the ones presented by the server. + verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate + // serverName contains the server name indicated by the client, if any. + serverName string + // secureRenegotiation is true if the server echoed the secure + // renegotiation extension. (This is meaningless as a server because + // renegotiation is not supported in that case.) + secureRenegotiation bool + // ekm is a closure for exporting keying material. + ekm func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) + + // clientFinishedIsFirst is true if the client sent the first Finished + // message during the most recent handshake. This is recorded because + // the first transmitted Finished message is the tls-unique + // channel-binding value. + clientFinishedIsFirst bool + + // closeNotifyErr is any error from sending the alertCloseNotify record. + closeNotifyErr error + // closeNotifySent is true if the Conn attempted to send an + // alertCloseNotify record. + closeNotifySent bool + + // clientFinished and serverFinished contain the Finished message sent + // by the client or server in the most recent handshake. This is + // retained to support the renegotiation extension and tls-unique + // channel-binding. + clientFinished [12]byte + serverFinished [12]byte + + clientProtocol string + clientProtocolFallback bool + + // input/output + in, out halfConn + rawInput *block // raw input, right off the wire + input *block // application data waiting to be read + hand bytes.Buffer // handshake data waiting to be read + buffering bool // whether records are buffered in sendBuf + sendBuf []byte // a buffer of records waiting to be sent + + // bytesSent counts the bytes of application data sent. + // packetsSent counts packets. + bytesSent int64 + packetsSent int64 + + // warnCount counts the number of consecutive warning alerts received + // by Conn.readRecord. Protected by in.Mutex. + warnCount int + + // activeCall is an atomic int32; the low bit is whether Close has + // been called. the rest of the bits are the number of goroutines + // in Conn.Write. + activeCall int32 + + tmp [16]byte +} + +// Access to net.Conn methods. +// Cannot just embed net.Conn because that would +// export the struct field too. + +// LocalAddr returns the local network address. +func (c *Conn) LocalAddr() net.Addr { + return c.conn.LocalAddr() +} + +// RemoteAddr returns the remote network address. +func (c *Conn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr { + return c.conn.RemoteAddr() +} + +// SetDeadline sets the read and write deadlines associated with the connection. +// A zero value for t means Read and Write will not time out. +// After a Write has timed out, the TLS state is corrupt and all future writes will return the same error. +func (c *Conn) SetDeadline(t time.Time) error { + return c.conn.SetDeadline(t) +} + +// SetReadDeadline sets the read deadline on the underlying connection. +// A zero value for t means Read will not time out. +func (c *Conn) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error { + return c.conn.SetReadDeadline(t) +} + +// SetWriteDeadline sets the write deadline on the underlying connection. +// A zero value for t means Write will not time out. +// After a Write has timed out, the TLS state is corrupt and all future writes will return the same error. +func (c *Conn) SetWriteDeadline(t time.Time) error { + return c.conn.SetWriteDeadline(t) +} + +// A halfConn represents one direction of the record layer +// connection, either sending or receiving. +type halfConn struct { + sync.Mutex + + err error // first permanent error + version uint16 // protocol version + cipher interface{} // cipher algorithm + mac macFunction + seq [8]byte // 64-bit sequence number + bfree *block // list of free blocks + additionalData [13]byte // to avoid allocs; interface method args escape + + nextCipher interface{} // next encryption state + nextMac macFunction // next MAC algorithm + + // used to save allocating a new buffer for each MAC. + inDigestBuf, outDigestBuf []byte +} + +func (hc *halfConn) setErrorLocked(err error) error { + hc.err = err + return err +} + +// prepareCipherSpec sets the encryption and MAC states +// that a subsequent changeCipherSpec will use. +func (hc *halfConn) prepareCipherSpec(version uint16, cipher interface{}, mac macFunction) { + hc.version = version + hc.nextCipher = cipher + hc.nextMac = mac +} + +// changeCipherSpec changes the encryption and MAC states +// to the ones previously passed to prepareCipherSpec. +func (hc *halfConn) changeCipherSpec() error { + if hc.nextCipher == nil { + return alertInternalError + } + hc.cipher = hc.nextCipher + hc.mac = hc.nextMac + hc.nextCipher = nil + hc.nextMac = nil + for i := range hc.seq { + hc.seq[i] = 0 + } + return nil +} + +// incSeq increments the sequence number. +func (hc *halfConn) incSeq() { + for i := 7; i >= 0; i-- { + hc.seq[i]++ + if hc.seq[i] != 0 { + return + } + } + + // Not allowed to let sequence number wrap. + // Instead, must renegotiate before it does. + // Not likely enough to bother. + panic("TLS: sequence number wraparound") +} + +// extractPadding returns, in constant time, the length of the padding to remove +// from the end of payload. It also returns a byte which is equal to 255 if the +// padding was valid and 0 otherwise. See RFC 2246, section 6.2.3.2 +func extractPadding(payload []byte) (toRemove int, good byte) { + if len(payload) < 1 { + return 0, 0 + } + + paddingLen := payload[len(payload)-1] + t := uint(len(payload)-1) - uint(paddingLen) + // if len(payload) >= (paddingLen - 1) then the MSB of t is zero + good = byte(int32(^t) >> 31) + + // The maximum possible padding length plus the actual length field + toCheck := 256 + // The length of the padded data is public, so we can use an if here + if toCheck > len(payload) { + toCheck = len(payload) + } + + for i := 0; i < toCheck; i++ { + t := uint(paddingLen) - uint(i) + // if i <= paddingLen then the MSB of t is zero + mask := byte(int32(^t) >> 31) + b := payload[len(payload)-1-i] + good &^= mask&paddingLen ^ mask&b + } + + // We AND together the bits of good and replicate the result across + // all the bits. + good &= good << 4 + good &= good << 2 + good &= good << 1 + good = uint8(int8(good) >> 7) + + toRemove = int(paddingLen) + 1 + return +} + +// extractPaddingSSL30 is a replacement for extractPadding in the case that the +// protocol version is SSLv3. In this version, the contents of the padding +// are random and cannot be checked. +func extractPaddingSSL30(payload []byte) (toRemove int, good byte) { + if len(payload) < 1 { + return 0, 0 + } + + paddingLen := int(payload[len(payload)-1]) + 1 + if paddingLen > len(payload) { + return 0, 0 + } + + return paddingLen, 255 +} + +func roundUp(a, b int) int { + return a + (b-a%b)%b +} + +// cbcMode is an interface for block ciphers using cipher block chaining. +type cbcMode interface { + cipher.BlockMode + SetIV([]byte) +} + +// decrypt checks and strips the mac and decrypts the data in b. Returns a +// success boolean, the number of bytes to skip from the start of the record in +// order to get the application payload, and an optional alert value. +func (hc *halfConn) decrypt(b *block) (ok bool, prefixLen int, alertValue alert) { + // pull out payload + payload := b.data[recordHeaderLen:] + + macSize := 0 + if hc.mac != nil { + macSize = hc.mac.Size() + } + + paddingGood := byte(255) + paddingLen := 0 + explicitIVLen := 0 + + // decrypt + if hc.cipher != nil { + switch c := hc.cipher.(type) { + case cipher.Stream: + c.XORKeyStream(payload, payload) + case aead: + explicitIVLen = c.explicitNonceLen() + if len(payload) < explicitIVLen { + return false, 0, alertBadRecordMAC + } + nonce := payload[:explicitIVLen] + payload = payload[explicitIVLen:] + + if len(nonce) == 0 { + nonce = hc.seq[:] + } + + copy(hc.additionalData[:], hc.seq[:]) + copy(hc.additionalData[8:], b.data[:3]) + n := len(payload) - c.Overhead() + hc.additionalData[11] = byte(n >> 8) + hc.additionalData[12] = byte(n) + var err error + payload, err = c.Open(payload[:0], nonce, payload, hc.additionalData[:]) + if err != nil { + return false, 0, alertBadRecordMAC + } + b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + len(payload)) + case cbcMode: + blockSize := c.BlockSize() + if hc.version >= VersionTLS11 || hc.version == VersionGMSSL { + explicitIVLen = blockSize + } + + if len(payload)%blockSize != 0 || len(payload) < roundUp(explicitIVLen+macSize+1, blockSize) { + return false, 0, alertBadRecordMAC + } + + if explicitIVLen > 0 { + c.SetIV(payload[:explicitIVLen]) + payload = payload[explicitIVLen:] + } + c.CryptBlocks(payload, payload) + if hc.version == VersionSSL30 { + paddingLen, paddingGood = extractPaddingSSL30(payload) + } else { + paddingLen, paddingGood = extractPadding(payload) + + // To protect against CBC padding oracles like Lucky13, the data + // past paddingLen (which is secret) is passed to the MAC + // function as extra data, to be fed into the HMAC after + // computing the digest. This makes the MAC constant time as + // long as the digest computation is constant time and does not + // affect the subsequent write. + } + default: + panic("unknown cipher type") + } + } + + // check, strip mac + if hc.mac != nil { + if len(payload) < macSize { + return false, 0, alertBadRecordMAC + } + + // strip mac off payload, b.data + n := len(payload) - macSize - paddingLen + n = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(int(uint32(n)>>31), 0, n) // if n < 0 { n = 0 } + b.data[3] = byte(n >> 8) + b.data[4] = byte(n) + remoteMAC := payload[n : n+macSize] + localMAC := hc.mac.MAC(hc.inDigestBuf, hc.seq[0:], b.data[:recordHeaderLen], payload[:n], payload[n+macSize:]) + + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(localMAC, remoteMAC) != 1 || paddingGood != 255 { + return false, 0, alertBadRecordMAC + } + hc.inDigestBuf = localMAC + + b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + n) + } + hc.incSeq() + + return true, recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen, 0 +} + +// padToBlockSize calculates the needed padding block, if any, for a payload. +// On exit, prefix aliases payload and extends to the end of the last full +// block of payload. finalBlock is a fresh slice which contains the contents of +// any suffix of payload as well as the needed padding to make finalBlock a +// full block. +func padToBlockSize(payload []byte, blockSize int) (prefix, finalBlock []byte) { + overrun := len(payload) % blockSize + paddingLen := blockSize - overrun + prefix = payload[:len(payload)-overrun] + finalBlock = make([]byte, blockSize) + copy(finalBlock, payload[len(payload)-overrun:]) + for i := overrun; i < blockSize; i++ { + finalBlock[i] = byte(paddingLen - 1) + } + return +} + +// encrypt encrypts and macs the data in b. +func (hc *halfConn) encrypt(b *block, explicitIVLen int) (bool, alert) { + // mac + if hc.mac != nil { + mac := hc.mac.MAC(hc.outDigestBuf, hc.seq[0:], b.data[:recordHeaderLen], b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen:], nil) + + n := len(b.data) + b.resize(n + len(mac)) + copy(b.data[n:], mac) + hc.outDigestBuf = mac + } + + payload := b.data[recordHeaderLen:] + + // encrypt + if hc.cipher != nil { + switch c := hc.cipher.(type) { + case cipher.Stream: + c.XORKeyStream(payload, payload) + case aead: + payloadLen := len(b.data) - recordHeaderLen - explicitIVLen + b.resize(len(b.data) + c.Overhead()) + nonce := b.data[recordHeaderLen : recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen] + if len(nonce) == 0 { + nonce = hc.seq[:] + } + payload := b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen:] + payload = payload[:payloadLen] + + copy(hc.additionalData[:], hc.seq[:]) + copy(hc.additionalData[8:], b.data[:3]) + hc.additionalData[11] = byte(payloadLen >> 8) + hc.additionalData[12] = byte(payloadLen) + + c.Seal(payload[:0], nonce, payload, hc.additionalData[:]) + case cbcMode: + blockSize := c.BlockSize() + if explicitIVLen > 0 { + c.SetIV(payload[:explicitIVLen]) + payload = payload[explicitIVLen:] + } + prefix, finalBlock := padToBlockSize(payload, blockSize) + b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + len(prefix) + len(finalBlock)) + c.CryptBlocks(b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen:], prefix) + c.CryptBlocks(b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen+len(prefix):], finalBlock) + default: + panic("unknown cipher type") + } + } + + // update length to include MAC and any block padding needed. + n := len(b.data) - recordHeaderLen + b.data[3] = byte(n >> 8) + b.data[4] = byte(n) + hc.incSeq() + + return true, 0 +} + +// A block is a simple data buffer. +type block struct { + data []byte + off int // index for Read + link *block +} + +// resize resizes block to be n bytes, growing if necessary. +func (b *block) resize(n int) { + if n > cap(b.data) { + b.reserve(n) + } + b.data = b.data[0:n] +} + +// reserve makes sure that block contains a capacity of at least n bytes. +func (b *block) reserve(n int) { + if cap(b.data) >= n { + return + } + m := cap(b.data) + if m == 0 { + m = 1024 + } + for m < n { + m *= 2 + } + data := make([]byte, len(b.data), m) + copy(data, b.data) + b.data = data +} + +// readFromUntil reads from r into b until b contains at least n bytes +// or else returns an error. +func (b *block) readFromUntil(r io.Reader, n int) error { + // quick case + if len(b.data) >= n { + return nil + } + + // read until have enough. + b.reserve(n) + for { + m, err := r.Read(b.data[len(b.data):cap(b.data)]) + b.data = b.data[0 : len(b.data)+m] + if len(b.data) >= n { + // TODO(bradfitz,agl): slightly suspicious + // that we're throwing away r.Read's err here. + break + } + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + return nil +} + +func (b *block) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) { + n = copy(p, b.data[b.off:]) + b.off += n + return +} + +// newBlock allocates a new block, from hc's free list if possible. +func (hc *halfConn) newBlock() *block { + b := hc.bfree + if b == nil { + return new(block) + } + hc.bfree = b.link + b.link = nil + b.resize(0) + return b +} + +// freeBlock returns a block to hc's free list. +// The protocol is such that each side only has a block or two on +// its free list at a time, so there's no need to worry about +// trimming the list, etc. +func (hc *halfConn) freeBlock(b *block) { + b.link = hc.bfree + hc.bfree = b +} + +// splitBlock splits a block after the first n bytes, +// returning a block with those n bytes and a +// block with the remainder. the latter may be nil. +func (hc *halfConn) splitBlock(b *block, n int) (*block, *block) { + if len(b.data) <= n { + return b, nil + } + bb := hc.newBlock() + bb.resize(len(b.data) - n) + copy(bb.data, b.data[n:]) + b.data = b.data[0:n] + return b, bb +} + +// RecordHeaderError results when a TLS record header is invalid. +type RecordHeaderError struct { + // Msg contains a human readable string that describes the error. + Msg string + // RecordHeader contains the five bytes of TLS record header that + // triggered the error. + RecordHeader [5]byte +} + +func (e RecordHeaderError) Error() string { return "tls: " + e.Msg } + +func (c *Conn) newRecordHeaderError(msg string) (err RecordHeaderError) { + err.Msg = msg + copy(err.RecordHeader[:], c.rawInput.data) + return err +} + +// readRecord reads the next TLS record from the connection +// and updates the record layer state. +func (c *Conn) readRecord(want recordType) error { + // Caller must be in sync with connection: + // handshake data if handshake not yet completed, + // else application data. + switch want { + case recordTypeHandshake, recordTypeChangeCipherSpec: + if c.handshakeComplete() { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: handshake or ChangeCipherSpec requested while not in handshake")) + } + case recordTypeApplicationData: + if !c.handshakeComplete() { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: application data record requested while in handshake")) + } + default: + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: unknown record type requested")) + } + +Again: + if c.rawInput == nil { + c.rawInput = c.in.newBlock() + } + b := c.rawInput + + // Read header, payload. + if err := b.readFromUntil(c.conn, recordHeaderLen); err != nil { + // RFC suggests that EOF without an alertCloseNotify is + // an error, but popular web sites seem to do this, + // so we can't make it an error. + // if err == io.EOF { + // err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF + // } + if e, ok := err.(net.Error); !ok || !e.Temporary() { + c.in.setErrorLocked(err) + } + return err + } + typ := recordType(b.data[0]) + + // No valid TLS record has a type of 0x80, however SSLv2 handshakes + // start with a uint16 length where the MSB is set and the first record + // is always < 256 bytes long. Therefore typ == 0x80 strongly suggests + // an SSLv2 client. + if want == recordTypeHandshake && typ == 0x80 { + c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.newRecordHeaderError("unsupported SSLv2 handshake received")) + } + + vers := uint16(b.data[1])<<8 | uint16(b.data[2]) + n := int(b.data[3])<<8 | int(b.data[4]) + if c.haveVers && vers != c.vers { + c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) + msg := fmt.Sprintf("received record with version %x when expecting version %x", vers, c.vers) + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.newRecordHeaderError(msg)) + } + if n > maxCiphertext { + c.sendAlert(alertRecordOverflow) + msg := fmt.Sprintf("oversized record received with length %d", n) + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.newRecordHeaderError(msg)) + } + if !c.haveVers { + // First message, be extra suspicious: this might not be a TLS + // client. Bail out before reading a full 'body', if possible. + // The current max version is 3.3 so if the version is >= 16.0, + // it's probably not real. + if (typ != recordTypeAlert && typ != want) || vers >= 0x1000 { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.newRecordHeaderError("first record does not look like a TLS handshake")) + } + } + if err := b.readFromUntil(c.conn, recordHeaderLen+n); err != nil { + if err == io.EOF { + err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF + } + if e, ok := err.(net.Error); !ok || !e.Temporary() { + c.in.setErrorLocked(err) + } + return err + } + + // Process message. + b, c.rawInput = c.in.splitBlock(b, recordHeaderLen+n) + ok, off, alertValue := c.in.decrypt(b) + if !ok { + c.in.freeBlock(b) + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertValue)) + } + b.off = off + data := b.data[b.off:] + if len(data) > maxPlaintext { + err := c.sendAlert(alertRecordOverflow) + c.in.freeBlock(b) + return c.in.setErrorLocked(err) + } + + if typ != recordTypeAlert && len(data) > 0 { + // this is a valid non-alert message: reset the count of alerts + c.warnCount = 0 + } + + switch typ { + default: + c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + + case recordTypeAlert: + if len(data) != 2 { + c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + break + } + if alert(data[1]) == alertCloseNotify { + c.in.setErrorLocked(io.EOF) + break + } + switch data[0] { + case alertLevelWarning: + // drop on the floor + c.in.freeBlock(b) + + c.warnCount++ + if c.warnCount > maxWarnAlertCount { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: too many warn alerts")) + } + + goto Again + case alertLevelError: + c.in.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "remote error", Err: alert(data[1])}) + default: + c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + } + + case recordTypeChangeCipherSpec: + if typ != want || len(data) != 1 || data[0] != 1 { + c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + break + } + // Handshake messages are not allowed to fragment across the CCS + if c.hand.Len() > 0 { + c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + break + } + err := c.in.changeCipherSpec() + if err != nil { + c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(err.(alert))) + } + + case recordTypeApplicationData: + if typ != want { + c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + break + } + c.input = b + b = nil + + case recordTypeHandshake: + // TODO(rsc): Should at least pick off connection close. + if typ != want && !(c.isClient && c.config.Renegotiation != RenegotiateNever) { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertNoRenegotiation)) + } + c.hand.Write(data) + } + + if b != nil { + c.in.freeBlock(b) + } + return c.in.err +} + +// sendAlert sends a TLS alert message. +func (c *Conn) sendAlertLocked(err alert) error { + switch err { + case alertNoRenegotiation, alertCloseNotify: + c.tmp[0] = alertLevelWarning + default: + c.tmp[0] = alertLevelError + } + c.tmp[1] = byte(err) + + _, writeErr := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeAlert, c.tmp[0:2]) + if err == alertCloseNotify { + // closeNotify is a special case in that it isn't an error. + return writeErr + } + + return c.out.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "local error", Err: err}) +} + +// sendAlert sends a TLS alert message. +func (c *Conn) sendAlert(err alert) error { + c.out.Lock() + defer c.out.Unlock() + return c.sendAlertLocked(err) +} + +const ( + // tcpMSSEstimate is a conservative estimate of the TCP maximum segment + // size (MSS). A constant is used, rather than querying the kernel for + // the actual MSS, to avoid complexity. The value here is the IPv6 + // minimum MTU (1280 bytes) minus the overhead of an IPv6 header (40 + // bytes) and a TCP header with timestamps (32 bytes). + tcpMSSEstimate = 1208 + + // recordSizeBoostThreshold is the number of bytes of application data + // sent after which the TLS record size will be increased to the + // maximum. + recordSizeBoostThreshold = 128 * 1024 +) + +// maxPayloadSizeForWrite returns the maximum TLS payload size to use for the +// next application data record. There is the following trade-off: +// +// - For latency-sensitive applications, such as web browsing, each TLS +// record should fit in one TCP segment. +// - For throughput-sensitive applications, such as large file transfers, +// larger TLS records better amortize framing and encryption overheads. +// +// A simple heuristic that works well in practice is to use small records for +// the first 1MB of data, then use larger records for subsequent data, and +// reset back to smaller records after the connection becomes idle. See "High +// Performance Web Networking", Chapter 4, or: +// https://www.igvita.com/2013/10/24/optimizing-tls-record-size-and-buffering-latency/ +// +// In the interests of simplicity and determinism, this code does not attempt +// to reset the record size once the connection is idle, however. +func (c *Conn) maxPayloadSizeForWrite(typ recordType, explicitIVLen int) int { + if c.config.DynamicRecordSizingDisabled || typ != recordTypeApplicationData { + return maxPlaintext + } + + if c.bytesSent >= recordSizeBoostThreshold { + return maxPlaintext + } + + // Subtract TLS overheads to get the maximum payload size. + macSize := 0 + if c.out.mac != nil { + macSize = c.out.mac.Size() + } + + payloadBytes := tcpMSSEstimate - recordHeaderLen - explicitIVLen + if c.out.cipher != nil { + switch ciph := c.out.cipher.(type) { + case cipher.Stream: + payloadBytes -= macSize + case cipher.AEAD: + payloadBytes -= ciph.Overhead() + case cbcMode: + blockSize := ciph.BlockSize() + // The payload must fit in a multiple of blockSize, with + // room for at least one padding byte. + payloadBytes = (payloadBytes & ^(blockSize - 1)) - 1 + // The MAC is appended before padding so affects the + // payload size directly. + payloadBytes -= macSize + default: + panic("unknown cipher type") + } + } + + // Allow packet growth in arithmetic progression up to max. + pkt := c.packetsSent + c.packetsSent++ + if pkt > 1000 { + return maxPlaintext // avoid overflow in multiply below + } + + n := payloadBytes * int(pkt+1) + if n > maxPlaintext { + n = maxPlaintext + } + return n +} + +func (c *Conn) write(data []byte) (int, error) { + if c.buffering { + c.sendBuf = append(c.sendBuf, data...) + return len(data), nil + } + + n, err := c.conn.Write(data) + c.bytesSent += int64(n) + return n, err +} + +func (c *Conn) flush() (int, error) { + if len(c.sendBuf) == 0 { + return 0, nil + } + + n, err := c.conn.Write(c.sendBuf) + c.bytesSent += int64(n) + c.sendBuf = nil + c.buffering = false + return n, err +} + +// writeRecordLocked writes a TLS record with the given type and payload to the +// connection and updates the record layer state. +func (c *Conn) writeRecordLocked(typ recordType, data []byte) (int, error) { + b := c.out.newBlock() + defer c.out.freeBlock(b) + + var n int + for len(data) > 0 { + explicitIVLen := 0 + explicitIVIsSeq := false + + var cbc cbcMode + if c.out.version >= VersionTLS11 || c.out.version == VersionGMSSL { + var ok bool + if cbc, ok = c.out.cipher.(cbcMode); ok { + explicitIVLen = cbc.BlockSize() + } + } + if explicitIVLen == 0 { + if c, ok := c.out.cipher.(aead); ok { + explicitIVLen = c.explicitNonceLen() + + // The AES-GCM construction in TLS has an + // explicit nonce so that the nonce can be + // random. However, the nonce is only 8 bytes + // which is too small for a secure, random + // nonce. Therefore we use the sequence number + // as the nonce. + explicitIVIsSeq = explicitIVLen > 0 + } + } + m := len(data) + if maxPayload := c.maxPayloadSizeForWrite(typ, explicitIVLen); m > maxPayload { + m = maxPayload + } + b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + m) + b.data[0] = byte(typ) + vers := c.vers + if vers == 0 { + // Some TLS servers fail if the record version is + // greater than TLS 1.0 for the initial ClientHello. + vers = VersionTLS10 + } + b.data[1] = byte(vers >> 8) + b.data[2] = byte(vers) + b.data[3] = byte(m >> 8) + b.data[4] = byte(m) + if explicitIVLen > 0 { + explicitIV := b.data[recordHeaderLen : recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen] + if explicitIVIsSeq { + copy(explicitIV, c.out.seq[:]) + } else { + if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), explicitIV); err != nil { + return n, err + } + } + } + copy(b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen:], data) + c.out.encrypt(b, explicitIVLen) + if _, err := c.write(b.data); err != nil { + return n, err + } + n += m + data = data[m:] + } + + if typ == recordTypeChangeCipherSpec { + if err := c.out.changeCipherSpec(); err != nil { + return n, c.sendAlertLocked(err.(alert)) + } + } + + return n, nil +} + +// writeRecord writes a TLS record with the given type and payload to the +// connection and updates the record layer state. +func (c *Conn) writeRecord(typ recordType, data []byte) (int, error) { + c.out.Lock() + defer c.out.Unlock() + + return c.writeRecordLocked(typ, data) +} + +// readHandshake reads the next handshake message from +// the record layer. +func (c *Conn) readHandshake() (interface{}, error) { + for c.hand.Len() < 4 { + if err := c.in.err; err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if err := c.readRecord(recordTypeHandshake); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + + data := c.hand.Bytes() + n := int(data[1])<<16 | int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3]) + if n > maxHandshake { + c.sendAlertLocked(alertInternalError) + return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("tls: handshake message of length %d bytes exceeds maximum of %d bytes", n, maxHandshake)) + } + for c.hand.Len() < 4+n { + if err := c.in.err; err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if err := c.readRecord(recordTypeHandshake); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + data = c.hand.Next(4 + n) + var m handshakeMessage + switch data[0] { + case typeHelloRequest: + m = new(helloRequestMsg) + case typeClientHello: + m = new(clientHelloMsg) + case typeServerHello: + m = new(serverHelloMsg) + case typeNewSessionTicket: + m = new(newSessionTicketMsg) + case typeCertificate: + m = new(certificateMsg) + case typeCertificateRequest: + if c.config.GMSupport != nil { + m = &certificateRequestMsgGM{} + } else { + m = &certificateRequestMsg{ + hasSignatureAndHash: c.vers >= VersionTLS12, + } + } + case typeCertificateStatus: + m = new(certificateStatusMsg) + case typeServerKeyExchange: + m = new(serverKeyExchangeMsg) + case typeServerHelloDone: + m = new(serverHelloDoneMsg) + case typeClientKeyExchange: + m = new(clientKeyExchangeMsg) + case typeCertificateVerify: + m = &certificateVerifyMsg{ + hasSignatureAndHash: c.vers >= VersionTLS12, + } + case typeNextProtocol: + m = new(nextProtoMsg) + case typeFinished: + m = new(finishedMsg) + default: + return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + } + + // The handshake message unmarshalers + // expect to be able to keep references to data, + // so pass in a fresh copy that won't be overwritten. + data = append([]byte(nil), data...) + + if !m.unmarshal(data) { + return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + } + return m, nil +} + +var ( + errClosed = errors.New("tls: use of closed connection") + errShutdown = errors.New("tls: protocol is shutdown") +) + +// Write writes data to the connection. +func (c *Conn) Write(b []byte) (int, error) { + // interlock with Close below + for { + x := atomic.LoadInt32(&c.activeCall) + if x&1 != 0 { + return 0, errClosed + } + if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&c.activeCall, x, x+2) { + defer atomic.AddInt32(&c.activeCall, -2) + break + } + } + + if err := c.Handshake(); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + + c.out.Lock() + defer c.out.Unlock() + + if err := c.out.err; err != nil { + return 0, err + } + + if !c.handshakeComplete() { + return 0, alertInternalError + } + + if c.closeNotifySent { + return 0, errShutdown + } + + // SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 are susceptible to a chosen-plaintext + // attack when using block mode ciphers due to predictable IVs. + // This can be prevented by splitting each Application Data + // record into two records, effectively randomizing the IV. + // + // https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt + // https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=665814 + // https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/01/15/beastfollowup.html + + var m int + if len(b) > 1 && c.vers <= VersionTLS10 { + if _, ok := c.out.cipher.(cipher.BlockMode); ok { + n, err := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeApplicationData, b[:1]) + if err != nil { + return n, c.out.setErrorLocked(err) + } + m, b = 1, b[1:] + } + } + + n, err := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeApplicationData, b) + return n + m, c.out.setErrorLocked(err) +} + +// handleRenegotiation processes a HelloRequest handshake message. +func (c *Conn) handleRenegotiation() error { + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + _, ok := msg.(*helloRequestMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return alertUnexpectedMessage + } + + if !c.isClient { + return c.sendAlert(alertNoRenegotiation) + } + + switch c.config.Renegotiation { + case RenegotiateNever: + return c.sendAlert(alertNoRenegotiation) + case RenegotiateOnceAsClient: + if c.handshakes > 1 { + return c.sendAlert(alertNoRenegotiation) + } + case RenegotiateFreelyAsClient: + // Ok. + default: + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return errors.New("tls: unknown Renegotiation value") + } + + c.handshakeMutex.Lock() + defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() + + atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 0) + if c.handshakeErr = c.clientHandshake(); c.handshakeErr == nil { + c.handshakes++ + } + return c.handshakeErr +} + +// Read can be made to time out and return a net.Error with Timeout() == true +// after a fixed time limit; see SetDeadline and SetReadDeadline. +func (c *Conn) Read(b []byte) (n int, err error) { + if err = c.Handshake(); err != nil { + return + } + if len(b) == 0 { + // Put this after Handshake, in case people were calling + // Read(nil) for the side effect of the Handshake. + return + } + + c.in.Lock() + defer c.in.Unlock() + + // Some OpenSSL servers send empty records in order to randomize the + // CBC IV. So this loop ignores a limited number of empty records. + const maxConsecutiveEmptyRecords = 100 + for emptyRecordCount := 0; emptyRecordCount <= maxConsecutiveEmptyRecords; emptyRecordCount++ { + for c.input == nil && c.in.err == nil { + if err := c.readRecord(recordTypeApplicationData); err != nil { + // Soft error, like EAGAIN + return 0, err + } + if c.hand.Len() > 0 { + // We received handshake bytes, indicating the + // start of a renegotiation. + if err := c.handleRenegotiation(); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + } + } + if err := c.in.err; err != nil { + return 0, err + } + + n, err = c.input.Read(b) + if c.input.off >= len(c.input.data) { + c.in.freeBlock(c.input) + c.input = nil + } + + // If a close-notify alert is waiting, read it so that + // we can return (n, EOF) instead of (n, nil), to signal + // to the HTTP response reading goroutine that the + // connection is now closed. This eliminates a race + // where the HTTP response reading goroutine would + // otherwise not observe the EOF until its next read, + // by which time a client goroutine might have already + // tried to reuse the HTTP connection for a new + // request. + // See https://codereview.appspot.com/76400046 + // and https://golang.org/issue/3514 + if ri := c.rawInput; ri != nil && + n != 0 && err == nil && + c.input == nil && len(ri.data) > 0 && recordType(ri.data[0]) == recordTypeAlert { + if recErr := c.readRecord(recordTypeApplicationData); recErr != nil { + err = recErr // will be io.EOF on closeNotify + } + } + + if n != 0 || err != nil { + return n, err + } + } + + return 0, io.ErrNoProgress +} + +// Close closes the connection. +func (c *Conn) Close() error { + // Interlock with Conn.Write above. + var x int32 + for { + x = atomic.LoadInt32(&c.activeCall) + if x&1 != 0 { + return errClosed + } + if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&c.activeCall, x, x|1) { + break + } + } + if x != 0 { + // io.Writer and io.Closer should not be used concurrently. + // If Close is called while a Write is currently in-flight, + // interpret that as a sign that this Close is really just + // being used to break the Write and/or clean up resources and + // avoid sending the alertCloseNotify, which may block + // waiting on handshakeMutex or the c.out mutex. + return c.conn.Close() + } + + var alertErr error + + if c.handshakeComplete() { + alertErr = c.closeNotify() + } + + if err := c.conn.Close(); err != nil { + return err + } + return alertErr +} + +var errEarlyCloseWrite = errors.New("tls: CloseWrite called before handshake complete") + +// CloseWrite shuts down the writing side of the connection. It should only be +// called once the handshake has completed and does not call CloseWrite on the +// underlying connection. Most callers should just use Close. +func (c *Conn) CloseWrite() error { + if !c.handshakeComplete() { + return errEarlyCloseWrite + } + + return c.closeNotify() +} + +func (c *Conn) closeNotify() error { + c.out.Lock() + defer c.out.Unlock() + + if !c.closeNotifySent { + c.closeNotifyErr = c.sendAlertLocked(alertCloseNotify) + c.closeNotifySent = true + } + return c.closeNotifyErr +} + +// Handshake runs the client or server handshake +// protocol if it has not yet been run. +// Most uses of this package need not call Handshake +// explicitly: the first Read or Write will call it automatically. +func (c *Conn) Handshake() error { + c.handshakeMutex.Lock() + defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() + + if err := c.handshakeErr; err != nil { + return err + } + if c.handshakeComplete() { + return nil + } + + c.in.Lock() + defer c.in.Unlock() + + if c.isClient { + c.handshakeErr = c.clientHandshake() + } else { + if c.config.GMSupport == nil { + // TLS Only + c.handshakeErr = c.serverHandshake() + } else if c.config.GMSupport.IsAutoSwitchMode() { + // GMSSL/TLS Auto switch + c.handshakeErr = c.serverHandshakeAutoSwitch() + } else { + // GMSSL Only + c.handshakeErr = c.serverHandshakeGM() + } + } + if c.handshakeErr == nil { + c.handshakes++ + } else { + // If an error occurred during the hadshake try to flush the + // alert that might be left in the buffer. + c.flush() + fmt.Println("handshake error :", c.handshakeErr) + } + + if c.handshakeErr == nil && !c.handshakeComplete() { + panic("handshake should have had a result.") + } + + return c.handshakeErr +} + +// ConnectionState returns basic TLS details about the connection. +func (c *Conn) ConnectionState() ConnectionState { + c.handshakeMutex.Lock() + defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() + + var state ConnectionState + state.HandshakeComplete = c.handshakeComplete() + state.ServerName = c.serverName + + if state.HandshakeComplete { + state.Version = c.vers + state.NegotiatedProtocol = c.clientProtocol + state.DidResume = c.didResume + state.NegotiatedProtocolIsMutual = !c.clientProtocolFallback + state.CipherSuite = c.cipherSuite + state.PeerCertificates = c.peerCertificates + state.VerifiedChains = c.verifiedChains + state.SignedCertificateTimestamps = c.scts + state.OCSPResponse = c.ocspResponse + if !c.didResume { + if c.clientFinishedIsFirst { + state.TLSUnique = c.clientFinished[:] + } else { + state.TLSUnique = c.serverFinished[:] + } + } + if c.config.Renegotiation != RenegotiateNever { + state.ekm = noExportedKeyingMaterial + } else { + state.ekm = c.ekm + } + } + + return state +} + +// OCSPResponse returns the stapled OCSP response from the TLS server, if +// any. (Only valid for client connections.) +func (c *Conn) OCSPResponse() []byte { + c.handshakeMutex.Lock() + defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() + + return c.ocspResponse +} + +// VerifyHostname checks that the peer certificate chain is valid for +// connecting to host. If so, it returns nil; if not, it returns an error +// describing the problem. +func (c *Conn) VerifyHostname(host string) error { + c.handshakeMutex.Lock() + defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() + if !c.isClient { + return errors.New("tls: VerifyHostname called on TLS server connection") + } + if !c.handshakeComplete() { + return errors.New("tls: handshake has not yet been performed") + } + if len(c.verifiedChains) == 0 { + return errors.New("tls: handshake did not verify certificate chain") + } + return c.peerCertificates[0].VerifyHostname(host) +} + +func (c *Conn) handshakeComplete() bool { + return atomic.LoadUint32(&c.handshakeStatus) == 1 +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_client.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_client.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a541d084 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_client.go @@ -0,0 +1,666 @@ +// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build single_cert + +package gmtls + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/subtle" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "strconv" + "sync/atomic" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2" + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509" +) + +type clientHandshakeStateGM struct { + c *Conn + serverHello *serverHelloMsg + hello *clientHelloMsg + suite *cipherSuite + finishedHash finishedHash + masterSecret []byte + session *ClientSessionState +} + +func makeClientHelloGM(config *Config) (*clientHelloMsg, error) { + if len(config.ServerName) == 0 && !config.InsecureSkipVerify { + return nil, errors.New("tls: either ServerName or InsecureSkipVerify must be specified in the tls.Config") + } + + hello := &clientHelloMsg{ + vers: config.GMSupport.GetVersion(), + compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone}, + random: make([]byte, 32), + } + possibleCipherSuites := getCipherSuites(config) + hello.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(possibleCipherSuites)) + +NextCipherSuite: + for _, suiteId := range possibleCipherSuites { + for _, suite := range config.GMSupport.cipherSuites() { + if suite.id != suiteId { + continue + } + hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, suiteId) + continue NextCipherSuite + } + } + + _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), hello.random) + if err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error()) + } + + return hello, nil +} + +// Does the handshake, either a full one or resumes old session. +// Requires hs.c, hs.hello, and, optionally, hs.session to be set. +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) handshake() error { + c := hs.c + + // send ClientHello + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + var ok bool + if hs.serverHello, ok = msg.(*serverHelloMsg); !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(hs.serverHello, msg) + } + + if hs.serverHello.vers != VersionGMSSL { + hs.c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: server selected unsupported protocol version %x, while expecting %x", hs.serverHello.vers, VersionGMSSL) + } + + if err = hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil { + return err + } + + isResume, err := hs.processServerHello() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHashGM(hs.suite) + + // No signatures of the handshake are needed in a resumption. + // Otherwise, in a full handshake, if we don't have any certificates + // configured then we will never send a CertificateVerify message and + // thus no signatures are needed in that case either. + if isResume || (len(c.config.Certificates) == 0 && c.config.GetClientCertificate == nil) { + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal()) + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal()) + + c.buffering = true + if isResume { + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false + if err := hs.sendFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + } else { + if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.sendFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true + if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random) + c.didResume = isResume + atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1) + + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) pickCipherSuite() error { + if hs.suite = mutualCipherSuiteGM(hs.hello.cipherSuites, hs.serverHello.cipherSuite); hs.suite == nil { + hs.c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return errors.New("tls: server chose an unconfigured cipher suite") + } + + hs.c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) doFullHandshake() error { + c := hs.c + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg) + if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg) + } + + // mod by syl only one cert + // Thanks to dual certificates mechanism, length of certificates in GMT0024 must great than 2 + //if len(certMsg.certificates) < 2{ + // c.sendAlert(alertInsufficientSecurity) + // return fmt.Errorf("tls: length of certificates in GMT0024 must great than 2") + //} + + hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) + + if c.handshakes == 0 { + // If this is the first handshake on a connection, process and + // (optionally) verify the server's certificates. + certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates)) + for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates { + cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return errors.New("tls: failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error()) + } + + // mod by syl below + //if cert.SignatureAlgorithm != x509.SM2WithSM3{ + // c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate) + // return fmt.Errorf("tls: SignatureAlgorithm of the certificate[%d] is not supported, actual:%s, expect:SM2WITHSM3", i, cert.SignatureAlgorithm.String()) + //} + //if cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm != x509.SM2 { + // c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate) + // return fmt.Errorf("tls: PublicKeyAlgorithm of the certificate[%d] is not supported, actual:%s, expect:SM2", i, []string{"unkown", "RSA", "DSA", "ECDSA", "SM2"}[int(cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm)]) + //} + ////cert[0] is for signature while cert[1] is for encipher, refer to GMT0024 + ////check key usage + //switch i { + //case 0: + // if cert.KeyUsage == 0 || (cert.KeyUsage & (x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | cert.KeyUsage&x509.KeyUsageContentCommitment)) == 0{ + // c.sendAlert(alertInsufficientSecurity) + // return fmt.Errorf("tls: the keyusage of cert[0] does not exist or is not for KeyUsageDigitalSignature/KeyUsageContentCommitment, value:%d", cert.KeyUsage) + // } + //case 1: + // if cert.KeyUsage == 0 || (cert.KeyUsage & (x509.KeyUsageDataEncipherment | x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment | x509.KeyUsageKeyAgreement))==0{ + // c.sendAlert(alertInsufficientSecurity) + // return fmt.Errorf("tls: the keyusage of cert[1] does not exist or is not for KeyUsageDataEncipherment/KeyUsageKeyEncipherment/KeyUsageKeyAgreement, value:%d", cert.KeyUsage) + // } + //} + + certs[i] = cert + } + + if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify { + opts := x509.VerifyOptions{ + Roots: c.config.RootCAs, + CurrentTime: c.config.time(), + DNSName: c.config.ServerName, + Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(), + } + if opts.Roots == nil { + opts.Roots = x509.NewCertPool() + } + + for _, rootca := range getCAs() { + opts.Roots.AddCert(rootca) + } + for i, cert := range certs { + if i == 0 { + continue + } + opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert) + } + + c.verifiedChains, err = certs[0].Verify(opts) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return err + } + } + + if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil { + if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certMsg.certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return err + } + } + + switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) { + case *sm2.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey: + break + default: + c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: server's certificate contains an unsupported type of public key: %T", certs[0].PublicKey) + } + + c.peerCertificates = certs + } else { + // This is a renegotiation handshake. We require that the + // server's identity (i.e. leaf certificate) is unchanged and + // thus any previous trust decision is still valid. + // + // See https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE for the + // motivation behind this requirement. + if !bytes.Equal(c.peerCertificates[0].Raw, certMsg.certificates[0]) { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return errors.New("tls: server's identity changed during renegotiation") + } + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers) + if ka, ok := keyAgreement.(*eccKeyAgreementGM); ok { + // mod by syl only one cert + //ka.encipherCert = c.peerCertificates[1] + ka.encipherCert = c.peerCertificates[0] + } + + skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg) + if ok { + hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal()) + err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, c.peerCertificates[0], skx) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return err + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + var chainToSend *Certificate + var certRequested bool + certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsgGM) + if ok { + certRequested = true + hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal()) + + if chainToSend, err = hs.getCertificate(certReq); err != nil || chainToSend.Certificate == nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(shd, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal()) + + // If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a + // Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a + // certificate to send. + if certRequested { + certMsg = new(certificateMsg) + certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate + hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + // mod by syl only one cert + //preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, c.peerCertificates[1]) + preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, c.peerCertificates[0]) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + if ckx != nil { + hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + if chainToSend != nil && len(chainToSend.Certificate) > 0 { + certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{} + + key, ok := chainToSend.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", chainToSend.PrivateKey) + } + + digest := hs.finishedHash.client.Sum(nil) + + certVerify.signature, err = key.Sign(c.config.rand(), digest, nil) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random) + if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(hs.hello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return errors.New("tls: failed to write to key log: " + err.Error()) + } + + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) establishKeys() error { + c := hs.c + + clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV := + keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen) + var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{} + var clientHash, serverHash macFunction + if hs.suite.cipher != nil { + clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */) + clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC) + serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */) + serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC) + } else { + clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV) + serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV) + } + + c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash) + c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash) + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) serverResumedSession() bool { + // If the server responded with the same sessionId then it means the + // sessionTicket is being used to resume a TLS session. + return hs.session != nil && hs.hello.sessionId != nil && + bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.sessionId, hs.hello.sessionId) +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) processServerHello() (bool, error) { + c := hs.c + + if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return false, errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format") + } + + if c.handshakes == 0 && hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiationSupported { + c.secureRenegotiation = true + if len(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension") + } + } + + if c.handshakes > 0 && c.secureRenegotiation { + var expectedSecureRenegotiation [24]byte + copy(expectedSecureRenegotiation[:], c.clientFinished[:]) + copy(expectedSecureRenegotiation[12:], c.serverFinished[:]) + if !bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation, expectedSecureRenegotiation[:]) { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: incorrect renegotiation extension contents") + } + } + + clientDidNPN := hs.hello.nextProtoNeg + clientDidALPN := len(hs.hello.alpnProtocols) > 0 + serverHasNPN := hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg + serverHasALPN := len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) > 0 + + if !clientDidNPN && serverHasNPN { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server advertised unrequested NPN extension") + } + + if !clientDidALPN && serverHasALPN { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server advertised unrequested ALPN extension") + } + + if serverHasNPN && serverHasALPN { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server advertised both NPN and ALPN extensions") + } + + if serverHasALPN { + c.clientProtocol = hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol + c.clientProtocolFallback = false + } + c.scts = hs.serverHello.scts + + if !hs.serverResumedSession() { + return false, nil + } + + if hs.session.vers != c.vers { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server resumed a session with a different version") + } + + if hs.session.cipherSuite != hs.suite.id { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server resumed a session with a different cipher suite") + } + + // Restore masterSecret and peerCerts from previous state + hs.masterSecret = hs.session.masterSecret + c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates + c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains + return true, nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) readFinished(out []byte) error { + c := hs.c + + c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec) + if c.in.err != nil { + return c.in.err + } + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(serverFinished, msg) + } + + verify := hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret) + if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) || + subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect") + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal()) + copy(out, verify) + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) readSessionTicket() error { + if !hs.serverHello.ticketSupported { + return nil + } + + c := hs.c + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + sessionTicketMsg, ok := msg.(*newSessionTicketMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(sessionTicketMsg, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(sessionTicketMsg.marshal()) + + hs.session = &ClientSessionState{ + sessionTicket: sessionTicketMsg.ticket, + vers: c.vers, + cipherSuite: hs.suite.id, + masterSecret: hs.masterSecret, + serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates, + verifiedChains: c.verifiedChains, + } + + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) sendFinished(out []byte) error { + c := hs.c + + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil { + return err + } + if hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg { + nextProto := new(nextProtoMsg) + proto, fallback := mutualProtocol(c.config.NextProtos, hs.serverHello.nextProtos) + nextProto.proto = proto + c.clientProtocol = proto + c.clientProtocolFallback = fallback + + hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, nextProto.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + finished := new(finishedMsg) + finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret) + hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + copy(out, finished.verifyData) + return nil +} + +//// tls11SignatureSchemes contains the signature schemes that we synthesise for +//// a TLS <= 1.1 connection, based on the supported certificate types. +//var tls11SignatureSchemes = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512, PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512, PKCS1WithSHA1} +// +//const ( +// // tls11SignatureSchemesNumECDSA is the number of initial elements of +// // tls11SignatureSchemes that use ECDSA. +// tls11SignatureSchemesNumECDSA = 3 +// // tls11SignatureSchemesNumRSA is the number of trailing elements of +// // tls11SignatureSchemes that use RSA. +// tls11SignatureSchemesNumRSA = 4 +//) + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) getCertificate(certReq *certificateRequestMsgGM) (*Certificate, error) { + c := hs.c + + if c.config.GetClientCertificate != nil { + var signatureSchemes []SignatureScheme + + return c.config.GetClientCertificate(&CertificateRequestInfo{ + AcceptableCAs: certReq.certificateAuthorities, + SignatureSchemes: signatureSchemes, + }) + } + + // RFC 4346 on the certificateAuthorities field: A list of the + // distinguished names of acceptable certificate authorities. + // These distinguished names may specify a desired + // distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA; + // thus, this message can be used to describe both known roots + // and a desired authorization space. If the + // certificate_authorities list is empty then the client MAY + // send any certificate of the appropriate + // ClientCertificateType, unless there is some external + // arrangement to the contrary. + + // We need to search our list of client certs for one + // where SignatureAlgorithm is acceptable to the server and the + // Issuer is in certReq.certificateAuthorities +findCert: + for i, chain := range c.config.Certificates { + + for j, cert := range chain.Certificate { + x509Cert := chain.Leaf + // parse the certificate if this isn't the leaf + // node, or if chain.Leaf was nil + if j != 0 || x509Cert == nil { + var err error + if x509Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(cert); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate #" + strconv.Itoa(i) + ": " + err.Error()) + } + } + + switch { + case x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.SM2: + default: + continue findCert + } + + if len(certReq.certificateAuthorities) == 0 { + // they gave us an empty list, so just take the + // first cert from c.config.Certificates + return &chain, nil + } + + for _, ca := range certReq.certificateAuthorities { + if bytes.Equal(x509Cert.RawIssuer, ca) { + return &chain, nil + } + } + } + } + + // No acceptable certificate found. Don't send a certificate. + return new(Certificate), nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_client_double.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_client_double.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34dd887a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_client_double.go @@ -0,0 +1,667 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package gmtls + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/subtle" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "strconv" + "sync/atomic" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2" + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509" +) + +type clientHandshakeStateGM struct { + c *Conn + serverHello *serverHelloMsg + hello *clientHelloMsg + suite *cipherSuite + finishedHash finishedHash + masterSecret []byte + session *ClientSessionState +} + +func makeClientHelloGM(config *Config) (*clientHelloMsg, error) { + if len(config.ServerName) == 0 && !config.InsecureSkipVerify { + return nil, errors.New("tls: either ServerName or InsecureSkipVerify must be specified in the tls.Config") + } + + hello := &clientHelloMsg{ + vers: config.GMSupport.GetVersion(), + compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone}, + random: make([]byte, 32), + serverName: hostnameInSNI(config.ServerName), + } + possibleCipherSuites := getCipherSuites(config) + hello.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(possibleCipherSuites)) + +NextCipherSuite: + for _, suiteId := range possibleCipherSuites { + for _, suite := range config.GMSupport.cipherSuites() { + if suite.id != suiteId { + continue + } + hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, suiteId) + continue NextCipherSuite + } + } + + _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), hello.random) + if err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error()) + } + + return hello, nil +} + +// Does the handshake, either a full one or resumes old session. +// Requires hs.c, hs.hello, and, optionally, hs.session to be set. +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) handshake() error { + c := hs.c + + // send ClientHello + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + var ok bool + if hs.serverHello, ok = msg.(*serverHelloMsg); !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(hs.serverHello, msg) + } + + if hs.serverHello.vers != VersionGMSSL { + hs.c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: server selected unsupported protocol version %x, while expecting %x", hs.serverHello.vers, VersionGMSSL) + } + + if err = hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil { + return err + } + + isResume, err := hs.processServerHello() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHashGM(hs.suite) + + // No signatures of the handshake are needed in a resumption. + // Otherwise, in a full handshake, if we don't have any certificates + // configured then we will never send a CertificateVerify message and + // thus no signatures are needed in that case either. + if isResume || (len(c.config.Certificates) == 0 && c.config.GetClientCertificate == nil) { + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal()) + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal()) + + c.buffering = true + if isResume { + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false + if err := hs.sendFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + } else { + if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.sendFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true + if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random) + c.didResume = isResume + atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1) + + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) pickCipherSuite() error { + if hs.suite = mutualCipherSuiteGM(hs.hello.cipherSuites, hs.serverHello.cipherSuite); hs.suite == nil { + hs.c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return errors.New("tls: server chose an unconfigured cipher suite") + } + + hs.c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) doFullHandshake() error { + c := hs.c + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg) + if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg) + } + + // mod by syl only one cert + // Thanks to dual certificates mechanism, length of certificates in GMT0024 must great than 2 + if len(certMsg.certificates) < 2 { + c.sendAlert(alertInsufficientSecurity) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: length of certificates in GMT0024 must great than 2") + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) + + if c.handshakes == 0 { + // If this is the first handshake on a connection, process and + // (optionally) verify the server's certificates. + certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates)) + for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates { + cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return errors.New("tls: failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error()) + } + + pubKey, _ := cert.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey) + if pubKey.Curve != sm2.P256Sm2() { + c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: pubkey type of cert is error, expect sm2.publicKey") + } + + //cert[0] is for signature while cert[1] is for encipher, refer to GMT0024 + //check key usage + switch i { + case 0: + if cert.KeyUsage == 0 || (cert.KeyUsage&(x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature|cert.KeyUsage&x509.KeyUsageContentCommitment)) == 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertInsufficientSecurity) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: the keyusage of cert[0] does not exist or is not for KeyUsageDigitalSignature/KeyUsageContentCommitment, value:%d", cert.KeyUsage) + } + case 1: + if cert.KeyUsage == 0 || (cert.KeyUsage&(x509.KeyUsageDataEncipherment|x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment|x509.KeyUsageKeyAgreement)) == 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertInsufficientSecurity) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: the keyusage of cert[1] does not exist or is not for KeyUsageDataEncipherment/KeyUsageKeyEncipherment/KeyUsageKeyAgreement, value:%d", cert.KeyUsage) + } + } + + certs[i] = cert + } + + if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify { + opts := x509.VerifyOptions{ + Roots: c.config.RootCAs, + CurrentTime: c.config.time(), + DNSName: c.config.ServerName, + Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(), + } + if opts.Roots == nil { + opts.Roots = x509.NewCertPool() + } + + for _, rootca := range getCAs() { + opts.Roots.AddCert(rootca) + } + for i, cert := range certs { + // GM SSL 证书链中不含根证书 第1张为签名证书、第2张为加密证书，其他的证书都认为是根证书 + if i == 0 || i == 1 { + // 只验证 签名证书 和 加密证书 + c.verifiedChains, err = certs[i].Verify(opts) + if err != nil { + _ = c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return err + } + continue + } + opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert) + } + + } + + if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil { + if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certMsg.certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return err + } + } + + switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) { + case *sm2.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey: + break + default: + c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: server's certificate contains an unsupported type of public key: %T", certs[0].PublicKey) + } + + c.peerCertificates = certs + } else { + // This is a renegotiation handshake. We require that the + // server's identity (i.e. leaf certificate) is unchanged and + // thus any previous trust decision is still valid. + // + // See https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE for the + // motivation behind this requirement. + if !bytes.Equal(c.peerCertificates[0].Raw, certMsg.certificates[0]) { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return errors.New("tls: server's identity changed during renegotiation") + } + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers) + if ka, ok := keyAgreement.(*eccKeyAgreementGM); ok { + ka.encipherCert = c.peerCertificates[1] + } + + skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg) + if ok { + hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal()) + err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, c.peerCertificates[0], skx) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return err + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + var chainToSend *Certificate + var certRequested bool + certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsgGM) + if ok { + certRequested = true + hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal()) + + if chainToSend, err = hs.getCertificate(certReq); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(shd, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal()) + + // If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a + // Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a + // certificate to send. + if certRequested { + certMsg = new(certificateMsg) + certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate + hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, c.peerCertificates[1]) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + if ckx != nil { + hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + if chainToSend != nil && len(chainToSend.Certificate) > 0 { + certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{} + + key, ok := chainToSend.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", chainToSend.PrivateKey) + } + + digest := hs.finishedHash.client.Sum(nil) + + certVerify.signature, err = key.Sign(c.config.rand(), digest, nil) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random) + if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(hs.hello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return errors.New("tls: failed to write to key log: " + err.Error()) + } + + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) establishKeys() error { + c := hs.c + + clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV := + keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen) + var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{} + var clientHash, serverHash macFunction + if hs.suite.cipher != nil { + clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */) + clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC) + serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */) + serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC) + } else { + clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV) + serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV) + } + + c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash) + c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash) + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) serverResumedSession() bool { + // If the server responded with the same sessionId then it means the + // sessionTicket is being used to resume a TLS session. + return hs.session != nil && hs.hello.sessionId != nil && + bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.sessionId, hs.hello.sessionId) +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) processServerHello() (bool, error) { + c := hs.c + + if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return false, errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format") + } + + if c.handshakes == 0 && hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiationSupported { + c.secureRenegotiation = true + if len(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension") + } + } + + if c.handshakes > 0 && c.secureRenegotiation { + var expectedSecureRenegotiation [24]byte + copy(expectedSecureRenegotiation[:], c.clientFinished[:]) + copy(expectedSecureRenegotiation[12:], c.serverFinished[:]) + if !bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation, expectedSecureRenegotiation[:]) { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: incorrect renegotiation extension contents") + } + } + + clientDidNPN := hs.hello.nextProtoNeg + clientDidALPN := len(hs.hello.alpnProtocols) > 0 + serverHasNPN := hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg + serverHasALPN := len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) > 0 + + if !clientDidNPN && serverHasNPN { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server advertised unrequested NPN extension") + } + + if !clientDidALPN && serverHasALPN { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server advertised unrequested ALPN extension") + } + + if serverHasNPN && serverHasALPN { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server advertised both NPN and ALPN extensions") + } + + if serverHasALPN { + c.clientProtocol = hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol + c.clientProtocolFallback = false + } + c.scts = hs.serverHello.scts + + if !hs.serverResumedSession() { + return false, nil + } + + if hs.session.vers != c.vers { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server resumed a session with a different version") + } + + if hs.session.cipherSuite != hs.suite.id { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server resumed a session with a different cipher suite") + } + + // Restore masterSecret and peerCerts from previous state + hs.masterSecret = hs.session.masterSecret + c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates + c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains + return true, nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) readFinished(out []byte) error { + c := hs.c + + c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec) + if c.in.err != nil { + return c.in.err + } + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(serverFinished, msg) + } + + verify := hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret) + if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) || + subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect") + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal()) + copy(out, verify) + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) readSessionTicket() error { + if !hs.serverHello.ticketSupported { + return nil + } + + c := hs.c + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + sessionTicketMsg, ok := msg.(*newSessionTicketMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(sessionTicketMsg, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(sessionTicketMsg.marshal()) + + hs.session = &ClientSessionState{ + sessionTicket: sessionTicketMsg.ticket, + vers: c.vers, + cipherSuite: hs.suite.id, + masterSecret: hs.masterSecret, + serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates, + verifiedChains: c.verifiedChains, + } + + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) sendFinished(out []byte) error { + c := hs.c + + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil { + return err + } + if hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg { + nextProto := new(nextProtoMsg) + proto, fallback := mutualProtocol(c.config.NextProtos, hs.serverHello.nextProtos) + nextProto.proto = proto + c.clientProtocol = proto + c.clientProtocolFallback = fallback + + hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, nextProto.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + finished := new(finishedMsg) + finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret) + hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + copy(out, finished.verifyData) + return nil +} + +//// tls11SignatureSchemes contains the signature schemes that we synthesise for +//// a TLS <= 1.1 connection, based on the supported certificate types. +//var tls11SignatureSchemes = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512, PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512, PKCS1WithSHA1} +// +//const ( +// // tls11SignatureSchemesNumECDSA is the number of initial elements of +// // tls11SignatureSchemes that use ECDSA. +// tls11SignatureSchemesNumECDSA = 3 +// // tls11SignatureSchemesNumRSA is the number of trailing elements of +// // tls11SignatureSchemes that use RSA. +// tls11SignatureSchemesNumRSA = 4 +//) + +func (hs *clientHandshakeStateGM) getCertificate(certReq *certificateRequestMsgGM) (*Certificate, error) { + c := hs.c + + if c.config.GetClientCertificate != nil { + var signatureSchemes []SignatureScheme + + return c.config.GetClientCertificate(&CertificateRequestInfo{ + AcceptableCAs: certReq.certificateAuthorities, + SignatureSchemes: signatureSchemes, + }) + } + + // RFC 4346 on the certificateAuthorities field: A list of the + // distinguished names of acceptable certificate authorities. + // These distinguished names may specify a desired + // distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA; + // thus, this message can be used to describe both known roots + // and a desired authorization space. If the + // certificate_authorities list is empty then the client MAY + // send any certificate of the appropriate + // ClientCertificateType, unless there is some external + // arrangement to the contrary. + + // We need to search our list of client certs for one + // where SignatureAlgorithm is acceptable to the server and the + // Issuer is in certReq.certificateAuthorities +findCert: + for i, chain := range c.config.Certificates { + + for j, cert := range chain.Certificate { + x509Cert := chain.Leaf + // parse the certificate if this isn't the leaf + // node, or if chain.Leaf was nil + if j != 0 || x509Cert == nil { + var err error + if x509Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(cert); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate #" + strconv.Itoa(i) + ": " + err.Error()) + } + } + + var isGMCert bool + + if x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.ECDSA { + pubKey, ok := x509Cert.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey) + if ok && pubKey.Curve == sm2.P256Sm2() { + isGMCert = true + } + } + + if !isGMCert { + continue findCert + } + + if len(certReq.certificateAuthorities) == 0 { + // they gave us an empty list, so just take the + // first cert from c.config.Certificates + return &chain, nil + } + + for _, ca := range certReq.certificateAuthorities { + if bytes.Equal(x509Cert.RawIssuer, ca) { + return &chain, nil + } + } + } + } + + // No acceptable certificate found. Don't send a certificate. + return new(Certificate), nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_messages.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_messages.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3704e582 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_messages.go @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package gmtls + +import "bytes" + +type certificateRequestMsgGM struct { + raw []byte + + certificateTypes []byte + certificateAuthorities [][]byte +} + +func (m *certificateRequestMsgGM) equal(i interface{}) bool { + m1, ok := i.(*certificateRequestMsgGM) + if !ok { + return false + } + + return bytes.Equal(m.raw, m1.raw) && + bytes.Equal(m.certificateTypes, m1.certificateTypes) && + eqByteSlices(m.certificateAuthorities, m1.certificateAuthorities) +} + +func (m *certificateRequestMsgGM) marshal() (x []byte) { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346#section-7.4.4 + length := 1 + len(m.certificateTypes) + 2 + casLength := 0 + for _, ca := range m.certificateAuthorities { + casLength += 2 + len(ca) + } + length += casLength + + x = make([]byte, 4+length) + x[0] = typeCertificateRequest + x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) + x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) + x[3] = uint8(length) + + x[4] = uint8(len(m.certificateTypes)) + + copy(x[5:], m.certificateTypes) + y := x[5+len(m.certificateTypes):] + + y[0] = uint8(casLength >> 8) + y[1] = uint8(casLength) + y = y[2:] + for _, ca := range m.certificateAuthorities { + y[0] = uint8(len(ca) >> 8) + y[1] = uint8(len(ca)) + y = y[2:] + copy(y, ca) + y = y[len(ca):] + } + + m.raw = x + return +} + +func (m *certificateRequestMsgGM) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + + if len(data) < 5 { + return false + } + + length := uint32(data[1])<<16 | uint32(data[2])<<8 | uint32(data[3]) + if uint32(len(data))-4 != length { + return false + } + + numCertTypes := int(data[4]) + data = data[5:] + if numCertTypes == 0 || len(data) <= numCertTypes { + return false + } + + m.certificateTypes = make([]byte, numCertTypes) + if copy(m.certificateTypes, data) != numCertTypes { + return false + } + + data = data[numCertTypes:] + + if len(data) < 2 { + return false + } + casLength := uint16(data[0])<<8 | uint16(data[1]) + data = data[2:] + if len(data) < int(casLength) { + return false + } + cas := make([]byte, casLength) + copy(cas, data) + data = data[casLength:] + + m.certificateAuthorities = nil + for len(cas) > 0 { + if len(cas) < 2 { + return false + } + caLen := uint16(cas[0])<<8 | uint16(cas[1]) + cas = cas[2:] + + if len(cas) < int(caLen) { + return false + } + + m.certificateAuthorities = append(m.certificateAuthorities, cas[:caLen]) + cas = cas[caLen:] + } + + return len(data) == 0 +} + diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_server.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_server.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c02c5b86 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_server.go @@ -0,0 +1,764 @@ +// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build single_cert + +package gmtls + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/subtle" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "sync/atomic" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2" + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509" +) + +// serverHandshakeStateGM contains details of a server handshake in progress. +// It's discarded once the handshake has completed. +type serverHandshakeStateGM struct { + c *Conn + clientHello *clientHelloMsg + hello *serverHelloMsg + suite *cipherSuite + sessionState *sessionState + finishedHash finishedHash + masterSecret []byte + certsFromClient [][]byte + cert *Certificate + cachedClientHelloInfo *ClientHelloInfo +} + +// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server. +func (c *Conn) serverHandshakeGM() error { + // If this is the first server handshake, we generate a random key to + // encrypt the tickets with. + c.config.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { c.config.serverInit(nil) }) + + hs := serverHandshakeStateGM{ + c: c, + } + isResume, err := hs.readClientHello() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + // For an overview of TLS handshaking, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.3 + c.buffering = true + if isResume { + // The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake. + if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + // ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the + // ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session + // ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent. + if hs.hello.ticketSupported { + if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false + if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil { + return err + } + c.didResume = true + } else { + // The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't + // valid so we do a full handshake. + if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true + c.buffering = true + if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random) + atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1) + + return nil +} + +// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message from the client and decides +// whether we will perform session resumption. +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) readClientHello() (isResume bool, err error) { + c := hs.c + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + var ok bool + hs.clientHello, ok = msg.(*clientHelloMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return false, unexpectedMessageError(hs.clientHello, msg) + } + + if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil { + if newConfig, err := c.config.GetConfigForClient(hs.clientHelloInfo()); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, err + } else if newConfig != nil { + newConfig.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { newConfig.serverInit(c.config) }) + c.config = newConfig + } + } + + c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(hs.clientHello.vers) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) + return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered an unsupported, maximum protocol version of %x", hs.clientHello.vers) + } + c.haveVers = true + + hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg) + + //supportedCurve := false + // preferredCurves := c.config.curvePreferences() + //Curves: + // for _, curve := range hs.clientHello.supportedCurves { + // for _, supported := range preferredCurves { + // if supported == curve { + // supportedCurve = true + // break Curves + // } + // } + // } + // + // supportedPointFormat := false + // for _, pointFormat := range hs.clientHello.supportedPoints { + // if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed { + // supportedPointFormat = true + // break + // } + // } + // hs.ellipticOk = supportedCurve && supportedPointFormat + + foundCompression := false + // We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it. + for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods { + if compression == compressionNone { + foundCompression = true + break + } + } + + if !foundCompression { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections") + } + + hs.hello.vers = c.vers + hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32) + _, err = io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hs.hello.random) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, err + } + + if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension") + } + + hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported + hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone + if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 { + c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName + } + + if len(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) > 0 { + if selectedProto, fallback := mutualProtocol(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, c.config.NextProtos); !fallback { + hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto + c.clientProtocol = selectedProto + } + } else { + // Although sending an empty NPN extension is reasonable, Firefox has + // had a bug around this. Best to send nothing at all if + // c.config.NextProtos is empty. See + // https://golang.org/issue/5445. + if hs.clientHello.nextProtoNeg && len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0 { + hs.hello.nextProtoNeg = true + hs.hello.nextProtos = c.config.NextProtos + } + } + + hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(hs.clientHelloInfo()) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, err + } + // GMT0024 + // mod by syl just for test change two certs into one cert + //if len(hs.cert.Certificate) < 2 { + // c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + // return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: amount of server certificates must be greater than 2, which will sign and encipher respectively") + //} + if len(hs.cert.Certificate) < 1 { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: amount of server certificates must be greater than 0") + } + if hs.clientHello.scts { + hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps + } + + if hs.checkForResumption() { + return true, nil + } + + var preferenceList, supportedList []uint16 + if c.config.PreferServerCipherSuites { + preferenceList = getCipherSuites(c.config) + supportedList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites + } else { + preferenceList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites + supportedList = getCipherSuites(c.config) + } + + for _, id := range preferenceList { + if hs.setCipherSuite(id, supportedList, c.vers) { + break + } + } + + if hs.suite == nil { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server") + } + + // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7507. + for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites { + if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV { + // The client is doing a fallback connection. + if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxVersion() { + c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback) + return false, errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback") + } + break + } + } + + return false, nil +} + +// checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection. +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) checkForResumption() bool { + c := hs.c + + if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled { + return false + } + + var ok bool + var sessionTicket = append([]uint8{}, hs.clientHello.sessionTicket...) + if hs.sessionState, ok = c.decryptTicket(sessionTicket); !ok { + return false + } + + // Never resume a session for a different TLS version. + if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers { + return false + } + + cipherSuiteOk := false + // Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session. + for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites { + if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite { + cipherSuiteOk = true + break + } + } + if !cipherSuiteOk { + return false + } + + // Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session. + if !hs.setCipherSuite(hs.sessionState.cipherSuite, c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.sessionState.vers) { + return false + } + + sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0 + needClientCerts := c.config.ClientAuth == RequireAnyClientCert || c.config.ClientAuth == RequireAndVerifyClientCert + if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts { + return false + } + if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert { + return false + } + + return true +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) doResumeHandshake() error { + c := hs.c + + hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id + // We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know + // that we're doing a resumption. + hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId + hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey + hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite) + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal()) + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + if len(hs.sessionState.certificates) > 0 { + if _, err := hs.processCertsFromClient(hs.sessionState.certificates); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret + + return nil +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) doFullHandshake() error { + c := hs.c + + if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 { + hs.hello.ocspStapling = true + } + + hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled + hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id + + hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHashGM(hs.suite) + if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert { + // No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client + // certificates won't be used. + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal()) + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + certMsg := new(certificateMsg) + certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate + hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + if hs.hello.ocspStapling { + certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg) + certStatus.statusType = statusTypeOCSP + certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple + hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers) + skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return err + } + if skx != nil { + hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert { + // Request a client certificate + certReq := new(certificateRequestMsgGM) + certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{ + byte(certTypeRSASign), + byte(certTypeECDSASign), + } + //if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 { + // certReq.hasSignatureAndHash = true + // certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms + //} + + // An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to + // the client that it may send any certificate in response + // to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then + // we can send them down, so that the client can choose + // an appropriate certificate to give to us. + if c.config.ClientCAs != nil { + certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects() + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg) + hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + + var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + fmt.Println("readHandshake error:", err) + return err + } + + var ok bool + // If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a + // certificate message, even if it's empty. + if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert { + if certMsg, ok = msg.(*certificateMsg); !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) + + if len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 { + // The client didn't actually send a certificate + switch c.config.ClientAuth { + case RequireAnyClientCert, RequireAndVerifyClientCert: + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate") + } + } + + pub, err = hs.processCertsFromClient(certMsg.certificates) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + // Get client key exchange + ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal()) + + preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return err + } + hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random) + if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + + // If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message, + // the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the + // clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding + // handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding + // to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in + // possession of the private key of the certificate. + if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 { + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg) + } + + // Determine the signature type. + _, sigType, hashFunc, err := pickSignatureAlgorithm(pub, []SignatureScheme{certVerify.signatureAlgorithm}, supportedSignatureAlgorithms, c.vers) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) + return err + } + + var digest []byte + if digest, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, hashFunc, hs.masterSecret); err == nil { + err = verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, pub, hashFunc, digest, certVerify.signature) + } + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return errors.New("tls: could not validate signature of connection nonces: " + err.Error()) + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal()) + } + + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + + return nil +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) establishKeys() error { + c := hs.c + + clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV := + keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen) + + var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{} + var clientHash, serverHash macFunction + + if hs.suite.aead == nil { + clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */) + clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC) + serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */) + serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC) + } else { + clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV) + serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV) + } + + c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash) + c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash) + + return nil +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) readFinished(out []byte) error { + c := hs.c + + c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec) + if c.in.err != nil { + return c.in.err + } + + if hs.hello.nextProtoNeg { + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + nextProto, ok := msg.(*nextProtoMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(nextProto, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal()) + c.clientProtocol = nextProto.proto + } + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg) + } + + verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret) + if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) || + subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect") + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal()) + copy(out, verify) + return nil +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) sendSessionTicket() error { + if !hs.hello.ticketSupported { + return nil + } + + c := hs.c + m := new(newSessionTicketMsg) + + var err error + state := sessionState{ + vers: c.vers, + cipherSuite: hs.suite.id, + masterSecret: hs.masterSecret, + certificates: hs.certsFromClient, + } + m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(&state) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + return nil +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) sendFinished(out []byte) error { + c := hs.c + + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil { + return err + } + + finished := new(finishedMsg) + finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret) + hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id + copy(out, finished.verifyData) + + return nil +} + +// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a +// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns +// the public key of the leaf certificate. +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) processCertsFromClient(certificates [][]byte) (crypto.PublicKey, error) { + c := hs.c + + hs.certsFromClient = certificates + certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates)) + var err error + for i, asn1Data := range certificates { + if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error()) + } + } + + if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 { + opts := x509.VerifyOptions{ + Roots: c.config.ClientCAs, + CurrentTime: c.config.time(), + Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(), + KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth}, + } + + for _, cert := range certs[1:] { + opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert) + } + + chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to verify client's certificate: " + err.Error()) + } + + c.verifiedChains = chains + } + + if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil { + if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return nil, err + } + } + + if len(certs) == 0 { + return nil, nil + } + + var pub crypto.PublicKey + switch key := certs[0].PublicKey.(type) { + case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey, *sm2.PublicKey: + pub = key + default: + c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate) + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client's certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey) + } + c.peerCertificates = certs + return pub, nil +} + +// setCipherSuite sets a cipherSuite with the given id as the serverHandshakeStateGM +// suite if that cipher suite is acceptable to use. +// It returns a bool indicating if the suite was set. +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) setCipherSuite(id uint16, supportedCipherSuites []uint16, version uint16) bool { + for _, supported := range supportedCipherSuites { + if id == supported { + var candidate *cipherSuite + + for _, s := range gmCipherSuites { + if s.id == id { + candidate = s + break + } + } + if candidate == nil { + continue + } + if version < VersionTLS12 && candidate.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 { + continue + } + hs.suite = candidate + return true + } + } + return false +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) clientHelloInfo() *ClientHelloInfo { + if hs.cachedClientHelloInfo != nil { + return hs.cachedClientHelloInfo + } + + var supportedVersions []uint16 + if hs.clientHello.vers > VersionTLS12 { + supportedVersions = suppVersArray[:] + } else if hs.clientHello.vers >= VersionSSL30 { + supportedVersions = suppVersArray[VersionTLS12-hs.clientHello.vers:] + } + + hs.cachedClientHelloInfo = &ClientHelloInfo{ + CipherSuites: hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, + ServerName: hs.clientHello.serverName, + SupportedCurves: hs.clientHello.supportedCurves, + SupportedPoints: hs.clientHello.supportedPoints, + SignatureSchemes: hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, + SupportedProtos: hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, + SupportedVersions: supportedVersions, + Conn: hs.c.conn, + } + + return hs.cachedClientHelloInfo +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_server_double.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_server_double.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..52341537 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_handshake_server_double.go @@ -0,0 +1,745 @@ +// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !single_cert + +package gmtls + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/subtle" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "sync/atomic" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2" + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509" +) + +// serverHandshakeStateGM contains details of a server handshake in progress. +// It's discarded once the handshake has completed. +type serverHandshakeStateGM struct { + c *Conn + clientHello *clientHelloMsg + hello *serverHelloMsg + suite *cipherSuite + sessionState *sessionState + finishedHash finishedHash + masterSecret []byte + certsFromClient [][]byte + cert []Certificate + cachedClientHelloInfo *ClientHelloInfo +} + +// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server. +func (c *Conn) serverHandshakeGM() error { + // If this is the first server handshake, we generate a random key to + // encrypt the tickets with. + c.config.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { c.config.serverInit(nil) }) + + hs := serverHandshakeStateGM{ + c: c, + } + isResume, err := hs.readClientHello() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + // For an overview of TLS handshaking, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.3 + c.buffering = true + if isResume { + // The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake. + if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + // ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the + // ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session + // ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent. + if hs.hello.ticketSupported { + if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false + if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil { + return err + } + c.didResume = true + } else { + // The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't + // valid so we do a full handshake. + if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true + c.buffering = true + if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random) + atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1) + + return nil +} + +// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message from the client and decides +// whether we will perform session resumption. +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) readClientHello() (isResume bool, err error) { + c := hs.c + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + var ok bool + hs.clientHello, ok = msg.(*clientHelloMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return false, unexpectedMessageError(hs.clientHello, msg) + } + + if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil { + if newConfig, err := c.config.GetConfigForClient(hs.clientHelloInfo()); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, err + } else if newConfig != nil { + newConfig.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { newConfig.serverInit(c.config) }) + c.config = newConfig + } + } + + c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(hs.clientHello.vers) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) + return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered an unsupported, maximum protocol version of %x", hs.clientHello.vers) + } + c.haveVers = true + + hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg) + + foundCompression := false + // We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it. + for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods { + if compression == compressionNone { + foundCompression = true + break + } + } + + if !foundCompression { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections") + } + + hs.hello.vers = c.vers + hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32) + _, err = io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hs.hello.random) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, err + } + + if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension") + } + + hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported + hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone + if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 { + c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName + } + + if len(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) > 0 { + if selectedProto, fallback := mutualProtocol(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, c.config.NextProtos); !fallback { + hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto + c.clientProtocol = selectedProto + } + } else { + // Although sending an empty NPN extension is reasonable, Firefox has + // had a bug around this. Best to send nothing at all if + // c.config.NextProtos is empty. See + // https://golang.org/issue/5445. + if hs.clientHello.nextProtoNeg && len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0 { + hs.hello.nextProtoNeg = true + hs.hello.nextProtos = c.config.NextProtos + } + } + + // just for test + c.config.getCertificate(hs.clientHelloInfo()) + hs.cert = c.config.Certificates + + // GMT0024 + if len(hs.cert) < 2 { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: amount of server certificates must be greater than 2, which will sign and encipher respectively") + } + + if hs.clientHello.scts { + hs.hello.scts = hs.cert[0].SignedCertificateTimestamps + } + + if hs.checkForResumption() { + return true, nil + } + + var preferenceList, supportedList []uint16 + if c.config.PreferServerCipherSuites { + preferenceList = getCipherSuites(c.config) + supportedList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites + } else { + preferenceList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites + supportedList = getCipherSuites(c.config) + } + + for _, id := range preferenceList { + if hs.setCipherSuite(id, supportedList, c.vers) { + break + } + } + + if hs.suite == nil { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server") + } + + // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7507. + for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites { + if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV { + // The client is doing a fallback connection. + if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxVersion() { + c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback) + return false, errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback") + } + break + } + } + + return false, nil +} + +// checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection. +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) checkForResumption() bool { + c := hs.c + + if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled { + return false + } + + var ok bool + var sessionTicket = append([]uint8{}, hs.clientHello.sessionTicket...) + if hs.sessionState, ok = c.decryptTicket(sessionTicket); !ok { + return false + } + + // Never resume a session for a different TLS version. + if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers { + return false + } + + cipherSuiteOk := false + // Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session. + for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites { + if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite { + cipherSuiteOk = true + break + } + } + if !cipherSuiteOk { + return false + } + + // Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session. + if !hs.setCipherSuite(hs.sessionState.cipherSuite, c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.sessionState.vers) { + return false + } + + sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0 + needClientCerts := c.config.ClientAuth == RequireAnyClientCert || c.config.ClientAuth == RequireAndVerifyClientCert + if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts { + return false + } + if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert { + return false + } + + return true +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) doResumeHandshake() error { + c := hs.c + + hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id + // We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know + // that we're doing a resumption. + hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId + hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey + hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite) + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal()) + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + if len(hs.sessionState.certificates) > 0 { + if _, err := hs.processCertsFromClient(hs.sessionState.certificates); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret + + return nil +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) doFullHandshake() error { + c := hs.c + + if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert[0].OCSPStaple) > 0 { + hs.hello.ocspStapling = true + } + + hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled + hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id + + hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHashGM(hs.suite) + if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert { + // No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client + // certificates won't be used. + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal()) + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + certMsg := new(certificateMsg) + //certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate + for i := 0; i < len(hs.cert); i++ { + certMsg.certificates = append(certMsg.certificates, hs.cert[i].Certificate...) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + if hs.hello.ocspStapling { + certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg) + certStatus.statusType = statusTypeOCSP + certStatus.response = hs.cert[0].OCSPStaple + hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers) + skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, &hs.cert[0], &hs.cert[1], hs.clientHello, hs.hello) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return err + } + if skx != nil { + hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert { + // Request a client certificate + certReq := new(certificateRequestMsgGM) + certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{ + byte(certTypeRSASign), + byte(certTypeECDSASign), + } + //if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 { + // certReq.hasSignatureAndHash = true + // certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms + //} + + // An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to + // the client that it may send any certificate in response + // to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then + // we can send them down, so that the client can choose + // an appropriate certificate to give to us. + if c.config.ClientCAs != nil { + certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects() + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg) + hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + + var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + fmt.Println("readHandshake error:", err) + return err + } + + var ok bool + // If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a + // certificate message, even if it's empty. + if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert { + if certMsg, ok = msg.(*certificateMsg); !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) + + if len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 { + // The client didn't actually send a certificate + switch c.config.ClientAuth { + case RequireAnyClientCert, RequireAndVerifyClientCert: + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate") + } + } + + pub, err = hs.processCertsFromClient(certMsg.certificates) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + // Get client key exchange + ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal()) + + preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, &hs.cert[1], ckx, c.vers) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return err + } + hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random) + if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + + // If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message, + // the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the + // clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding + // handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding + // to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in + // possession of the private key of the certificate. + if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 { + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg) + } + + // Determine the signature type. + _, sigType, hashFunc, err := pickSignatureAlgorithm(pub, []SignatureScheme{certVerify.signatureAlgorithm}, supportedSignatureAlgorithms, c.vers) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) + return err + } + + var digest []byte + if digest, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, hashFunc, hs.masterSecret); err == nil { + err = verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, pub, hashFunc, digest, certVerify.signature) + } + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return errors.New("tls: could not validate signature of connection nonces: " + err.Error()) + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal()) + } + + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + + return nil +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) establishKeys() error { + c := hs.c + + clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV := + keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen) + + var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{} + var clientHash, serverHash macFunction + + if hs.suite.aead == nil { + clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */) + clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC) + serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */) + serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC) + } else { + clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV) + serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV) + } + + c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash) + c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash) + + return nil +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) readFinished(out []byte) error { + c := hs.c + + c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec) + if c.in.err != nil { + return c.in.err + } + + if hs.hello.nextProtoNeg { + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + nextProto, ok := msg.(*nextProtoMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(nextProto, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal()) + c.clientProtocol = nextProto.proto + } + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg) + } + + verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret) + if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) || + subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect") + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal()) + copy(out, verify) + return nil +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) sendSessionTicket() error { + if !hs.hello.ticketSupported { + return nil + } + + c := hs.c + m := new(newSessionTicketMsg) + + var err error + state := sessionState{ + vers: c.vers, + cipherSuite: hs.suite.id, + masterSecret: hs.masterSecret, + certificates: hs.certsFromClient, + } + m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(&state) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + return nil +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) sendFinished(out []byte) error { + c := hs.c + + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil { + return err + } + + finished := new(finishedMsg) + finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret) + hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id + copy(out, finished.verifyData) + + return nil +} + +// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a +// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns +// the public key of the leaf certificate. +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) processCertsFromClient(certificates [][]byte) (crypto.PublicKey, error) { + c := hs.c + + hs.certsFromClient = certificates + certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates)) + var err error + for i, asn1Data := range certificates { + if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error()) + } + } + + if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 { + opts := x509.VerifyOptions{ + Roots: c.config.ClientCAs, + CurrentTime: c.config.time(), + Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(), + KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth}, + } + + for _, cert := range certs[1:] { + opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert) + } + + chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to verify client's certificate: " + err.Error()) + } + + c.verifiedChains = chains + } + + if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil { + if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return nil, err + } + } + + if len(certs) == 0 { + return nil, nil + } + + var pub crypto.PublicKey + switch key := certs[0].PublicKey.(type) { + case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey, *sm2.PublicKey: + pub = key + default: + c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate) + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client's certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey) + } + c.peerCertificates = certs + return pub, nil +} + +// setCipherSuite sets a cipherSuite with the given id as the serverHandshakeStateGM +// suite if that cipher suite is acceptable to use. +// It returns a bool indicating if the suite was set. +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) setCipherSuite(id uint16, supportedCipherSuites []uint16, version uint16) bool { + for _, supported := range supportedCipherSuites { + if id == supported { + var candidate *cipherSuite + + for _, s := range gmCipherSuites { + if s.id == id { + candidate = s + break + } + } + if candidate == nil { + continue + } + if version < VersionTLS12 && candidate.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 { + continue + } + hs.suite = candidate + return true + } + } + return false +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeStateGM) clientHelloInfo() *ClientHelloInfo { + if hs.cachedClientHelloInfo != nil { + return hs.cachedClientHelloInfo + } + // GM握手实现只需要支持 GMSSL版本就可以 + supportedVersions := []uint16{VersionGMSSL} + + //var supportedVersions []uint16 + //if hs.clientHello.vers > VersionTLS12 { + // supportedVersions = suppVersArray[:] + //} else if hs.clientHello.vers >= VersionSSL30 { + // supportedVersions = suppVersArray[VersionTLS12-hs.clientHello.vers:] + //}else{ + // + //} + + hs.cachedClientHelloInfo = &ClientHelloInfo{ + CipherSuites: hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, + ServerName: hs.clientHello.serverName, + SupportedCurves: hs.clientHello.supportedCurves, + SupportedPoints: hs.clientHello.supportedPoints, + SignatureSchemes: hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, + SupportedProtos: hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, + SupportedVersions: supportedVersions, + Conn: hs.c.conn, + } + + return hs.cachedClientHelloInfo +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_key_agreement.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_key_agreement.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..60c81367 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_key_agreement.go @@ -0,0 +1,451 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package gmtls + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/elliptic" + "encoding/asn1" + "errors" + "io" + "math/big" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2" + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" +) + +//// hashForServerKeyExchange hashes the given slices and returns their digest +//// using the given hash function (for >= TLS 1.2) or using a default based on +//// the sigType (for earlier TLS versions). +//func hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType uint8, hashFunc crypto.Hash, version uint16, slices ...[]byte) ([]byte, error) { +// if version >= VersionTLS12 { +// h := hashFunc.New() +// for _, slice := range slices { +// h.Write(slice) +// } +// digest := h.Sum(nil) +// return digest, nil +// } +// if sigType == signatureECDSA { +// return sha1Hash(slices), nil +// } +// return md5SHA1Hash(slices), nil +//} +// +//func curveForCurveID(id CurveID) (elliptic.Curve, bool) { +// switch id { +// case CurveP256: +// return elliptic.P256(), true +// case CurveP384: +// return elliptic.P384(), true +// case CurveP521: +// return elliptic.P521(), true +// default: +// return nil, false +// } +// +//} + +// ecdheKeyAgreementGM implements a TLS key agreement where the server +// generates an ephemeral SM2 public/private key pair and signs it. The +// pre-master secret is then calculated using ECDH. +type ecdheKeyAgreementGM struct { + version uint16 + privateKey []byte + curveid CurveID + + // publicKey is used to store the peer's public value when X25519 is + // being used. + publicKey []byte + // x and y are used to store the peer's public value when one of the + // NIST curves is being used. + x, y *big.Int +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreementGM) generateServerKeyExchange(config *Config, signCert, cipherCert *Certificate, + clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + panic("") + // preferredCurves := config.curvePreferences() + // + //NextCandidate: + // for _, candidate := range preferredCurves { + // for _, c := range clientHello.supportedCurves { + // if candidate == c { + // ka.curveid = c + // break NextCandidate + // } + // } + // } + // + // if ka.curveid == 0 { + // return nil, errors.New("tls: no supported elliptic curves offered") + // } + // + // var ecdhePublic []byte + // + // if ka.curveid == X25519 { + // var scalar, public [32]byte + // if _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), scalar[:]); err != nil { + // return nil, err + // } + // + // curve25519.ScalarBaseMult(&public, &scalar) + // ka.privateKey = scalar[:] + // ecdhePublic = public[:] + // } else { + // curve, ok := curveForCurveID(ka.curveid) + // if !ok { + // return nil, errors.New("tls: preferredCurves includes unsupported curve") + // } + // + // var x, y *big.Int + // var err error + // ka.privateKey, x, y, err = elliptic.GenerateKey(curve, config.rand()) + // if err != nil { + // return nil, err + // } + // ecdhePublic = elliptic.Marshal(curve, x, y) + // } + // + // // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.4 + // serverECDHParams := make([]byte, 1+2+1+len(ecdhePublic)) + // serverECDHParams[0] = 3 // named curve + // serverECDHParams[1] = byte(ka.curveid >> 8) + // serverECDHParams[2] = byte(ka.curveid) + // serverECDHParams[3] = byte(len(ecdhePublic)) + // copy(serverECDHParams[4:], ecdhePublic) + // + // priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) + // if !ok { + // return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer") + // } + // + // signatureAlgorithm, sigType, hashFunc, err := pickSignatureAlgorithm(priv.Public(), clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, supportedSignatureAlgorithms, ka.version) + // if err != nil { + // return nil, err + // } + // if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA { + // return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate cannot be used with the selected cipher suite") + // } + // + // digest, err := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, hashFunc, ka.version, clientHello.random, hello.random, serverECDHParams) + // if err != nil { + // return nil, err + // } + // + // signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(hashFunc) + // if sigType == signatureRSAPSS { + // signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: hashFunc} + // } + // sig, err := priv.Sign(config.rand(), digest, signOpts) + // if err != nil { + // return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to sign ECDHE parameters: " + err.Error()) + // } + // + // skx := new(serverKeyExchangeMsg) + // sigAndHashLen := 0 + // if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { + // sigAndHashLen = 2 + // } + // skx.key = make([]byte, len(serverECDHParams)+sigAndHashLen+2+len(sig)) + // copy(skx.key, serverECDHParams) + // k := skx.key[len(serverECDHParams):] + // if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { + // k[0] = byte(signatureAlgorithm >> 8) + // k[1] = byte(signatureAlgorithm) + // k = k[2:] + // } + // k[0] = byte(len(sig) >> 8) + // k[1] = byte(len(sig)) + // copy(k[2:], sig) + // + // return skx, nil +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreementGM) processClientKeyExchange(config *Config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) { + panic("") + // if len(ckx.ciphertext) == 0 || int(ckx.ciphertext[0]) != len(ckx.ciphertext)-1 { + // return nil, errClientKeyExchange + // } + // + // if ka.curveid == X25519 { + // if len(ckx.ciphertext) != 1+32 { + // return nil, errClientKeyExchange + // } + // + // var theirPublic, sharedKey, scalar [32]byte + // copy(theirPublic[:], ckx.ciphertext[1:]) + // copy(scalar[:], ka.privateKey) + // curve25519.ScalarMult(&sharedKey, &scalar, &theirPublic) + // return sharedKey[:], nil + // } + // + // curve, ok := curveForCurveID(ka.curveid) + // if !ok { + // panic("internal error") + // } + // x, y := elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, ckx.ciphertext[1:]) // Unmarshal also checks whether the given point is on the curve + // if x == nil { + // return nil, errClientKeyExchange + // } + // x, _ = curve.ScalarMult(x, y, ka.privateKey) + // preMasterSecret := make([]byte, (curve.Params().BitSize+7)>>3) + // xBytes := x.Bytes() + // copy(preMasterSecret[len(preMasterSecret)-len(xBytes):], xBytes) + // + // return preMasterSecret, nil +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreementGM) processServerKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error { + if len(skx.key) < 4 { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + if skx.key[0] != 3 { // named curve + return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve") + } + ka.curveid = CurveID(skx.key[1])<<8 | CurveID(skx.key[2]) + + publicLen := int(skx.key[3]) + if publicLen+4 > len(skx.key) { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + serverECDHParams := skx.key[:4+publicLen] + publicKey := serverECDHParams[4:] + + sig := skx.key[4+publicLen:] + if len(sig) < 2 { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + + //according to GMT0024, we don't care about + curve := sm2.P256Sm2() + ka.x, ka.y = elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, publicKey) // Unmarshal also checks whether the given point is on the curve + if ka.x == nil { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + + var signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme + _, sigType, hashFunc, err := pickSignatureAlgorithm(cert.PublicKey, []SignatureScheme{signatureAlgorithm}, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, ka.version) + + sigLen := int(sig[0])<<8 | int(sig[1]) + if sigLen+2 != len(sig) { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + sig = sig[2:] + + digest, err := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, hashFunc, ka.version, clientHello.random, serverHello.random, serverECDHParams) + if err != nil { + return err + } + return verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, cert.PublicKey, hashFunc, digest, sig) +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreementGM) generateClientKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + if ka.curveid == 0 { + return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: missing ServerKeyExchange message") + } + + var serialized, preMasterSecret []byte + + if ka.curveid == X25519 { + var ourPublic, theirPublic, sharedKey, scalar [32]byte + + if _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), scalar[:]); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + copy(theirPublic[:], ka.publicKey) + curve25519.ScalarBaseMult(&ourPublic, &scalar) + curve25519.ScalarMult(&sharedKey, &scalar, &theirPublic) + serialized = ourPublic[:] + preMasterSecret = sharedKey[:] + } else { + curve, ok := curveForCurveID(ka.curveid) + if !ok { + panic("internal error") + } + priv, mx, my, err := elliptic.GenerateKey(curve, config.rand()) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + x, _ := curve.ScalarMult(ka.x, ka.y, priv) + preMasterSecret = make([]byte, (curve.Params().BitSize+7)>>3) + xBytes := x.Bytes() + copy(preMasterSecret[len(preMasterSecret)-len(xBytes):], xBytes) + + serialized = elliptic.Marshal(curve, mx, my) + } + + ckx := new(clientKeyExchangeMsg) + ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, 1+len(serialized)) + ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(serialized)) + copy(ckx.ciphertext[1:], serialized) + + return preMasterSecret, ckx, nil +} + +// eccKeyAgreementGM implements a TLS key agreement where the server +// generates an ephemeral SM2 public/private key pair and signs it. The +// pre-master secret is then calculated using ECDH. +type eccKeyAgreementGM struct { + version uint16 + privateKey []byte + curveid CurveID + + // publicKey is used to store the peer's public value when X25519 is + // being used. + publicKey []byte + // x and y are used to store the peer's public value when one of the + // NIST curves is being used. + x, y *big.Int + + //cert for encipher referred to GMT0024 + encipherCert *x509.Certificate +} + +func (ka *eccKeyAgreementGM) generateServerKeyExchange(config *Config, signCert, cipherCert *Certificate, + clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + // mod by syl only one cert + //digest := ka.hashForServerKeyExchange(clientHello.random, hello.random, cert.Certificate[1]) + digest := ka.hashForServerKeyExchange(clientHello.random, hello.random, cipherCert.Certificate[0]) + + priv, ok := signCert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer") + } + sig, err := priv.Sign(config.rand(), digest, nil) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + len := len(sig) + + ske := new(serverKeyExchangeMsg) + ske.key = make([]byte, len+2) + ske.key[0] = byte(len >> 8) + ske.key[1] = byte(len) + copy(ske.key[2:], sig) + + return ske, nil +} + +func (ka *eccKeyAgreementGM) processClientKeyExchange(config *Config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) { + if len(ckx.ciphertext) == 0 { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + + if int(ckx.ciphertext[0]<<8|ckx.ciphertext[1]) != len(ckx.ciphertext)-2 { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + + cipher := ckx.ciphertext[2:] + + decrypter, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Decrypter") + } + + cipher, err := sm2.CipherUnmarshal(cipher) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + plain, err := decrypter.Decrypt(config.rand(), cipher, nil) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if len(plain) != 48 { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + + //we do not examine the version here according to openssl practice + return plain, nil +} + +func (ka *eccKeyAgreementGM) processServerKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error { + if len(skx.key) <= 2 { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + sigLen := int(skx.key[0]<<8 | skx.key[1]) + if sigLen+2 != len(skx.key) { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + sig := skx.key[2:] + //sig := skx.key[:] + + digest := ka.hashForServerKeyExchange(clientHello.random, serverHello.random, ka.encipherCert.Raw) + + //verify + pubKey, _ := cert.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey) + if pubKey.Curve != sm2.P256Sm2() { + return errors.New("tls: sm2 signing requires a sm2 public key") + } + + ecdsaSig := new(ecdsaSignature) + rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(sig, ecdsaSig) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if len(rest) != 0 { + return errors.New("tls:processServerKeyExchange: sm2 get signature failed") + } + if ecdsaSig.R.Sign() <= 0 || ecdsaSig.S.Sign() <= 0 { + return errors.New("tls: processServerKeyExchange: sm2 signature contained zero or negative values") + } + + sm2PubKey := sm2.PublicKey{ + Curve: pubKey.Curve, + X: pubKey.X, + Y: pubKey.Y, + } + + if !sm2PubKey.Verify(digest, sig) { + return errors.New("tls: processServerKeyExchange: sm2 verification failure") + } + + return nil +} + +func (ka *eccKeyAgreementGM) hashForServerKeyExchange(slices ...[]byte) []byte { + buffer := new(bytes.Buffer) + for i, slice := range slices { + if i == 2 { + buffer.Write([]byte{byte(len(slice) >> 16), byte(len(slice) >> 8), byte(len(slice))}) + } + buffer.Write(slice) + } + return buffer.Bytes() +} + +func (ka *eccKeyAgreementGM) generateClientKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + preMasterSecret := make([]byte, 48) + preMasterSecret[0] = byte(clientHello.vers >> 8) + preMasterSecret[1] = byte(clientHello.vers) + _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), preMasterSecret[2:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + pubKey := ka.encipherCert.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey) + sm2PubKey := &sm2.PublicKey{Curve: pubKey.Curve, X: pubKey.X, Y: pubKey.Y} + encrypted, err := sm2.Encrypt(sm2PubKey, preMasterSecret, config.rand(), sm2.C1C3C2) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + // GMT0024 通信时密文采用 GMT009 ASN1方式组织 + encrypted, err = sm2.CipherMarshal(encrypted) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + ckx := new(clientKeyExchangeMsg) + ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, len(encrypted)+2) + ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(encrypted) >> 8) + ckx.ciphertext[1] = byte(len(encrypted)) + copy(ckx.ciphertext[2:], encrypted) + return preMasterSecret, ckx, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_support.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_support.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2bfc60c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/gm_support.go @@ -0,0 +1,489 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package gmtls + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/hmac" + "encoding/pem" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io/ioutil" + "strings" + "sync" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2" + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm3" + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4" + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509" +) + +const VersionGMSSL = 0x0101 // GM/T 0024-2014 +const noncePrefixLength = 4 // RFC 5116 & RFC 5288 + +var pemCAs = []struct { + name string + pem string +}{ + { + name: "CFCA", + pem: `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIICezCCAh6gAwIBAgIQJRABs1dlPn+86pb7bT74wjAMBggqgRzPVQGDdQUAMFgx +CzAJBgNVBAYTAkNOMTAwLgYDVQQKDCdDaGluYSBGaW5hbmNpYWwgQ2VydGlmaWNh +dGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkxFzAVBgNVBAMMDkNGQ0EgQ1MgU00yIENBMB4XDTE1MDcx +MTAzMTUxM1oXDTM1MDcwNDAzMTUxM1owJTELMAkGA1UEBhMCQ04xFjAUBgNVBAoM +DUNGQ0EgU00yIE9DQTEwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqgRzPVQGCLQNCAAR8mpCijT4m +jIJHLSaxLZibTvrydXWlIu4r261LWKPfyhtYPKarSgxFHBTMMwRAjX0JqOjclSgY +XE6+wD5ha7dco4H6MIH3MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFOSO3dSj57YP7h0nls113CUlcmnd +MA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wgZMGA1UdHwSBizCBiDBVoFOgUaRPME0xCzAJBgNV +BAYTAkNOMRMwEQYDVQQKDApDRkNBIENTIENBMQwwCgYDVQQLDANDUkwxDDAKBgNV +BAsMA1NNMjENMAsGA1UEAwwEY3JsMTAvoC2gK4YpaHR0cDovL2NybC5jZmNhLmNv +bS5jbi9jc3JjYS9TTTIvY3JsMS5jcmwwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMB0GA1UdDgQW +BBRck1ggWiRzVhAbZFAQ7OmnygdBETAMBggqgRzPVQGDdQUAA0kAMEYCIQCka+W4 +lEDJGbdoQKfMyMIrwkuRjxV4fXu+CQZIsYGFnQIhAKFs1nR4OHFxsdjHPXG0CBx+ +1C++KMPnVTWTsfH9fKPf +-----END CERTIFICATE-----`, + }, + { + name: "TEST", + pem: `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIBgTCCASegAwIBAgIRAJa6ZDaSc3wau4+2sLM2zhMwCgYIKoEcz1UBg3UwJTEL +MAkGA1UEBhMCQ04xFjAUBgNVBAoTDWNhLmNldGNzYy5jb20wHhcNMTgxMjI0MDk1 +NDMyWhcNMzgxMjE5MDk1NDMyWjAlMQswCQYDVQQGEwJDTjEWMBQGA1UEChMNY2Eu +Y2V0Y3NjLmNvbTBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqBHM9VAYItA0IABNzzDdS5/RMcpbYW +d+hzCdocFpSOynYzalPvPWdyINM/7AP3DKYrYKyfa4jtW5xqYTpufWUabhSkvG3C +DGBbmE6jODA2MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIChDATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDATAP +BgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MAoGCCqBHM9VAYN1A0gAMEUCIQCsbtt9tJOtgwO6iavS +NB8Cs3U2so5gFQq6YdtX7d4EtgIgcVu9SQzlDmmmk61AaEES9UJgENmxrdhkon2T +vHTeE7Y= +-----END CERTIFICATE-----`, + }, + { + name: "FABRIC", + pem: `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIICMDCCAdagAwIBAgIRANnwbA2SIB/k0VNSkTi7TYUwCgYIKoEcz1UBg3UwaTEL +MAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAgTCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExFjAUBgNVBAcTDVNhbiBG +cmFuY2lzY28xFDASBgNVBAoTC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5jYS5leGFt +cGxlLmNvbTAeFw0xODEyMjcwNzE3MzBaFw0yODEyMjQwNzE3MzBaMGkxCzAJBgNV +BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRYwFAYDVQQHEw1TYW4gRnJhbmNp +c2NvMRQwEgYDVQQKEwtleGFtcGxlLmNvbTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOY2EuZXhhbXBsZS5j +b20wWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqgRzPVQGCLQNCAARAp0oXL9xvWjkipnru0gsuL95g +jpjscT5fQw0bHXPBSzYSq0+hoJf7C3t6tzjnI6pN0156KZg8Y1Bg7fx9xxOHo18w +XTAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAaYwDwYDVR0lBAgwBgYEVR0lADAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTAD +AQH/MCkGA1UdDgQiBCAt1zWEo9mUfmTAZlZthCkppNjgQlpQ9A77ylguCH4tRDAK +BggqgRzPVQGDdQNIADBFAiBFx066bqQswz5eFA6IWZjj7GmdAyypq48IUaI8cs+b +AwIhAPKX+rTHK3IHmZ3MHU2ajoJcGwq0h7aWpcpljF6cld4r +-----END CERTIFICATE-----`, + }, +} + +var certCAs []*x509.Certificate + +var initonce sync.Once + +func getCAs() []*x509.Certificate { + // mod by syl remove pre insert ca certs + return nil + initonce.Do(func() { + for _, pemca := range pemCAs { + block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(pemca.pem)) + ca, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + certCAs = append(certCAs, ca) + } + }) + return certCAs +} + +// A list of cipher suite IDs that are, or have been, implemented by this +// package. +const ( + //GM crypto suites ID Taken from GM/T 0024-2014 + GMTLS_ECDHE_SM2_WITH_SM1_SM3 uint16 = 0xe001 + GMTLS_SM2_WITH_SM1_SM3 uint16 = 0xe003 + GMTLS_IBSDH_WITH_SM1_SM3 uint16 = 0xe005 + GMTLS_IBC_WITH_SM1_SM3 uint16 = 0xe007 + GMTLS_RSA_WITH_SM1_SM3 uint16 = 0xe009 + GMTLS_RSA_WITH_SM1_SHA1 uint16 = 0xe00a + GMTLS_ECDHE_SM2_WITH_SM4_SM3 uint16 = 0xe011 + GMTLS_ECDHE_SM4_CBC_SM3 uint16 = 0xe011 + GMTLS_ECDHE_SM4_GCM_SM3 uint16 = 0xe051 + GMTLS_SM2_WITH_SM4_SM3 uint16 = 0xe013 + GMTLS_ECC_SM4_CBC_SM3 uint16 = 0xe013 + GMTLS_ECC_SM4_GCM_SM3 uint16 = 0xe053 + GMTLS_IBSDH_WITH_SM4_SM3 uint16 = 0xe015 + GMTLS_IBC_WITH_SM4_SM3 uint16 = 0xe017 + GMTLS_RSA_WITH_SM4_SM3 uint16 = 0xe019 + GMTLS_RSA_WITH_SM4_SHA1 uint16 = 0xe01a +) + +var gmCipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{ + {GMTLS_ECC_SM4_CBC_SM3, 16, 32, 16, eccGMKA, suiteECDSA, cipherSM4, macSM3, nil}, + {GMTLS_ECC_SM4_GCM_SM3, 16, 0, 4, eccGMKA, suiteECDSA, nil, nil, aeadSM4GCM}, + + {GMTLS_ECDHE_SM4_CBC_SM3, 16, 32, 16, ecdheGMKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA, cipherSM4, macSM3, nil}, + {GMTLS_ECDHE_SM4_GCM_SM3, 16, 0, 4, ecdheGMKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA, nil, nil, aeadSM4GCM}, +} + +// aeadSM4GCM SM4 GCM向前加解密函数 +// key: 对称密钥 +// nonce: 隐式随机数 (implicit nonce 4 Byte) +func aeadSM4GCM(key []byte, nonce []byte) cipher.AEAD { + if len(nonce) != noncePrefixLength { + panic("tls: internal error: wrong implicit nonce length") + } + block, err := sm4.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + aead, err := cipher.NewGCMWithNonceSize(block, 12) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + // AEAD 使用的随机数应由显式和隐式两部分构成， + // 显式部分即 nonce explicit，客户端和服务端使用隐式部分 + // 分别来自 client_write_iv 和 server_write_iv。 + // AEAD使用的随机数和计数器的构造参见 RFC 5116 + ret := &fixedNonceAEAD{aead: aead} + copy(ret.nonce[:], nonce) + return ret +} + +func getCipherSuites(c *Config) []uint16 { + s := c.CipherSuites + if s == nil { + s = []uint16{ + GMTLS_ECC_SM4_CBC_SM3, + GMTLS_ECC_SM4_GCM_SM3, + GMTLS_ECDHE_SM4_CBC_SM3, + GMTLS_ECDHE_SM4_GCM_SM3, + } + } + return s +} + +func cipherSM4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} { + block, _ := sm4.NewCipher(key) + if isRead { + return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv) + } + return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv) +} + +// macSHA1 returns a macFunction for the given protocol version. +func macSM3(version uint16, key []byte) macFunction { + return tls10MAC{hmac.New(sm3.New, key)} +} + +//used for adapt the demand of finishHash write +type nilMD5Hash struct{} + +func (nilMD5Hash) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { + return 0, nil +} + +func (nilMD5Hash) Sum(b []byte) []byte { + return nil +} + +func (nilMD5Hash) Reset() { +} + +func (nilMD5Hash) Size() int { + return 0 +} + +func (nilMD5Hash) BlockSize() int { + return 0 +} + +func newFinishedHashGM(cipherSuite *cipherSuite) finishedHash { + return finishedHash{sm3.New(), sm3.New(), new(nilMD5Hash), new(nilMD5Hash), []byte{}, VersionGMSSL, prf12(sm3.New)} +} + +func ecdheGMKA(version uint16) keyAgreement { + return &ecdheKeyAgreementGM{ + version: version, + } +} + +func eccGMKA(version uint16) keyAgreement { + return &eccKeyAgreementGM{ + version: version, + } +} + +// mutualCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite given a list of supported +// ciphersuites and the id requested by the peer. +func mutualCipherSuiteGM(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite { + for _, id := range have { + if id == want { + for _, suite := range gmCipherSuites { + if suite.id == want { + return suite + } + } + return nil + } + } + return nil +} + +const ( + ModeGMSSLOnly = "GMSSLOnly" // 仅支持 国密SSL模式 + ModeAutoSwitch = "AutoSwitch" // GMSSL/TLS 自动切换模式 +) + +type GMSupport struct { + WorkMode string // 工作模式 +} + +func NewGMSupport() *GMSupport { + return &GMSupport{WorkMode: ModeGMSSLOnly} +} + +func (support *GMSupport) GetVersion() uint16 { + return VersionGMSSL +} + +func (support *GMSupport) IsAvailable() bool { + return true +} + +func (support *GMSupport) cipherSuites() []*cipherSuite { + return gmCipherSuites +} + +// EnableMixMode 启用 GMSSL/TLS 自动切换的工作模式 +func (support *GMSupport) EnableMixMode() { + support.WorkMode = ModeAutoSwitch +} + +// IsAutoSwitchMode 是否处于混合工作模式 +// return true - GMSSL/TLS 均支持, false - 不处于混合模式 +func (support *GMSupport) IsAutoSwitchMode() bool { + return support.WorkMode == ModeAutoSwitch +} + +// LoadGMX509KeyPairs reads and parses two public/private key pairs from pairs +// of files. The files must contain PEM encoded data. The certificate file +// may contain intermediate certificates following the leaf certificate to +// form a certificate chain. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will +// be nil because the parsed form of the certificate is not retained. +func LoadGMX509KeyPairs(certFile, keyFile, encCertFile, encKeyFile string) (Certificate, error) { + certPEMBlock, err := ioutil.ReadFile(certFile) + if err != nil { + return Certificate{}, err + } + keyPEMBlock, err := ioutil.ReadFile(keyFile) + if err != nil { + return Certificate{}, err + } + encCertPEMBlock, err := ioutil.ReadFile(encCertFile) + if err != nil { + return Certificate{}, err + } + encKeyPEMBlock, err := ioutil.ReadFile(encKeyFile) + if err != nil { + return Certificate{}, err + } + + return GMX509KeyPairs(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock, encCertPEMBlock, encKeyPEMBlock) +} + +// add by syl add sigle key pair sitiation +func LoadGMX509KeyPair(certFile, keyFile string) (Certificate, error) { + certPEMBlock, err := ioutil.ReadFile(certFile) + if err != nil { + return Certificate{}, err + } + keyPEMBlock, err := ioutil.ReadFile(keyFile) + if err != nil { + return Certificate{}, err + } + + return GMX509KeyPairsSingle(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock) +} + +////load sign/enc certs and sign/enc privatekey from one single file respectively +//func LoadGMX509KeyPairs2(certFile, keyFile string) (Certificate, error) { +// certPEMBlock, err := ioutil.ReadFile(certFile) +// if err != nil { +// return Certificate{}, err +// } +// keyPEMBlock, err := ioutil.ReadFile(keyFile) +// if err != nil { +// return Certificate{}, err +// } +// encCertPEMBlock, err := ioutil.ReadFile(encCertFile) +// if err != nil { +// return Certificate{}, err +// } +// encKeyPEMBlock, err := ioutil.ReadFile(encKeyFile) +// if err != nil { +// return Certificate{}, err +// } +// +// return GMX509KeyPairs(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock, encCertPEMBlock, encKeyPEMBlock) +//} + +func getCert(certPEMBlock []byte) ([][]byte, error) { + + var certs [][]byte + var skippedBlockTypes []string + for { + var certDERBlock *pem.Block + certDERBlock, certPEMBlock = pem.Decode(certPEMBlock) + if certDERBlock == nil { + break + } + if certDERBlock.Type == "CERTIFICATE" { + certs = append(certs, certDERBlock.Bytes) + } else { + skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, certDERBlock.Type) + } + } + + if len(certs) == 0 { + if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in certificate input") + } + if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && strings.HasSuffix(skippedBlockTypes[0], "PRIVATE KEY") { + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to find certificate PEM data in certificate input, but did find a private key; PEM inputs may have been switched") + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find \"CERTIFICATE\" PEM block in certificate input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes) + } + return certs, nil +} + +func getKey(keyPEMBlock []byte) (*pem.Block, error) { + var skippedBlockTypes []string + var keyDERBlock *pem.Block + for { + keyDERBlock, keyPEMBlock = pem.Decode(keyPEMBlock) + if keyDERBlock == nil { + if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in key input") + } + if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && skippedBlockTypes[0] == "CERTIFICATE" { + return nil, errors.New("tls: found a certificate rather than a key in the PEM for the private key") + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find PEM block with type ending in \"PRIVATE KEY\" in key input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes) + } + if keyDERBlock.Type == "PRIVATE KEY" || strings.HasSuffix(keyDERBlock.Type, " PRIVATE KEY") { + break + } + skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, keyDERBlock.Type) + } + return keyDERBlock, nil +} + +func matchKeyCert(keyDERBlock *pem.Block, certDERBlock []byte) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) { + // We don't need to parse the public key for TLS, but we so do anyway + // to check that it looks sane and matches the private key. + x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(certDERBlock) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + privateKey, err := parsePrivateKey(keyDERBlock.Bytes) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + switch pub := x509Cert.PublicKey.(type) { + case *sm2.PublicKey: + priv, ok := privateKey.(*sm2.PrivateKey) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type") + } + if pub.X.Cmp(priv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(priv.Y) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key") + } + default: + return nil, errors.New("tls: unknown public key algorithm") + } + return privateKey, nil +} + +// X509KeyPair parses a public/private key pair from a pair of +// PEM encoded data. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will be nil because +// the parsed form of the certificate is not retained. +func GMX509KeyPairs(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock, encCertPEMBlock, encKeyPEMBlock []byte) (Certificate, error) { + fail := func(err error) (Certificate, error) { return Certificate{}, err } + + var certificate Certificate + + signCerts, err := getCert(certPEMBlock) + if err != nil { + return certificate, err + } + if len(signCerts) == 0 { + return certificate, errors.New("tls: failed to find any sign cert PEM data in cert input") + } + certificate.Certificate = append(certificate.Certificate, signCerts[0]) + + encCerts, err := getCert(encCertPEMBlock) + if err != nil { + return certificate, err + } + if len(encCerts) == 0 { + return certificate, errors.New("tls: failed to find any enc cert PEM data in cert input") + } + certificate.Certificate = append(certificate.Certificate, encCerts[0]) + + keyDERBlock, err := getKey(keyPEMBlock) + if err != nil { + return certificate, err + } + + certificate.PrivateKey, err = matchKeyCert(keyDERBlock, certificate.Certificate[0]) + if err != nil { + return fail(err) + } + + return certificate, nil +} + +//one cert for enc and sign +func GMX509KeyPairsSingle(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock []byte) (Certificate, error) { + fail := func(err error) (Certificate, error) { return Certificate{}, err } + + var certificate Certificate + + certs, err := getCert(certPEMBlock) + if err != nil { + return certificate, err + } + if len(certs) == 0 { + return certificate, errors.New("tls: failed to find any sign cert PEM data in cert input") + } + checkCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(certs[0]) + if err != nil { + return certificate, errors.New("tls: failed to parse certificate") + } + + //if cert is not for GM, use default X509KeyPair + if checkCert.PublicKeyAlgorithm != x509.SM2 { + return X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock) + } + + certificate.Certificate = append(certificate.Certificate, certs[0]) //this is for sign and env + + keyDERBlock, err := getKey(keyPEMBlock) + if err != nil { + return certificate, err + } + + certificate.PrivateKey, err = matchKeyCert(keyDERBlock, certificate.Certificate[0]) + if err != nil { + return fail(err) + } + + return certificate, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/handshake_client.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/handshake_client.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..414878a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/handshake_client.go @@ -0,0 +1,897 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package gmtls + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/subtle" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync/atomic" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509" +) + +type clientHandshakeState struct { + c *Conn + serverHello *serverHelloMsg + hello *clientHelloMsg + suite *cipherSuite + finishedHash finishedHash + masterSecret []byte + session *ClientSessionState +} + +func makeClientHello(config *Config) (*clientHelloMsg, error) { + if len(config.ServerName) == 0 && !config.InsecureSkipVerify { + return nil, errors.New("tls: either ServerName or InsecureSkipVerify must be specified in the tls.Config") + } + + nextProtosLength := 0 + for _, proto := range config.NextProtos { + if l := len(proto); l == 0 || l > 255 { + return nil, errors.New("tls: invalid NextProtos value") + } else { + nextProtosLength += 1 + l + } + } + + if nextProtosLength > 0xffff { + return nil, errors.New("tls: NextProtos values too large") + } + + hello := &clientHelloMsg{ + vers: config.maxVersion(), + compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone}, + random: make([]byte, 32), + ocspStapling: true, + scts: true, + serverName: hostnameInSNI(config.ServerName), + supportedCurves: config.curvePreferences(), + supportedPoints: []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed}, + nextProtoNeg: len(config.NextProtos) > 0, + secureRenegotiationSupported: true, + alpnProtocols: config.NextProtos, + } + possibleCipherSuites := config.cipherSuites() + hello.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(possibleCipherSuites)) + +NextCipherSuite: + for _, suiteId := range possibleCipherSuites { + for _, suite := range cipherSuites { + if suite.id != suiteId { + continue + } + // Don't advertise TLS 1.2-only cipher suites unless + // we're attempting TLS 1.2. + if hello.vers < VersionTLS12 && suite.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 { + continue + } + hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, suiteId) + continue NextCipherSuite + } + } + + _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), hello.random) + if err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error()) + } + + if hello.vers >= VersionTLS12 { + hello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms + } + + return hello, nil +} + +func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error { + if c.config == nil { + c.config = defaultConfig() + } + + // This may be a renegotiation handshake, in which case some fields + // need to be reset. + c.didResume = false + + var hello *clientHelloMsg + var err error + if c.config.GMSupport != nil { + c.vers = VersionGMSSL + hello, err = makeClientHelloGM(c.config) + } else { + hello, err = makeClientHello(c.config) + } + if err != nil { + return err + } + + if c.handshakes > 0 { + hello.secureRenegotiation = c.clientFinished[:] + } + + var session *ClientSessionState + var cacheKey string + sessionCache := c.config.ClientSessionCache + if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled { + sessionCache = nil + } + + if sessionCache != nil { + hello.ticketSupported = true + } + + // Session resumption is not allowed if renegotiating because + // renegotiation is primarily used to allow a client to send a client + // certificate, which would be skipped if session resumption occurred. + if sessionCache != nil && c.handshakes == 0 { + // Try to resume a previously negotiated TLS session, if + // available. + cacheKey = clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config) + candidateSession, ok := sessionCache.Get(cacheKey) + if ok { + // Check that the ciphersuite/version used for the + // previous session are still valid. + cipherSuiteOk := false + for _, id := range hello.cipherSuites { + if id == candidateSession.cipherSuite { + cipherSuiteOk = true + break + } + } + + versOk := candidateSession.vers >= c.config.minVersion() && + candidateSession.vers <= c.config.maxVersion() + if versOk && cipherSuiteOk { + session = candidateSession + } + } + } + + if session != nil { + hello.sessionTicket = session.sessionTicket + // A random session ID is used to detect when the + // server accepted the ticket and is resuming a session + // (see RFC 5077). + hello.sessionId = make([]byte, 16) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.sessionId); err != nil { + return errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error()) + } + } + + if c.config.GMSupport != nil { + hs := &clientHandshakeStateGM{ + c: c, + hello: hello, + session: session, + } + if err = hs.handshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + // If we had a successful handshake and hs.session is different from + // the one already cached - cache a new one + if sessionCache != nil && hs.session != nil && session != hs.session { + sessionCache.Put(cacheKey, hs.session) + } + } else { + hs := &clientHandshakeState{ + c: c, + hello: hello, + session: session, + } + if err = hs.handshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + // If we had a successful handshake and hs.session is different from + // the one already cached - cache a new one + if sessionCache != nil && hs.session != nil && session != hs.session { + sessionCache.Put(cacheKey, hs.session) + } + } + + return nil +} + +// Does the handshake, either a full one or resumes old session. +// Requires hs.c, hs.hello, and, optionally, hs.session to be set. +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) handshake() error { + c := hs.c + + // send ClientHello + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + var ok bool + if hs.serverHello, ok = msg.(*serverHelloMsg); !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(hs.serverHello, msg) + } + + if err = hs.pickTLSVersion(); err != nil { + return err + } + + if err = hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil { + return err + } + + isResume, err := hs.processServerHello() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite) + + // No signatures of the handshake are needed in a resumption. + // Otherwise, in a full handshake, if we don't have any certificates + // configured then we will never send a CertificateVerify message and + // thus no signatures are needed in that case either. + if isResume || (len(c.config.Certificates) == 0 && c.config.GetClientCertificate == nil) { + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal()) + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal()) + + c.buffering = true + if isResume { + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false + if err := hs.sendFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + } else { + if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.sendFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true + if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random) + c.didResume = isResume + atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1) + + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) pickTLSVersion() error { + vers, ok := hs.c.config.mutualVersion(hs.serverHello.vers) + if !ok || vers < VersionTLS10 { + // TLS 1.0 is the minimum version supported as a client. + hs.c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: server selected unsupported protocol version %x", hs.serverHello.vers) + } + + hs.c.vers = vers + hs.c.haveVers = true + + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error { + if hs.suite = mutualCipherSuite(hs.hello.cipherSuites, hs.serverHello.cipherSuite); hs.suite == nil { + hs.c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return errors.New("tls: server chose an unconfigured cipher suite") + } + + hs.c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error { + c := hs.c + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg) + if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) + + if c.handshakes == 0 { + // If this is the first handshake on a connection, process and + // (optionally) verify the server's certificates. + certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates)) + for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates { + cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return errors.New("tls: failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error()) + } + certs[i] = cert + } + + if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify { + opts := x509.VerifyOptions{ + Roots: c.config.RootCAs, + CurrentTime: c.config.time(), + DNSName: c.config.ServerName, + Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(), + } + + for i, cert := range certs { + if i == 0 { + continue + } + opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert) + } + c.verifiedChains, err = certs[0].Verify(opts) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return err + } + } + + if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil { + if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certMsg.certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return err + } + } + + switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey: + break + default: + c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: server's certificate contains an unsupported type of public key: %T", certs[0].PublicKey) + } + + c.peerCertificates = certs + } else { + // This is a renegotiation handshake. We require that the + // server's identity (i.e. leaf certificate) is unchanged and + // thus any previous trust decision is still valid. + // + // See https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE for the + // motivation behind this requirement. + if !bytes.Equal(c.peerCertificates[0].Raw, certMsg.certificates[0]) { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return errors.New("tls: server's identity changed during renegotiation") + } + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg) + if ok { + // RFC4366 on Certificate Status Request: + // The server MAY return a "certificate_status" message. + + if !hs.serverHello.ocspStapling { + // If a server returns a "CertificateStatus" message, then the + // server MUST have included an extension of type "status_request" + // with empty "extension_data" in the extended server hello. + + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return errors.New("tls: received unexpected CertificateStatus message") + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal()) + + if cs.statusType == statusTypeOCSP { + c.ocspResponse = cs.response + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers) + + skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg) + if ok { + hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal()) + err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, c.peerCertificates[0], skx) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return err + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + var chainToSend *Certificate + var certRequested bool + certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg) + if ok { + certRequested = true + hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal()) + + if chainToSend, err = hs.getCertificate(certReq); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(shd, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal()) + + // If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a + // Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a + // certificate to send. + if certRequested { + certMsg = new(certificateMsg) + certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate + hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, c.peerCertificates[0]) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + if ckx != nil { + hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + if chainToSend != nil && len(chainToSend.Certificate) > 0 { + certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{ + hasSignatureAndHash: c.vers >= VersionTLS12, + } + + key, ok := chainToSend.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", chainToSend.PrivateKey) + } + + signatureAlgorithm, sigType, hashFunc, err := pickSignatureAlgorithm(key.Public(), certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, hs.hello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, c.vers) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + // SignatureAndHashAlgorithm was introduced in TLS 1.2. + if certVerify.hasSignatureAndHash { + certVerify.signatureAlgorithm = signatureAlgorithm + } + digest, err := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, hashFunc, hs.masterSecret) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(hashFunc) + if sigType == signatureRSAPSS { + signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: hashFunc} + } + certVerify.signature, err = key.Sign(c.config.rand(), digest, signOpts) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random) + if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(hs.hello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return errors.New("tls: failed to write to key log: " + err.Error()) + } + + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) establishKeys() error { + c := hs.c + + clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV := + keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen) + var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{} + var clientHash, serverHash macFunction + if hs.suite.cipher != nil { + clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */) + clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC) + serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */) + serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC) + } else { + clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV) + serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV) + } + + c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash) + c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash) + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) serverResumedSession() bool { + // If the server responded with the same sessionId then it means the + // sessionTicket is being used to resume a TLS session. + return hs.session != nil && hs.hello.sessionId != nil && + bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.sessionId, hs.hello.sessionId) +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) processServerHello() (bool, error) { + c := hs.c + + if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return false, errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format") + } + + if c.handshakes == 0 && hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiationSupported { + c.secureRenegotiation = true + if len(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension") + } + } + + if c.handshakes > 0 && c.secureRenegotiation { + var expectedSecureRenegotiation [24]byte + copy(expectedSecureRenegotiation[:], c.clientFinished[:]) + copy(expectedSecureRenegotiation[12:], c.serverFinished[:]) + if !bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation, expectedSecureRenegotiation[:]) { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: incorrect renegotiation extension contents") + } + } + + clientDidNPN := hs.hello.nextProtoNeg + clientDidALPN := len(hs.hello.alpnProtocols) > 0 + serverHasNPN := hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg + serverHasALPN := len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) > 0 + + if !clientDidNPN && serverHasNPN { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server advertised unrequested NPN extension") + } + + if !clientDidALPN && serverHasALPN { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server advertised unrequested ALPN extension") + } + + if serverHasNPN && serverHasALPN { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server advertised both NPN and ALPN extensions") + } + + if serverHasALPN { + c.clientProtocol = hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol + c.clientProtocolFallback = false + } + c.scts = hs.serverHello.scts + + if !hs.serverResumedSession() { + return false, nil + } + + if hs.session.vers != c.vers { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server resumed a session with a different version") + } + + if hs.session.cipherSuite != hs.suite.id { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server resumed a session with a different cipher suite") + } + + // Restore masterSecret and peerCerts from previous state + hs.masterSecret = hs.session.masterSecret + c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates + c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains + return true, nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error { + c := hs.c + + c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec) + if c.in.err != nil { + return c.in.err + } + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(serverFinished, msg) + } + + verify := hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret) + if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) || + subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect") + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal()) + copy(out, verify) + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error { + if !hs.serverHello.ticketSupported { + return nil + } + + c := hs.c + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + sessionTicketMsg, ok := msg.(*newSessionTicketMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(sessionTicketMsg, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(sessionTicketMsg.marshal()) + + hs.session = &ClientSessionState{ + sessionTicket: sessionTicketMsg.ticket, + vers: c.vers, + cipherSuite: hs.suite.id, + masterSecret: hs.masterSecret, + serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates, + verifiedChains: c.verifiedChains, + } + + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error { + c := hs.c + + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil { + return err + } + if hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg { + nextProto := new(nextProtoMsg) + proto, fallback := mutualProtocol(c.config.NextProtos, hs.serverHello.nextProtos) + nextProto.proto = proto + c.clientProtocol = proto + c.clientProtocolFallback = fallback + + hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, nextProto.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + finished := new(finishedMsg) + finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret) + hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + copy(out, finished.verifyData) + return nil +} + +// tls11SignatureSchemes contains the signature schemes that we synthesise for +// a TLS <= 1.1 connection, based on the supported certificate types. +var tls11SignatureSchemes = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512, PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512, PKCS1WithSHA1} + +const ( + // tls11SignatureSchemesNumECDSA is the number of initial elements of + // tls11SignatureSchemes that use ECDSA. + tls11SignatureSchemesNumECDSA = 3 + // tls11SignatureSchemesNumRSA is the number of trailing elements of + // tls11SignatureSchemes that use RSA. + tls11SignatureSchemesNumRSA = 4 +) + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) getCertificate(certReq *certificateRequestMsg) (*Certificate, error) { + c := hs.c + + var rsaAvail, ecdsaAvail bool + for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes { + switch certType { + case certTypeRSASign: + rsaAvail = true + case certTypeECDSASign: + ecdsaAvail = true + } + } + + if c.config.GetClientCertificate != nil { + var signatureSchemes []SignatureScheme + + if !certReq.hasSignatureAndHash { + // Prior to TLS 1.2, the signature schemes were not + // included in the certificate request message. In this + // case we use a plausible list based on the acceptable + // certificate types. + signatureSchemes = tls11SignatureSchemes + if !ecdsaAvail { + signatureSchemes = signatureSchemes[tls11SignatureSchemesNumECDSA:] + } + if !rsaAvail { + signatureSchemes = signatureSchemes[:len(signatureSchemes)-tls11SignatureSchemesNumRSA] + } + } else { + signatureSchemes = certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms + } + + return c.config.GetClientCertificate(&CertificateRequestInfo{ + AcceptableCAs: certReq.certificateAuthorities, + SignatureSchemes: signatureSchemes, + }) + } + + // RFC 4346 on the certificateAuthorities field: A list of the + // distinguished names of acceptable certificate authorities. + // These distinguished names may specify a desired + // distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA; + // thus, this message can be used to describe both known roots + // and a desired authorization space. If the + // certificate_authorities list is empty then the client MAY + // send any certificate of the appropriate + // ClientCertificateType, unless there is some external + // arrangement to the contrary. + + // We need to search our list of client certs for one + // where SignatureAlgorithm is acceptable to the server and the + // Issuer is in certReq.certificateAuthorities +findCert: + for i, chain := range c.config.Certificates { + if !rsaAvail && !ecdsaAvail { + continue + } + + for j, cert := range chain.Certificate { + x509Cert := chain.Leaf + // parse the certificate if this isn't the leaf + // node, or if chain.Leaf was nil + if j != 0 || x509Cert == nil { + var err error + if x509Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(cert); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate #" + strconv.Itoa(i) + ": " + err.Error()) + } + } + + switch { + case rsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA: + case ecdsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.ECDSA: + default: + continue findCert + } + + if len(certReq.certificateAuthorities) == 0 { + // they gave us an empty list, so just take the + // first cert from c.config.Certificates + return &chain, nil + } + + for _, ca := range certReq.certificateAuthorities { + if bytes.Equal(x509Cert.RawIssuer, ca) { + return &chain, nil + } + } + } + } + + // No acceptable certificate found. Don't send a certificate. + return new(Certificate), nil +} + +// clientSessionCacheKey returns a key used to cache sessionTickets that could +// be used to resume previously negotiated TLS sessions with a server. +func clientSessionCacheKey(serverAddr net.Addr, config *Config) string { + if len(config.ServerName) > 0 { + return config.ServerName + } + return serverAddr.String() +} + +// mutualProtocol finds the mutual Next Protocol Negotiation or ALPN protocol +// given list of possible protocols and a list of the preference order. The +// first list must not be empty. It returns the resulting protocol and flag +// indicating if the fallback case was reached. +func mutualProtocol(protos, preferenceProtos []string) (string, bool) { + for _, s := range preferenceProtos { + for _, c := range protos { + if s == c { + return s, false + } + } + } + + return protos[0], true +} + +// hostnameInSNI converts name into an approriate hostname for SNI. +// Literal IP addresses and absolute FQDNs are not permitted as SNI values. +// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3. +func hostnameInSNI(name string) string { + host := name + if len(host) > 0 && host[0] == '[' && host[len(host)-1] == ']' { + host = host[1 : len(host)-1] + } + if i := strings.LastIndex(host, "%"); i > 0 { + host = host[:i] + } + if net.ParseIP(host) != nil { + return "" + } + for len(name) > 0 && name[len(name)-1] == '.' { + name = name[:len(name)-1] + } + return name +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/handshake_messages.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/handshake_messages.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bdb66129 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/handshake_messages.go @@ -0,0 +1,1566 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package gmtls + +import "bytes" + +type clientHelloMsg struct { + raw []byte + vers uint16 + random []byte + sessionId []byte + cipherSuites []uint16 + compressionMethods []uint8 + nextProtoNeg bool + serverName string + ocspStapling bool + scts bool + supportedCurves []CurveID + supportedPoints []uint8 + ticketSupported bool + sessionTicket []uint8 + supportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme + secureRenegotiation []byte + secureRenegotiationSupported bool + alpnProtocols []string +} + +func (m *clientHelloMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool { + m1, ok := i.(*clientHelloMsg) + if !ok { + return false + } + + return bytes.Equal(m.raw, m1.raw) && + m.vers == m1.vers && + bytes.Equal(m.random, m1.random) && + bytes.Equal(m.sessionId, m1.sessionId) && + eqUint16s(m.cipherSuites, m1.cipherSuites) && + bytes.Equal(m.compressionMethods, m1.compressionMethods) && + m.nextProtoNeg == m1.nextProtoNeg && + m.serverName == m1.serverName && + m.ocspStapling == m1.ocspStapling && + m.scts == m1.scts && + eqCurveIDs(m.supportedCurves, m1.supportedCurves) && + bytes.Equal(m.supportedPoints, m1.supportedPoints) && + m.ticketSupported == m1.ticketSupported && + bytes.Equal(m.sessionTicket, m1.sessionTicket) && + eqSignatureAlgorithms(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, m1.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) && + m.secureRenegotiationSupported == m1.secureRenegotiationSupported && + bytes.Equal(m.secureRenegotiation, m1.secureRenegotiation) && + eqStrings(m.alpnProtocols, m1.alpnProtocols) +} + +func (m *clientHelloMsg) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + length := 2 + 32 + 1 + len(m.sessionId) + 2 + len(m.cipherSuites)*2 + 1 + len(m.compressionMethods) + numExtensions := 0 + extensionsLength := 0 + if m.nextProtoNeg { + numExtensions++ + } + if m.ocspStapling { + extensionsLength += 1 + 2 + 2 + numExtensions++ + } + if len(m.serverName) > 0 { + extensionsLength += 5 + len(m.serverName) + numExtensions++ + } + if len(m.supportedCurves) > 0 { + extensionsLength += 2 + 2*len(m.supportedCurves) + numExtensions++ + } + if len(m.supportedPoints) > 0 { + extensionsLength += 1 + len(m.supportedPoints) + numExtensions++ + } + if m.ticketSupported { + extensionsLength += len(m.sessionTicket) + numExtensions++ + } + if len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) > 0 { + extensionsLength += 2 + 2*len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) + numExtensions++ + } + if m.secureRenegotiationSupported { + extensionsLength += 1 + len(m.secureRenegotiation) + numExtensions++ + } + if len(m.alpnProtocols) > 0 { + extensionsLength += 2 + for _, s := range m.alpnProtocols { + if l := len(s); l == 0 || l > 255 { + panic("invalid ALPN protocol") + } + extensionsLength++ + extensionsLength += len(s) + } + numExtensions++ + } + if m.scts { + numExtensions++ + } + if numExtensions > 0 { + extensionsLength += 4 * numExtensions + length += 2 + extensionsLength + } + + x := make([]byte, 4+length) + x[0] = typeClientHello + x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) + x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) + x[3] = uint8(length) + x[4] = uint8(m.vers >> 8) + x[5] = uint8(m.vers) + copy(x[6:38], m.random) + x[38] = uint8(len(m.sessionId)) + copy(x[39:39+len(m.sessionId)], m.sessionId) + y := x[39+len(m.sessionId):] + y[0] = uint8(len(m.cipherSuites) >> 7) + y[1] = uint8(len(m.cipherSuites) << 1) + for i, suite := range m.cipherSuites { + y[2+i*2] = uint8(suite >> 8) + y[3+i*2] = uint8(suite) + } + z := y[2+len(m.cipherSuites)*2:] + z[0] = uint8(len(m.compressionMethods)) + copy(z[1:], m.compressionMethods) + + z = z[1+len(m.compressionMethods):] + if numExtensions > 0 { + z[0] = byte(extensionsLength >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionsLength) + z = z[2:] + } + if m.nextProtoNeg { + z[0] = byte(extensionNextProtoNeg >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionNextProtoNeg & 0xff) + // The length is always 0 + z = z[4:] + } + if len(m.serverName) > 0 { + z[0] = byte(extensionServerName >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionServerName & 0xff) + l := len(m.serverName) + 5 + z[2] = byte(l >> 8) + z[3] = byte(l) + z = z[4:] + + // RFC 3546, section 3.1 + // + // struct { + // NameType name_type; + // select (name_type) { + // case host_name: HostName; + // } name; + // } ServerName; + // + // enum { + // host_name(0), (255) + // } NameType; + // + // opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>; + // + // struct { + // ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> + // } ServerNameList; + + z[0] = byte((len(m.serverName) + 3) >> 8) + z[1] = byte(len(m.serverName) + 3) + z[3] = byte(len(m.serverName) >> 8) + z[4] = byte(len(m.serverName)) + copy(z[5:], []byte(m.serverName)) + z = z[l:] + } + if m.ocspStapling { + // RFC 4366, section 3.6 + z[0] = byte(extensionStatusRequest >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionStatusRequest) + z[2] = 0 + z[3] = 5 + z[4] = 1 // OCSP type + // Two zero valued uint16s for the two lengths. + z = z[9:] + } + if len(m.supportedCurves) > 0 { + // http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.5.1 + z[0] = byte(extensionSupportedCurves >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionSupportedCurves) + l := 2 + 2*len(m.supportedCurves) + z[2] = byte(l >> 8) + z[3] = byte(l) + l -= 2 + z[4] = byte(l >> 8) + z[5] = byte(l) + z = z[6:] + for _, curve := range m.supportedCurves { + z[0] = byte(curve >> 8) + z[1] = byte(curve) + z = z[2:] + } + } + if len(m.supportedPoints) > 0 { + // http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.5.2 + z[0] = byte(extensionSupportedPoints >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionSupportedPoints) + l := 1 + len(m.supportedPoints) + z[2] = byte(l >> 8) + z[3] = byte(l) + l-- + z[4] = byte(l) + z = z[5:] + for _, pointFormat := range m.supportedPoints { + z[0] = pointFormat + z = z[1:] + } + } + if m.ticketSupported { + // http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077#section-3.2 + z[0] = byte(extensionSessionTicket >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionSessionTicket) + l := len(m.sessionTicket) + z[2] = byte(l >> 8) + z[3] = byte(l) + z = z[4:] + copy(z, m.sessionTicket) + z = z[len(m.sessionTicket):] + } + if len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) > 0 { + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 + z[0] = byte(extensionSignatureAlgorithms >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionSignatureAlgorithms) + l := 2 + 2*len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) + z[2] = byte(l >> 8) + z[3] = byte(l) + z = z[4:] + + l -= 2 + z[0] = byte(l >> 8) + z[1] = byte(l) + z = z[2:] + for _, sigAlgo := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms { + z[0] = byte(sigAlgo >> 8) + z[1] = byte(sigAlgo) + z = z[2:] + } + } + if m.secureRenegotiationSupported { + z[0] = byte(extensionRenegotiationInfo >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionRenegotiationInfo & 0xff) + z[2] = 0 + z[3] = byte(len(m.secureRenegotiation) + 1) + z[4] = byte(len(m.secureRenegotiation)) + z = z[5:] + copy(z, m.secureRenegotiation) + z = z[len(m.secureRenegotiation):] + } + if len(m.alpnProtocols) > 0 { + z[0] = byte(extensionALPN >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionALPN & 0xff) + lengths := z[2:] + z = z[6:] + + stringsLength := 0 + for _, s := range m.alpnProtocols { + l := len(s) + z[0] = byte(l) + copy(z[1:], s) + z = z[1+l:] + stringsLength += 1 + l + } + + lengths[2] = byte(stringsLength >> 8) + lengths[3] = byte(stringsLength) + stringsLength += 2 + lengths[0] = byte(stringsLength >> 8) + lengths[1] = byte(stringsLength) + } + if m.scts { + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3.1 + z[0] = byte(extensionSCT >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionSCT) + // zero uint16 for the zero-length extension_data + z = z[4:] + } + + m.raw = x + + return x +} + +func (m *clientHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + if len(data) < 42 { + return false + } + m.raw = data + m.vers = uint16(data[4])<<8 | uint16(data[5]) + m.random = data[6:38] + sessionIdLen := int(data[38]) + if sessionIdLen > 32 || len(data) < 39+sessionIdLen { + return false + } + m.sessionId = data[39 : 39+sessionIdLen] + data = data[39+sessionIdLen:] + if len(data) < 2 { + return false + } + // cipherSuiteLen is the number of bytes of cipher suite numbers. Since + // they are uint16s, the number must be even. + cipherSuiteLen := int(data[0])<<8 | int(data[1]) + if cipherSuiteLen%2 == 1 || len(data) < 2+cipherSuiteLen { + return false + } + numCipherSuites := cipherSuiteLen / 2 + m.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, numCipherSuites) + for i := 0; i < numCipherSuites; i++ { + m.cipherSuites[i] = uint16(data[2+2*i])<<8 | uint16(data[3+2*i]) + if m.cipherSuites[i] == scsvRenegotiation { + m.secureRenegotiationSupported = true + } + } + data = data[2+cipherSuiteLen:] + if len(data) < 1 { + return false + } + compressionMethodsLen := int(data[0]) + if len(data) < 1+compressionMethodsLen { + return false + } + m.compressionMethods = data[1 : 1+compressionMethodsLen] + + data = data[1+compressionMethodsLen:] + + m.nextProtoNeg = false + m.serverName = "" + m.ocspStapling = false + m.ticketSupported = false + m.sessionTicket = nil + m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = nil + m.alpnProtocols = nil + m.scts = false + + if len(data) == 0 { + // ClientHello is optionally followed by extension data + return true + } + if len(data) < 2 { + return false + } + + extensionsLength := int(data[0])<<8 | int(data[1]) + data = data[2:] + if extensionsLength != len(data) { + return false + } + + for len(data) != 0 { + if len(data) < 4 { + return false + } + extension := uint16(data[0])<<8 | uint16(data[1]) + length := int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3]) + data = data[4:] + if len(data) < length { + return false + } + + switch extension { + case extensionServerName: + d := data[:length] + if len(d) < 2 { + return false + } + namesLen := int(d[0])<<8 | int(d[1]) + d = d[2:] + if len(d) != namesLen { + return false + } + for len(d) > 0 { + if len(d) < 3 { + return false + } + nameType := d[0] + nameLen := int(d[1])<<8 | int(d[2]) + d = d[3:] + if len(d) < nameLen { + return false + } + if nameType == 0 { + m.serverName = string(d[:nameLen]) + break + } + d = d[nameLen:] + } + case extensionNextProtoNeg: + if length > 0 { + return false + } + m.nextProtoNeg = true + case extensionStatusRequest: + m.ocspStapling = length > 0 && data[0] == statusTypeOCSP + case extensionSupportedCurves: + // http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.5.1 + if length < 2 { + return false + } + l := int(data[0])<<8 | int(data[1]) + if l%2 == 1 || length != l+2 { + return false + } + numCurves := l / 2 + m.supportedCurves = make([]CurveID, numCurves) + d := data[2:] + for i := 0; i < numCurves; i++ { + m.supportedCurves[i] = CurveID(d[0])<<8 | CurveID(d[1]) + d = d[2:] + } + case extensionSupportedPoints: + // http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.5.2 + if length < 1 { + return false + } + l := int(data[0]) + if length != l+1 { + return false + } + m.supportedPoints = make([]uint8, l) + copy(m.supportedPoints, data[1:]) + case extensionSessionTicket: + // http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077#section-3.2 + m.ticketSupported = true + m.sessionTicket = data[:length] + case extensionSignatureAlgorithms: + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 + if length < 2 || length&1 != 0 { + return false + } + l := int(data[0])<<8 | int(data[1]) + if l != length-2 { + return false + } + n := l / 2 + d := data[2:] + m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = make([]SignatureScheme, n) + for i := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms { + m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] = SignatureScheme(d[0])<<8 | SignatureScheme(d[1]) + d = d[2:] + + } + case extensionRenegotiationInfo: + if length == 0 { + return false + } + d := data[:length] + l := int(d[0]) + d = d[1:] + if l != len(d) { + return false + } + + m.secureRenegotiation = d + m.secureRenegotiationSupported = true + case extensionALPN: + if length < 2 { + return false + } + l := int(data[0])<<8 | int(data[1]) + if l != length-2 { + return false + } + d := data[2:length] + for len(d) != 0 { + stringLen := int(d[0]) + d = d[1:] + if stringLen == 0 || stringLen > len(d) { + return false + } + m.alpnProtocols = append(m.alpnProtocols, string(d[:stringLen])) + d = d[stringLen:] + } + case extensionSCT: + m.scts = true + if length != 0 { + return false + } + } + data = data[length:] + } + + return true +} + +type serverHelloMsg struct { + raw []byte + vers uint16 + random []byte + sessionId []byte + cipherSuite uint16 + compressionMethod uint8 + nextProtoNeg bool + nextProtos []string + ocspStapling bool + scts [][]byte + ticketSupported bool + secureRenegotiation []byte + secureRenegotiationSupported bool + alpnProtocol string +} + +func (m *serverHelloMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool { + m1, ok := i.(*serverHelloMsg) + if !ok { + return false + } + + if len(m.scts) != len(m1.scts) { + return false + } + for i, sct := range m.scts { + if !bytes.Equal(sct, m1.scts[i]) { + return false + } + } + + return bytes.Equal(m.raw, m1.raw) && + m.vers == m1.vers && + bytes.Equal(m.random, m1.random) && + bytes.Equal(m.sessionId, m1.sessionId) && + m.cipherSuite == m1.cipherSuite && + m.compressionMethod == m1.compressionMethod && + m.nextProtoNeg == m1.nextProtoNeg && + eqStrings(m.nextProtos, m1.nextProtos) && + m.ocspStapling == m1.ocspStapling && + m.ticketSupported == m1.ticketSupported && + m.secureRenegotiationSupported == m1.secureRenegotiationSupported && + bytes.Equal(m.secureRenegotiation, m1.secureRenegotiation) && + m.alpnProtocol == m1.alpnProtocol +} + +func (m *serverHelloMsg) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + length := 38 + len(m.sessionId) + numExtensions := 0 + extensionsLength := 0 + + nextProtoLen := 0 + if m.nextProtoNeg { + numExtensions++ + for _, v := range m.nextProtos { + nextProtoLen += len(v) + } + nextProtoLen += len(m.nextProtos) + extensionsLength += nextProtoLen + } + if m.ocspStapling { + numExtensions++ + } + if m.ticketSupported { + numExtensions++ + } + if m.secureRenegotiationSupported { + extensionsLength += 1 + len(m.secureRenegotiation) + numExtensions++ + } + if alpnLen := len(m.alpnProtocol); alpnLen > 0 { + if alpnLen >= 256 { + panic("invalid ALPN protocol") + } + extensionsLength += 2 + 1 + alpnLen + numExtensions++ + } + sctLen := 0 + if len(m.scts) > 0 { + for _, sct := range m.scts { + sctLen += len(sct) + 2 + } + extensionsLength += 2 + sctLen + numExtensions++ + } + + if numExtensions > 0 { + extensionsLength += 4 * numExtensions + length += 2 + extensionsLength + } + + x := make([]byte, 4+length) + x[0] = typeServerHello + x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) + x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) + x[3] = uint8(length) + x[4] = uint8(m.vers >> 8) + x[5] = uint8(m.vers) + copy(x[6:38], m.random) + x[38] = uint8(len(m.sessionId)) + copy(x[39:39+len(m.sessionId)], m.sessionId) + z := x[39+len(m.sessionId):] + z[0] = uint8(m.cipherSuite >> 8) + z[1] = uint8(m.cipherSuite) + z[2] = m.compressionMethod + + z = z[3:] + if numExtensions > 0 { + z[0] = byte(extensionsLength >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionsLength) + z = z[2:] + } + if m.nextProtoNeg { + z[0] = byte(extensionNextProtoNeg >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionNextProtoNeg & 0xff) + z[2] = byte(nextProtoLen >> 8) + z[3] = byte(nextProtoLen) + z = z[4:] + + for _, v := range m.nextProtos { + l := len(v) + if l > 255 { + l = 255 + } + z[0] = byte(l) + copy(z[1:], []byte(v[0:l])) + z = z[1+l:] + } + } + if m.ocspStapling { + z[0] = byte(extensionStatusRequest >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionStatusRequest) + z = z[4:] + } + if m.ticketSupported { + z[0] = byte(extensionSessionTicket >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionSessionTicket) + z = z[4:] + } + if m.secureRenegotiationSupported { + z[0] = byte(extensionRenegotiationInfo >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionRenegotiationInfo & 0xff) + z[2] = 0 + z[3] = byte(len(m.secureRenegotiation) + 1) + z[4] = byte(len(m.secureRenegotiation)) + z = z[5:] + copy(z, m.secureRenegotiation) + z = z[len(m.secureRenegotiation):] + } + if alpnLen := len(m.alpnProtocol); alpnLen > 0 { + z[0] = byte(extensionALPN >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionALPN & 0xff) + l := 2 + 1 + alpnLen + z[2] = byte(l >> 8) + z[3] = byte(l) + l -= 2 + z[4] = byte(l >> 8) + z[5] = byte(l) + l -= 1 + z[6] = byte(l) + copy(z[7:], []byte(m.alpnProtocol)) + z = z[7+alpnLen:] + } + if sctLen > 0 { + z[0] = byte(extensionSCT >> 8) + z[1] = byte(extensionSCT) + l := sctLen + 2 + z[2] = byte(l >> 8) + z[3] = byte(l) + z[4] = byte(sctLen >> 8) + z[5] = byte(sctLen) + + z = z[6:] + for _, sct := range m.scts { + z[0] = byte(len(sct) >> 8) + z[1] = byte(len(sct)) + copy(z[2:], sct) + z = z[len(sct)+2:] + } + } + + m.raw = x + + return x +} + +func (m *serverHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + if len(data) < 42 { + return false + } + m.raw = data + m.vers = uint16(data[4])<<8 | uint16(data[5]) + m.random = data[6:38] + sessionIdLen := int(data[38]) + if sessionIdLen > 32 || len(data) < 39+sessionIdLen { + return false + } + m.sessionId = data[39 : 39+sessionIdLen] + data = data[39+sessionIdLen:] + if len(data) < 3 { + return false + } + m.cipherSuite = uint16(data[0])<<8 | uint16(data[1]) + m.compressionMethod = data[2] + data = data[3:] + + m.nextProtoNeg = false + m.nextProtos = nil + m.ocspStapling = false + m.scts = nil + m.ticketSupported = false + m.alpnProtocol = "" + + if len(data) == 0 { + // ServerHello is optionally followed by extension data + return true + } + if len(data) < 2 { + return false + } + + extensionsLength := int(data[0])<<8 | int(data[1]) + data = data[2:] + if len(data) != extensionsLength { + return false + } + + for len(data) != 0 { + if len(data) < 4 { + return false + } + extension := uint16(data[0])<<8 | uint16(data[1]) + length := int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3]) + data = data[4:] + if len(data) < length { + return false + } + + switch extension { + case extensionNextProtoNeg: + m.nextProtoNeg = true + d := data[:length] + for len(d) > 0 { + l := int(d[0]) + d = d[1:] + if l == 0 || l > len(d) { + return false + } + m.nextProtos = append(m.nextProtos, string(d[:l])) + d = d[l:] + } + case extensionStatusRequest: + if length > 0 { + return false + } + m.ocspStapling = true + case extensionSessionTicket: + if length > 0 { + return false + } + m.ticketSupported = true + case extensionRenegotiationInfo: + if length == 0 { + return false + } + d := data[:length] + l := int(d[0]) + d = d[1:] + if l != len(d) { + return false + } + + m.secureRenegotiation = d + m.secureRenegotiationSupported = true + case extensionALPN: + d := data[:length] + if len(d) < 3 { + return false + } + l := int(d[0])<<8 | int(d[1]) + if l != len(d)-2 { + return false + } + d = d[2:] + l = int(d[0]) + if l != len(d)-1 { + return false + } + d = d[1:] + if len(d) == 0 { + // ALPN protocols must not be empty. + return false + } + m.alpnProtocol = string(d) + case extensionSCT: + d := data[:length] + + if len(d) < 2 { + return false + } + l := int(d[0])<<8 | int(d[1]) + d = d[2:] + if len(d) != l || l == 0 { + return false + } + + m.scts = make([][]byte, 0, 3) + for len(d) != 0 { + if len(d) < 2 { + return false + } + sctLen := int(d[0])<<8 | int(d[1]) + d = d[2:] + if sctLen == 0 || len(d) < sctLen { + return false + } + m.scts = append(m.scts, d[:sctLen]) + d = d[sctLen:] + } + } + data = data[length:] + } + + return true +} + +type certificateMsg struct { + raw []byte + certificates [][]byte +} + +func (m *certificateMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool { + m1, ok := i.(*certificateMsg) + if !ok { + return false + } + + return bytes.Equal(m.raw, m1.raw) && + eqByteSlices(m.certificates, m1.certificates) +} + +func (m *certificateMsg) marshal() (x []byte) { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + var i int + for _, slice := range m.certificates { + i += len(slice) + } + + length := 3 + 3*len(m.certificates) + i + x = make([]byte, 4+length) + x[0] = typeCertificate + x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) + x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) + x[3] = uint8(length) + + certificateOctets := length - 3 + x[4] = uint8(certificateOctets >> 16) + x[5] = uint8(certificateOctets >> 8) + x[6] = uint8(certificateOctets) + + y := x[7:] + for _, slice := range m.certificates { + y[0] = uint8(len(slice) >> 16) + y[1] = uint8(len(slice) >> 8) + y[2] = uint8(len(slice)) + copy(y[3:], slice) + y = y[3+len(slice):] + } + + m.raw = x + return +} + +func (m *certificateMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + if len(data) < 7 { + return false + } + + m.raw = data + certsLen := uint32(data[4])<<16 | uint32(data[5])<<8 | uint32(data[6]) + if uint32(len(data)) != certsLen+7 { + return false + } + + numCerts := 0 + d := data[7:] + for certsLen > 0 { + if len(d) < 4 { + return false + } + certLen := uint32(d[0])<<16 | uint32(d[1])<<8 | uint32(d[2]) + if uint32(len(d)) < 3+certLen { + return false + } + d = d[3+certLen:] + certsLen -= 3 + certLen + numCerts++ + } + + m.certificates = make([][]byte, numCerts) + d = data[7:] + for i := 0; i < numCerts; i++ { + certLen := uint32(d[0])<<16 | uint32(d[1])<<8 | uint32(d[2]) + m.certificates[i] = d[3 : 3+certLen] + d = d[3+certLen:] + } + + return true +} + +type serverKeyExchangeMsg struct { + raw []byte + key []byte +} + +func (m *serverKeyExchangeMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool { + m1, ok := i.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg) + if !ok { + return false + } + + return bytes.Equal(m.raw, m1.raw) && + bytes.Equal(m.key, m1.key) +} + +func (m *serverKeyExchangeMsg) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + length := len(m.key) + x := make([]byte, length+4) + x[0] = typeServerKeyExchange + x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) + x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) + x[3] = uint8(length) + copy(x[4:], m.key) + + m.raw = x + return x +} + +func (m *serverKeyExchangeMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + if len(data) < 4 { + return false + } + m.key = data[4:] + return true +} + +type certificateStatusMsg struct { + raw []byte + statusType uint8 + response []byte +} + +func (m *certificateStatusMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool { + m1, ok := i.(*certificateStatusMsg) + if !ok { + return false + } + + return bytes.Equal(m.raw, m1.raw) && + m.statusType == m1.statusType && + bytes.Equal(m.response, m1.response) +} + +func (m *certificateStatusMsg) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + var x []byte + if m.statusType == statusTypeOCSP { + x = make([]byte, 4+4+len(m.response)) + x[0] = typeCertificateStatus + l := len(m.response) + 4 + x[1] = byte(l >> 16) + x[2] = byte(l >> 8) + x[3] = byte(l) + x[4] = statusTypeOCSP + + l -= 4 + x[5] = byte(l >> 16) + x[6] = byte(l >> 8) + x[7] = byte(l) + copy(x[8:], m.response) + } else { + x = []byte{typeCertificateStatus, 0, 0, 1, m.statusType} + } + + m.raw = x + return x +} + +func (m *certificateStatusMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + if len(data) < 5 { + return false + } + m.statusType = data[4] + + m.response = nil + if m.statusType == statusTypeOCSP { + if len(data) < 8 { + return false + } + respLen := uint32(data[5])<<16 | uint32(data[6])<<8 | uint32(data[7]) + if uint32(len(data)) != 4+4+respLen { + return false + } + m.response = data[8:] + } + return true +} + +type serverHelloDoneMsg struct{} + +func (m *serverHelloDoneMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool { + _, ok := i.(*serverHelloDoneMsg) + return ok +} + +func (m *serverHelloDoneMsg) marshal() []byte { + x := make([]byte, 4) + x[0] = typeServerHelloDone + return x +} + +func (m *serverHelloDoneMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + return len(data) == 4 +} + +type clientKeyExchangeMsg struct { + raw []byte + ciphertext []byte +} + +func (m *clientKeyExchangeMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool { + m1, ok := i.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg) + if !ok { + return false + } + + return bytes.Equal(m.raw, m1.raw) && + bytes.Equal(m.ciphertext, m1.ciphertext) +} + +func (m *clientKeyExchangeMsg) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + length := len(m.ciphertext) + x := make([]byte, length+4) + x[0] = typeClientKeyExchange + x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) + x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) + x[3] = uint8(length) + copy(x[4:], m.ciphertext) + + m.raw = x + return x +} + +func (m *clientKeyExchangeMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + if len(data) < 4 { + return false + } + l := int(data[1])<<16 | int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3]) + if l != len(data)-4 { + return false + } + m.ciphertext = data[4:] + return true +} + +type finishedMsg struct { + raw []byte + verifyData []byte +} + +func (m *finishedMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool { + m1, ok := i.(*finishedMsg) + if !ok { + return false + } + + return bytes.Equal(m.raw, m1.raw) && + bytes.Equal(m.verifyData, m1.verifyData) +} + +func (m *finishedMsg) marshal() (x []byte) { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + x = make([]byte, 4+len(m.verifyData)) + x[0] = typeFinished + x[3] = byte(len(m.verifyData)) + copy(x[4:], m.verifyData) + m.raw = x + return +} + +func (m *finishedMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + if len(data) < 4 { + return false + } + m.verifyData = data[4:] + return true +} + +type nextProtoMsg struct { + raw []byte + proto string +} + +func (m *nextProtoMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool { + m1, ok := i.(*nextProtoMsg) + if !ok { + return false + } + + return bytes.Equal(m.raw, m1.raw) && + m.proto == m1.proto +} + +func (m *nextProtoMsg) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + l := len(m.proto) + if l > 255 { + l = 255 + } + + padding := 32 - (l+2)%32 + length := l + padding + 2 + x := make([]byte, length+4) + x[0] = typeNextProtocol + x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) + x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) + x[3] = uint8(length) + + y := x[4:] + y[0] = byte(l) + copy(y[1:], []byte(m.proto[0:l])) + y = y[1+l:] + y[0] = byte(padding) + + m.raw = x + + return x +} + +func (m *nextProtoMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + + if len(data) < 5 { + return false + } + data = data[4:] + protoLen := int(data[0]) + data = data[1:] + if len(data) < protoLen { + return false + } + m.proto = string(data[0:protoLen]) + data = data[protoLen:] + + if len(data) < 1 { + return false + } + paddingLen := int(data[0]) + data = data[1:] + if len(data) != paddingLen { + return false + } + + return true +} + +type certificateRequestMsg struct { + raw []byte + // hasSignatureAndHash indicates whether this message includes a list + // of signature and hash functions. This change was introduced with TLS + // 1.2. + hasSignatureAndHash bool + + certificateTypes []byte + supportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme + certificateAuthorities [][]byte +} + +func (m *certificateRequestMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool { + m1, ok := i.(*certificateRequestMsg) + if !ok { + return false + } + + return bytes.Equal(m.raw, m1.raw) && + bytes.Equal(m.certificateTypes, m1.certificateTypes) && + eqByteSlices(m.certificateAuthorities, m1.certificateAuthorities) && + eqSignatureAlgorithms(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, m1.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) +} + +func (m *certificateRequestMsg) marshal() (x []byte) { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + // See http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346#section-7.4.4 + length := 1 + len(m.certificateTypes) + 2 + casLength := 0 + for _, ca := range m.certificateAuthorities { + casLength += 2 + len(ca) + } + length += casLength + + if m.hasSignatureAndHash { + length += 2 +2*len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) + } + + x = make([]byte, 4+length) + x[0] = typeCertificateRequest + x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) + x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) + x[3] = uint8(length) + + x[4] = uint8(len(m.certificateTypes)) + + copy(x[5:], m.certificateTypes) + y := x[5+len(m.certificateTypes):] + + if m.hasSignatureAndHash { + n := len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) * 2 + y[0] = uint8(n >> 8) + y[1] = uint8(n) + y = y[2:] + for _, sigAlgo := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms { + y[0] = uint8(sigAlgo >> 8) + y[1] = uint8(sigAlgo) + y = y[2:] + } + } + + y[0] = uint8(casLength >> 8) + y[1] = uint8(casLength) + y = y[2:] + for _, ca := range m.certificateAuthorities { + y[0] = uint8(len(ca) >> 8) + y[1] = uint8(len(ca)) + y = y[2:] + copy(y, ca) + y = y[len(ca):] + } + + m.raw = x + return +} + +func (m *certificateRequestMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + + if len(data) < 5 { + return false + } + + length := uint32(data[1])<<16 | uint32(data[2])<<8 | uint32(data[3]) + if uint32(len(data))-4 != length { + return false + } + + numCertTypes := int(data[4]) + data = data[5:] + if numCertTypes == 0 || len(data) <= numCertTypes { + return false + } + + m.certificateTypes = make([]byte, numCertTypes) + if copy(m.certificateTypes, data) != numCertTypes { + return false + } + + data = data[numCertTypes:] + + if m.hasSignatureAndHash { + if len(data) < 2 { + return false + } + sigAndHashLen := uint16(data[0])<<8 | uint16(data[1]) + data = data[2:] + if sigAndHashLen&1 != 0 { + return false + } + if len(data) < int(sigAndHashLen) { + return false + } + numSigAlgos := sigAndHashLen / 2 + m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = make([]SignatureScheme, numSigAlgos) + for i := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms { + m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] = SignatureScheme(data[0])<<8 | SignatureScheme(data[1]) + data = data[2:] + } + } + + if len(data) < 2 { + return false + } + casLength := uint16(data[0])<<8 | uint16(data[1]) + data = data[2:] + if len(data) < int(casLength) { + return false + } + cas := make([]byte, casLength) + copy(cas, data) + data = data[casLength:] + + m.certificateAuthorities = nil + for len(cas) > 0 { + if len(cas) < 2 { + return false + } + caLen := uint16(cas[0])<<8 | uint16(cas[1]) + cas = cas[2:] + + if len(cas) < int(caLen) { + return false + } + + m.certificateAuthorities = append(m.certificateAuthorities, cas[:caLen]) + cas = cas[caLen:] + } + + return len(data) == 0 +} + +type certificateVerifyMsg struct { + raw []byte + hasSignatureAndHash bool + signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme + signature []byte +} + +func (m *certificateVerifyMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool { + m1, ok := i.(*certificateVerifyMsg) + if !ok { + return false + } + + return bytes.Equal(m.raw, m1.raw) && + m.hasSignatureAndHash == m1.hasSignatureAndHash && + m.signatureAlgorithm == m1.signatureAlgorithm && + bytes.Equal(m.signature, m1.signature) +} + +func (m *certificateVerifyMsg) marshal() (x []byte) { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + // See http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346#section-7.4.8 + siglength := len(m.signature) + length := 2 + siglength + if m.hasSignatureAndHash { + length += 2 + } + x = make([]byte, 4+length) + x[0] = typeCertificateVerify + x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) + x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) + x[3] = uint8(length) + y := x[4:] + if m.hasSignatureAndHash { + y[0] = uint8(m.signatureAlgorithm >> 8) + y[1] = uint8(m.signatureAlgorithm) + y = y[2:] + } + y[0] = uint8(siglength >> 8) + y[1] = uint8(siglength) + copy(y[2:], m.signature) + + m.raw = x + + return +} + +func (m *certificateVerifyMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + + if len(data) < 6 { + return false + } + + length := uint32(data[1])<<16 | uint32(data[2])<<8 | uint32(data[3]) + if uint32(len(data))-4 != length { + return false + } + + data = data[4:] + if m.hasSignatureAndHash { + m.signatureAlgorithm = SignatureScheme(data[0])<<8 | SignatureScheme(data[1]) + data = data[2:] + } + + if len(data) < 2 { + return false + } + siglength := int(data[0])<<8 + int(data[1]) + data = data[2:] + if len(data) != siglength { + return false + } + + m.signature = data + + return true +} + +type newSessionTicketMsg struct { + raw []byte + ticket []byte +} + +func (m *newSessionTicketMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool { + m1, ok := i.(*newSessionTicketMsg) + if !ok { + return false + } + + return bytes.Equal(m.raw, m1.raw) && + bytes.Equal(m.ticket, m1.ticket) +} + +func (m *newSessionTicketMsg) marshal() (x []byte) { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + // See http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077#section-3.3 + ticketLen := len(m.ticket) + length := 2 + 4 + ticketLen + x = make([]byte, 4+length) + x[0] = typeNewSessionTicket + x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) + x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) + x[3] = uint8(length) + x[8] = uint8(ticketLen >> 8) + x[9] = uint8(ticketLen) + copy(x[10:], m.ticket) + + m.raw = x + + return +} + +func (m *newSessionTicketMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + + if len(data) < 10 { + return false + } + + length := uint32(data[1])<<16 | uint32(data[2])<<8 | uint32(data[3]) + if uint32(len(data))-4 != length { + return false + } + + ticketLen := int(data[8])<<8 + int(data[9]) + if len(data)-10 != ticketLen { + return false + } + + m.ticket = data[10:] + + return true +} + +type helloRequestMsg struct { +} + +func (*helloRequestMsg) marshal() []byte { + return []byte{typeHelloRequest, 0, 0, 0} +} + +func (*helloRequestMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + return len(data) == 4 +} + +func eqUint16s(x, y []uint16) bool { + if len(x) != len(y) { + return false + } + for i, v := range x { + if y[i] != v { + return false + } + } + return true +} + +func eqCurveIDs(x, y []CurveID) bool { + if len(x) != len(y) { + return false + } + for i, v := range x { + if y[i] != v { + return false + } + } + return true +} + +func eqStrings(x, y []string) bool { + if len(x) != len(y) { + return false + } + for i, v := range x { + if y[i] != v { + return false + } + } + return true +} + +func eqByteSlices(x, y [][]byte) bool { + if len(x) != len(y) { + return false + } + for i, v := range x { + if !bytes.Equal(v, y[i]) { + return false + } + } + return true +} + +func eqSignatureAlgorithms(x, y []SignatureScheme) bool { + if len(x) != len(y) { + return false + } + for i, v := range x { + if v != y[i] { + return false + } + } + return true +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/handshake_server.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/handshake_server.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..be642a5a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/handshake_server.go @@ -0,0 +1,805 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package gmtls + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/subtle" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "sync/atomic" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509" +) + +// serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress. +// It's discarded once the handshake has completed. +type serverHandshakeState struct { + c *Conn + clientHello *clientHelloMsg + hello *serverHelloMsg + suite *cipherSuite + ellipticOk bool + ecdsaOk bool + rsaDecryptOk bool + rsaSignOk bool + sessionState *sessionState + finishedHash finishedHash + masterSecret []byte + certsFromClient [][]byte + cert *Certificate + cachedClientHelloInfo *ClientHelloInfo +} + +// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server. +// c.out.Mutex <= L; c.handshakeMutex <= L. +func (c *Conn) serverHandshake() error { + // If this is the first server handshake, we generate a random key to + // encrypt the tickets with. + c.config.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { c.config.serverInit(nil) }) + + hs := serverHandshakeState{ + c: c, + } + isResume, err := hs.readClientHello() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + // For an overview of TLS handshaking, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.3 + c.buffering = true + if isResume { + // The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake. + if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + // ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the + // ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session + // ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent. + if hs.hello.ticketSupported { + if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false + if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil { + return err + } + c.didResume = true + } else { + // The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't + // valid so we do a full handshake. + if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true + c.buffering = true + if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random) + atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1) + + return nil +} + +// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message from the client and decides +// whether we will perform session resumption. +func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readClientHello() (isResume bool, err error) { + c := hs.c + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + var ok bool + hs.clientHello, ok = msg.(*clientHelloMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return false, unexpectedMessageError(hs.clientHello, msg) + } + + if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil { + if newConfig, err := c.config.GetConfigForClient(hs.clientHelloInfo()); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, err + } else if newConfig != nil { + newConfig.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { newConfig.serverInit(c.config) }) + c.config = newConfig + } + } + + c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(hs.clientHello.vers) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) + return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered an unsupported, maximum protocol version of %x", hs.clientHello.vers) + } + c.haveVers = true + + hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg) + + supportedCurve := false + preferredCurves := c.config.curvePreferences() +Curves: + for _, curve := range hs.clientHello.supportedCurves { + for _, supported := range preferredCurves { + if supported == curve { + supportedCurve = true + break Curves + } + } + } + + supportedPointFormat := false + for _, pointFormat := range hs.clientHello.supportedPoints { + if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed { + supportedPointFormat = true + break + } + } + hs.ellipticOk = supportedCurve && supportedPointFormat + + foundCompression := false + // We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it. + for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods { + if compression == compressionNone { + foundCompression = true + break + } + } + + if !foundCompression { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections") + } + + hs.hello.vers = c.vers + hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32) + _, err = io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hs.hello.random) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, err + } + + if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension") + } + + hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported + hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone + if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 { + c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName + } + + if len(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) > 0 { + if selectedProto, fallback := mutualProtocol(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, c.config.NextProtos); !fallback { + hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto + c.clientProtocol = selectedProto + } + } else { + // Although sending an empty NPN extension is reasonable, Firefox has + // had a bug around this. Best to send nothing at all if + // c.config.NextProtos is empty. See + // https://golang.org/issue/5445. + if hs.clientHello.nextProtoNeg && len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0 { + hs.hello.nextProtoNeg = true + hs.hello.nextProtos = c.config.NextProtos + } + } + + hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(hs.clientHelloInfo()) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, err + } + if hs.clientHello.scts { + hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps + } + + if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok { + switch priv.Public().(type) { + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + hs.ecdsaOk = true + case *rsa.PublicKey: + hs.rsaSignOk = true + default: + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signing key type (%T)", priv.Public()) + } + } + if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok { + switch priv.Public().(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey: + hs.rsaDecryptOk = true + default: + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported decryption key type (%T)", priv.Public()) + } + } + + if hs.checkForResumption() { + return true, nil + } + + var preferenceList, supportedList []uint16 + if c.config.PreferServerCipherSuites { + preferenceList = c.config.cipherSuites() + supportedList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites + } else { + preferenceList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites + supportedList = c.config.cipherSuites() + } + + for _, id := range preferenceList { + if hs.setCipherSuite(id, supportedList, c.vers) { + break + } + } + + if hs.suite == nil { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server") + } + + // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7507. + for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites { + if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV { + // The client is doing a fallback connection. + if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxVersion() { + c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback) + return false, errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback") + } + break + } + } + + return false, nil +} + +// checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection. +func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool { + c := hs.c + + if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled { + return false + } + + var ok bool + var sessionTicket = append([]uint8{}, hs.clientHello.sessionTicket...) + if hs.sessionState, ok = c.decryptTicket(sessionTicket); !ok { + return false + } + + // Never resume a session for a different TLS version. + if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers { + return false + } + + cipherSuiteOk := false + // Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session. + for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites { + if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite { + cipherSuiteOk = true + break + } + } + if !cipherSuiteOk { + return false + } + + // Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session. + if !hs.setCipherSuite(hs.sessionState.cipherSuite, c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.sessionState.vers) { + return false + } + + sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0 + needClientCerts := c.config.ClientAuth == RequireAnyClientCert || c.config.ClientAuth == RequireAndVerifyClientCert + if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts { + return false + } + if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert { + return false + } + + return true +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error { + c := hs.c + + hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id + // We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know + // that we're doing a resumption. + hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId + hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey + hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite) + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal()) + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + if len(hs.sessionState.certificates) > 0 { + if _, err := hs.processCertsFromClient(hs.sessionState.certificates); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret + + return nil +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error { + c := hs.c + + if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 { + hs.hello.ocspStapling = true + } + + hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled + hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id + + hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(hs.c.vers, hs.suite) + if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert { + // No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client + // certificates won't be used. + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal()) + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + certMsg := new(certificateMsg) + certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate + hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + if hs.hello.ocspStapling { + certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg) + certStatus.statusType = statusTypeOCSP + certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple + hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers) + skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return err + } + if skx != nil { + hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert { + // Request a client certificate + certReq := new(certificateRequestMsg) + certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{ + byte(certTypeRSASign), + byte(certTypeECDSASign), + } + if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 { + certReq.hasSignatureAndHash = true + certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms + } + + // An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to + // the client that it may send any certificate in response + // to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then + // we can send them down, so that the client can choose + // an appropriate certificate to give to us. + if c.config.ClientCAs != nil { + certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects() + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg) + hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + + var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + var ok bool + // If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a + // certificate message, even if it's empty. + if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert { + if certMsg, ok = msg.(*certificateMsg); !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) + + if len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 { + // The client didn't actually send a certificate + switch c.config.ClientAuth { + case RequireAnyClientCert, RequireAndVerifyClientCert: + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate") + } + } + + pub, err = hs.processCertsFromClient(certMsg.certificates) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + // Get client key exchange + ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal()) + + preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return err + } + hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random) + if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + + // If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message, + // the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the + // clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding + // handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding + // to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in + // possession of the private key of the certificate. + if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 { + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg) + } + + // Determine the signature type. + _, sigType, hashFunc, err := pickSignatureAlgorithm(pub, []SignatureScheme{certVerify.signatureAlgorithm}, supportedSignatureAlgorithms, c.vers) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) + return err + } + + var digest []byte + if digest, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, hashFunc, hs.masterSecret); err == nil { + err = verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, pub, hashFunc, digest, certVerify.signature) + } + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return errors.New("tls: could not validate signature of connection nonces: " + err.Error()) + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal()) + } + + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + + return nil +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error { + c := hs.c + + clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV := + keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen) + + var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{} + var clientHash, serverHash macFunction + + if hs.suite.aead == nil { + clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */) + clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC) + serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */) + serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC) + } else { + clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV) + serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV) + } + + c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash) + c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash) + + return nil +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error { + c := hs.c + + c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec) + if c.in.err != nil { + return c.in.err + } + + if hs.hello.nextProtoNeg { + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + nextProto, ok := msg.(*nextProtoMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(nextProto, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal()) + c.clientProtocol = nextProto.proto + } + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg) + } + + verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret) + if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) || + subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect") + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal()) + copy(out, verify) + return nil +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error { + if !hs.hello.ticketSupported { + return nil + } + + c := hs.c + m := new(newSessionTicketMsg) + + var err error + state := sessionState{ + vers: c.vers, + cipherSuite: hs.suite.id, + masterSecret: hs.masterSecret, + certificates: hs.certsFromClient, + } + m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(&state) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + return nil +} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error { + c := hs.c + + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil { + return err + } + + finished := new(finishedMsg) + finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret) + hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id + copy(out, finished.verifyData) + + return nil +} + +// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a +// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns +// the public key of the leaf certificate. +func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processCertsFromClient(certificates [][]byte) (crypto.PublicKey, error) { + c := hs.c + + hs.certsFromClient = certificates + certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates)) + var err error + for i, asn1Data := range certificates { + if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error()) + } + } + + if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 { + opts := x509.VerifyOptions{ + Roots: c.config.ClientCAs, + CurrentTime: c.config.time(), + Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(), + KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth}, + } + + for _, cert := range certs[1:] { + opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert) + } + + chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to verify client's certificate: " + err.Error()) + } + + c.verifiedChains = chains + } + + if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil { + if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return nil, err + } + } + + if len(certs) == 0 { + return nil, nil + } + + var pub crypto.PublicKey + switch key := certs[0].PublicKey.(type) { + case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey: + pub = key + default: + c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate) + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client's certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey) + } + c.peerCertificates = certs + return pub, nil +} + +// setCipherSuite sets a cipherSuite with the given id as the serverHandshakeState +// suite if that cipher suite is acceptable to use. +// It returns a bool indicating if the suite was set. +func (hs *serverHandshakeState) setCipherSuite(id uint16, supportedCipherSuites []uint16, version uint16) bool { + for _, supported := range supportedCipherSuites { + if id == supported { + var candidate *cipherSuite + + for _, s := range cipherSuites { + if s.id == id { + candidate = s + break + } + } + if candidate == nil { + continue + } + // Don't select a ciphersuite which we can't + // support for this client. + if candidate.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 { + if !hs.ellipticOk { + continue + } + if candidate.flags&suiteECDSA != 0 { + if !hs.ecdsaOk { + continue + } + } else if !hs.rsaSignOk { + continue + } + } else if !hs.rsaDecryptOk { + continue + } + if version < VersionTLS12 && candidate.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 { + continue + } + hs.suite = candidate + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// suppVersArray is the backing array of ClientHelloInfo.SupportedVersions +var suppVersArray = [...]uint16{VersionTLS12, VersionTLS11, VersionTLS10, VersionSSL30} + +func (hs *serverHandshakeState) clientHelloInfo() *ClientHelloInfo { + if hs.cachedClientHelloInfo != nil { + return hs.cachedClientHelloInfo + } + + var supportedVersions []uint16 + if hs.clientHello.vers > VersionTLS12 { + supportedVersions = suppVersArray[:] + } else if hs.clientHello.vers >= VersionSSL30 { + supportedVersions = suppVersArray[VersionTLS12-hs.clientHello.vers:] + } + + hs.cachedClientHelloInfo = &ClientHelloInfo{ + CipherSuites: hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, + ServerName: hs.clientHello.serverName, + SupportedCurves: hs.clientHello.supportedCurves, + SupportedPoints: hs.clientHello.supportedPoints, + SignatureSchemes: hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, + SupportedProtos: hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, + SupportedVersions: supportedVersions, + Conn: hs.c.conn, + } + + return hs.cachedClientHelloInfo +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/http_client.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/http_client.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..46d4aee1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/http_client.go @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package gmtls + +import ( + "context" + "net" + "net/http" + "time" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509" +) + +// NewHTTPSClient 创建国密HTTPS客户端，只对服务端进行身份认证（验证服务端证书）。 +// pool: 根证书链 +func NewHTTPSClient(pool *x509.CertPool) *http.Client { + return &http.Client{ + Transport: NewSimpleRoundTripper(&Config{ + GMSupport: &GMSupport{}, + RootCAs: pool, + }), + } +} + +// NewAuthHTTPSClient 创建双向身份认证国密HTTPS客户端 +// +// pool: 根证书链 +// clientAuthCert: 客户端认证密钥对和证书 +func NewAuthHTTPSClient(pool *x509.CertPool, clientAuthCert *Certificate) *http.Client { + return &http.Client{ + Transport: NewSimpleRoundTripper(&Config{ + GMSupport: &GMSupport{}, + RootCAs: pool, + Certificates: []Certificate{*clientAuthCert}, + }), + } +} + +// NewCustomHTTPSClient 创建自定义国密HTTPS客户端 +// 通过自定义TLS参数定制TLS实现细节，如进行双向身份认证等。 +func NewCustomHTTPSClient(config *Config) *http.Client { + if config == nil { + return &http.Client{} + } + + return &http.Client{ + Transport: newDefaultGMHttpClientTransport(config), + } +} + +func newDefaultGMHttpClientTransport(tlsConfig *Config) http.RoundTripper { + return &http.Transport{ + DialTLSContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { + + dialer := &net.Dialer{} + + conn, err := DialWithDialer(dialer, network, addr, tlsConfig) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return conn, nil + }, + Dial: (&net.Dialer{ + Timeout: 10 * time.Second, + KeepAlive: 60 * time.Second, + }).Dial, + TLSHandshakeTimeout: 10 * time.Second, + IdleConnTimeout: 30 * time.Second, + } +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/key_agreement.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/key_agreement.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..238959ee --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/key_agreement.go @@ -0,0 +1,414 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package gmtls + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/md5" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/sha1" + "errors" + "io" + "math/big" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" +) + +var errClientKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ClientKeyExchange message") +var errServerKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ServerKeyExchange message") + +// rsaKeyAgreement implements the standard TLS key agreement where the client +// encrypts the pre-master secret to the server's public key. +type rsaKeyAgreement struct{} + +func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *Config, signCert, cipherCert *Certificate, + clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + return nil, nil +} + +func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *Config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) { + if len(ckx.ciphertext) < 2 { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + + ciphertext := ckx.ciphertext + if version != VersionSSL30 { + ciphertextLen := int(ckx.ciphertext[0])<<8 | int(ckx.ciphertext[1]) + if ciphertextLen != len(ckx.ciphertext)-2 { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + ciphertext = ckx.ciphertext[2:] + } + priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Decrypter") + } + // Perform constant time RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption + preMasterSecret, err := priv.Decrypt(config.rand(), ciphertext, &rsa.PKCS1v15DecryptOptions{SessionKeyLen: 48}) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // We don't check the version number in the premaster secret. For one, + // by checking it, we would leak information about the validity of the + // encrypted pre-master secret. Secondly, it provides only a small + // benefit against a downgrade attack and some implementations send the + // wrong version anyway. See the discussion at the end of section + // 7.4.7.1 of RFC 4346. + return preMasterSecret, nil +} + +func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error { + return errors.New("tls: unexpected ServerKeyExchange") +} + +func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + preMasterSecret := make([]byte, 48) + preMasterSecret[0] = byte(clientHello.vers >> 8) + preMasterSecret[1] = byte(clientHello.vers) + _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), preMasterSecret[2:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + encrypted, err := rsa.EncryptPKCS1v15(config.rand(), cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey), preMasterSecret) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + ckx := new(clientKeyExchangeMsg) + ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, len(encrypted)+2) + ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(encrypted) >> 8) + ckx.ciphertext[1] = byte(len(encrypted)) + copy(ckx.ciphertext[2:], encrypted) + return preMasterSecret, ckx, nil +} + +// sha1Hash calculates a SHA1 hash over the given byte slices. +func sha1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte { + hsha1 := sha1.New() + for _, slice := range slices { + hsha1.Write(slice) + } + return hsha1.Sum(nil) +} + +// md5SHA1Hash implements TLS 1.0's hybrid hash function which consists of the +// concatenation of an MD5 and SHA1 hash. +func md5SHA1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte { + md5sha1 := make([]byte, md5.Size+sha1.Size) + hmd5 := md5.New() + for _, slice := range slices { + hmd5.Write(slice) + } + copy(md5sha1, hmd5.Sum(nil)) + copy(md5sha1[md5.Size:], sha1Hash(slices)) + return md5sha1 +} + +// hashForServerKeyExchange hashes the given slices and returns their digest +// using the given hash function (for >= TLS 1.2) or using a default based on +// the sigType (for earlier TLS versions). +func hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType uint8, hashFunc crypto.Hash, version uint16, slices ...[]byte) ([]byte, error) { + if version >= VersionTLS12 { + h := hashFunc.New() + for _, slice := range slices { + h.Write(slice) + } + digest := h.Sum(nil) + return digest, nil + } + if sigType == signatureECDSA { + return sha1Hash(slices), nil + } + return md5SHA1Hash(slices), nil +} + +func curveForCurveID(id CurveID) (elliptic.Curve, bool) { + switch id { + case CurveP256: + return elliptic.P256(), true + case CurveP384: + return elliptic.P384(), true + case CurveP521: + return elliptic.P521(), true + default: + return nil, false + } + +} + +// ecdheKeyAgreement implements a TLS key agreement where the server +// generates an ephemeral EC public/private key pair and signs it. The +// pre-master secret is then calculated using ECDH. The signature may +// either be ECDSA or RSA. +type ecdheKeyAgreement struct { + version uint16 + isRSA bool + privateKey []byte + curveid CurveID + + // publicKey is used to store the peer's public value when X25519 is + // being used. + publicKey []byte + // x and y are used to store the peer's public value when one of the + // NIST curves is being used. + x, y *big.Int +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *Config, signCert, cipherCert *Certificate, + clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + preferredCurves := config.curvePreferences() + +NextCandidate: + for _, candidate := range preferredCurves { + for _, c := range clientHello.supportedCurves { + if candidate == c { + ka.curveid = c + break NextCandidate + } + } + } + + if ka.curveid == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("tls: no supported elliptic curves offered") + } + + var ecdhePublic []byte + + if ka.curveid == X25519 { + var scalar, public [32]byte + if _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), scalar[:]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + curve25519.ScalarBaseMult(&public, &scalar) + ka.privateKey = scalar[:] + ecdhePublic = public[:] + } else { + curve, ok := curveForCurveID(ka.curveid) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("tls: preferredCurves includes unsupported curve") + } + + var x, y *big.Int + var err error + ka.privateKey, x, y, err = elliptic.GenerateKey(curve, config.rand()) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ecdhePublic = elliptic.Marshal(curve, x, y) + } + + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.4 + serverECDHParams := make([]byte, 1+2+1+len(ecdhePublic)) + serverECDHParams[0] = 3 // named curve + serverECDHParams[1] = byte(ka.curveid >> 8) + serverECDHParams[2] = byte(ka.curveid) + serverECDHParams[3] = byte(len(ecdhePublic)) + copy(serverECDHParams[4:], ecdhePublic) + + priv, ok := signCert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer") + } + + signatureAlgorithm, sigType, hashFunc, err := pickSignatureAlgorithm(priv.Public(), clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, supportedSignatureAlgorithms, ka.version) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA { + return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate cannot be used with the selected cipher suite") + } + + digest, err := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, hashFunc, ka.version, clientHello.random, hello.random, serverECDHParams) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(hashFunc) + if sigType == signatureRSAPSS { + signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: hashFunc} + } + sig, err := priv.Sign(config.rand(), digest, signOpts) + if err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to sign ECDHE parameters: " + err.Error()) + } + + skx := new(serverKeyExchangeMsg) + sigAndHashLen := 0 + if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { + sigAndHashLen = 2 + } + skx.key = make([]byte, len(serverECDHParams)+sigAndHashLen+2+len(sig)) + copy(skx.key, serverECDHParams) + k := skx.key[len(serverECDHParams):] + if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { + k[0] = byte(signatureAlgorithm >> 8) + k[1] = byte(signatureAlgorithm) + k = k[2:] + } + k[0] = byte(len(sig) >> 8) + k[1] = byte(len(sig)) + copy(k[2:], sig) + + return skx, nil +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *Config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) { + if len(ckx.ciphertext) == 0 || int(ckx.ciphertext[0]) != len(ckx.ciphertext)-1 { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + + if ka.curveid == X25519 { + if len(ckx.ciphertext) != 1+32 { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + + var theirPublic, sharedKey, scalar [32]byte + copy(theirPublic[:], ckx.ciphertext[1:]) + copy(scalar[:], ka.privateKey) + curve25519.ScalarMult(&sharedKey, &scalar, &theirPublic) + return sharedKey[:], nil + } + + curve, ok := curveForCurveID(ka.curveid) + if !ok { + panic("internal error") + } + x, y := elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, ckx.ciphertext[1:]) // Unmarshal also checks whether the given point is on the curve + if x == nil { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + x, _ = curve.ScalarMult(x, y, ka.privateKey) + preMasterSecret := make([]byte, (curve.Params().BitSize+7)>>3) + xBytes := x.Bytes() + copy(preMasterSecret[len(preMasterSecret)-len(xBytes):], xBytes) + + return preMasterSecret, nil +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error { + if len(skx.key) < 4 { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + if skx.key[0] != 3 { // named curve + return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve") + } + ka.curveid = CurveID(skx.key[1])<<8 | CurveID(skx.key[2]) + + publicLen := int(skx.key[3]) + if publicLen+4 > len(skx.key) { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + serverECDHParams := skx.key[:4+publicLen] + publicKey := serverECDHParams[4:] + + sig := skx.key[4+publicLen:] + if len(sig) < 2 { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + + if ka.curveid == X25519 { + if len(publicKey) != 32 { + return errors.New("tls: bad X25519 public value") + } + ka.publicKey = publicKey + } else { + curve, ok := curveForCurveID(ka.curveid) + if !ok { + return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve") + } + ka.x, ka.y = elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, publicKey) // Unmarshal also checks whether the given point is on the curve + if ka.x == nil { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + } + + var signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme + if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { + // handle SignatureAndHashAlgorithm + signatureAlgorithm = SignatureScheme(sig[0])<<8 | SignatureScheme(sig[1]) + sig = sig[2:] + if len(sig) < 2 { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + } + _, sigType, hashFunc, err := pickSignatureAlgorithm(cert.PublicKey, []SignatureScheme{signatureAlgorithm}, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, ka.version) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + + sigLen := int(sig[0])<<8 | int(sig[1]) + if sigLen+2 != len(sig) { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + sig = sig[2:] + + digest, err := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, hashFunc, ka.version, clientHello.random, serverHello.random, serverECDHParams) + if err != nil { + return err + } + return verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, cert.PublicKey, hashFunc, digest, sig) +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + if ka.curveid == 0 { + return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: missing ServerKeyExchange message") + } + + var serialized, preMasterSecret []byte + + if ka.curveid == X25519 { + var ourPublic, theirPublic, sharedKey, scalar [32]byte + + if _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), scalar[:]); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + copy(theirPublic[:], ka.publicKey) + curve25519.ScalarBaseMult(&ourPublic, &scalar) + curve25519.ScalarMult(&sharedKey, &scalar, &theirPublic) + serialized = ourPublic[:] + preMasterSecret = sharedKey[:] + } else { + curve, ok := curveForCurveID(ka.curveid) + if !ok { + panic("internal error") + } + priv, mx, my, err := elliptic.GenerateKey(curve, config.rand()) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + x, _ := curve.ScalarMult(ka.x, ka.y, priv) + preMasterSecret = make([]byte, (curve.Params().BitSize+7)>>3) + xBytes := x.Bytes() + copy(preMasterSecret[len(preMasterSecret)-len(xBytes):], xBytes) + + serialized = elliptic.Marshal(curve, mx, my) + } + + ckx := new(clientKeyExchangeMsg) + ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, 1+len(serialized)) + ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(serialized)) + copy(ckx.ciphertext[1:], serialized) + + return preMasterSecret, ckx, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/prf.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/prf.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d589f6c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/prf.go @@ -0,0 +1,419 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package gmtls + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/md5" + "crypto/sha1" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/sha512" + "errors" + "fmt" + "hash" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm3" +) + +// Split a premaster secret in two as specified in RFC 4346, section 5. +func splitPreMasterSecret(secret []byte) (s1, s2 []byte) { + s1 = secret[0 : (len(secret)+1)/2] + s2 = secret[len(secret)/2:] + return +} + +// pHash implements the P_hash function, as defined in RFC 4346, section 5. +func pHash(result, secret, seed []byte, hash func() hash.Hash) { + h := hmac.New(hash, secret) + h.Write(seed) + a := h.Sum(nil) + + j := 0 + for j < len(result) { + h.Reset() + h.Write(a) + h.Write(seed) + b := h.Sum(nil) + todo := len(b) + if j+todo > len(result) { + todo = len(result) - j + } + copy(result[j:j+todo], b) + j += todo + + h.Reset() + h.Write(a) + a = h.Sum(nil) + } +} + +// prf10 implements the TLS 1.0 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 2246, section 5. +func prf10(result, secret, label, seed []byte) { + hashSHA1 := sha1.New + hashMD5 := md5.New + + labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed)) + copy(labelAndSeed, label) + copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed) + + s1, s2 := splitPreMasterSecret(secret) + pHash(result, s1, labelAndSeed, hashMD5) + result2 := make([]byte, len(result)) + pHash(result2, s2, labelAndSeed, hashSHA1) + + for i, b := range result2 { + result[i] ^= b + } +} + +// prf12 implements the TLS 1.2 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 5246, section 5. +func prf12(hashFunc func() hash.Hash) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) { + return func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) { + labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed)) + copy(labelAndSeed, label) + copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed) + + pHash(result, secret, labelAndSeed, hashFunc) + } +} + +// prf30 implements the SSL 3.0 pseudo-random function, as defined in +// www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft302.txt section 6. +func prf30(result, secret, label, seed []byte) { + hashSHA1 := sha1.New() + hashMD5 := md5.New() + + done := 0 + i := 0 + // RFC 5246 section 6.3 says that the largest PRF output needed is 128 + // bytes. Since no more ciphersuites will be added to SSLv3, this will + // remain true. Each iteration gives us 16 bytes so 10 iterations will + // be sufficient. + var b [11]byte + for done < len(result) { + for j := 0; j <= i; j++ { + b[j] = 'A' + byte(i) + } + + hashSHA1.Reset() + hashSHA1.Write(b[:i+1]) + hashSHA1.Write(secret) + hashSHA1.Write(seed) + digest := hashSHA1.Sum(nil) + + hashMD5.Reset() + hashMD5.Write(secret) + hashMD5.Write(digest) + + done += copy(result[done:], hashMD5.Sum(nil)) + i++ + } +} + +const ( + tlsRandomLength = 32 // Length of a random nonce in TLS 1.1. + masterSecretLength = 48 // Length of a master secret in TLS 1.1. + finishedVerifyLength = 12 // Length of verify_data in a Finished message. +) + +var masterSecretLabel = []byte("master secret") +var keyExpansionLabel = []byte("key expansion") +var clientFinishedLabel = []byte("client finished") +var serverFinishedLabel = []byte("server finished") + +func prfAndHashForGM() func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) { + return prf12(sm3.New) +} + +func prfAndHashForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) (func(result, secret, label, seed []byte), crypto.Hash) { + switch version { + case VersionSSL30: + return prf30, crypto.Hash(0) + case VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11: + return prf10, crypto.Hash(0) + case VersionTLS12: + if suite.flags&suiteSHA384 != 0 { + return prf12(sha512.New384), crypto.SHA384 + } + return prf12(sha256.New), crypto.SHA256 + default: + panic("unknown version") + } +} + +func prfForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) { + var prf func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) + if version == VersionGMSSL { + prf = prfAndHashForGM() + } else { + prf, _ = prfAndHashForVersion(version, suite) + } + return prf +} + +// masterFromPreMasterSecret generates the master secret from the pre-master +// secret. See http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-8.1 +func masterFromPreMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, preMasterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) []byte { + seed := make([]byte, 0, len(clientRandom)+len(serverRandom)) + seed = append(seed, clientRandom...) + seed = append(seed, serverRandom...) + + masterSecret := make([]byte, masterSecretLength) + prfForVersion(version, suite)(masterSecret, preMasterSecret, masterSecretLabel, seed) + return masterSecret +} + +// keysFromMasterSecret generates the connection keys from the master +// secret, given the lengths of the MAC key, cipher key and IV, as defined in +// RFC 2246, section 6.3. +func keysFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, macLen, keyLen, ivLen int) (clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV []byte) { + seed := make([]byte, 0, len(serverRandom)+len(clientRandom)) + seed = append(seed, serverRandom...) + seed = append(seed, clientRandom...) + + n := 2*macLen + 2*keyLen + 2*ivLen + keyMaterial := make([]byte, n) + prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, keyExpansionLabel, seed) + clientMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen] + keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:] + serverMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen] + keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:] + clientKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen] + keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:] + serverKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen] + keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:] + clientIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen] + keyMaterial = keyMaterial[ivLen:] + serverIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen] + return +} + +// lookupTLSHash looks up the corresponding crypto.Hash for a given +// TLS hash identifier. +func lookupTLSHash(signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme) (crypto.Hash, error) { + switch signatureAlgorithm { + case PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1: + return crypto.SHA1, nil + case PKCS1WithSHA256, PSSWithSHA256, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256: + return crypto.SHA256, nil + case PKCS1WithSHA384, PSSWithSHA384, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384: + return crypto.SHA384, nil + case PKCS1WithSHA512, PSSWithSHA512, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512: + return crypto.SHA512, nil + default: + return 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signature algorithm: %#04x", signatureAlgorithm) + } +} +func newFinishedHash(version uint16, cipherSuite *cipherSuite) finishedHash { + var buffer []byte + if version == VersionSSL30 || version >= VersionTLS12 { + buffer = []byte{} + } + + var prf func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) + + if version == VersionGMSSL { + prf = prfAndHashForGM() + return finishedHash{sm3.New(), sm3.New(), nil, nil, buffer, version, prf} + } else { + prf, hash := prfAndHashForVersion(version, cipherSuite) + if hash != 0 { + return finishedHash{hash.New(), hash.New(), nil, nil, buffer, version, prf} + } + } + + return finishedHash{sha1.New(), sha1.New(), md5.New(), md5.New(), buffer, version, prf} +} + +// A finishedHash calculates the hash of a set of handshake messages suitable +// for including in a Finished message. +type finishedHash struct { + client hash.Hash + server hash.Hash + + // Prior to TLS 1.2, an additional MD5 hash is required. + clientMD5 hash.Hash + serverMD5 hash.Hash + + // In TLS 1.2, a full buffer is sadly required. + buffer []byte + + version uint16 + prf func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) +} + +func (h *finishedHash) Write(msg []byte) (n int, err error) { + h.client.Write(msg) + h.server.Write(msg) + + if h.version < VersionTLS12 { + h.clientMD5.Write(msg) + h.serverMD5.Write(msg) + } + + if h.buffer != nil { + h.buffer = append(h.buffer, msg...) + } + + return len(msg), nil +} + +func (h finishedHash) Sum() []byte { + if h.version >= VersionTLS12 || h.version == VersionGMSSL { + return h.client.Sum(nil) + } + + out := make([]byte, 0, md5.Size+sha1.Size) + out = h.clientMD5.Sum(out) + return h.client.Sum(out) +} + +// finishedSum30 calculates the contents of the verify_data member of a SSLv3 +// Finished message given the MD5 and SHA1 hashes of a set of handshake +// messages. +func finishedSum30(md5, sha1 hash.Hash, masterSecret []byte, magic []byte) []byte { + md5.Write(magic) + md5.Write(masterSecret) + md5.Write(ssl30Pad1[:]) + md5Digest := md5.Sum(nil) + + md5.Reset() + md5.Write(masterSecret) + md5.Write(ssl30Pad2[:]) + md5.Write(md5Digest) + md5Digest = md5.Sum(nil) + + sha1.Write(magic) + sha1.Write(masterSecret) + sha1.Write(ssl30Pad1[:40]) + sha1Digest := sha1.Sum(nil) + + sha1.Reset() + sha1.Write(masterSecret) + sha1.Write(ssl30Pad2[:40]) + sha1.Write(sha1Digest) + sha1Digest = sha1.Sum(nil) + + ret := make([]byte, len(md5Digest)+len(sha1Digest)) + copy(ret, md5Digest) + copy(ret[len(md5Digest):], sha1Digest) + return ret +} + +var ssl3ClientFinishedMagic = [4]byte{0x43, 0x4c, 0x4e, 0x54} +var ssl3ServerFinishedMagic = [4]byte{0x53, 0x52, 0x56, 0x52} + +// clientSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a client's +// Finished message. +func (h finishedHash) clientSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte { + if h.version == VersionSSL30 { + return finishedSum30(h.clientMD5, h.client, masterSecret, ssl3ClientFinishedMagic[:]) + } + + out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength) + h.prf(out, masterSecret, clientFinishedLabel, h.Sum()) + return out +} + +// serverSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a server's +// Finished message. +func (h finishedHash) serverSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte { + if h.version == VersionSSL30 { + return finishedSum30(h.serverMD5, h.server, masterSecret, ssl3ServerFinishedMagic[:]) + } + + out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength) + h.prf(out, masterSecret, serverFinishedLabel, h.Sum()) + return out +} + +// hashForClientCertificate returns a digest, hash function, and TLS 1.2 hash +// id suitable for signing by a TLS client certificate. +func (h finishedHash) hashForClientCertificate(sigType uint8, hashAlg crypto.Hash, masterSecret []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if (h.version == VersionSSL30 || h.version >= VersionTLS12) && h.buffer == nil { + panic("a handshake hash for a client-certificate was requested after discarding the handshake buffer") + } + + if h.version == VersionSSL30 { + if sigType != signaturePKCS1v15 { + return nil, errors.New("tls: unsupported signature type for client certificate") + } + + md5Hash := md5.New() + md5Hash.Write(h.buffer) + sha1Hash := sha1.New() + sha1Hash.Write(h.buffer) + return finishedSum30(md5Hash, sha1Hash, masterSecret, nil), nil + } + if h.version >= VersionTLS12 { + hash := hashAlg.New() + hash.Write(h.buffer) + return hash.Sum(nil), nil + } + + if sigType == signatureECDSA { + return h.server.Sum(nil), nil + } + + return h.Sum(), nil +} + +// discardHandshakeBuffer is called when there is no more need to +// buffer the entirety of the handshake messages. +func (h *finishedHash) discardHandshakeBuffer() { + h.buffer = nil +} + +// noExportedKeyingMaterial is used as a value of +// ConnectionState.ekm when renegotation is enabled and thus +// we wish to fail all key-material export requests. +func noExportedKeyingMaterial(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) { + return nil, errors.New("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial is unavailable when renegotiation is enabled") +} + +// ekmFromMasterSecret generates exported keying material as defined in +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5705. +func ekmFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) func(string, []byte, int) ([]byte, error) { + return func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) { + switch label { + case "client finished", "server finished", "master secret", "key expansion": + // These values are reserved and may not be used. + return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: reserved ExportKeyingMaterial label: %s", label) + } + + seedLen := len(serverRandom) + len(clientRandom) + if context != nil { + seedLen += 2 + len(context) + } + seed := make([]byte, 0, seedLen) + + seed = append(seed, clientRandom...) + seed = append(seed, serverRandom...) + + if context != nil { + if len(context) >= 1<<16 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial context too long") + } + seed = append(seed, byte(len(context)>>8), byte(len(context))) + seed = append(seed, context...) + } + + keyMaterial := make([]byte, length) + prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, []byte(label), seed) + return keyMaterial, nil + } +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/simple_round_trip.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/simple_round_trip.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f9fe781e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/simple_round_trip.go @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package gmtls + +import ( + "bufio" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "net/http" + "sync" +) + +// SimpleRoundTripper 简单的单次HTTP/HTTPS（国密） 连接往返器 +// 每次建立新的连接 +type SimpleRoundTripper struct { + lock sync.Mutex + tlsConfig *Config +} + +func NewSimpleRoundTripper(cfg *Config) *SimpleRoundTripper { + return &SimpleRoundTripper{tlsConfig: cfg} +} + +func (s *SimpleRoundTripper) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { + // 加锁保证线程安全 + s.lock.Lock() + defer s.lock.Unlock() + + scheme := req.URL.Scheme + isHTTP := scheme == "http" || scheme == "https" + if !isHTTP { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("仅支持http/https协议") + } + + // 获取主机名 和 端口 + hostname := req.URL.Hostname() + port := req.URL.Port() + address := net.JoinHostPort(hostname, port) + + var conn io.ReadWriteCloser + var err error + // 根据协议建立连接 + if scheme == "http" { + // HTTP 协议建立TCP连接 + conn, err = net.Dial("tcp", address) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } else { + // HTTPS 协议建立TLS连接 + conn, err = Dial("tcp", address, s.tlsConfig) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + defer conn.Close() + + // 把请求写入连接中，发起请求 + err = req.Write(conn) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // 从连接中读取 + response, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(conn), req) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // 协议升级时，替换Body实现 + if response.StatusCode == http.StatusSwitchingProtocols { + response.Body = conn + } + return response, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/ticket.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/ticket.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8775ec74 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/ticket.go @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package gmtls + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto/aes" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/subtle" + "errors" + "io" +) + +// sessionState contains the information that is serialized into a session +// ticket in order to later resume a connection. +type sessionState struct { + vers uint16 + cipherSuite uint16 + masterSecret []byte + certificates [][]byte + // usedOldKey is true if the ticket from which this session came from + // was encrypted with an older key and thus should be refreshed. + usedOldKey bool +} + +func (s *sessionState) equal(i interface{}) bool { + s1, ok := i.(*sessionState) + if !ok { + return false + } + + if s.vers != s1.vers || + s.cipherSuite != s1.cipherSuite || + !bytes.Equal(s.masterSecret, s1.masterSecret) { + return false + } + + if len(s.certificates) != len(s1.certificates) { + return false + } + + for i := range s.certificates { + if !bytes.Equal(s.certificates[i], s1.certificates[i]) { + return false + } + } + + return true +} + +func (s *sessionState) marshal() []byte { + length := 2 + 2 + 2 + len(s.masterSecret) + 2 + for _, cert := range s.certificates { + length += 4 + len(cert) + } + + ret := make([]byte, length) + x := ret + x[0] = byte(s.vers >> 8) + x[1] = byte(s.vers) + x[2] = byte(s.cipherSuite >> 8) + x[3] = byte(s.cipherSuite) + x[4] = byte(len(s.masterSecret) >> 8) + x[5] = byte(len(s.masterSecret)) + x = x[6:] + copy(x, s.masterSecret) + x = x[len(s.masterSecret):] + + x[0] = byte(len(s.certificates) >> 8) + x[1] = byte(len(s.certificates)) + x = x[2:] + + for _, cert := range s.certificates { + x[0] = byte(len(cert) >> 24) + x[1] = byte(len(cert) >> 16) + x[2] = byte(len(cert) >> 8) + x[3] = byte(len(cert)) + copy(x[4:], cert) + x = x[4+len(cert):] + } + + return ret +} + +func (s *sessionState) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + if len(data) < 8 { + return false + } + + s.vers = uint16(data[0])<<8 | uint16(data[1]) + s.cipherSuite = uint16(data[2])<<8 | uint16(data[3]) + masterSecretLen := int(data[4])<<8 | int(data[5]) + data = data[6:] + if len(data) < masterSecretLen { + return false + } + + s.masterSecret = data[:masterSecretLen] + data = data[masterSecretLen:] + + if len(data) < 2 { + return false + } + + numCerts := int(data[0])<<8 | int(data[1]) + data = data[2:] + + s.certificates = make([][]byte, numCerts) + for i := range s.certificates { + if len(data) < 4 { + return false + } + certLen := int(data[0])<<24 | int(data[1])<<16 | int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3]) + data = data[4:] + if certLen < 0 { + return false + } + if len(data) < certLen { + return false + } + s.certificates[i] = data[:certLen] + data = data[certLen:] + } + + return len(data) == 0 +} + +func (c *Conn) encryptTicket(state *sessionState) ([]byte, error) { + serialized := state.marshal() + encrypted := make([]byte, ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+len(serialized)+sha256.Size) + keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen] + iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize] + macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:] + + if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), iv); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + key := c.config.ticketKeys()[0] + copy(keyName, key.keyName[:]) + block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to create cipher while encrypting ticket: " + err.Error()) + } + cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize:], serialized) + + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:]) + mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size]) + mac.Sum(macBytes[:0]) + + return encrypted, nil +} + +func (c *Conn) decryptTicket(encrypted []byte) (*sessionState, bool) { + if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || + len(encrypted) < ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+sha256.Size { + return nil, false + } + + keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen] + iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize] + macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:] + + keys := c.config.ticketKeys() + keyIndex := -1 + for i, candidateKey := range keys { + if bytes.Equal(keyName, candidateKey.keyName[:]) { + keyIndex = i + break + } + } + + if keyIndex == -1 { + return nil, false + } + key := &keys[keyIndex] + + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:]) + mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size]) + expected := mac.Sum(nil) + + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(macBytes, expected) != 1 { + return nil, false + } + + block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, false + } + ciphertext := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize : len(encrypted)-sha256.Size] + plaintext := ciphertext + cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(plaintext, ciphertext) + + state := &sessionState{usedOldKey: keyIndex > 0} + ok := state.unmarshal(plaintext) + return state, ok +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/tls.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/tls.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..13b7478b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls/tls.go @@ -0,0 +1,314 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +// add sm2 support +package gmtls + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/x509" + "encoding/pem" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io/ioutil" + "net" + "strings" + "time" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2" + X "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509" +) + +// Server returns a new TLS server side connection +// using conn as the underlying transport. +// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include +// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate. +func Server(conn net.Conn, config *Config) *Conn { + return &Conn{conn: conn, config: config} +} + +// Client returns a new TLS client side connection +// using conn as the underlying transport. +// The config cannot be nil: users must set either ServerName or +// InsecureSkipVerify in the config. +func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config) *Conn { + return &Conn{conn: conn, config: config, isClient: true} +} + +// A listener implements a network listener (net.Listener) for TLS connections. +type listener struct { + net.Listener + config *Config +} + +// Accept waits for and returns the next incoming TLS connection. +// The returned connection is of type *Conn. +func (l *listener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) { + c, err := l.Listener.Accept() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return Server(c, l.config), nil +} + +// NewListener creates a Listener which accepts connections from an inner +// Listener and wraps each connection with Server. +// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include +// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate. +func NewListener(inner net.Listener, config *Config) net.Listener { + l := new(listener) + l.Listener = inner + l.config = config + return l +} + +// Listen creates a TLS listener accepting connections on the +// given network address using net.Listen. +// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include +// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate. +func Listen(network, laddr string, config *Config) (net.Listener, error) { + if config == nil || (len(config.Certificates) == 0 && config.GetCertificate == nil) { + return nil, errors.New("tls: neither Certificates nor GetCertificate set in Config") + } + l, err := net.Listen(network, laddr) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return NewListener(l, config), nil +} + +type timeoutError struct{} + +func (timeoutError) Error() string { return "tls: DialWithDialer timed out" } +func (timeoutError) Timeout() bool { return true } +func (timeoutError) Temporary() bool { return true } + +// DialWithDialer connects to the given network address using dialer.Dial and +// then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection. Any +// timeout or deadline given in the dialer apply to connection and TLS +// handshake as a whole. +// +// DialWithDialer interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to the zero +// configuration; see the documentation of Config for the defaults. +func DialWithDialer(dialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config) (*Conn, error) { + // We want the Timeout and Deadline values from dialer to cover the + // whole process: TCP connection and TLS handshake. This means that we + // also need to start our own timers now. + timeout := dialer.Timeout + + if !dialer.Deadline.IsZero() { + // deadlineTimeout := time.Until(dialer.Deadline) + deadlineTimeout := dialer.Deadline.Sub(time.Now()) // support go before 1.8 + if timeout == 0 || deadlineTimeout < timeout { + timeout = deadlineTimeout + } + } + + var errChannel chan error + + if timeout != 0 { + errChannel = make(chan error, 2) + time.AfterFunc(timeout, func() { + errChannel <- timeoutError{} + }) + } + + rawConn, err := dialer.Dial(network, addr) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + colonPos := strings.LastIndex(addr, ":") + if colonPos == -1 { + colonPos = len(addr) + } + hostname := addr[:colonPos] + + if config == nil { + config = defaultConfig() + } + // If no ServerName is set, infer the ServerName + // from the hostname we're connecting to. + if config.ServerName == "" { + // Make a copy to avoid polluting argument or default. + c := config.Clone() + c.ServerName = hostname + config = c + } + + conn := Client(rawConn, config) + + if timeout == 0 { + err = conn.Handshake() + } else { + go func() { + errChannel <- conn.Handshake() + }() + + err = <-errChannel + } + + if err != nil { + rawConn.Close() + return nil, err + } + + return conn, nil +} + +// Dial connects to the given network address using net.Dial +// and then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting +// TLS connection. +// Dial interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to +// the zero configuration; see the documentation of Config +// for the defaults. +func Dial(network, addr string, config *Config) (*Conn, error) { + return DialWithDialer(new(net.Dialer), network, addr, config) +} + +// LoadX509KeyPair reads and parses a public/private key pair from a pair +// of files. The files must contain PEM encoded data. The certificate file +// may contain intermediate certificates following the leaf certificate to +// form a certificate chain. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will +// be nil because the parsed form of the certificate is not retained. +func LoadX509KeyPair(certFile, keyFile string) (Certificate, error) { + certPEMBlock, err := ioutil.ReadFile(certFile) + if err != nil { + return Certificate{}, err + } + keyPEMBlock, err := ioutil.ReadFile(keyFile) + if err != nil { + return Certificate{}, err + } + return X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock) +} + +// X509KeyPair parses a public/private key pair from a pair of +// PEM encoded data. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will be nil because +// the parsed form of the certificate is not retained. +func X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock []byte) (Certificate, error) { + fail := func(err error) (Certificate, error) { return Certificate{}, err } + + var cert Certificate + var skippedBlockTypes []string + for { + var certDERBlock *pem.Block + certDERBlock, certPEMBlock = pem.Decode(certPEMBlock) + if certDERBlock == nil { + break + } + if certDERBlock.Type == "CERTIFICATE" { + cert.Certificate = append(cert.Certificate, certDERBlock.Bytes) + } else { + skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, certDERBlock.Type) + } + } + + if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 { + if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 { + return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in certificate input")) + } + if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && strings.HasSuffix(skippedBlockTypes[0], "PRIVATE KEY") { + return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find certificate PEM data in certificate input, but did find a private key; PEM inputs may have been switched")) + } + return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find \"CERTIFICATE\" PEM block in certificate input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes)) + } + + skippedBlockTypes = skippedBlockTypes[:0] + var keyDERBlock *pem.Block + for { + keyDERBlock, keyPEMBlock = pem.Decode(keyPEMBlock) + if keyDERBlock == nil { + if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 { + return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in key input")) + } + if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && skippedBlockTypes[0] == "CERTIFICATE" { + return fail(errors.New("tls: found a certificate rather than a key in the PEM for the private key")) + } + return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find PEM block with type ending in \"PRIVATE KEY\" in key input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes)) + } + if keyDERBlock.Type == "PRIVATE KEY" || strings.HasSuffix(keyDERBlock.Type, " PRIVATE KEY") { + break + } + skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, keyDERBlock.Type) + } + + var err error + cert.PrivateKey, err = parsePrivateKey(keyDERBlock.Bytes) + if err != nil { + return fail(err) + } + + // We don't need to parse the public key for TLS, but we so do anyway + // to check that it looks sane and matches the private key. + x509Cert, err := X.ParseCertificate(cert.Certificate[0]) + if err != nil { + return fail(err) + } + + switch pub := x509Cert.PublicKey.(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey: + priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey) + if !ok { + return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type")) + } + if pub.N.Cmp(priv.N) != 0 { + return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key")) + } + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + pub, _ = x509Cert.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey) + switch pub.Curve { + case sm2.P256Sm2(): + priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*sm2.PrivateKey) + if !ok { + return fail(errors.New("tls: sm2 private key type does not match public key type")) + } + if pub.X.Cmp(priv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(priv.Y) != 0 { + return fail(errors.New("tls: sm2 private key does not match public key")) + } + default: + priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey) + if !ok { + return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type")) + } + if pub.X.Cmp(priv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(priv.Y) != 0 { + return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key")) + } + } + default: + return fail(errors.New("tls: unknown public key algorithm")) + } + return cert, nil +} + +func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) { + if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der); err == nil { + return key, nil + } + if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der); err == nil { + switch key := key.(type) { + case *rsa.PrivateKey, *ecdsa.PrivateKey: + return key, nil + default: + return nil, errors.New("tls: found unknown private key type in PKCS#8 wrapping") + } + } + if key, err := X.ParsePKCS8UnecryptedPrivateKey(der); err == nil { + return key, nil + } + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse private key") +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2/p256.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2/p256.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fd892b06 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2/p256.go @@ -0,0 +1,1182 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package sm2 + +import ( + "crypto/elliptic" + "math/big" + "sync" +) + +/** 学习标准库p256的优化方法实现sm2的快速版本 + * 标准库的p256的代码实现有些晦涩难懂，当然sm2的同样如此，有兴趣的大家可以研究研究，最后神兽压阵。。。 + * + * ━━━━━━animal━━━━━━ + * 　　　┏┓　　　┏┓ + * 　　┏┛┻━━━┛┻┓ + * 　　┃　　　　　　　┃ + * 　　┃　　　━　　　┃ + * 　　┃　┳┛　┗┳　┃ + * 　　┃　　　　　　　┃ + * 　　┃　　　┻　　　┃ + * 　　┃　　　　　　　┃ + * 　　┗━┓　　　┏━┛ + * 　　　┃　　　┃ + *　　 　┃　　　┃ + *　　　 ┃　　　┗━━━┓ + * 　┃　　　　　┣┓ + * 　　┃　　　　　┏┛ + *　　 　┗┓┓┏━┳┓┏┛ + *　　　　┃┫┫ ┃┫┫ + *　　　　┗┻┛ ┗┻┛ + * + * ━━━━━Kawaii ━━━━━━ + */ + +type sm2P256Curve struct { + RInverse *big.Int + *elliptic.CurveParams + a, b, gx, gy sm2P256FieldElement +} + +var initonce sync.Once +var sm2P256 sm2P256Curve + +type sm2P256FieldElement [9]uint32 +type sm2P256LargeFieldElement [17]uint64 + +const ( + bottom28Bits = 0xFFFFFFF + bottom29Bits = 0x1FFFFFFF +) + +func initP256Sm2() { + sm2P256.CurveParams = &elliptic.CurveParams{Name: "SM2-P-256"} // sm2 + A, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC", 16) + //SM2椭 椭 圆 曲 线 公 钥 密 码 算 法 推 荐 曲 线 参 数 + sm2P256.P, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", 16) + sm2P256.N, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF7203DF6B21C6052B53BBF40939D54123", 16) + sm2P256.B, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("28E9FA9E9D9F5E344D5A9E4BCF6509A7F39789F515AB8F92DDBCBD414D940E93", 16) + sm2P256.Gx, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("32C4AE2C1F1981195F9904466A39C9948FE30BBFF2660BE1715A4589334C74C7", 16) + sm2P256.Gy, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("BC3736A2F4F6779C59BDCEE36B692153D0A9877CC62A474002DF32E52139F0A0", 16) + sm2P256.RInverse, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("7ffffffd80000002fffffffe000000017ffffffe800000037ffffffc80000002", 16) + sm2P256.BitSize = 256 + sm2P256FromBig(&sm2P256.a, A) + sm2P256FromBig(&sm2P256.gx, sm2P256.Gx) + sm2P256FromBig(&sm2P256.gy, sm2P256.Gy) + sm2P256FromBig(&sm2P256.b, sm2P256.B) +} + +func P256Sm2() elliptic.Curve { + initonce.Do(initP256Sm2) + return sm2P256 +} + +func (curve sm2P256Curve) Params() *elliptic.CurveParams { + return sm2P256.CurveParams +} + +// y^2 = x^3 + ax + b +func (curve sm2P256Curve) IsOnCurve(X, Y *big.Int) bool { + var a, x, y, y2, x3 sm2P256FieldElement + + sm2P256FromBig(&x, X) + sm2P256FromBig(&y, Y) + + sm2P256Square(&x3, &x) // x3 = x ^ 2 + sm2P256Mul(&x3, &x3, &x) // x3 = x ^ 2 * x + sm2P256Mul(&a, &curve.a, &x) // a = a * x + sm2P256Add(&x3, &x3, &a) + sm2P256Add(&x3, &x3, &curve.b) + + sm2P256Square(&y2, &y) // y2 = y ^ 2 + return sm2P256ToBig(&x3).Cmp(sm2P256ToBig(&y2)) == 0 +} + +func zForAffine(x, y *big.Int) *big.Int { + z := new(big.Int) + if x.Sign() != 0 || y.Sign() != 0 { + z.SetInt64(1) + } + return z +} + +func (curve sm2P256Curve) Add(x1, y1, x2, y2 *big.Int) (*big.Int, *big.Int) { + var X1, Y1, Z1, X2, Y2, Z2, X3, Y3, Z3 sm2P256FieldElement + + z1 := zForAffine(x1, y1) + z2 := zForAffine(x2, y2) + sm2P256FromBig(&X1, x1) + sm2P256FromBig(&Y1, y1) + sm2P256FromBig(&Z1, z1) + sm2P256FromBig(&X2, x2) + sm2P256FromBig(&Y2, y2) + sm2P256FromBig(&Z2, z2) + sm2P256PointAdd(&X1, &Y1, &Z1, &X2, &Y2, &Z2, &X3, &Y3, &Z3) + return sm2P256ToAffine(&X3, &Y3, &Z3) +} + +func (curve sm2P256Curve) Double(x1, y1 *big.Int) (*big.Int, *big.Int) { + var X1, Y1, Z1 sm2P256FieldElement + + z1 := zForAffine(x1, y1) + sm2P256FromBig(&X1, x1) + sm2P256FromBig(&Y1, y1) + sm2P256FromBig(&Z1, z1) + sm2P256PointDouble(&X1, &Y1, &Z1, &X1, &Y1, &Z1) + return sm2P256ToAffine(&X1, &Y1, &Z1) +} + +func (curve sm2P256Curve) ScalarMult(x1, y1 *big.Int, k []byte) (*big.Int, *big.Int) { + var X, Y, Z, X1, Y1 sm2P256FieldElement + sm2P256FromBig(&X1, x1) + sm2P256FromBig(&Y1, y1) + scalar := sm2GenrateWNaf(k) + scalarReversed := WNafReversed(scalar) + sm2P256ScalarMult(&X, &Y, &Z, &X1, &Y1, scalarReversed) + return sm2P256ToAffine(&X, &Y, &Z) +} + +func (curve sm2P256Curve) ScalarBaseMult(k []byte) (*big.Int, *big.Int) { + var scalarReversed [32]byte + var X, Y, Z sm2P256FieldElement + + sm2P256GetScalar(&scalarReversed, k) + sm2P256ScalarBaseMult(&X, &Y, &Z, &scalarReversed) + return sm2P256ToAffine(&X, &Y, &Z) +} + +var sm2P256Precomputed = [9 * 2 * 15 * 2]uint32{ + 0x830053d, 0x328990f, 0x6c04fe1, 0xc0f72e5, 0x1e19f3c, 0x666b093, 0x175a87b, 0xec38276, 0x222cf4b, + 0x185a1bba, 0x354e593, 0x1295fac1, 0xf2bc469, 0x47c60fa, 0xc19b8a9, 0xf63533e, 0x903ae6b, 0xc79acba, + 0x15b061a4, 0x33e020b, 0xdffb34b, 0xfcf2c8, 0x16582e08, 0x262f203, 0xfb34381, 0xa55452, 0x604f0ff, + 0x41f1f90, 0xd64ced2, 0xee377bf, 0x75f05f0, 0x189467ae, 0xe2244e, 0x1e7700e8, 0x3fbc464, 0x9612d2e, + 0x1341b3b8, 0xee84e23, 0x1edfa5b4, 0x14e6030, 0x19e87be9, 0x92f533c, 0x1665d96c, 0x226653e, 0xa238d3e, + 0xf5c62c, 0x95bb7a, 0x1f0e5a41, 0x28789c3, 0x1f251d23, 0x8726609, 0xe918910, 0x8096848, 0xf63d028, + 0x152296a1, 0x9f561a8, 0x14d376fb, 0x898788a, 0x61a95fb, 0xa59466d, 0x159a003d, 0x1ad1698, 0x93cca08, + 0x1b314662, 0x706e006, 0x11ce1e30, 0x97b710, 0x172fbc0d, 0x8f50158, 0x11c7ffe7, 0xd182cce, 0xc6ad9e8, + 0x12ea31b2, 0xc4e4f38, 0x175b0d96, 0xec06337, 0x75a9c12, 0xb001fdf, 0x93e82f5, 0x34607de, 0xb8035ed, + 0x17f97924, 0x75cf9e6, 0xdceaedd, 0x2529924, 0x1a10c5ff, 0xb1a54dc, 0x19464d8, 0x2d1997, 0xde6a110, + 0x1e276ee5, 0x95c510c, 0x1aca7c7a, 0xfe48aca, 0x121ad4d9, 0xe4132c6, 0x8239b9d, 0x40ea9cd, 0x816c7b, + 0x632d7a4, 0xa679813, 0x5911fcf, 0x82b0f7c, 0x57b0ad5, 0xbef65, 0xd541365, 0x7f9921f, 0xc62e7a, + 0x3f4b32d, 0x58e50e1, 0x6427aed, 0xdcdda67, 0xe8c2d3e, 0x6aa54a4, 0x18df4c35, 0x49a6a8e, 0x3cd3d0c, + 0xd7adf2, 0xcbca97, 0x1bda5f2d, 0x3258579, 0x606b1e6, 0x6fc1b5b, 0x1ac27317, 0x503ca16, 0xa677435, + 0x57bc73, 0x3992a42, 0xbab987b, 0xfab25eb, 0x128912a4, 0x90a1dc4, 0x1402d591, 0x9ffbcfc, 0xaa48856, + 0x7a7c2dc, 0xcefd08a, 0x1b29bda6, 0xa785641, 0x16462d8c, 0x76241b7, 0x79b6c3b, 0x204ae18, 0xf41212b, + 0x1f567a4d, 0xd6ce6db, 0xedf1784, 0x111df34, 0x85d7955, 0x55fc189, 0x1b7ae265, 0xf9281ac, 0xded7740, + 0xf19468b, 0x83763bb, 0x8ff7234, 0x3da7df8, 0x9590ac3, 0xdc96f2a, 0x16e44896, 0x7931009, 0x99d5acc, + 0x10f7b842, 0xaef5e84, 0xc0310d7, 0xdebac2c, 0x2a7b137, 0x4342344, 0x19633649, 0x3a10624, 0x4b4cb56, + 0x1d809c59, 0xac007f, 0x1f0f4bcd, 0xa1ab06e, 0xc5042cf, 0x82c0c77, 0x76c7563, 0x22c30f3, 0x3bf1568, + 0x7a895be, 0xfcca554, 0x12e90e4c, 0x7b4ab5f, 0x13aeb76b, 0x5887e2c, 0x1d7fe1e3, 0x908c8e3, 0x95800ee, + 0xb36bd54, 0xf08905d, 0x4e73ae8, 0xf5a7e48, 0xa67cb0, 0x50e1067, 0x1b944a0a, 0xf29c83a, 0xb23cfb9, + 0xbe1db1, 0x54de6e8, 0xd4707f2, 0x8ebcc2d, 0x2c77056, 0x1568ce4, 0x15fcc849, 0x4069712, 0xe2ed85f, + 0x2c5ff09, 0x42a6929, 0x628e7ea, 0xbd5b355, 0xaf0bd79, 0xaa03699, 0xdb99816, 0x4379cef, 0x81d57b, + 0x11237f01, 0xe2a820b, 0xfd53b95, 0x6beb5ee, 0x1aeb790c, 0xe470d53, 0x2c2cfee, 0x1c1d8d8, 0xa520fc4, + 0x1518e034, 0xa584dd4, 0x29e572b, 0xd4594fc, 0x141a8f6f, 0x8dfccf3, 0x5d20ba3, 0x2eb60c3, 0x9f16eb0, + 0x11cec356, 0xf039f84, 0x1b0990c1, 0xc91e526, 0x10b65bae, 0xf0616e8, 0x173fa3ff, 0xec8ccf9, 0xbe32790, + 0x11da3e79, 0xe2f35c7, 0x908875c, 0xdacf7bd, 0x538c165, 0x8d1487f, 0x7c31aed, 0x21af228, 0x7e1689d, + 0xdfc23ca, 0x24f15dc, 0x25ef3c4, 0x35248cd, 0x99a0f43, 0xa4b6ecc, 0xd066b3, 0x2481152, 0x37a7688, + 0x15a444b6, 0xb62300c, 0x4b841b, 0xa655e79, 0xd53226d, 0xbeb348a, 0x127f3c2, 0xb989247, 0x71a277d, + 0x19e9dfcb, 0xb8f92d0, 0xe2d226c, 0x390a8b0, 0x183cc462, 0x7bd8167, 0x1f32a552, 0x5e02db4, 0xa146ee9, + 0x1a003957, 0x1c95f61, 0x1eeec155, 0x26f811f, 0xf9596ba, 0x3082bfb, 0x96df083, 0x3e3a289, 0x7e2d8be, + 0x157a63e0, 0x99b8941, 0x1da7d345, 0xcc6cd0, 0x10beed9a, 0x48e83c0, 0x13aa2e25, 0x7cad710, 0x4029988, + 0x13dfa9dd, 0xb94f884, 0x1f4adfef, 0xb88543, 0x16f5f8dc, 0xa6a67f4, 0x14e274e2, 0x5e56cf4, 0x2f24ef, + 0x1e9ef967, 0xfe09bad, 0xfe079b3, 0xcc0ae9e, 0xb3edf6d, 0x3e961bc, 0x130d7831, 0x31043d6, 0xba986f9, + 0x1d28055, 0x65240ca, 0x4971fa3, 0x81b17f8, 0x11ec34a5, 0x8366ddc, 0x1471809, 0xfa5f1c6, 0xc911e15, + 0x8849491, 0xcf4c2e2, 0x14471b91, 0x39f75be, 0x445c21e, 0xf1585e9, 0x72cc11f, 0x4c79f0c, 0xe5522e1, + 0x1874c1ee, 0x4444211, 0x7914884, 0x3d1b133, 0x25ba3c, 0x4194f65, 0x1c0457ef, 0xac4899d, 0xe1fa66c, + 0x130a7918, 0x9b8d312, 0x4b1c5c8, 0x61ccac3, 0x18c8aa6f, 0xe93cb0a, 0xdccb12c, 0xde10825, 0x969737d, + 0xf58c0c3, 0x7cee6a9, 0xc2c329a, 0xc7f9ed9, 0x107b3981, 0x696a40e, 0x152847ff, 0x4d88754, 0xb141f47, + 0x5a16ffe, 0x3a7870a, 0x18667659, 0x3b72b03, 0xb1c9435, 0x9285394, 0xa00005a, 0x37506c, 0x2edc0bb, + 0x19afe392, 0xeb39cac, 0x177ef286, 0xdf87197, 0x19f844ed, 0x31fe8, 0x15f9bfd, 0x80dbec, 0x342e96e, + 0x497aced, 0xe88e909, 0x1f5fa9ba, 0x530a6ee, 0x1ef4e3f1, 0x69ffd12, 0x583006d, 0x2ecc9b1, 0x362db70, + 0x18c7bdc5, 0xf4bb3c5, 0x1c90b957, 0xf067c09, 0x9768f2b, 0xf73566a, 0x1939a900, 0x198c38a, 0x202a2a1, + 0x4bbf5a6, 0x4e265bc, 0x1f44b6e7, 0x185ca49, 0xa39e81b, 0x24aff5b, 0x4acc9c2, 0x638bdd3, 0xb65b2a8, + 0x6def8be, 0xb94537a, 0x10b81dee, 0xe00ec55, 0x2f2cdf7, 0xc20622d, 0x2d20f36, 0xe03c8c9, 0x898ea76, + 0x8e3921b, 0x8905bff, 0x1e94b6c8, 0xee7ad86, 0x154797f2, 0xa620863, 0x3fbd0d9, 0x1f3caab, 0x30c24bd, + 0x19d3892f, 0x59c17a2, 0x1ab4b0ae, 0xf8714ee, 0x90c4098, 0xa9c800d, 0x1910236b, 0xea808d3, 0x9ae2f31, + 0x1a15ad64, 0xa48c8d1, 0x184635a4, 0xb725ef1, 0x11921dcc, 0x3f866df, 0x16c27568, 0xbdf580a, 0xb08f55c, + 0x186ee1c, 0xb1627fa, 0x34e82f6, 0x933837e, 0xf311be5, 0xfedb03b, 0x167f72cd, 0xa5469c0, 0x9c82531, + 0xb92a24b, 0x14fdc8b, 0x141980d1, 0xbdc3a49, 0x7e02bb1, 0xaf4e6dd, 0x106d99e1, 0xd4616fc, 0x93c2717, + 0x1c0a0507, 0xc6d5fed, 0x9a03d8b, 0xa1d22b0, 0x127853e3, 0xc4ac6b8, 0x1a048cf7, 0x9afb72c, 0x65d485d, + 0x72d5998, 0xe9fa744, 0xe49e82c, 0x253cf80, 0x5f777ce, 0xa3799a5, 0x17270cbb, 0xc1d1ef0, 0xdf74977, + 0x114cb859, 0xfa8e037, 0xb8f3fe5, 0xc734cc6, 0x70d3d61, 0xeadac62, 0x12093dd0, 0x9add67d, 0x87200d6, + 0x175bcbb, 0xb29b49f, 0x1806b79c, 0x12fb61f, 0x170b3a10, 0x3aaf1cf, 0xa224085, 0x79d26af, 0x97759e2, + 0x92e19f1, 0xb32714d, 0x1f00d9f1, 0xc728619, 0x9e6f627, 0xe745e24, 0x18ea4ace, 0xfc60a41, 0x125f5b2, + 0xc3cf512, 0x39ed486, 0xf4d15fa, 0xf9167fd, 0x1c1f5dd5, 0xc21a53e, 0x1897930, 0x957a112, 0x21059a0, + 0x1f9e3ddc, 0xa4dfced, 0x8427f6f, 0x726fbe7, 0x1ea658f8, 0x2fdcd4c, 0x17e9b66f, 0xb2e7c2e, 0x39923bf, + 0x1bae104, 0x3973ce5, 0xc6f264c, 0x3511b84, 0x124195d7, 0x11996bd, 0x20be23d, 0xdc437c4, 0x4b4f16b, + 0x11902a0, 0x6c29cc9, 0x1d5ffbe6, 0xdb0b4c7, 0x10144c14, 0x2f2b719, 0x301189, 0x2343336, 0xa0bf2ac, +} + +func sm2P256GetScalar(b *[32]byte, a []byte) { + var scalarBytes []byte + + n := new(big.Int).SetBytes(a) + if n.Cmp(sm2P256.N) >= 0 { + n.Mod(n, sm2P256.N) + scalarBytes = n.Bytes() + } else { + scalarBytes = a + } + for i, v := range scalarBytes { + b[len(scalarBytes)-(1+i)] = v + } +} + +func sm2P256PointAddMixed(xOut, yOut, zOut, x1, y1, z1, x2, y2 *sm2P256FieldElement) { + var z1z1, z1z1z1, s2, u2, h, i, j, r, rr, v, tmp sm2P256FieldElement + + sm2P256Square(&z1z1, z1) + sm2P256Add(&tmp, z1, z1) + + sm2P256Mul(&u2, x2, &z1z1) + sm2P256Mul(&z1z1z1, z1, &z1z1) + sm2P256Mul(&s2, y2, &z1z1z1) + sm2P256Sub(&h, &u2, x1) + sm2P256Add(&i, &h, &h) + sm2P256Square(&i, &i) + sm2P256Mul(&j, &h, &i) + sm2P256Sub(&r, &s2, y1) + sm2P256Add(&r, &r, &r) + sm2P256Mul(&v, x1, &i) + + sm2P256Mul(zOut, &tmp, &h) + sm2P256Square(&rr, &r) + sm2P256Sub(xOut, &rr, &j) + sm2P256Sub(xOut, xOut, &v) + sm2P256Sub(xOut, xOut, &v) + + sm2P256Sub(&tmp, &v, xOut) + sm2P256Mul(yOut, &tmp, &r) + sm2P256Mul(&tmp, y1, &j) + sm2P256Sub(yOut, yOut, &tmp) + sm2P256Sub(yOut, yOut, &tmp) +} + +// sm2P256CopyConditional sets out=in if mask = 0xffffffff in constant time. +// +// On entry: mask is either 0 or 0xffffffff. +func sm2P256CopyConditional(out, in *sm2P256FieldElement, mask uint32) { + for i := 0; i < 9; i++ { + tmp := mask & (in[i] ^ out[i]) + out[i] ^= tmp + } +} + +// sm2P256SelectAffinePoint sets {out_x,out_y} to the index'th entry of table. +// On entry: index < 16, table[0] must be zero. +func sm2P256SelectAffinePoint(xOut, yOut *sm2P256FieldElement, table []uint32, index uint32) { + for i := range xOut { + xOut[i] = 0 + } + for i := range yOut { + yOut[i] = 0 + } + + for i := uint32(1); i < 16; i++ { + mask := i ^ index + mask |= mask >> 2 + mask |= mask >> 1 + mask &= 1 + mask-- + for j := range xOut { + xOut[j] |= table[0] & mask + table = table[1:] + } + for j := range yOut { + yOut[j] |= table[0] & mask + table = table[1:] + } + } +} + +// sm2P256SelectJacobianPoint sets {out_x,out_y,out_z} to the index'th entry of +// table. +// On entry: index < 16, table[0] must be zero. +func sm2P256SelectJacobianPoint(xOut, yOut, zOut *sm2P256FieldElement, table *[16][3]sm2P256FieldElement, index uint32) { + for i := range xOut { + xOut[i] = 0 + } + for i := range yOut { + yOut[i] = 0 + } + for i := range zOut { + zOut[i] = 0 + } + + // The implicit value at index 0 is all zero. We don't need to perform that + // iteration of the loop because we already set out_* to zero. + for i := uint32(1); i < 16; i++ { + mask := i ^ index + mask |= mask >> 2 + mask |= mask >> 1 + mask &= 1 + mask-- + for j := range xOut { + xOut[j] |= table[i][0][j] & mask + } + for j := range yOut { + yOut[j] |= table[i][1][j] & mask + } + for j := range zOut { + zOut[j] |= table[i][2][j] & mask + } + } +} + +// sm2P256GetBit returns the bit'th bit of scalar. +func sm2P256GetBit(scalar *[32]uint8, bit uint) uint32 { + return uint32(((scalar[bit>>3]) >> (bit & 7)) & 1) +} + +// sm2P256ScalarBaseMult sets {xOut,yOut,zOut} = scalar*G where scalar is a +// little-endian number. Note that the value of scalar must be less than the +// order of the group. +func sm2P256ScalarBaseMult(xOut, yOut, zOut *sm2P256FieldElement, scalar *[32]uint8) { + nIsInfinityMask := ^uint32(0) + var px, py, tx, ty, tz sm2P256FieldElement + var pIsNoninfiniteMask, mask, tableOffset uint32 + + for i := range xOut { + xOut[i] = 0 + } + for i := range yOut { + yOut[i] = 0 + } + for i := range zOut { + zOut[i] = 0 + } + + // The loop adds bits at positions 0, 64, 128 and 192, followed by + // positions 32,96,160 and 224 and does this 32 times. + for i := uint(0); i < 32; i++ { + if i != 0 { + sm2P256PointDouble(xOut, yOut, zOut, xOut, yOut, zOut) + } + tableOffset = 0 + for j := uint(0); j <= 32; j += 32 { + bit0 := sm2P256GetBit(scalar, 31-i+j) + bit1 := sm2P256GetBit(scalar, 95-i+j) + bit2 := sm2P256GetBit(scalar, 159-i+j) + bit3 := sm2P256GetBit(scalar, 223-i+j) + index := bit0 | (bit1 << 1) | (bit2 << 2) | (bit3 << 3) + + sm2P256SelectAffinePoint(&px, &py, sm2P256Precomputed[tableOffset:], index) + tableOffset += 30 * 9 + + // Since scalar is less than the order of the group, we know that + // {xOut,yOut,zOut} != {px,py,1}, unless both are zero, which we handle + // below. + sm2P256PointAddMixed(&tx, &ty, &tz, xOut, yOut, zOut, &px, &py) + // The result of pointAddMixed is incorrect if {xOut,yOut,zOut} is zero + // (a.k.a. the point at infinity). We handle that situation by + // copying the point from the table. + sm2P256CopyConditional(xOut, &px, nIsInfinityMask) + sm2P256CopyConditional(yOut, &py, nIsInfinityMask) + sm2P256CopyConditional(zOut, &sm2P256Factor[1], nIsInfinityMask) + + // Equally, the result is also wrong if the point from the table is + // zero, which happens when the index is zero. We handle that by + // only copying from {tx,ty,tz} to {xOut,yOut,zOut} if index != 0. + pIsNoninfiniteMask = nonZeroToAllOnes(index) + mask = pIsNoninfiniteMask & ^nIsInfinityMask + sm2P256CopyConditional(xOut, &tx, mask) + sm2P256CopyConditional(yOut, &ty, mask) + sm2P256CopyConditional(zOut, &tz, mask) + // If p was not zero, then n is now non-zero. + nIsInfinityMask &^= pIsNoninfiniteMask + } + } +} + +func sm2P256PointToAffine(xOut, yOut, x, y, z *sm2P256FieldElement) { + var zInv, zInvSq sm2P256FieldElement + + zz := sm2P256ToBig(z) + zz.ModInverse(zz, sm2P256.P) + sm2P256FromBig(&zInv, zz) + + sm2P256Square(&zInvSq, &zInv) + sm2P256Mul(xOut, x, &zInvSq) + sm2P256Mul(&zInv, &zInv, &zInvSq) + sm2P256Mul(yOut, y, &zInv) +} + +func sm2P256ToAffine(x, y, z *sm2P256FieldElement) (xOut, yOut *big.Int) { + var xx, yy sm2P256FieldElement + + sm2P256PointToAffine(&xx, &yy, x, y, z) + return sm2P256ToBig(&xx), sm2P256ToBig(&yy) +} + +var sm2P256Factor = []sm2P256FieldElement{ + sm2P256FieldElement{0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0}, + sm2P256FieldElement{0x2, 0x0, 0x1FFFFF00, 0x7FF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x2000000, 0x0}, + sm2P256FieldElement{0x4, 0x0, 0x1FFFFE00, 0xFFF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4000000, 0x0}, + sm2P256FieldElement{0x6, 0x0, 0x1FFFFD00, 0x17FF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x6000000, 0x0}, + sm2P256FieldElement{0x8, 0x0, 0x1FFFFC00, 0x1FFF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x8000000, 0x0}, + sm2P256FieldElement{0xA, 0x0, 0x1FFFFB00, 0x27FF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xA000000, 0x0}, + sm2P256FieldElement{0xC, 0x0, 0x1FFFFA00, 0x2FFF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xC000000, 0x0}, + sm2P256FieldElement{0xE, 0x0, 0x1FFFF900, 0x37FF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xE000000, 0x0}, + sm2P256FieldElement{0x10, 0x0, 0x1FFFF800, 0x3FFF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x01}, +} + +func sm2P256Scalar(b *sm2P256FieldElement, a int) { + sm2P256Mul(b, b, &sm2P256Factor[a]) +} + +// (x3, y3, z3) = (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2) +func sm2P256PointAdd(x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2, x3, y3, z3 *sm2P256FieldElement) { + var u1, u2, z22, z12, z23, z13, s1, s2, h, h2, r, r2, tm sm2P256FieldElement + + if sm2P256ToBig(z1).Sign() == 0 { + sm2P256Dup(x3, x2) + sm2P256Dup(y3, y2) + sm2P256Dup(z3, z2) + return + } + + if sm2P256ToBig(z2).Sign() == 0 { + sm2P256Dup(x3, x1) + sm2P256Dup(y3, y1) + sm2P256Dup(z3, z1) + return + } + + sm2P256Square(&z12, z1) // z12 = z1 ^ 2 + sm2P256Square(&z22, z2) // z22 = z2 ^ 2 + + sm2P256Mul(&z13, &z12, z1) // z13 = z1 ^ 3 + sm2P256Mul(&z23, &z22, z2) // z23 = z2 ^ 3 + + sm2P256Mul(&u1, x1, &z22) // u1 = x1 * z2 ^ 2 + sm2P256Mul(&u2, x2, &z12) // u2 = x2 * z1 ^ 2 + + sm2P256Mul(&s1, y1, &z23) // s1 = y1 * z2 ^ 3 + sm2P256Mul(&s2, y2, &z13) // s2 = y2 * z1 ^ 3 + + if sm2P256ToBig(&u1).Cmp(sm2P256ToBig(&u2)) == 0 && + sm2P256ToBig(&s1).Cmp(sm2P256ToBig(&s2)) == 0 { + sm2P256PointDouble(x1, y1, z1, x1, y1, z1) + } + + sm2P256Sub(&h, &u2, &u1) // h = u2 - u1 + sm2P256Sub(&r, &s2, &s1) // r = s2 - s1 + + sm2P256Square(&r2, &r) // r2 = r ^ 2 + sm2P256Square(&h2, &h) // h2 = h ^ 2 + + sm2P256Mul(&tm, &h2, &h) // tm = h ^ 3 + sm2P256Sub(x3, &r2, &tm) + sm2P256Mul(&tm, &u1, &h2) + sm2P256Scalar(&tm, 2) // tm = 2 * (u1 * h ^ 2) + sm2P256Sub(x3, x3, &tm) // x3 = r ^ 2 - h ^ 3 - 2 * u1 * h ^ 2 + + sm2P256Mul(&tm, &u1, &h2) // tm = u1 * h ^ 2 + sm2P256Sub(&tm, &tm, x3) // tm = u1 * h ^ 2 - x3 + sm2P256Mul(y3, &r, &tm) + sm2P256Mul(&tm, &h2, &h) // tm = h ^ 3 + sm2P256Mul(&tm, &tm, &s1) // tm = s1 * h ^ 3 + sm2P256Sub(y3, y3, &tm) // y3 = r * (u1 * h ^ 2 - x3) - s1 * h ^ 3 + + sm2P256Mul(z3, z1, z2) + sm2P256Mul(z3, z3, &h) // z3 = z1 * z3 * h +} + +// (x3, y3, z3) = (x1, y1, z1)- (x2, y2, z2) +func sm2P256PointSub(x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2, x3, y3, z3 *sm2P256FieldElement) { + var u1, u2, z22, z12, z23, z13, s1, s2, h, h2, r, r2, tm sm2P256FieldElement + y:=sm2P256ToBig(y2) + zero:=new(big.Int).SetInt64(0) + y.Sub(zero,y) + sm2P256FromBig(y2,y) + + if sm2P256ToBig(z1).Sign() == 0 { + sm2P256Dup(x3, x2) + sm2P256Dup(y3, y2) + sm2P256Dup(z3, z2) + return + } + + if sm2P256ToBig(z2).Sign() == 0 { + sm2P256Dup(x3, x1) + sm2P256Dup(y3, y1) + sm2P256Dup(z3, z1) + return + } + + sm2P256Square(&z12, z1) // z12 = z1 ^ 2 + sm2P256Square(&z22, z2) // z22 = z2 ^ 2 + + sm2P256Mul(&z13, &z12, z1) // z13 = z1 ^ 3 + sm2P256Mul(&z23, &z22, z2) // z23 = z2 ^ 3 + + sm2P256Mul(&u1, x1, &z22) // u1 = x1 * z2 ^ 2 + sm2P256Mul(&u2, x2, &z12) // u2 = x2 * z1 ^ 2 + + sm2P256Mul(&s1, y1, &z23) // s1 = y1 * z2 ^ 3 + sm2P256Mul(&s2, y2, &z13) // s2 = y2 * z1 ^ 3 + + if sm2P256ToBig(&u1).Cmp(sm2P256ToBig(&u2)) == 0 && + sm2P256ToBig(&s1).Cmp(sm2P256ToBig(&s2)) == 0 { + sm2P256PointDouble(x1, y1, z1, x1, y1, z1) + } + + sm2P256Sub(&h, &u2, &u1) // h = u2 - u1 + sm2P256Sub(&r, &s2, &s1) // r = s2 - s1 + + sm2P256Square(&r2, &r) // r2 = r ^ 2 + sm2P256Square(&h2, &h) // h2 = h ^ 2 + + sm2P256Mul(&tm, &h2, &h) // tm = h ^ 3 + sm2P256Sub(x3, &r2, &tm) + sm2P256Mul(&tm, &u1, &h2) + sm2P256Scalar(&tm, 2) // tm = 2 * (u1 * h ^ 2) + sm2P256Sub(x3, x3, &tm) // x3 = r ^ 2 - h ^ 3 - 2 * u1 * h ^ 2 + + sm2P256Mul(&tm, &u1, &h2) // tm = u1 * h ^ 2 + sm2P256Sub(&tm, &tm, x3) // tm = u1 * h ^ 2 - x3 + sm2P256Mul(y3, &r, &tm) + sm2P256Mul(&tm, &h2, &h) // tm = h ^ 3 + sm2P256Mul(&tm, &tm, &s1) // tm = s1 * h ^ 3 + sm2P256Sub(y3, y3, &tm) // y3 = r * (u1 * h ^ 2 - x3) - s1 * h ^ 3 + + sm2P256Mul(z3, z1, z2) + sm2P256Mul(z3, z3, &h) // z3 = z1 * z3 * h +} + +func sm2P256PointDouble(x3, y3, z3, x, y, z *sm2P256FieldElement) { + var s, m, m2, x2, y2, z2, z4, y4, az4 sm2P256FieldElement + + sm2P256Square(&x2, x) // x2 = x ^ 2 + sm2P256Square(&y2, y) // y2 = y ^ 2 + sm2P256Square(&z2, z) // z2 = z ^ 2 + + sm2P256Square(&z4, z) // z4 = z ^ 2 + sm2P256Mul(&z4, &z4, z) // z4 = z ^ 3 + sm2P256Mul(&z4, &z4, z) // z4 = z ^ 4 + + sm2P256Square(&y4, y) // y4 = y ^ 2 + sm2P256Mul(&y4, &y4, y) // y4 = y ^ 3 + sm2P256Mul(&y4, &y4, y) // y4 = y ^ 4 + sm2P256Scalar(&y4, 8) // y4 = 8 * y ^ 4 + + sm2P256Mul(&s, x, &y2) + sm2P256Scalar(&s, 4) // s = 4 * x * y ^ 2 + + sm2P256Dup(&m, &x2) + sm2P256Scalar(&m, 3) + sm2P256Mul(&az4, &sm2P256.a, &z4) + sm2P256Add(&m, &m, &az4) // m = 3 * x ^ 2 + a * z ^ 4 + + sm2P256Square(&m2, &m) // m2 = m ^ 2 + + sm2P256Add(z3, y, z) + sm2P256Square(z3, z3) + sm2P256Sub(z3, z3, &z2) + sm2P256Sub(z3, z3, &y2) // z' = (y + z) ^2 - z ^ 2 - y ^ 2 + + sm2P256Sub(x3, &m2, &s) + sm2P256Sub(x3, x3, &s) // x' = m2 - 2 * s + + sm2P256Sub(y3, &s, x3) + sm2P256Mul(y3, y3, &m) + sm2P256Sub(y3, y3, &y4) // y' = m * (s - x') - 8 * y ^ 4 +} + +// p256Zero31 is 0 mod p. +var sm2P256Zero31 = sm2P256FieldElement{0x7FFFFFF8, 0x3FFFFFFC, 0x800003FC, 0x3FFFDFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x3FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x37FFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC} + +// c = a + b +func sm2P256Add(c, a, b *sm2P256FieldElement) { + carry := uint32(0) + for i := 0; ; i++ { + c[i] = a[i] + b[i] + c[i] += carry + carry = c[i] >> 29 + c[i] &= bottom29Bits + i++ + if i == 9 { + break + } + c[i] = a[i] + b[i] + c[i] += carry + carry = c[i] >> 28 + c[i] &= bottom28Bits + } + sm2P256ReduceCarry(c, carry) +} + +// c = a - b +func sm2P256Sub(c, a, b *sm2P256FieldElement) { + var carry uint32 + + for i := 0; ; i++ { + c[i] = a[i] - b[i] + c[i] += sm2P256Zero31[i] + c[i] += carry + carry = c[i] >> 29 + c[i] &= bottom29Bits + i++ + if i == 9 { + break + } + c[i] = a[i] - b[i] + c[i] += sm2P256Zero31[i] + c[i] += carry + carry = c[i] >> 28 + c[i] &= bottom28Bits + } + sm2P256ReduceCarry(c, carry) +} + +// c = a * b +func sm2P256Mul(c, a, b *sm2P256FieldElement) { + var tmp sm2P256LargeFieldElement + + tmp[0] = uint64(a[0]) * uint64(b[0]) + tmp[1] = uint64(a[0])*(uint64(b[1])<<0) + + uint64(a[1])*(uint64(b[0])<<0) + tmp[2] = uint64(a[0])*(uint64(b[2])<<0) + + uint64(a[1])*(uint64(b[1])<<1) + + uint64(a[2])*(uint64(b[0])<<0) + tmp[3] = uint64(a[0])*(uint64(b[3])<<0) + + uint64(a[1])*(uint64(b[2])<<0) + + uint64(a[2])*(uint64(b[1])<<0) + + uint64(a[3])*(uint64(b[0])<<0) + tmp[4] = uint64(a[0])*(uint64(b[4])<<0) + + uint64(a[1])*(uint64(b[3])<<1) + + uint64(a[2])*(uint64(b[2])<<0) + + uint64(a[3])*(uint64(b[1])<<1) + + uint64(a[4])*(uint64(b[0])<<0) + tmp[5] = uint64(a[0])*(uint64(b[5])<<0) + + uint64(a[1])*(uint64(b[4])<<0) + + uint64(a[2])*(uint64(b[3])<<0) + + uint64(a[3])*(uint64(b[2])<<0) + + uint64(a[4])*(uint64(b[1])<<0) + + uint64(a[5])*(uint64(b[0])<<0) + tmp[6] = uint64(a[0])*(uint64(b[6])<<0) + + uint64(a[1])*(uint64(b[5])<<1) + + uint64(a[2])*(uint64(b[4])<<0) + + uint64(a[3])*(uint64(b[3])<<1) + + uint64(a[4])*(uint64(b[2])<<0) + + uint64(a[5])*(uint64(b[1])<<1) + + uint64(a[6])*(uint64(b[0])<<0) + tmp[7] = uint64(a[0])*(uint64(b[7])<<0) + + uint64(a[1])*(uint64(b[6])<<0) + + uint64(a[2])*(uint64(b[5])<<0) + + uint64(a[3])*(uint64(b[4])<<0) + + uint64(a[4])*(uint64(b[3])<<0) + + uint64(a[5])*(uint64(b[2])<<0) + + uint64(a[6])*(uint64(b[1])<<0) + + uint64(a[7])*(uint64(b[0])<<0) + // tmp[8] has the greatest value but doesn't overflow. See logic in + // p256Square. + tmp[8] = uint64(a[0])*(uint64(b[8])<<0) + + uint64(a[1])*(uint64(b[7])<<1) + + uint64(a[2])*(uint64(b[6])<<0) + + uint64(a[3])*(uint64(b[5])<<1) + + uint64(a[4])*(uint64(b[4])<<0) + + uint64(a[5])*(uint64(b[3])<<1) + + uint64(a[6])*(uint64(b[2])<<0) + + uint64(a[7])*(uint64(b[1])<<1) + + uint64(a[8])*(uint64(b[0])<<0) + tmp[9] = uint64(a[1])*(uint64(b[8])<<0) + + uint64(a[2])*(uint64(b[7])<<0) + + uint64(a[3])*(uint64(b[6])<<0) + + uint64(a[4])*(uint64(b[5])<<0) + + uint64(a[5])*(uint64(b[4])<<0) + + uint64(a[6])*(uint64(b[3])<<0) + + uint64(a[7])*(uint64(b[2])<<0) + + uint64(a[8])*(uint64(b[1])<<0) + tmp[10] = uint64(a[2])*(uint64(b[8])<<0) + + uint64(a[3])*(uint64(b[7])<<1) + + uint64(a[4])*(uint64(b[6])<<0) + + uint64(a[5])*(uint64(b[5])<<1) + + uint64(a[6])*(uint64(b[4])<<0) + + uint64(a[7])*(uint64(b[3])<<1) + + uint64(a[8])*(uint64(b[2])<<0) + tmp[11] = uint64(a[3])*(uint64(b[8])<<0) + + uint64(a[4])*(uint64(b[7])<<0) + + uint64(a[5])*(uint64(b[6])<<0) + + uint64(a[6])*(uint64(b[5])<<0) + + uint64(a[7])*(uint64(b[4])<<0) + + uint64(a[8])*(uint64(b[3])<<0) + tmp[12] = uint64(a[4])*(uint64(b[8])<<0) + + uint64(a[5])*(uint64(b[7])<<1) + + uint64(a[6])*(uint64(b[6])<<0) + + uint64(a[7])*(uint64(b[5])<<1) + + uint64(a[8])*(uint64(b[4])<<0) + tmp[13] = uint64(a[5])*(uint64(b[8])<<0) + + uint64(a[6])*(uint64(b[7])<<0) + + uint64(a[7])*(uint64(b[6])<<0) + + uint64(a[8])*(uint64(b[5])<<0) + tmp[14] = uint64(a[6])*(uint64(b[8])<<0) + + uint64(a[7])*(uint64(b[7])<<1) + + uint64(a[8])*(uint64(b[6])<<0) + tmp[15] = uint64(a[7])*(uint64(b[8])<<0) + + uint64(a[8])*(uint64(b[7])<<0) + tmp[16] = uint64(a[8]) * (uint64(b[8]) << 0) + sm2P256ReduceDegree(c, &tmp) +} + +// b = a * a +func sm2P256Square(b, a *sm2P256FieldElement) { + var tmp sm2P256LargeFieldElement + + tmp[0] = uint64(a[0]) * uint64(a[0]) + tmp[1] = uint64(a[0]) * (uint64(a[1]) << 1) + tmp[2] = uint64(a[0])*(uint64(a[2])<<1) + + uint64(a[1])*(uint64(a[1])<<1) + tmp[3] = uint64(a[0])*(uint64(a[3])<<1) + + uint64(a[1])*(uint64(a[2])<<1) + tmp[4] = uint64(a[0])*(uint64(a[4])<<1) + + uint64(a[1])*(uint64(a[3])<<2) + + uint64(a[2])*uint64(a[2]) + tmp[5] = uint64(a[0])*(uint64(a[5])<<1) + + uint64(a[1])*(uint64(a[4])<<1) + + uint64(a[2])*(uint64(a[3])<<1) + tmp[6] = uint64(a[0])*(uint64(a[6])<<1) + + uint64(a[1])*(uint64(a[5])<<2) + + uint64(a[2])*(uint64(a[4])<<1) + + uint64(a[3])*(uint64(a[3])<<1) + tmp[7] = uint64(a[0])*(uint64(a[7])<<1) + + uint64(a[1])*(uint64(a[6])<<1) + + uint64(a[2])*(uint64(a[5])<<1) + + uint64(a[3])*(uint64(a[4])<<1) + // tmp[8] has the greatest value of 2**61 + 2**60 + 2**61 + 2**60 + 2**60, + // which is < 2**64 as required. + tmp[8] = uint64(a[0])*(uint64(a[8])<<1) + + uint64(a[1])*(uint64(a[7])<<2) + + uint64(a[2])*(uint64(a[6])<<1) + + uint64(a[3])*(uint64(a[5])<<2) + + uint64(a[4])*uint64(a[4]) + tmp[9] = uint64(a[1])*(uint64(a[8])<<1) + + uint64(a[2])*(uint64(a[7])<<1) + + uint64(a[3])*(uint64(a[6])<<1) + + uint64(a[4])*(uint64(a[5])<<1) + tmp[10] = uint64(a[2])*(uint64(a[8])<<1) + + uint64(a[3])*(uint64(a[7])<<2) + + uint64(a[4])*(uint64(a[6])<<1) + + uint64(a[5])*(uint64(a[5])<<1) + tmp[11] = uint64(a[3])*(uint64(a[8])<<1) + + uint64(a[4])*(uint64(a[7])<<1) + + uint64(a[5])*(uint64(a[6])<<1) + tmp[12] = uint64(a[4])*(uint64(a[8])<<1) + + uint64(a[5])*(uint64(a[7])<<2) + + uint64(a[6])*uint64(a[6]) + tmp[13] = uint64(a[5])*(uint64(a[8])<<1) + + uint64(a[6])*(uint64(a[7])<<1) + tmp[14] = uint64(a[6])*(uint64(a[8])<<1) + + uint64(a[7])*(uint64(a[7])<<1) + tmp[15] = uint64(a[7]) * (uint64(a[8]) << 1) + tmp[16] = uint64(a[8]) * uint64(a[8]) + sm2P256ReduceDegree(b, &tmp) +} + +// nonZeroToAllOnes returns: +// 0xffffffff for 0 < x <= 2**31 +// 0 for x == 0 or x > 2**31. +func nonZeroToAllOnes(x uint32) uint32 { + return ((x - 1) >> 31) - 1 +} + +var sm2P256Carry = [8 * 9]uint32{ + 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, + 0x2, 0x0, 0x1FFFFF00, 0x7FF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x2000000, 0x0, + 0x4, 0x0, 0x1FFFFE00, 0xFFF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4000000, 0x0, + 0x6, 0x0, 0x1FFFFD00, 0x17FF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x6000000, 0x0, + 0x8, 0x0, 0x1FFFFC00, 0x1FFF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x8000000, 0x0, + 0xA, 0x0, 0x1FFFFB00, 0x27FF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xA000000, 0x0, + 0xC, 0x0, 0x1FFFFA00, 0x2FFF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xC000000, 0x0, + 0xE, 0x0, 0x1FFFF900, 0x37FF, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xE000000, 0x0, +} + +// carry < 2 ^ 3 +func sm2P256ReduceCarry(a *sm2P256FieldElement, carry uint32) { + a[0] += sm2P256Carry[carry*9+0] + a[2] += sm2P256Carry[carry*9+2] + a[3] += sm2P256Carry[carry*9+3] + a[7] += sm2P256Carry[carry*9+7] +} + + +func sm2P256ReduceDegree(a *sm2P256FieldElement, b *sm2P256LargeFieldElement) { + var tmp [18]uint32 + var carry, x, xMask uint32 + + // tmp + // 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 ... + // 29 | 28 | 29 | 28 | 29 | 28 | 29 | 28 | 29 | 28 | 29 ... + tmp[0] = uint32(b[0]) & bottom29Bits + tmp[1] = uint32(b[0]) >> 29 + tmp[1] |= (uint32(b[0]>>32) << 3) & bottom28Bits + tmp[1] += uint32(b[1]) & bottom28Bits + carry = tmp[1] >> 28 + tmp[1] &= bottom28Bits + for i := 2; i < 17; i++ { + tmp[i] = (uint32(b[i-2] >> 32)) >> 25 + tmp[i] += (uint32(b[i-1])) >> 28 + tmp[i] += (uint32(b[i-1]>>32) << 4) & bottom29Bits + tmp[i] += uint32(b[i]) & bottom29Bits + tmp[i] += carry + carry = tmp[i] >> 29 + tmp[i] &= bottom29Bits + + i++ + if i == 17 { + break + } + tmp[i] = uint32(b[i-2]>>32) >> 25 + tmp[i] += uint32(b[i-1]) >> 29 + tmp[i] += ((uint32(b[i-1] >> 32)) << 3) & bottom28Bits + tmp[i] += uint32(b[i]) & bottom28Bits + tmp[i] += carry + carry = tmp[i] >> 28 + tmp[i] &= bottom28Bits + } + tmp[17] = uint32(b[15]>>32) >> 25 + tmp[17] += uint32(b[16]) >> 29 + tmp[17] += uint32(b[16]>>32) << 3 + tmp[17] += carry + + for i := 0; ; i += 2 { + + tmp[i+1] += tmp[i] >> 29 + x = tmp[i] & bottom29Bits + tmp[i] = 0 + if x > 0 { + set4 := uint32(0) + set7 := uint32(0) + xMask = nonZeroToAllOnes(x) + tmp[i+2] += (x << 7) & bottom29Bits + tmp[i+3] += x >> 22 + if tmp[i+3] < 0x10000000 { + set4 = 1 + tmp[i+3] += 0x10000000 & xMask + tmp[i+3] -= (x << 10) & bottom28Bits + } else { + tmp[i+3] -= (x << 10) & bottom28Bits + } + if tmp[i+4] < 0x20000000 { + tmp[i+4] += 0x20000000 & xMask + tmp[i+4] -= set4 // 借位 + tmp[i+4] -= x >> 18 + if tmp[i+5] < 0x10000000 { + tmp[i+5] += 0x10000000 & xMask + tmp[i+5] -= 1 // 借位 + if tmp[i+6] < 0x20000000 { + set7 = 1 + tmp[i+6] += 0x20000000 & xMask + tmp[i+6] -= 1 // 借位 + } else { + tmp[i+6] -= 1 // 借位 + } + } else { + tmp[i+5] -= 1 + } + } else { + tmp[i+4] -= set4 // 借位 + tmp[i+4] -= x >> 18 + } + if tmp[i+7] < 0x10000000 { + tmp[i+7] += 0x10000000 & xMask + tmp[i+7] -= set7 + tmp[i+7] -= (x << 24) & bottom28Bits + tmp[i+8] += (x << 28) & bottom29Bits + if tmp[i+8] < 0x20000000 { + tmp[i+8] += 0x20000000 & xMask + tmp[i+8] -= 1 + tmp[i+8] -= x >> 4 + tmp[i+9] += ((x >> 1) - 1) & xMask + } else { + tmp[i+8] -= 1 + tmp[i+8] -= x >> 4 + tmp[i+9] += (x >> 1) & xMask + } + } else { + tmp[i+7] -= set7 // 借位 + tmp[i+7] -= (x << 24) & bottom28Bits + tmp[i+8] += (x << 28) & bottom29Bits + if tmp[i+8] < 0x20000000 { + tmp[i+8] += 0x20000000 & xMask + tmp[i+8] -= x >> 4 + tmp[i+9] += ((x >> 1) - 1) & xMask + } else { + tmp[i+8] -= x >> 4 + tmp[i+9] += (x >> 1) & xMask + } + } + + } + + if i+1 == 9 { + break + } + + tmp[i+2] += tmp[i+1] >> 28 + x = tmp[i+1] & bottom28Bits + tmp[i+1] = 0 + if x > 0 { + set5 := uint32(0) + set8 := uint32(0) + set9 := uint32(0) + xMask = nonZeroToAllOnes(x) + tmp[i+3] += (x << 7) & bottom28Bits + tmp[i+4] += x >> 21 + if tmp[i+4] < 0x20000000 { + set5 = 1 + tmp[i+4] += 0x20000000 & xMask + tmp[i+4] -= (x << 11) & bottom29Bits + } else { + tmp[i+4] -= (x << 11) & bottom29Bits + } + if tmp[i+5] < 0x10000000 { + tmp[i+5] += 0x10000000 & xMask + tmp[i+5] -= set5 // 借位 + tmp[i+5] -= x >> 18 + if tmp[i+6] < 0x20000000 { + tmp[i+6] += 0x20000000 & xMask + tmp[i+6] -= 1 // 借位 + if tmp[i+7] < 0x10000000 { + set8 = 1 + tmp[i+7] += 0x10000000 & xMask + tmp[i+7] -= 1 // 借位 + } else { + tmp[i+7] -= 1 // 借位 + } + } else { + tmp[i+6] -= 1 // 借位 + } + } else { + tmp[i+5] -= set5 // 借位 + tmp[i+5] -= x >> 18 + } + if tmp[i+8] < 0x20000000 { + set9 = 1 + tmp[i+8] += 0x20000000 & xMask + tmp[i+8] -= set8 + tmp[i+8] -= (x << 25) & bottom29Bits + } else { + tmp[i+8] -= set8 + tmp[i+8] -= (x << 25) & bottom29Bits + } + if tmp[i+9] < 0x10000000 { + tmp[i+9] += 0x10000000 & xMask + tmp[i+9] -= set9 // 借位 + tmp[i+9] -= x >> 4 + tmp[i+10] += (x - 1) & xMask + } else { + tmp[i+9] -= set9 // 借位 + tmp[i+9] -= x >> 4 + tmp[i+10] += x & xMask + } + } + } + + carry = uint32(0) + for i := 0; i < 8; i++ { + a[i] = tmp[i+9] + a[i] += carry + a[i] += (tmp[i+10] << 28) & bottom29Bits + carry = a[i] >> 29 + a[i] &= bottom29Bits + + i++ + a[i] = tmp[i+9] >> 1 + a[i] += carry + carry = a[i] >> 28 + a[i] &= bottom28Bits + } + a[8] = tmp[17] + a[8] += carry + carry = a[8] >> 29 + a[8] &= bottom29Bits + sm2P256ReduceCarry(a, carry) +} + +// b = a +func sm2P256Dup(b, a *sm2P256FieldElement) { + *b = *a +} + +// X = a * R mod P +func sm2P256FromBig(X *sm2P256FieldElement, a *big.Int) { + x := new(big.Int).Lsh(a, 257) + x.Mod(x, sm2P256.P) + for i := 0; i < 9; i++ { + if bits := x.Bits(); len(bits) > 0 { + X[i] = uint32(bits[0]) & bottom29Bits + } else { + X[i] = 0 + } + x.Rsh(x, 29) + i++ + if i == 9 { + break + } + if bits := x.Bits(); len(bits) > 0 { + X[i] = uint32(bits[0]) & bottom28Bits + } else { + X[i] = 0 + } + x.Rsh(x, 28) + } +} + +// X = r * R mod P +// r = X * R' mod P +func sm2P256ToBig(X *sm2P256FieldElement) *big.Int { + r, tm := new(big.Int), new(big.Int) + r.SetInt64(int64(X[8])) + for i := 7; i >= 0; i-- { + if (i & 1) == 0 { + r.Lsh(r, 29) + } else { + r.Lsh(r, 28) + } + tm.SetInt64(int64(X[i])) + r.Add(r, tm) + } + r.Mul(r, sm2P256.RInverse) + r.Mod(r, sm2P256.P) + return r +} +func WNafReversed(wnaf []int8) []int8 { + wnafRev := make([]int8, len(wnaf), len(wnaf)) + for i, v := range wnaf { + wnafRev[len(wnaf)-(1+i)] = v + } + return wnafRev +} +func sm2GenrateWNaf(b []byte) []int8 { + n:= new(big.Int).SetBytes(b) + var k *big.Int + if n.Cmp(sm2P256.N) >= 0 { + n.Mod(n, sm2P256.N) + k = n + } else { + k = n + } + wnaf := make([]int8, k.BitLen()+1, k.BitLen()+1) + if k.Sign() == 0 { + return wnaf + } + var width, pow2, sign int + width, pow2, sign = 4, 16, 8 + var mask int64 = 15 + var carry bool + var length, pos int + for pos <= k.BitLen() { + if k.Bit(pos) == boolToUint(carry) { + pos++ + continue + } + k.Rsh(k, uint(pos)) + var digit int + digit = int(k.Int64() & mask) + if carry { + digit++ + } + carry = (digit & sign) != 0 + if carry { + digit -= pow2 + } + length += pos + wnaf[length] = int8(digit) + pos = int(width) + } + if len(wnaf) > length+1 { + t := make([]int8, length+1, length+1) + copy(t, wnaf[0:length+1]) + wnaf = t + } + return wnaf +} +func boolToUint(b bool) uint { + if b { + return 1 + } + return 0 +} +func abs(a int8) uint32{ + if a<0 { + return uint32(-a) + } + return uint32(a) +} + +func sm2P256ScalarMult(xOut, yOut, zOut, x, y *sm2P256FieldElement, scalar []int8) { + var precomp [16][3]sm2P256FieldElement + var px, py, pz, tx, ty, tz sm2P256FieldElement + var nIsInfinityMask, index, pIsNoninfiniteMask, mask uint32 + + // We precompute 0,1,2,... times {x,y}. + precomp[1][0] = *x + precomp[1][1] = *y + precomp[1][2] = sm2P256Factor[1] + + for i := 2; i < 8; i += 2 { + sm2P256PointDouble(&precomp[i][0], &precomp[i][1], &precomp[i][2], &precomp[i/2][0], &precomp[i/2][1], &precomp[i/2][2]) + sm2P256PointAddMixed(&precomp[i+1][0], &precomp[i+1][1], &precomp[i+1][2], &precomp[i][0], &precomp[i][1], &precomp[i][2], x, y) + } + + for i := range xOut { + xOut[i] = 0 + } + for i := range yOut { + yOut[i] = 0 + } + for i := range zOut { + zOut[i] = 0 + } + nIsInfinityMask = ^uint32(0) + var zeroes int16 + for i := 0; i0){ + for ;zeroes>0;zeroes-- { + sm2P256PointDouble(xOut, yOut, zOut, xOut, yOut, zOut) + } + } + index = abs(scalar[i]) + sm2P256PointDouble(xOut, yOut, zOut, xOut, yOut, zOut) + sm2P256SelectJacobianPoint(&px, &py, &pz, &precomp, index) + if scalar[i] > 0 { + sm2P256PointAdd(xOut, yOut, zOut, &px, &py, &pz, &tx, &ty, &tz) + } else { + sm2P256PointSub(xOut, yOut, zOut, &px, &py, &pz, &tx, &ty, &tz) + } + sm2P256CopyConditional(xOut, &px, nIsInfinityMask) + sm2P256CopyConditional(yOut, &py, nIsInfinityMask) + sm2P256CopyConditional(zOut, &pz, nIsInfinityMask) + pIsNoninfiniteMask = nonZeroToAllOnes(index) + mask = pIsNoninfiniteMask & ^nIsInfinityMask + sm2P256CopyConditional(xOut, &tx, mask) + sm2P256CopyConditional(yOut, &ty, mask) + sm2P256CopyConditional(zOut, &tz, mask) + nIsInfinityMask &^= pIsNoninfiniteMask + } + if(zeroes>0){ + for ;zeroes>0;zeroes-- { + sm2P256PointDouble(xOut, yOut, zOut, xOut, yOut, zOut) + } + } +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2/sm2.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2/sm2.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..16a0280e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2/sm2.go @@ -0,0 +1,683 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package sm2 + +// reference to ecdsa +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/rand" + "encoding/asn1" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "io" + "math/big" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte" + cbasn1 "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm3" +) + +var ( + default_uid = []byte{0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38} + + C1C3C2 = 0 + C1C2C3 = 1 +) + +type PublicKey struct { + elliptic.Curve + X, Y *big.Int +} + +type PrivateKey struct { + PublicKey + D *big.Int +} + +type sm2Cipher struct { + XCoordinate *big.Int + YCoordinate *big.Int + HASH []byte + CipherText []byte +} + +// The SM2's private key contains the public key +func (priv *PrivateKey) Public() crypto.PublicKey { + return &priv.PublicKey +} + +var errZeroParam = errors.New("zero parameter") +var one = new(big.Int).SetInt64(1) +var two = new(big.Int).SetInt64(2) + +// sign format = 30 + len(z) + 02 + len(r) + r + 02 + len(s) + s, z being what follows its size, ie 02+len(r)+r+02+len(s)+s +func (priv *PrivateKey) Sign(random io.Reader, msg []byte, signer crypto.SignerOpts) ([]byte, error) { + r, s, err := Sm2Sign(priv, msg, nil, random) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var b cryptobyte.Builder + b.AddASN1(cbasn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddASN1BigInt(r) + b.AddASN1BigInt(s) + }) + return b.Bytes() +} + +func (pub *PublicKey) Verify(msg []byte, sig []byte) bool { + var ( + r, s = &big.Int{}, &big.Int{} + inner cryptobyte.String + ) + input := cryptobyte.String(sig) + if !input.ReadASN1(&inner, cbasn1.SEQUENCE) || + !input.Empty() || + !inner.ReadASN1Integer(r) || + !inner.ReadASN1Integer(s) || + !inner.Empty() { + return false + } + return Sm2Verify(pub, msg, default_uid, r, s) +} + +func (pub *PublicKey) Sm3Digest(msg, uid []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if len(uid) == 0 { + uid = default_uid + } + + za, err := ZA(pub, uid) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + e, err := msgHash(za, msg) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return e.Bytes(), nil +} + +//****************************Encryption algorithm****************************// +func (pub *PublicKey) EncryptAsn1(data []byte, random io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + return EncryptAsn1(pub, data, random) +} + +func (priv *PrivateKey) DecryptAsn1(data []byte) ([]byte, error) { + return DecryptAsn1(priv, data) +} + +//**************************Key agreement algorithm**************************// +// KeyExchangeB 协商第二部，用户B调用， 返回共享密钥k +func KeyExchangeB(klen int, ida, idb []byte, priB *PrivateKey, pubA *PublicKey, rpri *PrivateKey, rpubA *PublicKey) (k, s1, s2 []byte, err error) { + return keyExchange(klen, ida, idb, priB, pubA, rpri, rpubA, false) +} + +// KeyExchangeA 协商第二部，用户A调用，返回共享密钥k +func KeyExchangeA(klen int, ida, idb []byte, priA *PrivateKey, pubB *PublicKey, rpri *PrivateKey, rpubB *PublicKey) (k, s1, s2 []byte, err error) { + return keyExchange(klen, ida, idb, priA, pubB, rpri, rpubB, true) +} + +//****************************************************************************// + +func Sm2Sign(priv *PrivateKey, msg, uid []byte, random io.Reader) (r, s *big.Int, err error) { + digest, err := priv.PublicKey.Sm3Digest(msg, uid) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + e := new(big.Int).SetBytes(digest) + c := priv.PublicKey.Curve + N := c.Params().N + if N.Sign() == 0 { + return nil, nil, errZeroParam + } + var k *big.Int + for { // 调整算法细节以实现SM2 + for { + k, err = randFieldElement(c, random) + if err != nil { + r = nil + return + } + r, _ = priv.Curve.ScalarBaseMult(k.Bytes()) + r.Add(r, e) + r.Mod(r, N) + if r.Sign() != 0 { + if t := new(big.Int).Add(r, k); t.Cmp(N) != 0 { + break + } + } + + } + rD := new(big.Int).Mul(priv.D, r) + s = new(big.Int).Sub(k, rD) + d1 := new(big.Int).Add(priv.D, one) + d1Inv := new(big.Int).ModInverse(d1, N) + s.Mul(s, d1Inv) + s.Mod(s, N) + if s.Sign() != 0 { + break + } + } + return +} +func Sm2Verify(pub *PublicKey, msg, uid []byte, r, s *big.Int) bool { + c := pub.Curve + N := c.Params().N + one := new(big.Int).SetInt64(1) + if r.Cmp(one) < 0 || s.Cmp(one) < 0 { + return false + } + if r.Cmp(N) >= 0 || s.Cmp(N) >= 0 { + return false + } + if len(uid) == 0 { + uid = default_uid + } + za, err := ZA(pub, uid) + if err != nil { + return false + } + e, err := msgHash(za, msg) + if err != nil { + return false + } + t := new(big.Int).Add(r, s) + t.Mod(t, N) + if t.Sign() == 0 { + return false + } + var x *big.Int + x1, y1 := c.ScalarBaseMult(s.Bytes()) + x2, y2 := c.ScalarMult(pub.X, pub.Y, t.Bytes()) + x, _ = c.Add(x1, y1, x2, y2) + + x.Add(x, e) + x.Mod(x, N) + return x.Cmp(r) == 0 +} + +/* + za, err := ZA(pub, uid) + if err != nil { + return + } + e, err := msgHash(za, msg) + hash=e.getBytes() +*/ +func Verify(pub *PublicKey, hash []byte, r, s *big.Int) bool { + c := pub.Curve + N := c.Params().N + + if r.Sign() <= 0 || s.Sign() <= 0 { + return false + } + if r.Cmp(N) >= 0 || s.Cmp(N) >= 0 { + return false + } + + // 调整算法细节以实现SM2 + t := new(big.Int).Add(r, s) + t.Mod(t, N) + if t.Sign() == 0 { + return false + } + + var x *big.Int + x1, y1 := c.ScalarBaseMult(s.Bytes()) + x2, y2 := c.ScalarMult(pub.X, pub.Y, t.Bytes()) + x, _ = c.Add(x1, y1, x2, y2) + + e := new(big.Int).SetBytes(hash) + x.Add(x, e) + x.Mod(x, N) + return x.Cmp(r) == 0 +} + +/* + * sm2密文结构如下: + * x + * y + * hash + * CipherText + */ +func Encrypt(pub *PublicKey, data []byte, random io.Reader, mode int) ([]byte, error) { + length := len(data) + for { + c := []byte{} + curve := pub.Curve + k, err := randFieldElement(curve, random) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + x1, y1 := curve.ScalarBaseMult(k.Bytes()) + x2, y2 := curve.ScalarMult(pub.X, pub.Y, k.Bytes()) + x1Buf := x1.Bytes() + y1Buf := y1.Bytes() + x2Buf := x2.Bytes() + y2Buf := y2.Bytes() + if n := len(x1Buf); n < 32 { + x1Buf = append(zeroByteSlice()[:32-n], x1Buf...) + } + if n := len(y1Buf); n < 32 { + y1Buf = append(zeroByteSlice()[:32-n], y1Buf...) + } + if n := len(x2Buf); n < 32 { + x2Buf = append(zeroByteSlice()[:32-n], x2Buf...) + } + if n := len(y2Buf); n < 32 { + y2Buf = append(zeroByteSlice()[:32-n], y2Buf...) + } + c = append(c, x1Buf...) // x分量 + c = append(c, y1Buf...) // y分量 + tm := []byte{} + tm = append(tm, x2Buf...) + tm = append(tm, data...) + tm = append(tm, y2Buf...) + h := sm3.Sm3Sum(tm) + c = append(c, h...) + ct, ok := kdf(length, x2Buf, y2Buf) // 密文 + if !ok { + continue + } + c = append(c, ct...) + for i := 0; i < length; i++ { + c[96+i] ^= data[i] + } + switch mode { + + case C1C3C2: + return append([]byte{0x04}, c...), nil + case C1C2C3: + c1 := make([]byte, 64) + c2 := make([]byte, len(c)-96) + c3 := make([]byte, 32) + copy(c1, c[:64]) //x1,y1 + copy(c3, c[64:96]) //hash + copy(c2, c[96:]) //密文 + ciphertext := []byte{} + ciphertext = append(ciphertext, c1...) + ciphertext = append(ciphertext, c2...) + ciphertext = append(ciphertext, c3...) + return append([]byte{0x04}, ciphertext...), nil + default: + return append([]byte{0x04}, c...), nil + } + } +} + +func Decrypt(priv *PrivateKey, data []byte, mode int) ([]byte, error) { + switch mode { + case C1C3C2: + data = data[1:] + case C1C2C3: + data = data[1:] + c1 := make([]byte, 64) + c2 := make([]byte, len(data)-96) + c3 := make([]byte, 32) + copy(c1, data[:64]) //x1,y1 + copy(c2, data[64:len(data)-32]) //密文 + copy(c3, data[len(data)-32:]) //hash + c := []byte{} + c = append(c, c1...) + c = append(c, c3...) + c = append(c, c2...) + data = c + default: + data = data[1:] + } + length := len(data) - 96 + curve := priv.Curve + x := new(big.Int).SetBytes(data[:32]) + y := new(big.Int).SetBytes(data[32:64]) + x2, y2 := curve.ScalarMult(x, y, priv.D.Bytes()) + x2Buf := x2.Bytes() + y2Buf := y2.Bytes() + if n := len(x2Buf); n < 32 { + x2Buf = append(zeroByteSlice()[:32-n], x2Buf...) + } + if n := len(y2Buf); n < 32 { + y2Buf = append(zeroByteSlice()[:32-n], y2Buf...) + } + c, ok := kdf(length, x2Buf, y2Buf) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("Decrypt: failed to decrypt") + } + for i := 0; i < length; i++ { + c[i] ^= data[i+96] + } + tm := []byte{} + tm = append(tm, x2Buf...) + tm = append(tm, c...) + tm = append(tm, y2Buf...) + h := sm3.Sm3Sum(tm) + if bytes.Compare(h, data[64:96]) != 0 { + return c, errors.New("Decrypt: failed to decrypt") + } + return c, nil +} + +// keyExchange 为SM2密钥交换算法的第二部和第三步复用部分，协商的双方均调用此函数计算共同的字节串 +// klen: 密钥长度 +// ida, idb: 协商双方的标识，ida为密钥协商算法发起方标识，idb为响应方标识 +// pri: 函数调用者的密钥 +// pub: 对方的公钥 +// rpri: 函数调用者生成的临时SM2密钥 +// rpub: 对方发来的临时SM2公钥 +// thisIsA: 如果是A调用，文档中的协商第三步，设置为true，否则设置为false +// 返回 k 为klen长度的字节串 +func keyExchange(klen int, ida, idb []byte, pri *PrivateKey, pub *PublicKey, rpri *PrivateKey, rpub *PublicKey, thisISA bool) (k, s1, s2 []byte, err error) { + curve := P256Sm2() + N := curve.Params().N + x2hat := keXHat(rpri.PublicKey.X) + x2rb := new(big.Int).Mul(x2hat, rpri.D) + tbt := new(big.Int).Add(pri.D, x2rb) + tb := new(big.Int).Mod(tbt, N) + if !curve.IsOnCurve(rpub.X, rpub.Y) { + err = errors.New("Ra not on curve") + return + } + x1hat := keXHat(rpub.X) + ramx1, ramy1 := curve.ScalarMult(rpub.X, rpub.Y, x1hat.Bytes()) + vxt, vyt := curve.Add(pub.X, pub.Y, ramx1, ramy1) + + vx, vy := curve.ScalarMult(vxt, vyt, tb.Bytes()) + pza := pub + if thisISA { + pza = &pri.PublicKey + } + za, err := ZA(pza, ida) + if err != nil { + return + } + zero := new(big.Int) + if vx.Cmp(zero) == 0 || vy.Cmp(zero) == 0 { + err = errors.New("V is infinite") + } + pzb := pub + if !thisISA { + pzb = &pri.PublicKey + } + zb, err := ZA(pzb, idb) + k, ok := kdf(klen, vx.Bytes(), vy.Bytes(), za, zb) + if !ok { + err = errors.New("kdf: zero key") + return + } + h1 := BytesCombine(vx.Bytes(), za, zb, rpub.X.Bytes(), rpub.Y.Bytes(), rpri.X.Bytes(), rpri.Y.Bytes()) + if !thisISA { + h1 = BytesCombine(vx.Bytes(), za, zb, rpri.X.Bytes(), rpri.Y.Bytes(), rpub.X.Bytes(), rpub.Y.Bytes()) + } + hash := sm3.Sm3Sum(h1) + h2 := BytesCombine([]byte{0x02}, vy.Bytes(), hash) + S1 := sm3.Sm3Sum(h2) + h3 := BytesCombine([]byte{0x03}, vy.Bytes(), hash) + S2 := sm3.Sm3Sum(h3) + return k, S1, S2, nil +} + +func msgHash(za, msg []byte) (*big.Int, error) { + e := sm3.New() + e.Write(za) + e.Write(msg) + return new(big.Int).SetBytes(e.Sum(nil)[:32]), nil +} + +// ZA = H256(ENTLA || IDA || a || b || xG || yG || xA || yA) +func ZA(pub *PublicKey, uid []byte) ([]byte, error) { + za := sm3.New() + uidLen := len(uid) + if uidLen >= 8192 { + return []byte{}, errors.New("SM2: uid too large") + } + Entla := uint16(8 * uidLen) + za.Write([]byte{byte((Entla >> 8) & 0xFF)}) + za.Write([]byte{byte(Entla & 0xFF)}) + if uidLen > 0 { + za.Write(uid) + } + za.Write(sm2P256ToBig(&sm2P256.a).Bytes()) + za.Write(sm2P256.B.Bytes()) + za.Write(sm2P256.Gx.Bytes()) + za.Write(sm2P256.Gy.Bytes()) + + xBuf := pub.X.Bytes() + yBuf := pub.Y.Bytes() + if n := len(xBuf); n < 32 { + xBuf = append(zeroByteSlice()[:32-n], xBuf...) + } + if n := len(yBuf); n < 32 { + yBuf = append(zeroByteSlice()[:32-n], yBuf...) + } + za.Write(xBuf) + za.Write(yBuf) + return za.Sum(nil)[:32], nil +} + +// 32byte +func zeroByteSlice() []byte { + return []byte{ + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + } +} + +/* +sm2加密，返回asn.1编码格式的密文内容 +*/ +func EncryptAsn1(pub *PublicKey, data []byte, rand io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + cipher, err := Encrypt(pub, data, rand, C1C3C2) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return CipherMarshal(cipher) +} + +/* +sm2解密，解析asn.1编码格式的密文内容 +*/ +func DecryptAsn1(pub *PrivateKey, data []byte) ([]byte, error) { + cipher, err := CipherUnmarshal(data) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return Decrypt(pub, cipher, C1C3C2) +} + +/* +*sm2密文转asn.1编码格式 +*sm2密文结构如下: +* x +* y +* hash +* CipherText + */ +func CipherMarshal(data []byte) ([]byte, error) { + data = data[1:] + x := new(big.Int).SetBytes(data[:32]) + y := new(big.Int).SetBytes(data[32:64]) + hash := data[64:96] + cipherText := data[96:] + return asn1.Marshal(sm2Cipher{x, y, hash, cipherText}) +} + +/* +sm2密文asn.1编码格式转C1|C3|C2拼接格式 +*/ +func CipherUnmarshal(data []byte) ([]byte, error) { + var cipher sm2Cipher + _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(data, &cipher) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + x := cipher.XCoordinate.Bytes() + y := cipher.YCoordinate.Bytes() + hash := cipher.HASH + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + cipherText := cipher.CipherText + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if n := len(x); n < 32 { + x = append(zeroByteSlice()[:32-n], x...) + } + if n := len(y); n < 32 { + y = append(zeroByteSlice()[:32-n], y...) + } + c := []byte{} + c = append(c, x...) // x分量 + c = append(c, y...) // y分 + c = append(c, hash...) // x分量 + c = append(c, cipherText...) // y分 + return append([]byte{0x04}, c...), nil +} + +// keXHat 计算 x = 2^w + (x & (2^w-1)) +// 密钥协商算法辅助函数 +func keXHat(x *big.Int) (xul *big.Int) { + buf := x.Bytes() + for i := 0; i < len(buf)-16; i++ { + buf[i] = 0 + } + if len(buf) >= 16 { + c := buf[len(buf)-16] + buf[len(buf)-16] = c & 0x7f + } + + r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(buf) + _2w := new(big.Int).SetBytes([]byte{ + 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}) + return r.Add(r, _2w) +} + +func BytesCombine(pBytes ...[]byte) []byte { + len := len(pBytes) + s := make([][]byte, len) + for index := 0; index < len; index++ { + s[index] = pBytes[index] + } + sep := []byte("") + return bytes.Join(s, sep) +} + +func intToBytes(x int) []byte { + var buf = make([]byte, 4) + + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(buf, uint32(x)) + return buf +} + +func kdf(length int, x ...[]byte) ([]byte, bool) { + var c []byte + + ct := 1 + h := sm3.New() + for i, j := 0, (length+31)/32; i < j; i++ { + h.Reset() + for _, xx := range x { + h.Write(xx) + } + h.Write(intToBytes(ct)) + hash := h.Sum(nil) + if i+1 == j && length%32 != 0 { + c = append(c, hash[:length%32]...) + } else { + c = append(c, hash...) + } + ct++ + } + for i := 0; i < length; i++ { + if c[i] != 0 { + return c, true + } + } + return c, false +} + +func randFieldElement(c elliptic.Curve, random io.Reader) (k *big.Int, err error) { + if random == nil { + random = rand.Reader //If there is no external trusted random source,please use rand.Reader to instead of it. + } + params := c.Params() + b := make([]byte, params.BitSize/8+8) + _, err = io.ReadFull(random, b) + if err != nil { + return + } + k = new(big.Int).SetBytes(b) + n := new(big.Int).Sub(params.N, one) + k.Mod(k, n) + k.Add(k, one) + return +} + +func GenerateKey(random io.Reader) (*PrivateKey, error) { + c := P256Sm2() + if random == nil { + random = rand.Reader //If there is no external trusted random source,please use rand.Reader to instead of it. + } + params := c.Params() + b := make([]byte, params.BitSize/8+8) + _, err := io.ReadFull(random, b) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + k := new(big.Int).SetBytes(b) + n := new(big.Int).Sub(params.N, two) + k.Mod(k, n) + k.Add(k, one) + priv := new(PrivateKey) + priv.PublicKey.Curve = c + priv.D = k + priv.PublicKey.X, priv.PublicKey.Y = c.ScalarBaseMult(k.Bytes()) + + return priv, nil +} + +type zr struct { + io.Reader +} + +func (z *zr) Read(dst []byte) (n int, err error) { + for i := range dst { + dst[i] = 0 + } + return len(dst), nil +} + +var zeroReader = &zr{} + +func getLastBit(a *big.Int) uint { + return a.Bit(0) +} + +// crypto.Decrypter +func (priv *PrivateKey) Decrypt(_ io.Reader, msg []byte, _ crypto.DecrypterOpts) (plaintext []byte, err error) { + return Decrypt(priv, msg, C1C3C2) +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2/utils.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2/utils.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a2ecc1ca --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2/utils.go @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +package sm2 + +import ( + "encoding/asn1" + "math/big" +) + +func Decompress(a []byte) *PublicKey { + var aa, xx, xx3 sm2P256FieldElement + + P256Sm2() + x := new(big.Int).SetBytes(a[1:]) + curve := sm2P256 + sm2P256FromBig(&xx, x) + sm2P256Square(&xx3, &xx) // x3 = x ^ 2 + sm2P256Mul(&xx3, &xx3, &xx) // x3 = x ^ 2 * x + sm2P256Mul(&aa, &curve.a, &xx) // a = a * x + sm2P256Add(&xx3, &xx3, &aa) + sm2P256Add(&xx3, &xx3, &curve.b) + + y2 := sm2P256ToBig(&xx3) + y := new(big.Int).ModSqrt(y2, sm2P256.P) + if getLastBit(y) != uint(a[0]) { + y.Sub(sm2P256.P, y) + } + return &PublicKey{ + Curve: P256Sm2(), + X: x, + Y: y, + } +} + +func Compress(a *PublicKey) []byte { + buf := []byte{} + yp := getLastBit(a.Y) + buf = append(buf, a.X.Bytes()...) + if n := len(a.X.Bytes()); n < 32 { + buf = append(zeroByteSlice()[:(32-n)], buf...) + } + buf = append([]byte{byte(yp)}, buf...) + return buf +} + +type sm2Signature struct { + R, S *big.Int +} + +func SignDigitToSignData(r, s *big.Int) ([]byte, error) { + return asn1.Marshal(sm2Signature{r, s}) +} + +func SignDataToSignDigit(sign []byte) (*big.Int, *big.Int, error) { + var sm2Sign sm2Signature + + _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(sign, &sm2Sign) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + return sm2Sign.R, sm2Sign.S, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm3/ifile b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm3/ifile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..30d74d25 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm3/ifile @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +test \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm3/sm3.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm3/sm3.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7c6094cd --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm3/sm3.go @@ -0,0 +1,259 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package sm3 + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "hash" +) + +type SM3 struct { + digest [8]uint32 // digest represents the partial evaluation of V + length uint64 // length of the message + unhandleMsg []byte // uint8 // +} + +func (sm3 *SM3) ff0(x, y, z uint32) uint32 { return x ^ y ^ z } + +func (sm3 *SM3) ff1(x, y, z uint32) uint32 { return (x & y) | (x & z) | (y & z) } + +func (sm3 *SM3) gg0(x, y, z uint32) uint32 { return x ^ y ^ z } + +func (sm3 *SM3) gg1(x, y, z uint32) uint32 { return (x & y) | (^x & z) } + +func (sm3 *SM3) p0(x uint32) uint32 { return x ^ sm3.leftRotate(x, 9) ^ sm3.leftRotate(x, 17) } + +func (sm3 *SM3) p1(x uint32) uint32 { return x ^ sm3.leftRotate(x, 15) ^ sm3.leftRotate(x, 23) } + +func (sm3 *SM3) leftRotate(x uint32, i uint32) uint32 { return x<<(i%32) | x>>(32-i%32) } + +func (sm3 *SM3) pad() []byte { + msg := sm3.unhandleMsg + msg = append(msg, 0x80) // Append '1' + blockSize := 64 // Append until the resulting message length (in bits) is congruent to 448 (mod 512) + for len(msg)%blockSize != 56 { + msg = append(msg, 0x00) + } + // append message length + msg = append(msg, uint8(sm3.length>>56&0xff)) + msg = append(msg, uint8(sm3.length>>48&0xff)) + msg = append(msg, uint8(sm3.length>>40&0xff)) + msg = append(msg, uint8(sm3.length>>32&0xff)) + msg = append(msg, uint8(sm3.length>>24&0xff)) + msg = append(msg, uint8(sm3.length>>16&0xff)) + msg = append(msg, uint8(sm3.length>>8&0xff)) + msg = append(msg, uint8(sm3.length>>0&0xff)) + + if len(msg)%64 != 0 { + panic("------SM3 Pad: error msgLen =") + } + return msg +} + +func (sm3 *SM3) update(msg []byte) { + var w [68]uint32 + var w1 [64]uint32 + + a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h := sm3.digest[0], sm3.digest[1], sm3.digest[2], sm3.digest[3], sm3.digest[4], sm3.digest[5], sm3.digest[6], sm3.digest[7] + for len(msg) >= 64 { + for i := 0; i < 16; i++ { + w[i] = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(msg[4*i : 4*(i+1)]) + } + for i := 16; i < 68; i++ { + w[i] = sm3.p1(w[i-16]^w[i-9]^sm3.leftRotate(w[i-3], 15)) ^ sm3.leftRotate(w[i-13], 7) ^ w[i-6] + } + for i := 0; i < 64; i++ { + w1[i] = w[i] ^ w[i+4] + } + A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H := a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h + for i := 0; i < 16; i++ { + SS1 := sm3.leftRotate(sm3.leftRotate(A, 12)+E+sm3.leftRotate(0x79cc4519, uint32(i)), 7) + SS2 := SS1 ^ sm3.leftRotate(A, 12) + TT1 := sm3.ff0(A, B, C) + D + SS2 + w1[i] + TT2 := sm3.gg0(E, F, G) + H + SS1 + w[i] + D = C + C = sm3.leftRotate(B, 9) + B = A + A = TT1 + H = G + G = sm3.leftRotate(F, 19) + F = E + E = sm3.p0(TT2) + } + for i := 16; i < 64; i++ { + SS1 := sm3.leftRotate(sm3.leftRotate(A, 12)+E+sm3.leftRotate(0x7a879d8a, uint32(i)), 7) + SS2 := SS1 ^ sm3.leftRotate(A, 12) + TT1 := sm3.ff1(A, B, C) + D + SS2 + w1[i] + TT2 := sm3.gg1(E, F, G) + H + SS1 + w[i] + D = C + C = sm3.leftRotate(B, 9) + B = A + A = TT1 + H = G + G = sm3.leftRotate(F, 19) + F = E + E = sm3.p0(TT2) + } + a ^= A + b ^= B + c ^= C + d ^= D + e ^= E + f ^= F + g ^= G + h ^= H + msg = msg[64:] + } + sm3.digest[0], sm3.digest[1], sm3.digest[2], sm3.digest[3], sm3.digest[4], sm3.digest[5], sm3.digest[6], sm3.digest[7] = a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h +} +func (sm3 *SM3) update2(msg []byte,) [8]uint32 { + var w [68]uint32 + var w1 [64]uint32 + + a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h := sm3.digest[0], sm3.digest[1], sm3.digest[2], sm3.digest[3], sm3.digest[4], sm3.digest[5], sm3.digest[6], sm3.digest[7] + for len(msg) >= 64 { + for i := 0; i < 16; i++ { + w[i] = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(msg[4*i : 4*(i+1)]) + } + for i := 16; i < 68; i++ { + w[i] = sm3.p1(w[i-16]^w[i-9]^sm3.leftRotate(w[i-3], 15)) ^ sm3.leftRotate(w[i-13], 7) ^ w[i-6] + } + for i := 0; i < 64; i++ { + w1[i] = w[i] ^ w[i+4] + } + A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H := a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h + for i := 0; i < 16; i++ { + SS1 := sm3.leftRotate(sm3.leftRotate(A, 12)+E+sm3.leftRotate(0x79cc4519, uint32(i)), 7) + SS2 := SS1 ^ sm3.leftRotate(A, 12) + TT1 := sm3.ff0(A, B, C) + D + SS2 + w1[i] + TT2 := sm3.gg0(E, F, G) + H + SS1 + w[i] + D = C + C = sm3.leftRotate(B, 9) + B = A + A = TT1 + H = G + G = sm3.leftRotate(F, 19) + F = E + E = sm3.p0(TT2) + } + for i := 16; i < 64; i++ { + SS1 := sm3.leftRotate(sm3.leftRotate(A, 12)+E+sm3.leftRotate(0x7a879d8a, uint32(i)), 7) + SS2 := SS1 ^ sm3.leftRotate(A, 12) + TT1 := sm3.ff1(A, B, C) + D + SS2 + w1[i] + TT2 := sm3.gg1(E, F, G) + H + SS1 + w[i] + D = C + C = sm3.leftRotate(B, 9) + B = A + A = TT1 + H = G + G = sm3.leftRotate(F, 19) + F = E + E = sm3.p0(TT2) + } + a ^= A + b ^= B + c ^= C + d ^= D + e ^= E + f ^= F + g ^= G + h ^= H + msg = msg[64:] + } + var digest [8]uint32 + digest[0], digest[1], digest[2], digest[3], digest[4], digest[5], digest[6], digest[7] = a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h + return digest +} + +// 创建哈希计算实例 +func New() hash.Hash { + var sm3 SM3 + + sm3.Reset() + return &sm3 +} + +// BlockSize returns the hash's underlying block size. +// The Write method must be able to accept any amount +// of data, but it may operate more efficiently if all writes +// are a multiple of the block size. +func (sm3 *SM3) BlockSize() int { return 64 } + +// Size returns the number of bytes Sum will return. +func (sm3 *SM3) Size() int { return 32 } + +// Reset clears the internal state by zeroing bytes in the state buffer. +// This can be skipped for a newly-created hash state; the default zero-allocated state is correct. +func (sm3 *SM3) Reset() { + // Reset digest + sm3.digest[0] = 0x7380166f + sm3.digest[1] = 0x4914b2b9 + sm3.digest[2] = 0x172442d7 + sm3.digest[3] = 0xda8a0600 + sm3.digest[4] = 0xa96f30bc + sm3.digest[5] = 0x163138aa + sm3.digest[6] = 0xe38dee4d + sm3.digest[7] = 0xb0fb0e4e + + sm3.length = 0 // Reset numberic states + sm3.unhandleMsg = []byte{} +} + +// Write (via the embedded io.Writer interface) adds more data to the running hash. +// It never returns an error. +func (sm3 *SM3) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + toWrite := len(p) + sm3.length += uint64(len(p) * 8) + msg := append(sm3.unhandleMsg, p...) + nblocks := len(msg) / sm3.BlockSize() + sm3.update(msg) + // Update unhandleMsg + sm3.unhandleMsg = msg[nblocks*sm3.BlockSize():] + + return toWrite, nil +} + +// 返回SM3哈希算法摘要值 +// Sum appends the current hash to b and returns the resulting slice. +// It does not change the underlying hash state. +func (sm3 *SM3) Sum(in []byte) []byte { + _, _ = sm3.Write(in) + msg := sm3.pad() + //Finalize + digest := sm3.update2(msg) + + // save hash to in + needed := sm3.Size() + if cap(in)-len(in) < needed { + newIn := make([]byte, len(in), len(in)+needed) + copy(newIn, in) + in = newIn + } + out := in[len(in) : len(in)+needed] + for i := 0; i < 8; i++ { + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(out[i*4:], digest[i]) + } + return out + +} + +func Sm3Sum(data []byte) []byte { + var sm3 SM3 + + sm3.Reset() + _, _ = sm3.Write(data) + return sm3.Sum(nil) +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4/sm4.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4/sm4.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0e301deb --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4/sm4.go @@ -0,0 +1,492 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. + +sm4 acceleration +modified by Jack, 2017 Oct +*/ + +package sm4 + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto/cipher" + "errors" + "strconv" +) + +const BlockSize = 16 + +var IV = make([]byte, BlockSize) + +type SM4Key []byte + +// Cipher is an instance of SM4 encryption. +type Sm4Cipher struct { + subkeys []uint32 + block1 []uint32 + block2 []byte +} + +// sm4密钥参量 +var fk = [4]uint32{ + 0xa3b1bac6, 0x56aa3350, 0x677d9197, 0xb27022dc, +} + +// sm4密钥参量 +var ck = [32]uint32{ + 0x00070e15, 0x1c232a31, 0x383f464d, 0x545b6269, + 0x70777e85, 0x8c939aa1, 0xa8afb6bd, 0xc4cbd2d9, + 0xe0e7eef5, 0xfc030a11, 0x181f262d, 0x343b4249, + 0x50575e65, 0x6c737a81, 0x888f969d, 0xa4abb2b9, + 0xc0c7ced5, 0xdce3eaf1, 0xf8ff060d, 0x141b2229, + 0x30373e45, 0x4c535a61, 0x686f767d, 0x848b9299, + 0xa0a7aeb5, 0xbcc3cad1, 0xd8dfe6ed, 0xf4fb0209, + 0x10171e25, 0x2c333a41, 0x484f565d, 0x646b7279, +} + +// sm4密钥参量 +var sbox = [256]uint8{ + 0xd6, 0x90, 0xe9, 0xfe, 0xcc, 0xe1, 0x3d, 0xb7, 0x16, 0xb6, 0x14, 0xc2, 0x28, 0xfb, 0x2c, 0x05, + 0x2b, 0x67, 0x9a, 0x76, 0x2a, 0xbe, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0x44, 0x13, 0x26, 0x49, 0x86, 0x06, 0x99, + 0x9c, 0x42, 0x50, 0xf4, 0x91, 0xef, 0x98, 0x7a, 0x33, 0x54, 0x0b, 0x43, 0xed, 0xcf, 0xac, 0x62, + 0xe4, 0xb3, 0x1c, 0xa9, 0xc9, 0x08, 0xe8, 0x95, 0x80, 0xdf, 0x94, 0xfa, 0x75, 0x8f, 0x3f, 0xa6, + 0x47, 0x07, 0xa7, 0xfc, 0xf3, 0x73, 0x17, 0xba, 0x83, 0x59, 0x3c, 0x19, 0xe6, 0x85, 0x4f, 0xa8, + 0x68, 0x6b, 0x81, 0xb2, 0x71, 0x64, 0xda, 0x8b, 0xf8, 0xeb, 0x0f, 0x4b, 0x70, 0x56, 0x9d, 0x35, + 0x1e, 0x24, 0x0e, 0x5e, 0x63, 0x58, 0xd1, 0xa2, 0x25, 0x22, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x01, 0x21, 0x78, 0x87, + 0xd4, 0x00, 0x46, 0x57, 0x9f, 0xd3, 0x27, 0x52, 0x4c, 0x36, 0x02, 0xe7, 0xa0, 0xc4, 0xc8, 0x9e, + 0xea, 0xbf, 0x8a, 0xd2, 0x40, 0xc7, 0x38, 0xb5, 0xa3, 0xf7, 0xf2, 0xce, 0xf9, 0x61, 0x15, 0xa1, + 0xe0, 0xae, 0x5d, 0xa4, 0x9b, 0x34, 0x1a, 0x55, 0xad, 0x93, 0x32, 0x30, 0xf5, 0x8c, 0xb1, 0xe3, + 0x1d, 0xf6, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x82, 0x66, 0xca, 0x60, 0xc0, 0x29, 0x23, 0xab, 0x0d, 0x53, 0x4e, 0x6f, + 0xd5, 0xdb, 0x37, 0x45, 0xde, 0xfd, 0x8e, 0x2f, 0x03, 0xff, 0x6a, 0x72, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0x5b, 0x51, + 0x8d, 0x1b, 0xaf, 0x92, 0xbb, 0xdd, 0xbc, 0x7f, 0x11, 0xd9, 0x5c, 0x41, 0x1f, 0x10, 0x5a, 0xd8, + 0x0a, 0xc1, 0x31, 0x88, 0xa5, 0xcd, 0x7b, 0xbd, 0x2d, 0x74, 0xd0, 0x12, 0xb8, 0xe5, 0xb4, 0xb0, + 0x89, 0x69, 0x97, 0x4a, 0x0c, 0x96, 0x77, 0x7e, 0x65, 0xb9, 0xf1, 0x09, 0xc5, 0x6e, 0xc6, 0x84, + 0x18, 0xf0, 0x7d, 0xec, 0x3a, 0xdc, 0x4d, 0x20, 0x79, 0xee, 0x5f, 0x3e, 0xd7, 0xcb, 0x39, 0x48, +} + +var sbox0 = [256]uint32{ + 0xd55b5b8e, 0x924242d0, 0xeaa7a74d, 0xfdfbfb06, 0xcf3333fc, 0xe2878765, 0x3df4f4c9, 0xb5dede6b, 0x1658584e, 0xb4dada6e, 0x14505044, 0xc10b0bca, 0x28a0a088, 0xf8efef17, 0x2cb0b09c, 0x05141411, + 0x2bacac87, 0x669d9dfb, 0x986a6af2, 0x77d9d9ae, 0x2aa8a882, 0xbcfafa46, 0x04101014, 0xc00f0fcf, 0xa8aaaa02, 0x45111154, 0x134c4c5f, 0x269898be, 0x4825256d, 0x841a1a9e, 0x0618181e, 0x9b6666fd, + 0x9e7272ec, 0x4309094a, 0x51414110, 0xf7d3d324, 0x934646d5, 0xecbfbf53, 0x9a6262f8, 0x7be9e992, 0x33ccccff, 0x55515104, 0x0b2c2c27, 0x420d0d4f, 0xeeb7b759, 0xcc3f3ff3, 0xaeb2b21c, 0x638989ea, + 0xe7939374, 0xb1cece7f, 0x1c70706c, 0xaba6a60d, 0xca2727ed, 0x08202028, 0xeba3a348, 0x975656c1, 0x82020280, 0xdc7f7fa3, 0x965252c4, 0xf9ebeb12, 0x74d5d5a1, 0x8d3e3eb3, 0x3ffcfcc3, 0xa49a9a3e, + 0x461d1d5b, 0x071c1c1b, 0xa59e9e3b, 0xfff3f30c, 0xf0cfcf3f, 0x72cdcdbf, 0x175c5c4b, 0xb8eaea52, 0x810e0e8f, 0x5865653d, 0x3cf0f0cc, 0x1964647d, 0xe59b9b7e, 0x87161691, 0x4e3d3d73, 0xaaa2a208, + 0x69a1a1c8, 0x6aadadc7, 0x83060685, 0xb0caca7a, 0x70c5c5b5, 0x659191f4, 0xd96b6bb2, 0x892e2ea7, 0xfbe3e318, 0xe8afaf47, 0x0f3c3c33, 0x4a2d2d67, 0x71c1c1b0, 0x5759590e, 0x9f7676e9, 0x35d4d4e1, + 0x1e787866, 0x249090b4, 0x0e383836, 0x5f797926, 0x628d8def, 0x59616138, 0xd2474795, 0xa08a8a2a, 0x259494b1, 0x228888aa, 0x7df1f18c, 0x3bececd7, 0x01040405, 0x218484a5, 0x79e1e198, 0x851e1e9b, + 0xd7535384, 0x00000000, 0x4719195e, 0x565d5d0b, 0x9d7e7ee3, 0xd04f4f9f, 0x279c9cbb, 0x5349491a, 0x4d31317c, 0x36d8d8ee, 0x0208080a, 0xe49f9f7b, 0xa2828220, 0xc71313d4, 0xcb2323e8, 0x9c7a7ae6, + 0xe9abab42, 0xbdfefe43, 0x882a2aa2, 0xd14b4b9a, 0x41010140, 0xc41f1fdb, 0x38e0e0d8, 0xb7d6d661, 0xa18e8e2f, 0xf4dfdf2b, 0xf1cbcb3a, 0xcd3b3bf6, 0xfae7e71d, 0x608585e5, 0x15545441, 0xa3868625, + 0xe3838360, 0xacbaba16, 0x5c757529, 0xa6929234, 0x996e6ef7, 0x34d0d0e4, 0x1a686872, 0x54555501, 0xafb6b619, 0x914e4edf, 0x32c8c8fa, 0x30c0c0f0, 0xf6d7d721, 0x8e3232bc, 0xb3c6c675, 0xe08f8f6f, + 0x1d747469, 0xf5dbdb2e, 0xe18b8b6a, 0x2eb8b896, 0x800a0a8a, 0x679999fe, 0xc92b2be2, 0x618181e0, 0xc30303c0, 0x29a4a48d, 0x238c8caf, 0xa9aeae07, 0x0d343439, 0x524d4d1f, 0x4f393976, 0x6ebdbdd3, + 0xd6575781, 0xd86f6fb7, 0x37dcdceb, 0x44151551, 0xdd7b7ba6, 0xfef7f709, 0x8c3a3ab6, 0x2fbcbc93, 0x030c0c0f, 0xfcffff03, 0x6ba9a9c2, 0x73c9c9ba, 0x6cb5b5d9, 0x6db1b1dc, 0x5a6d6d37, 0x50454515, + 0x8f3636b9, 0x1b6c6c77, 0xadbebe13, 0x904a4ada, 0xb9eeee57, 0xde7777a9, 0xbef2f24c, 0x7efdfd83, 0x11444455, 0xda6767bd, 0x5d71712c, 0x40050545, 0x1f7c7c63, 0x10404050, 0x5b696932, 0xdb6363b8, + 0x0a282822, 0xc20707c5, 0x31c4c4f5, 0x8a2222a8, 0xa7969631, 0xce3737f9, 0x7aeded97, 0xbff6f649, 0x2db4b499, 0x75d1d1a4, 0xd3434390, 0x1248485a, 0xbae2e258, 0xe6979771, 0xb6d2d264, 0xb2c2c270, + 0x8b2626ad, 0x68a5a5cd, 0x955e5ecb, 0x4b292962, 0x0c30303c, 0x945a5ace, 0x76ddddab, 0x7ff9f986, 0x649595f1, 0xbbe6e65d, 0xf2c7c735, 0x0924242d, 0xc61717d1, 0x6fb9b9d6, 0xc51b1bde, 0x86121294, + 0x18606078, 0xf3c3c330, 0x7cf5f589, 0xefb3b35c, 0x3ae8e8d2, 0xdf7373ac, 0x4c353579, 0x208080a0, 0x78e5e59d, 0xedbbbb56, 0x5e7d7d23, 0x3ef8f8c6, 0xd45f5f8b, 0xc82f2fe7, 0x39e4e4dd, 0x49212168, +} + +var sbox1 = [256]uint32{ + 0x5b5b8ed5, 0x4242d092, 0xa7a74dea, 0xfbfb06fd, 0x3333fccf, 0x878765e2, 0xf4f4c93d, 0xdede6bb5, 0x58584e16, 0xdada6eb4, 0x50504414, 0x0b0bcac1, 0xa0a08828, 0xefef17f8, 0xb0b09c2c, 0x14141105, + 0xacac872b, 0x9d9dfb66, 0x6a6af298, 0xd9d9ae77, 0xa8a8822a, 0xfafa46bc, 0x10101404, 0x0f0fcfc0, 0xaaaa02a8, 0x11115445, 0x4c4c5f13, 0x9898be26, 0x25256d48, 0x1a1a9e84, 0x18181e06, 0x6666fd9b, + 0x7272ec9e, 0x09094a43, 0x41411051, 0xd3d324f7, 0x4646d593, 0xbfbf53ec, 0x6262f89a, 0xe9e9927b, 0xccccff33, 0x51510455, 0x2c2c270b, 0x0d0d4f42, 0xb7b759ee, 0x3f3ff3cc, 0xb2b21cae, 0x8989ea63, + 0x939374e7, 0xcece7fb1, 0x70706c1c, 0xa6a60dab, 0x2727edca, 0x20202808, 0xa3a348eb, 0x5656c197, 0x02028082, 0x7f7fa3dc, 0x5252c496, 0xebeb12f9, 0xd5d5a174, 0x3e3eb38d, 0xfcfcc33f, 0x9a9a3ea4, + 0x1d1d5b46, 0x1c1c1b07, 0x9e9e3ba5, 0xf3f30cff, 0xcfcf3ff0, 0xcdcdbf72, 0x5c5c4b17, 0xeaea52b8, 0x0e0e8f81, 0x65653d58, 0xf0f0cc3c, 0x64647d19, 0x9b9b7ee5, 0x16169187, 0x3d3d734e, 0xa2a208aa, + 0xa1a1c869, 0xadadc76a, 0x06068583, 0xcaca7ab0, 0xc5c5b570, 0x9191f465, 0x6b6bb2d9, 0x2e2ea789, 0xe3e318fb, 0xafaf47e8, 0x3c3c330f, 0x2d2d674a, 0xc1c1b071, 0x59590e57, 0x7676e99f, 0xd4d4e135, + 0x7878661e, 0x9090b424, 0x3838360e, 0x7979265f, 0x8d8def62, 0x61613859, 0x474795d2, 0x8a8a2aa0, 0x9494b125, 0x8888aa22, 0xf1f18c7d, 0xececd73b, 0x04040501, 0x8484a521, 0xe1e19879, 0x1e1e9b85, + 0x535384d7, 0x00000000, 0x19195e47, 0x5d5d0b56, 0x7e7ee39d, 0x4f4f9fd0, 0x9c9cbb27, 0x49491a53, 0x31317c4d, 0xd8d8ee36, 0x08080a02, 0x9f9f7be4, 0x828220a2, 0x1313d4c7, 0x2323e8cb, 0x7a7ae69c, + 0xabab42e9, 0xfefe43bd, 0x2a2aa288, 0x4b4b9ad1, 0x01014041, 0x1f1fdbc4, 0xe0e0d838, 0xd6d661b7, 0x8e8e2fa1, 0xdfdf2bf4, 0xcbcb3af1, 0x3b3bf6cd, 0xe7e71dfa, 0x8585e560, 0x54544115, 0x868625a3, + 0x838360e3, 0xbaba16ac, 0x7575295c, 0x929234a6, 0x6e6ef799, 0xd0d0e434, 0x6868721a, 0x55550154, 0xb6b619af, 0x4e4edf91, 0xc8c8fa32, 0xc0c0f030, 0xd7d721f6, 0x3232bc8e, 0xc6c675b3, 0x8f8f6fe0, + 0x7474691d, 0xdbdb2ef5, 0x8b8b6ae1, 0xb8b8962e, 0x0a0a8a80, 0x9999fe67, 0x2b2be2c9, 0x8181e061, 0x0303c0c3, 0xa4a48d29, 0x8c8caf23, 0xaeae07a9, 0x3434390d, 0x4d4d1f52, 0x3939764f, 0xbdbdd36e, + 0x575781d6, 0x6f6fb7d8, 0xdcdceb37, 0x15155144, 0x7b7ba6dd, 0xf7f709fe, 0x3a3ab68c, 0xbcbc932f, 0x0c0c0f03, 0xffff03fc, 0xa9a9c26b, 0xc9c9ba73, 0xb5b5d96c, 0xb1b1dc6d, 0x6d6d375a, 0x45451550, + 0x3636b98f, 0x6c6c771b, 0xbebe13ad, 0x4a4ada90, 0xeeee57b9, 0x7777a9de, 0xf2f24cbe, 0xfdfd837e, 0x44445511, 0x6767bdda, 0x71712c5d, 0x05054540, 0x7c7c631f, 0x40405010, 0x6969325b, 0x6363b8db, + 0x2828220a, 0x0707c5c2, 0xc4c4f531, 0x2222a88a, 0x969631a7, 0x3737f9ce, 0xeded977a, 0xf6f649bf, 0xb4b4992d, 0xd1d1a475, 0x434390d3, 0x48485a12, 0xe2e258ba, 0x979771e6, 0xd2d264b6, 0xc2c270b2, + 0x2626ad8b, 0xa5a5cd68, 0x5e5ecb95, 0x2929624b, 0x30303c0c, 0x5a5ace94, 0xddddab76, 0xf9f9867f, 0x9595f164, 0xe6e65dbb, 0xc7c735f2, 0x24242d09, 0x1717d1c6, 0xb9b9d66f, 0x1b1bdec5, 0x12129486, + 0x60607818, 0xc3c330f3, 0xf5f5897c, 0xb3b35cef, 0xe8e8d23a, 0x7373acdf, 0x3535794c, 0x8080a020, 0xe5e59d78, 0xbbbb56ed, 0x7d7d235e, 0xf8f8c63e, 0x5f5f8bd4, 0x2f2fe7c8, 0xe4e4dd39, 0x21216849, +} + +var sbox2 = [256]uint32{ + 0x5b8ed55b, 0x42d09242, 0xa74deaa7, 0xfb06fdfb, 0x33fccf33, 0x8765e287, 0xf4c93df4, 0xde6bb5de, 0x584e1658, 0xda6eb4da, 0x50441450, 0x0bcac10b, 0xa08828a0, 0xef17f8ef, 0xb09c2cb0, 0x14110514, + 0xac872bac, 0x9dfb669d, 0x6af2986a, 0xd9ae77d9, 0xa8822aa8, 0xfa46bcfa, 0x10140410, 0x0fcfc00f, 0xaa02a8aa, 0x11544511, 0x4c5f134c, 0x98be2698, 0x256d4825, 0x1a9e841a, 0x181e0618, 0x66fd9b66, + 0x72ec9e72, 0x094a4309, 0x41105141, 0xd324f7d3, 0x46d59346, 0xbf53ecbf, 0x62f89a62, 0xe9927be9, 0xccff33cc, 0x51045551, 0x2c270b2c, 0x0d4f420d, 0xb759eeb7, 0x3ff3cc3f, 0xb21caeb2, 0x89ea6389, + 0x9374e793, 0xce7fb1ce, 0x706c1c70, 0xa60daba6, 0x27edca27, 0x20280820, 0xa348eba3, 0x56c19756, 0x02808202, 0x7fa3dc7f, 0x52c49652, 0xeb12f9eb, 0xd5a174d5, 0x3eb38d3e, 0xfcc33ffc, 0x9a3ea49a, + 0x1d5b461d, 0x1c1b071c, 0x9e3ba59e, 0xf30cfff3, 0xcf3ff0cf, 0xcdbf72cd, 0x5c4b175c, 0xea52b8ea, 0x0e8f810e, 0x653d5865, 0xf0cc3cf0, 0x647d1964, 0x9b7ee59b, 0x16918716, 0x3d734e3d, 0xa208aaa2, + 0xa1c869a1, 0xadc76aad, 0x06858306, 0xca7ab0ca, 0xc5b570c5, 0x91f46591, 0x6bb2d96b, 0x2ea7892e, 0xe318fbe3, 0xaf47e8af, 0x3c330f3c, 0x2d674a2d, 0xc1b071c1, 0x590e5759, 0x76e99f76, 0xd4e135d4, + 0x78661e78, 0x90b42490, 0x38360e38, 0x79265f79, 0x8def628d, 0x61385961, 0x4795d247, 0x8a2aa08a, 0x94b12594, 0x88aa2288, 0xf18c7df1, 0xecd73bec, 0x04050104, 0x84a52184, 0xe19879e1, 0x1e9b851e, + 0x5384d753, 0x00000000, 0x195e4719, 0x5d0b565d, 0x7ee39d7e, 0x4f9fd04f, 0x9cbb279c, 0x491a5349, 0x317c4d31, 0xd8ee36d8, 0x080a0208, 0x9f7be49f, 0x8220a282, 0x13d4c713, 0x23e8cb23, 0x7ae69c7a, + 0xab42e9ab, 0xfe43bdfe, 0x2aa2882a, 0x4b9ad14b, 0x01404101, 0x1fdbc41f, 0xe0d838e0, 0xd661b7d6, 0x8e2fa18e, 0xdf2bf4df, 0xcb3af1cb, 0x3bf6cd3b, 0xe71dfae7, 0x85e56085, 0x54411554, 0x8625a386, + 0x8360e383, 0xba16acba, 0x75295c75, 0x9234a692, 0x6ef7996e, 0xd0e434d0, 0x68721a68, 0x55015455, 0xb619afb6, 0x4edf914e, 0xc8fa32c8, 0xc0f030c0, 0xd721f6d7, 0x32bc8e32, 0xc675b3c6, 0x8f6fe08f, + 0x74691d74, 0xdb2ef5db, 0x8b6ae18b, 0xb8962eb8, 0x0a8a800a, 0x99fe6799, 0x2be2c92b, 0x81e06181, 0x03c0c303, 0xa48d29a4, 0x8caf238c, 0xae07a9ae, 0x34390d34, 0x4d1f524d, 0x39764f39, 0xbdd36ebd, + 0x5781d657, 0x6fb7d86f, 0xdceb37dc, 0x15514415, 0x7ba6dd7b, 0xf709fef7, 0x3ab68c3a, 0xbc932fbc, 0x0c0f030c, 0xff03fcff, 0xa9c26ba9, 0xc9ba73c9, 0xb5d96cb5, 0xb1dc6db1, 0x6d375a6d, 0x45155045, + 0x36b98f36, 0x6c771b6c, 0xbe13adbe, 0x4ada904a, 0xee57b9ee, 0x77a9de77, 0xf24cbef2, 0xfd837efd, 0x44551144, 0x67bdda67, 0x712c5d71, 0x05454005, 0x7c631f7c, 0x40501040, 0x69325b69, 0x63b8db63, + 0x28220a28, 0x07c5c207, 0xc4f531c4, 0x22a88a22, 0x9631a796, 0x37f9ce37, 0xed977aed, 0xf649bff6, 0xb4992db4, 0xd1a475d1, 0x4390d343, 0x485a1248, 0xe258bae2, 0x9771e697, 0xd264b6d2, 0xc270b2c2, + 0x26ad8b26, 0xa5cd68a5, 0x5ecb955e, 0x29624b29, 0x303c0c30, 0x5ace945a, 0xddab76dd, 0xf9867ff9, 0x95f16495, 0xe65dbbe6, 0xc735f2c7, 0x242d0924, 0x17d1c617, 0xb9d66fb9, 0x1bdec51b, 0x12948612, + 0x60781860, 0xc330f3c3, 0xf5897cf5, 0xb35cefb3, 0xe8d23ae8, 0x73acdf73, 0x35794c35, 0x80a02080, 0xe59d78e5, 0xbb56edbb, 0x7d235e7d, 0xf8c63ef8, 0x5f8bd45f, 0x2fe7c82f, 0xe4dd39e4, 0x21684921, +} + +var sbox3 = [256]uint32{ + 0x8ed55b5b, 0xd0924242, 0x4deaa7a7, 0x06fdfbfb, 0xfccf3333, 0x65e28787, 0xc93df4f4, 0x6bb5dede, 0x4e165858, 0x6eb4dada, 0x44145050, 0xcac10b0b, 0x8828a0a0, 0x17f8efef, 0x9c2cb0b0, 0x11051414, + 0x872bacac, 0xfb669d9d, 0xf2986a6a, 0xae77d9d9, 0x822aa8a8, 0x46bcfafa, 0x14041010, 0xcfc00f0f, 0x02a8aaaa, 0x54451111, 0x5f134c4c, 0xbe269898, 0x6d482525, 0x9e841a1a, 0x1e061818, 0xfd9b6666, + 0xec9e7272, 0x4a430909, 0x10514141, 0x24f7d3d3, 0xd5934646, 0x53ecbfbf, 0xf89a6262, 0x927be9e9, 0xff33cccc, 0x04555151, 0x270b2c2c, 0x4f420d0d, 0x59eeb7b7, 0xf3cc3f3f, 0x1caeb2b2, 0xea638989, + 0x74e79393, 0x7fb1cece, 0x6c1c7070, 0x0daba6a6, 0xedca2727, 0x28082020, 0x48eba3a3, 0xc1975656, 0x80820202, 0xa3dc7f7f, 0xc4965252, 0x12f9ebeb, 0xa174d5d5, 0xb38d3e3e, 0xc33ffcfc, 0x3ea49a9a, + 0x5b461d1d, 0x1b071c1c, 0x3ba59e9e, 0x0cfff3f3, 0x3ff0cfcf, 0xbf72cdcd, 0x4b175c5c, 0x52b8eaea, 0x8f810e0e, 0x3d586565, 0xcc3cf0f0, 0x7d196464, 0x7ee59b9b, 0x91871616, 0x734e3d3d, 0x08aaa2a2, + 0xc869a1a1, 0xc76aadad, 0x85830606, 0x7ab0caca, 0xb570c5c5, 0xf4659191, 0xb2d96b6b, 0xa7892e2e, 0x18fbe3e3, 0x47e8afaf, 0x330f3c3c, 0x674a2d2d, 0xb071c1c1, 0x0e575959, 0xe99f7676, 0xe135d4d4, + 0x661e7878, 0xb4249090, 0x360e3838, 0x265f7979, 0xef628d8d, 0x38596161, 0x95d24747, 0x2aa08a8a, 0xb1259494, 0xaa228888, 0x8c7df1f1, 0xd73becec, 0x05010404, 0xa5218484, 0x9879e1e1, 0x9b851e1e, + 0x84d75353, 0x00000000, 0x5e471919, 0x0b565d5d, 0xe39d7e7e, 0x9fd04f4f, 0xbb279c9c, 0x1a534949, 0x7c4d3131, 0xee36d8d8, 0x0a020808, 0x7be49f9f, 0x20a28282, 0xd4c71313, 0xe8cb2323, 0xe69c7a7a, + 0x42e9abab, 0x43bdfefe, 0xa2882a2a, 0x9ad14b4b, 0x40410101, 0xdbc41f1f, 0xd838e0e0, 0x61b7d6d6, 0x2fa18e8e, 0x2bf4dfdf, 0x3af1cbcb, 0xf6cd3b3b, 0x1dfae7e7, 0xe5608585, 0x41155454, 0x25a38686, + 0x60e38383, 0x16acbaba, 0x295c7575, 0x34a69292, 0xf7996e6e, 0xe434d0d0, 0x721a6868, 0x01545555, 0x19afb6b6, 0xdf914e4e, 0xfa32c8c8, 0xf030c0c0, 0x21f6d7d7, 0xbc8e3232, 0x75b3c6c6, 0x6fe08f8f, + 0x691d7474, 0x2ef5dbdb, 0x6ae18b8b, 0x962eb8b8, 0x8a800a0a, 0xfe679999, 0xe2c92b2b, 0xe0618181, 0xc0c30303, 0x8d29a4a4, 0xaf238c8c, 0x07a9aeae, 0x390d3434, 0x1f524d4d, 0x764f3939, 0xd36ebdbd, + 0x81d65757, 0xb7d86f6f, 0xeb37dcdc, 0x51441515, 0xa6dd7b7b, 0x09fef7f7, 0xb68c3a3a, 0x932fbcbc, 0x0f030c0c, 0x03fcffff, 0xc26ba9a9, 0xba73c9c9, 0xd96cb5b5, 0xdc6db1b1, 0x375a6d6d, 0x15504545, + 0xb98f3636, 0x771b6c6c, 0x13adbebe, 0xda904a4a, 0x57b9eeee, 0xa9de7777, 0x4cbef2f2, 0x837efdfd, 0x55114444, 0xbdda6767, 0x2c5d7171, 0x45400505, 0x631f7c7c, 0x50104040, 0x325b6969, 0xb8db6363, + 0x220a2828, 0xc5c20707, 0xf531c4c4, 0xa88a2222, 0x31a79696, 0xf9ce3737, 0x977aeded, 0x49bff6f6, 0x992db4b4, 0xa475d1d1, 0x90d34343, 0x5a124848, 0x58bae2e2, 0x71e69797, 0x64b6d2d2, 0x70b2c2c2, + 0xad8b2626, 0xcd68a5a5, 0xcb955e5e, 0x624b2929, 0x3c0c3030, 0xce945a5a, 0xab76dddd, 0x867ff9f9, 0xf1649595, 0x5dbbe6e6, 0x35f2c7c7, 0x2d092424, 0xd1c61717, 0xd66fb9b9, 0xdec51b1b, 0x94861212, + 0x78186060, 0x30f3c3c3, 0x897cf5f5, 0x5cefb3b3, 0xd23ae8e8, 0xacdf7373, 0x794c3535, 0xa0208080, 0x9d78e5e5, 0x56edbbbb, 0x235e7d7d, 0xc63ef8f8, 0x8bd45f5f, 0xe7c82f2f, 0xdd39e4e4, 0x68492121, +} + +func rl(x uint32, i uint8) uint32 { return (x << (i % 32)) | (x >> (32 - (i % 32))) } + +func l0(b uint32) uint32 { return b ^ rl(b, 13) ^ rl(b, 23) } + +func feistel0(x0, x1, x2, x3, rk uint32) uint32 { return x0 ^ l0(p(x1^x2^x3^rk)) } + +//非线性变换τ(.) +func p(a uint32) uint32 { + return (uint32(sbox[a>>24]) << 24) ^ (uint32(sbox[(a>>16)&0xff]) << 16) ^ (uint32(sbox[(a>>8)&0xff]) << 8) ^ uint32(sbox[(a)&0xff]) +} + +func permuteInitialBlock(b []uint32, block []byte) { + for i := 0; i < 4; i++ { + b[i] = (uint32(block[i*4]) << 24) | (uint32(block[i*4+1]) << 16) | + (uint32(block[i*4+2]) << 8) | (uint32(block[i*4+3])) + } +} + +func permuteFinalBlock(b []byte, block []uint32) { + for i := 0; i < 4; i++ { + b[i*4] = uint8(block[i] >> 24) + b[i*4+1] = uint8(block[i] >> 16) + b[i*4+2] = uint8(block[i] >> 8) + b[i*4+3] = uint8(block[i]) + } +} + +//修改后的加密核心函数 +func cryptBlock(subkeys []uint32, b []uint32, r []byte, dst, src []byte, decrypt bool) { + permuteInitialBlock(b, src) + + // bounds check elimination in major encryption loop + // https://go101.org/article/bounds-check-elimination.html + _ = b[3] + if decrypt { + for i := 0; i < 8; i++ { + s := subkeys[31-4*i-3 : 31-4*i-3+4] + x := b[1] ^ b[2] ^ b[3] ^ s[3] + b[0] = b[0] ^ sbox0[x&0xff] ^ sbox1[(x>>8)&0xff] ^ sbox2[(x>>16)&0xff] ^ sbox3[(x>>24)&0xff] + x = b[0] ^ b[2] ^ b[3] ^ s[2] + b[1] = b[1] ^ sbox0[x&0xff] ^ sbox1[(x>>8)&0xff] ^ sbox2[(x>>16)&0xff] ^ sbox3[(x>>24)&0xff] + x = b[0] ^ b[1] ^ b[3] ^ s[1] + b[2] = b[2] ^ sbox0[x&0xff] ^ sbox1[(x>>8)&0xff] ^ sbox2[(x>>16)&0xff] ^ sbox3[(x>>24)&0xff] + x = b[1] ^ b[2] ^ b[0] ^ s[0] + b[3] = b[3] ^ sbox0[x&0xff] ^ sbox1[(x>>8)&0xff] ^ sbox2[(x>>16)&0xff] ^ sbox3[(x>>24)&0xff] + } + } else { + for i := 0; i < 8; i++ { + s := subkeys[4*i : 4*i+4] + x := b[1] ^ b[2] ^ b[3] ^ s[0] + b[0] = b[0] ^ sbox0[x&0xff] ^ sbox1[(x>>8)&0xff] ^ sbox2[(x>>16)&0xff] ^ sbox3[(x>>24)&0xff] + x = b[0] ^ b[2] ^ b[3] ^ s[1] + b[1] = b[1] ^ sbox0[x&0xff] ^ sbox1[(x>>8)&0xff] ^ sbox2[(x>>16)&0xff] ^ sbox3[(x>>24)&0xff] + x = b[0] ^ b[1] ^ b[3] ^ s[2] + b[2] = b[2] ^ sbox0[x&0xff] ^ sbox1[(x>>8)&0xff] ^ sbox2[(x>>16)&0xff] ^ sbox3[(x>>24)&0xff] + x = b[1] ^ b[2] ^ b[0] ^ s[3] + b[3] = b[3] ^ sbox0[x&0xff] ^ sbox1[(x>>8)&0xff] ^ sbox2[(x>>16)&0xff] ^ sbox3[(x>>24)&0xff] + } + } + b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3] = b[3], b[2], b[1], b[0] + permuteFinalBlock(r, b) + copy(dst, r) +} + +func generateSubKeys(key []byte) []uint32 { + subkeys := make([]uint32, 32) + b := make([]uint32, 4) + permuteInitialBlock(b, key) + b[0] ^= fk[0] + b[1] ^= fk[1] + b[2] ^= fk[2] + b[3] ^= fk[3] + for i := 0; i < 32; i++ { + subkeys[i] = feistel0(b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3], ck[i]) + b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3] = b[1], b[2], b[3], subkeys[i] + } + return subkeys +} + +// NewCipher creates and returns a new cipher.Block. +func NewCipher(key []byte) (cipher.Block, error) { + if len(key) != BlockSize { + return nil, errors.New("SM4: invalid key size " + strconv.Itoa(len(key))) + } + c := new(Sm4Cipher) + c.subkeys = generateSubKeys(key) + c.block1 = make([]uint32, 4) + c.block2 = make([]byte, 16) + return c, nil +} + +func (c *Sm4Cipher) BlockSize() int { + return BlockSize +} + +func (c *Sm4Cipher) Encrypt(dst, src []byte) { + cryptBlock(c.subkeys, c.block1, c.block2, dst, src, false) +} + +func (c *Sm4Cipher) Decrypt(dst, src []byte) { + cryptBlock(c.subkeys, c.block1, c.block2, dst, src, true) +} + +func xor(in, iv []byte) (out []byte) { + if len(in) != len(iv) { + return nil + } + + out = make([]byte, len(in)) + for i := 0; i < len(in); i++ { + out[i] = in[i] ^ iv[i] + } + return +} + +func pkcs7Padding(src []byte) []byte { + padding := BlockSize - len(src)%BlockSize + padtext := bytes.Repeat([]byte{byte(padding)}, padding) + return append(src, padtext...) +} + +func pkcs7UnPadding(src []byte) ([]byte, error) { + length := len(src) + if length == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("Invalid pkcs7 padding (len(padtext) == 0)") + } + unpadding := int(src[length-1]) + if unpadding > BlockSize || unpadding == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("Invalid pkcs7 padding (unpadding > BlockSize || unpadding == 0)") + } + + pad := src[len(src)-unpadding:] + for i := 0; i < unpadding; i++ { + if pad[i] != byte(unpadding) { + return nil, errors.New("Invalid pkcs7 padding (pad[i] != unpadding)") + } + } + + return src[:(length - unpadding)], nil +} +func SetIV(iv []byte) error { + if len(iv) != BlockSize { + return errors.New("SM4: invalid iv size") + } + IV = iv + return nil +} + +func Sm4Cbc(key []byte, in []byte, mode bool) (out []byte, err error) { + if len(key) != BlockSize { + return nil, errors.New("SM4: invalid key size " + strconv.Itoa(len(key))) + } + var inData []byte + if mode { + inData = pkcs7Padding(in) + } else { + inData = in + } + iv := make([]byte, BlockSize) + copy(iv, IV) + out = make([]byte, len(inData)) + c, err := NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if mode { + for i := 0; i < len(inData)/16; i++ { + in_tmp := xor(inData[i*16:i*16+16], iv) + out_tmp := make([]byte, 16) + c.Encrypt(out_tmp, in_tmp) + copy(out[i*16:i*16+16], out_tmp) + iv = out_tmp + } + } else { + for i := 0; i < len(inData)/16; i++ { + in_tmp := inData[i*16 : i*16+16] + out_tmp := make([]byte, 16) + c.Decrypt(out_tmp, in_tmp) + out_tmp = xor(out_tmp, iv) + copy(out[i*16:i*16+16], out_tmp) + iv = in_tmp + } + out, _ = pkcs7UnPadding(out) + } + + return out, nil +} +func Sm4Ecb(key []byte, in []byte, mode bool) (out []byte, err error) { + if len(key) != BlockSize { + return nil, errors.New("SM4: invalid key size " + strconv.Itoa(len(key))) + } + var inData []byte + if mode { + inData = pkcs7Padding(in) + } else { + inData = in + } + out = make([]byte, len(inData)) + c, err := NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if mode { + for i := 0; i < len(inData)/16; i++ { + in_tmp := inData[i*16 : i*16+16] + out_tmp := make([]byte, 16) + c.Encrypt(out_tmp, in_tmp) + copy(out[i*16:i*16+16], out_tmp) + } + } else { + for i := 0; i < len(inData)/16; i++ { + in_tmp := inData[i*16 : i*16+16] + out_tmp := make([]byte, 16) + c.Decrypt(out_tmp, in_tmp) + copy(out[i*16:i*16+16], out_tmp) + } + out, _ = pkcs7UnPadding(out) + } + + return out, nil +} + +//密码反馈模式（Cipher FeedBack (CFB)） +//https://blog.csdn.net/zy_strive_2012/article/details/102520356 +//https://blog.csdn.net/sinat_23338865/article/details/72869841 +func Sm4CFB(key []byte, in []byte, mode bool) (out []byte, err error) { + if len(key) != BlockSize { + return nil, errors.New("SM4: invalid key size " + strconv.Itoa(len(key))) + } + var inData []byte + if mode { + inData = pkcs7Padding(in) + } else { + inData = in + } + + out = make([]byte, len(inData)) + c, err := NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + K := make([]byte, BlockSize) + cipherBlock := make([]byte, BlockSize) + plainBlock := make([]byte, BlockSize) + if mode { //加密 + for i := 0; i < len(inData)/16; i++ { + if i == 0 { + c.Encrypt(K, IV) + cipherBlock = xor(K[:BlockSize], inData[i*16:i*16+16]) + copy(out[i*16:i*16+16], cipherBlock) + //copy(cipherBlock,out_tmp) + continue + } + c.Encrypt(K, cipherBlock) + cipherBlock = xor(K[:BlockSize], inData[i*16:i*16+16]) + copy(out[i*16:i*16+16], cipherBlock) + //copy(cipherBlock,out_tmp) + } + + } else { //解密 + var i int = 0 + for ; i < len(inData)/16; i++ { + if i == 0 { + c.Encrypt(K, IV) //这里是加密，而不是调用解密方法Decrypt + plainBlock = xor(K[:BlockSize], inData[i*16:i*16+16]) //获取明文分组 + copy(out[i*16:i*16+16], plainBlock) + continue + } + c.Encrypt(K, inData[(i-1)*16:(i-1)*16+16]) + plainBlock = xor(K[:BlockSize], inData[i*16:i*16+16]) //获取明文分组 + copy(out[i*16:i*16+16], plainBlock) + + } + + out, _ = pkcs7UnPadding(out) + } + + return out, nil +} + +//输出反馈模式（Output feedback, OFB） +//https://blog.csdn.net/chengqiuming/article/details/82390910 +//https://blog.csdn.net/sinat_23338865/article/details/72869841 +func Sm4OFB(key []byte, in []byte, mode bool) (out []byte, err error) { + if len(key) != BlockSize { + return nil, errors.New("SM4: invalid key size " + strconv.Itoa(len(key))) + } + var inData []byte + if mode { + inData = pkcs7Padding(in) + } else { + inData = in + } + + out = make([]byte, len(inData)) + c, err := NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + K := make([]byte, BlockSize) + cipherBlock := make([]byte, BlockSize) + plainBlock := make([]byte, BlockSize) + shiftIV := make([]byte, BlockSize) + if mode { //加密 + for i := 0; i < len(inData)/16; i++ { + if i == 0 { + c.Encrypt(K, IV) + cipherBlock = xor(K[:BlockSize], inData[i*16:i*16+16]) + copy(out[i*16:i*16+16], cipherBlock) + copy(shiftIV, K[:BlockSize]) + continue + } + c.Encrypt(K, shiftIV) + cipherBlock = xor(K[:BlockSize], inData[i*16:i*16+16]) + copy(out[i*16:i*16+16], cipherBlock) + copy(shiftIV, K[:BlockSize]) + } + + } else { //解密 + for i := 0; i < len(inData)/16; i++ { + if i == 0 { + c.Encrypt(K, IV) //这里是加密，而不是调用解密方法Decrypt + plainBlock = xor(K[:BlockSize], inData[i*16:i*16+16]) //获取明文分组 + copy(out[i*16:i*16+16], plainBlock) + copy(shiftIV, K[:BlockSize]) + continue + } + c.Encrypt(K, shiftIV) + plainBlock = xor(K[:BlockSize], inData[i*16:i*16+16]) //获取明文分组 + copy(out[i*16:i*16+16], plainBlock) + copy(shiftIV, K[:BlockSize]) + } + out, _ = pkcs7UnPadding(out) + } + + return out, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4/sm4_gcm.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4/sm4_gcm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a5d531d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4/sm4_gcm.go @@ -0,0 +1,355 @@ +/* +Copyright Hyperledger-TWGC All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. + +writed by Zhiwei Yan, 2020 Oct +*/ + +package sm4 + +import ( + "errors" + "strconv" +) + +// Sm4GCM SM4 GCM 加解密模式 +// Paper: The Galois/Counter Mode of Operation (GCM) David A. Mcgrew，John Viega .2004. +// key: 对称加密密钥 +// IV: IV向量 +// in: +// A: 附加的可鉴别数据(ADD) +// mode: true - 加密; false - 解密验证 +// +// return: 密文C, 鉴别标签T, 错误 +func Sm4GCM(key []byte, IV, in, A []byte, mode bool) ([]byte, []byte, error) { + if len(key) != BlockSize { + return nil, nil, errors.New("SM4: invalid key size " + strconv.Itoa(len(key))) + } + if mode { + C, T := GCMEncrypt(key, IV, in, A) + return C, T, nil + } else { + P, _T := GCMDecrypt(key, IV, in, A) + return P, _T, nil + } +} + +// GetH 对“0”分组的加密得到 GHASH泛杂凑函数的子密钥 +// key: 对称密钥 +// return: GHASH泛杂凑函数的子密钥 +func GetH(key []byte) (H []byte) { + c, err := NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + + zores := make([]byte, BlockSize) + H = make([]byte, BlockSize) + c.Encrypt(H, zores) + return H +} + +//ut = a + b +func addition(a, b []byte) (out []byte) { + Len := len(a) + if Len != len(b) { + return nil + } + out = make([]byte, Len) + for i := 0; i < Len; i++ { + out[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] + } + return out +} + +func Rightshift(V []byte) { + n := len(V) + for i := n - 1; i >= 0; i-- { + V[i] = V[i] >> 1 + if i != 0 { + V[i] = ((V[i-1] & 0x01) << 7) | V[i] + } + } +} + +func findYi(Y []byte, index int) int { + var temp byte + i := uint(index) + temp = Y[i/8] + temp = temp >> (7 - i%8) + if temp&0x01 == 1 { + return 1 + } else { + return 0 + } +} + +func multiplication(X, Y []byte) (Z []byte) { + + R := make([]byte, BlockSize) + R[0] = 0xe1 + Z = make([]byte, BlockSize) + V := make([]byte, BlockSize) + copy(V, X) + for i := 0; i <= 127; i++ { + if findYi(Y, i) == 1 { + Z = addition(Z, V) + } + if V[BlockSize-1]&0x01 == 0 { + Rightshift(V) + } else { + Rightshift(V) + V = addition(V, R) + } + } + return Z +} + +func GHASH(H []byte, A []byte, C []byte) (X []byte) { + + calculm_v := func(m, v int) (int, int) { + if m == 0 && v != 0 { + m = 1 + v = v * 8 + } else if m != 0 && v == 0 { + v = BlockSize * 8 + } else if m != 0 && v != 0 { + m = m + 1 + v = v * 8 + } else { //m==0 && v==0 + m = 1 + v = 0 + } + return m, v + } + m := len(A) / BlockSize + v := len(A) % BlockSize + m, v = calculm_v(m, v) + + n := len(C) / BlockSize + u := (len(C) % BlockSize) + n, u = calculm_v(n, u) + + //i=0 + X = make([]byte, BlockSize*(m+n+2)) //X0 = 0 + for i := 0; i < BlockSize; i++ { + X[i] = 0x00 + } + + //i=1...m-1 + for i := 1; i <= m-1; i++ { + copy(X[i*BlockSize:i*BlockSize+BlockSize], multiplication(addition(X[(i-1)*BlockSize:(i-1)*BlockSize+BlockSize], A[(i-1)*BlockSize:(i-1)*BlockSize+BlockSize]), H)) //A 1-->m-1 对于数组来说是 0-->m-2 + } + + //i=m + zeros := make([]byte, (128-v)/8) + Am := make([]byte, v/8) + copy(Am[:], A[(m-1)*BlockSize:]) + Am = append(Am, zeros...) + copy(X[m*BlockSize:m*BlockSize+BlockSize], multiplication(addition(X[(m-1)*BlockSize:(m-1)*BlockSize+BlockSize], Am), H)) + + //i=m+1...m+n-1 + for i := m + 1; i <= (m + n - 1); i++ { + copy(X[i*BlockSize:i*BlockSize+BlockSize], multiplication(addition(X[(i-1)*BlockSize:(i-1)*BlockSize+BlockSize], C[(i-m-1)*BlockSize:(i-m-1)*BlockSize+BlockSize]), H)) + } + + //i=m+n + zeros = make([]byte, (128-u)/8) + Cn := make([]byte, u/8) + copy(Cn[:], C[(n-1)*BlockSize:]) + Cn = append(Cn, zeros...) + copy(X[(m+n)*BlockSize:(m+n)*BlockSize+BlockSize], multiplication(addition(X[(m+n-1)*BlockSize:(m+n-1)*BlockSize+BlockSize], Cn), H)) + + //i=m+n+1 + var lenAB []byte + calculateLenToBytes := func(len int) []byte { + data := make([]byte, 8) + data[0] = byte((len >> 56) & 0xff) + data[1] = byte((len >> 48) & 0xff) + data[2] = byte((len >> 40) & 0xff) + data[3] = byte((len >> 32) & 0xff) + data[4] = byte((len >> 24) & 0xff) + data[5] = byte((len >> 16) & 0xff) + data[6] = byte((len >> 8) & 0xff) + data[7] = byte((len >> 0) & 0xff) + return data + } + lenAB = append(lenAB, calculateLenToBytes(len(A))...) + lenAB = append(lenAB, calculateLenToBytes(len(C))...) + copy(X[(m+n+1)*BlockSize:(m+n+1)*BlockSize+BlockSize], multiplication(addition(X[(m+n)*BlockSize:(m+n)*BlockSize+BlockSize], lenAB), H)) + return X[(m+n+1)*BlockSize : (m+n+1)*BlockSize+BlockSize] +} + +// GetY0 生成初始的计数器时钟J0 +// +// H: GHASH自密钥 +// IV: IV向量 +// return: 初始的计数器时钟(J0) +func GetY0(H, IV []byte) []byte { + if len(IV)*8 == 96 { + zero31one1 := []byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01} + IV = append(IV, zero31one1...) + return IV + } else { + return GHASH(H, []byte{}, IV) + } +} + +func incr(n int, Y_i []byte) (Y_ii []byte) { + + Y_ii = make([]byte, BlockSize*n) + copy(Y_ii, Y_i) + + addYone := func(yi, yii []byte) { + copy(yii[:], yi[:]) + + Len := len(yi) + var rc byte = 0x00 + for i := Len - 1; i >= 0; i-- { + if i == Len-1 { + if yii[i] < 0xff { + yii[i] = yii[i] + 0x01 + rc = 0x00 + } else { + yii[i] = 0x00 + rc = 0x01 + } + } else { + if yii[i]+rc < 0xff { + yii[i] = yii[i] + rc + rc = 0x00 + } else { + yii[i] = 0x00 + rc = 0x01 + } + } + } + } + for i := 1; i < n; i++ { //2^32 + addYone(Y_ii[(i-1)*BlockSize:(i-1)*BlockSize+BlockSize], Y_ii[i*BlockSize:i*BlockSize+BlockSize]) + } + return Y_ii +} + +func MSB(len int, S []byte) (out []byte) { + return S[:len/8] +} + +// GCMEncrypt 可鉴别加密函数 (GCM-AE(k)) +// K: 对称密钥 +// IV: IV向量 +// P: 明文 +// A: 附加的鉴别数据 +// +// return: 密文, 鉴别标签 +func GCMEncrypt(K, IV, P, A []byte) (C, T []byte) { + calculm_v := func(m, v int) (int, int) { + if m == 0 && v != 0 { + m = 1 + v = v * 8 + } else if m != 0 && v == 0 { + v = BlockSize * 8 + } else if m != 0 && v != 0 { + m = m + 1 + v = v * 8 + } else { //m==0 && v==0 + m = 1 + v = 0 + } + return m, v + } + n := len(P) / BlockSize + u := len(P) % BlockSize + n, u = calculm_v(n, u) + + // a) 通过对“0”分组的加密得到 GHASH泛杂凑函数的子密钥 + H := GetH(K) + + Y0 := GetY0(H, IV) + + Y := make([]byte, BlockSize*(n+1)) + Y = incr(n+1, Y0) + c, err := NewCipher(K) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + Enc := make([]byte, BlockSize) + C = make([]byte, len(P)) + + //i=1...n-1 + for i := 1; i <= n-1; i++ { + c.Encrypt(Enc, Y[i*BlockSize:i*BlockSize+BlockSize]) + + copy(C[(i-1)*BlockSize:(i-1)*BlockSize+BlockSize], addition(P[(i-1)*BlockSize:(i-1)*BlockSize+BlockSize], Enc)) + } + + //i=n + c.Encrypt(Enc, Y[n*BlockSize:n*BlockSize+BlockSize]) + out := MSB(u, Enc) + copy(C[(n-1)*BlockSize:], addition(P[(n-1)*BlockSize:], out)) + + c.Encrypt(Enc, Y0) + + t := 128 + T = MSB(t, addition(Enc, GHASH(H, A, C))) + return C, T +} + +func GCMDecrypt(K, IV, C, A []byte) (P, _T []byte) { + calculm_v := func(m, v int) (int, int) { + if m == 0 && v != 0 { + m = 1 + v = v * 8 + } else if m != 0 && v == 0 { + v = BlockSize * 8 + } else if m != 0 && v != 0 { + m = m + 1 + v = v * 8 + } else { //m==0 && v==0 + m = 1 + v = 0 + } + return m, v + } + + H := GetH(K) + + Y0 := GetY0(H, IV) + + Enc := make([]byte, BlockSize) + c, err := NewCipher(K) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + c.Encrypt(Enc, Y0) + t := 128 + _T = MSB(t, addition(Enc, GHASH(H, A, C))) + + n := len(C) / BlockSize + u := len(C) % BlockSize + n, u = calculm_v(n, u) + Y := make([]byte, BlockSize*(n+1)) + Y = incr(n+1, Y0) + + P = make([]byte, BlockSize*n) + for i := 1; i <= n; i++ { + c.Encrypt(Enc, Y[i*BlockSize:i*BlockSize+BlockSize]) + copy(P[(i-1)*BlockSize:(i-1)*BlockSize+BlockSize], addition(C[(i-1)*BlockSize:(i-1)*BlockSize+BlockSize], Enc)) + } + + c.Encrypt(Enc, Y[n*BlockSize:n*BlockSize+BlockSize]) + out := MSB(u, Enc) + copy(P[(n-1)*BlockSize:], addition(C[(n-1)*BlockSize:], out)) + + return P, _T +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4/utils.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4/utils.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..93060f40 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4/utils.go @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +package sm4 + +import ( + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/x509" + "encoding/pem" + "errors" + "io/ioutil" +) + +// ReadKeyFromPem will return SM4Key from PEM format data. +func ReadKeyFromPem(data []byte, pwd []byte) (SM4Key, error) { + block, _ := pem.Decode(data) + if block == nil { + return nil, errors.New("SM4: pem decode failed") + } + if x509.IsEncryptedPEMBlock(block) { + if block.Type != "SM4 ENCRYPTED KEY" { + return nil, errors.New("SM4: unknown type") + } + if pwd == nil { + return nil, errors.New("SM4: need passwd") + } + data, err := x509.DecryptPEMBlock(block, pwd) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return data, nil + } + if block.Type != "SM4 KEY" { + return nil, errors.New("SM4: unknown type") + } + return block.Bytes, nil +} + +// ReadKeyFromPemFile will return SM4Key from filename that saved PEM format data. +func ReadKeyFromPemFile(FileName string, pwd []byte) (SM4Key, error) { + data, err := ioutil.ReadFile(FileName) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return ReadKeyFromPem(data, pwd) +} + +// WriteKeyToPem will convert SM4Key to PEM format data and return it. +func WriteKeyToPem(key SM4Key, pwd []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if pwd != nil { + block, err := x509.EncryptPEMBlock(rand.Reader, + "SM4 ENCRYPTED KEY", key, pwd, x509.PEMCipherAES256) //Use AES256 algorithms to encrypt SM4KEY + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return pem.EncodeToMemory(block), nil + } else { + block := &pem.Block{ + Type: "SM4 KEY", + Bytes: key, + } + return pem.EncodeToMemory(block), nil + } +} + +// WriteKeyToPemFile will convert SM4Key to PEM format data, then write it +// into the input filename. +func WriteKeyToPemFile(FileName string, key SM4Key, pwd []byte) error { + var block *pem.Block + var err error + if pwd != nil { + block, err = x509.EncryptPEMBlock(rand.Reader, + "SM4 ENCRYPTED KEY", key, pwd, x509.PEMCipherAES256) + if err != nil { + return err + } + } else { + block = &pem.Block{ + Type: "SM4 KEY", + Bytes: key, + } + } + pemBytes := pem.EncodeToMemory(block) + err = ioutil.WriteFile(FileName, pemBytes, 0666) + if err != nil { + return err + } + return nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/ber.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/ber.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4539e46a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/ber.go @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +package x509 + +import ( + "bytes" + "errors" +) + +var encodeIndent = 0 + +type asn1Object interface { + EncodeTo(writer *bytes.Buffer) error +} + +type asn1Structured struct { + tagBytes []byte + content []asn1Object +} + +func (s asn1Structured) EncodeTo(out *bytes.Buffer) error { + //fmt.Printf("%s--> tag: % X\n", strings.Repeat("| ", encodeIndent), s.tagBytes) + encodeIndent++ + inner := new(bytes.Buffer) + for _, obj := range s.content { + err := obj.EncodeTo(inner) + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + encodeIndent-- + out.Write(s.tagBytes) + encodeLength(out, inner.Len()) + out.Write(inner.Bytes()) + return nil +} + +type asn1Primitive struct { + tagBytes []byte + length int + content []byte +} + +func (p asn1Primitive) EncodeTo(out *bytes.Buffer) error { + _, err := out.Write(p.tagBytes) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if err = encodeLength(out, p.length); err != nil { + return err + } + //fmt.Printf("%s--> tag: % X length: %d\n", strings.Repeat("| ", encodeIndent), p.tagBytes, p.length) + //fmt.Printf("%s--> content length: %d\n", strings.Repeat("| ", encodeIndent), len(p.content)) + out.Write(p.content) + + return nil +} + +func ber2der(ber []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if len(ber) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ber2der: input ber is empty") + } + //fmt.Printf("--> ber2der: Transcoding %d bytes\n", len(ber)) + out := new(bytes.Buffer) + + obj, _, err := readObject(ber, 0) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + obj.EncodeTo(out) + + // if offset < len(ber) { + // return nil, fmt.Errorf("ber2der: Content longer than expected. Got %d, expected %d", offset, len(ber)) + //} + + return out.Bytes(), nil +} + +// encodes lengths that are longer than 127 into string of bytes +func marshalLongLength(out *bytes.Buffer, i int) (err error) { + n := lengthLength(i) + + for ; n > 0; n-- { + err = out.WriteByte(byte(i >> uint((n-1)*8))) + if err != nil { + return + } + } + + return nil +} + +// computes the byte length of an encoded length value +func lengthLength(i int) (numBytes int) { + numBytes = 1 + for i > 255 { + numBytes++ + i >>= 8 + } + return +} + +// encodes the length in DER format +// If the length fits in 7 bits, the value is encoded directly. +// +// Otherwise, the number of bytes to encode the length is first determined. +// This number is likely to be 4 or less for a 32bit length. This number is +// added to 0x80. The length is encoded in big endian encoding follow after +// +// Examples: +// length | byte 1 | bytes n +// 0 | 0x00 | - +// 120 | 0x78 | - +// 200 | 0x81 | 0xC8 +// 500 | 0x82 | 0x01 0xF4 +// +func encodeLength(out *bytes.Buffer, length int) (err error) { + if length >= 128 { + l := lengthLength(length) + err = out.WriteByte(0x80 | byte(l)) + if err != nil { + return + } + err = marshalLongLength(out, length) + if err != nil { + return + } + } else { + err = out.WriteByte(byte(length)) + if err != nil { + return + } + } + return +} + +func readObject(ber []byte, offset int) (asn1Object, int, error) { + //fmt.Printf("\n====> Starting readObject at offset: %d\n\n", offset) + tagStart := offset + b := ber[offset] + offset++ + tag := b & 0x1F // last 5 bits + if tag == 0x1F { + tag = 0 + for ber[offset] >= 0x80 { + tag = tag*128 + ber[offset] - 0x80 + offset++ + } + tag = tag*128 + ber[offset] - 0x80 + offset++ + } + tagEnd := offset + + kind := b & 0x20 + /* + if kind == 0 { + fmt.Print("--> Primitive\n") + } else { + fmt.Print("--> Constructed\n") + } + */ + // read length + var length int + l := ber[offset] + offset++ + indefinite := false + if l > 0x80 { + numberOfBytes := (int)(l & 0x7F) + if numberOfBytes > 4 { // int is only guaranteed to be 32bit + return nil, 0, errors.New("ber2der: BER tag length too long") + } + if numberOfBytes == 4 && (int)(ber[offset]) > 0x7F { + return nil, 0, errors.New("ber2der: BER tag length is negative") + } + if 0x0 == (int)(ber[offset]) { + return nil, 0, errors.New("ber2der: BER tag length has leading zero") + } + //fmt.Printf("--> (compute length) indicator byte: %x\n", l) + //fmt.Printf("--> (compute length) length bytes: % X\n", ber[offset:offset+numberOfBytes]) + for i := 0; i < numberOfBytes; i++ { + length = length*256 + (int)(ber[offset]) + offset++ + } + } else if l == 0x80 { + indefinite = true + } else { + length = (int)(l) + } + + //fmt.Printf("--> length : %d\n", length) + contentEnd := offset + length + if contentEnd > len(ber) { + return nil, 0, errors.New("ber2der: BER tag length is more than available data") + } + //fmt.Printf("--> content start : %d\n", offset) + //fmt.Printf("--> content end : %d\n", contentEnd) + //fmt.Printf("--> content : % X\n", ber[offset:contentEnd]) + var obj asn1Object + if indefinite && kind == 0 { + return nil, 0, errors.New("ber2der: Indefinite form tag must have constructed encoding") + } + if kind == 0 { + obj = asn1Primitive{ + tagBytes: ber[tagStart:tagEnd], + length: length, + content: ber[offset:contentEnd], + } + } else { + var subObjects []asn1Object + for (offset < contentEnd) || indefinite { + var subObj asn1Object + var err error + subObj, offset, err = readObject(ber, offset) + if err != nil { + return nil, 0, err + } + subObjects = append(subObjects, subObj) + + if indefinite { + terminated, err := isIndefiniteTermination(ber, offset) + if err != nil { + return nil, 0, err + } + + if terminated { + break + } + } + } + obj = asn1Structured{ + tagBytes: ber[tagStart:tagEnd], + content: subObjects, + } + } + + // Apply indefinite form length with 0x0000 terminator. + if indefinite { + contentEnd = offset + 2 + } + + return obj, contentEnd, nil +} + +func isIndefiniteTermination(ber []byte, offset int) (bool, error) { + if len(ber)-offset < 2 { + return false, errors.New("ber2der: Invalid BER format") + } + + return bytes.Index(ber[offset:], []byte{0x0, 0x0}) == 0, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/cert_pool.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/cert_pool.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c28e2add --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/cert_pool.go @@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package x509 + +import ( + "encoding/pem" + "errors" + "io/ioutil" + "os" + "runtime" + "sync" +) + +// Possible certificate files; stop after finding one. +var certFiles = []string{ + "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt", // Debian/Ubuntu/Gentoo etc. + "/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt", // Fedora/RHEL 6 + "/etc/ssl/ca-bundle.pem", // OpenSUSE + "/etc/pki/tls/cacert.pem", // OpenELEC + "/etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/pem/tls-ca-bundle.pem", // CentOS/RHEL 7 +} + +// CertPool is a set of certificates. +type CertPool struct { + bySubjectKeyId map[string][]int + byName map[string][]int + certs []*Certificate +} + +// NewCertPool returns a new, empty CertPool. +func NewCertPool() *CertPool { + return &CertPool{ + bySubjectKeyId: make(map[string][]int), + byName: make(map[string][]int), + } +} + +// Possible directories with certificate files; stop after successfully +// reading at least one file from a directory. +var certDirectories = []string{ + "/etc/ssl/certs", // SLES10/SLES11, https://golang.org/issue/12139 + "/system/etc/security/cacerts", // Android +} + +var ( + once sync.Once + systemRoots *CertPool + systemRootsErr error +) + +func systemRootsPool() *CertPool { + once.Do(initSystemRoots) + return systemRoots +} + +func initSystemRoots() { + systemRoots, systemRootsErr = loadSystemRoots() +} + +func (c *Certificate) systemVerify(opts *VerifyOptions) (chains [][]*Certificate, err error) { + return nil, nil +} + +func loadSystemRoots() (*CertPool, error) { + roots := NewCertPool() + var firstErr error + for _, file := range certFiles { + data, err := ioutil.ReadFile(file) + if err == nil { + roots.AppendCertsFromPEM(data) + return roots, nil + } + if firstErr == nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) { + firstErr = err + } + } + + for _, directory := range certDirectories { + fis, err := ioutil.ReadDir(directory) + if err != nil { + if firstErr == nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) { + firstErr = err + } + continue + } + rootsAdded := false + for _, fi := range fis { + data, err := ioutil.ReadFile(directory + "/" + fi.Name()) + if err == nil && roots.AppendCertsFromPEM(data) { + rootsAdded = true + } + } + if rootsAdded { + return roots, nil + } + } + + return nil, firstErr +} + +// SystemCertPool returns a copy of the system cert pool. +// +// Any mutations to the returned pool are not written to disk and do +// not affect any other pool. +func SystemCertPool() (*CertPool, error) { + if runtime.GOOS == "windows" { + // Issue 16736, 18609: + return nil, errors.New("crypto/x509: system root pool is not available on Windows") + } + + return loadSystemRoots() +} + +// findVerifiedParents attempts to find certificates in s which have signed the +// given certificate. If any candidates were rejected then errCert will be set +// to one of them, arbitrarily, and err will contain the reason that it was +// rejected. +func (s *CertPool) findVerifiedParents(cert *Certificate) (parents []int, errCert *Certificate, err error) { + if s == nil { + return + } + var candidates []int + + if len(cert.AuthorityKeyId) > 0 { + candidates = s.bySubjectKeyId[string(cert.AuthorityKeyId)] + } + if len(candidates) == 0 { + candidates = s.byName[string(cert.RawIssuer)] + } + + for _, c := range candidates { + if err = cert.CheckSignatureFrom(s.certs[c]); err == nil { + parents = append(parents, c) + } else { + errCert = s.certs[c] + } + } + + return +} + +func (s *CertPool) contains(cert *Certificate) bool { + if s == nil { + return false + } + + candidates := s.byName[string(cert.RawSubject)] + for _, c := range candidates { + if s.certs[c].Equal(cert) { + return true + } + } + + return false +} + +// AddCert adds a certificate to a pool. +func (s *CertPool) AddCert(cert *Certificate) { + if cert == nil { + panic("adding nil Certificate to CertPool") + } + + // Check that the certificate isn't being added twice. + if s.contains(cert) { + return + } + + n := len(s.certs) + s.certs = append(s.certs, cert) + + if len(cert.SubjectKeyId) > 0 { + keyId := string(cert.SubjectKeyId) + s.bySubjectKeyId[keyId] = append(s.bySubjectKeyId[keyId], n) + } + name := string(cert.RawSubject) + s.byName[name] = append(s.byName[name], n) +} + +// AppendCertsFromPEM attempts to parse a series of PEM encoded certificates. +// It appends any certificates found to s and reports whether any certificates +// were successfully parsed. +// +// On many Linux systems, /etc/ssl/cert.pem will contain the system wide set +// of root CAs in a format suitable for this function. +func (s *CertPool) AppendCertsFromPEM(pemCerts []byte) (ok bool) { + for len(pemCerts) > 0 { + var block *pem.Block + block, pemCerts = pem.Decode(pemCerts) + if block == nil { + break + } + if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE" || len(block.Headers) != 0 { + continue + } + + cert, err := ParseCertificate(block.Bytes) + if err != nil { + continue + } + + s.AddCert(cert) + ok = true + } + + return +} + +// Subjects returns a list of the DER-encoded subjects of +// all of the certificates in the pool. +func (s *CertPool) Subjects() [][]byte { + res := make([][]byte, len(s.certs)) + for i, c := range s.certs { + res[i] = c.RawSubject + } + return res +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/pkcs1.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/pkcs1.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c56b92d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/pkcs1.go @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package x509 + +import ( + "crypto/rsa" + "encoding/asn1" + "errors" + "math/big" +) + +// pkcs1PrivateKey is a structure which mirrors the PKCS#1 ASN.1 for an RSA private key. +type pkcs1PrivateKey struct { + Version int + N *big.Int + E int + D *big.Int + P *big.Int + Q *big.Int + // We ignore these values, if present, because rsa will calculate them. + Dp *big.Int `asn1:"optional"` + Dq *big.Int `asn1:"optional"` + Qinv *big.Int `asn1:"optional"` + + AdditionalPrimes []pkcs1AdditionalRSAPrime `asn1:"optional,omitempty"` +} + +type pkcs1AdditionalRSAPrime struct { + Prime *big.Int + + // We ignore these values because rsa will calculate them. + Exp *big.Int + Coeff *big.Int +} + +// ParsePKCS1PrivateKey returns an RSA private key from its ASN.1 PKCS#1 DER encoded form. +func ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der []byte) (*rsa.PrivateKey, error) { + var priv pkcs1PrivateKey + rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &priv) + if len(rest) > 0 { + return nil, asn1.SyntaxError{Msg: "trailing data"} + } + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if priv.Version > 1 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: unsupported private key version") + } + + if priv.N.Sign() <= 0 || priv.D.Sign() <= 0 || priv.P.Sign() <= 0 || priv.Q.Sign() <= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: private key contains zero or negative value") + } + + key := new(rsa.PrivateKey) + key.PublicKey = rsa.PublicKey{ + E: priv.E, + N: priv.N, + } + + key.D = priv.D + key.Primes = make([]*big.Int, 2+len(priv.AdditionalPrimes)) + key.Primes[0] = priv.P + key.Primes[1] = priv.Q + for i, a := range priv.AdditionalPrimes { + if a.Prime.Sign() <= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: private key contains zero or negative prime") + } + key.Primes[i+2] = a.Prime + // We ignore the other two values because rsa will calculate + // them as needed. + } + + err = key.Validate() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + key.Precompute() + + return key, nil +} + +// MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey converts a private key to ASN.1 DER encoded form. +func MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(key *rsa.PrivateKey) []byte { + key.Precompute() + + version := 0 + if len(key.Primes) > 2 { + version = 1 + } + + priv := pkcs1PrivateKey{ + Version: version, + N: key.N, + E: key.PublicKey.E, + D: key.D, + P: key.Primes[0], + Q: key.Primes[1], + Dp: key.Precomputed.Dp, + Dq: key.Precomputed.Dq, + Qinv: key.Precomputed.Qinv, + } + + priv.AdditionalPrimes = make([]pkcs1AdditionalRSAPrime, len(key.Precomputed.CRTValues)) + for i, values := range key.Precomputed.CRTValues { + priv.AdditionalPrimes[i].Prime = key.Primes[2+i] + priv.AdditionalPrimes[i].Exp = values.Exp + priv.AdditionalPrimes[i].Coeff = values.Coeff + } + + b, _ := asn1.Marshal(priv) + return b +} + +// rsaPublicKey reflects the ASN.1 structure of a PKCS#1 public key. +type rsaPublicKey struct { + N *big.Int + E int +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/pkcs7.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/pkcs7.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d40b05df --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/pkcs7.go @@ -0,0 +1,1075 @@ +package x509 + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/aes" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/des" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/rsa" + _ "crypto/sha1" // for crypto.SHA1 + "crypto/x509/pkix" + "encoding/asn1" + "errors" + "fmt" + "math/big" + "sort" + "time" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2" +) + +// PKCS7 Represents a PKCS7 structure +type PKCS7 struct { + Content []byte + Certificates []*Certificate + CRLs []pkix.CertificateList + Signers []signerInfo + raw interface{} +} + +type contentInfo struct { + ContentType asn1.ObjectIdentifier + Content asn1.RawValue `asn1:"explicit,optional,tag:0"` +} + +// ErrUnsupportedContentType is returned when a PKCS7 content is not supported. +// Currently only Data (1.2.156.10197.6.1.4.2.1), Signed Data (1.2.156.10197.6.1.4.2.2), +// and Enveloped Data are supported (1.2.156.10197.6.1.4.2.3) +var ErrUnsupportedContentType = errors.New("pkcs7: cannot parse data: unimplemented content type") + +type unsignedData []byte + +var ( + oidData = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 7, 1} + oidSignedData = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 7, 2} + oidSMSignedData = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 6, 1, 4, 2, 2} + oidEnvelopedData = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 7, 3} + oidSignedAndEnvelopedData = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 7, 4} + oidDigestedData = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 7, 5} + oidEncryptedData = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 7, 6} + oidAttributeContentType = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 3} + oidAttributeMessageDigest = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 4} + oidAttributeSigningTime = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 5} + oidSM3withSM2 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 501} + oidDSASM2 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 301, 1} +) + +type signedData struct { + Version int `asn1:"default:1"` + DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers []pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier `asn1:"set"` + ContentInfo contentInfo + Certificates rawCertificates `asn1:"optional,tag:0"` + CRLs []pkix.CertificateList `asn1:"optional,tag:1"` + SignerInfos []signerInfo `asn1:"set"` +} + +type rawCertificates struct { + Raw asn1.RawContent +} + +type envelopedData struct { + Version int + RecipientInfos []recipientInfo `asn1:"set"` + EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContentInfo +} + +type recipientInfo struct { + Version int + IssuerAndSerialNumber issuerAndSerial + KeyEncryptionAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + EncryptedKey []byte +} + +type encryptedContentInfo struct { + ContentType asn1.ObjectIdentifier + ContentEncryptionAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + EncryptedContent asn1.RawValue `asn1:"tag:0,optional"` +} + +type attribute struct { + Type asn1.ObjectIdentifier + Value asn1.RawValue `asn1:"set"` +} + +type issuerAndSerial struct { + IssuerName asn1.RawValue + SerialNumber *big.Int +} + +// MessageDigestMismatchError is returned when the signer data digest does not +// match the computed digest for the contained content +type MessageDigestMismatchError struct { + ExpectedDigest []byte + ActualDigest []byte +} + +func (err *MessageDigestMismatchError) Error() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("pkcs7: Message digest mismatch\n\tExpected: %X\n\tActual : %X", err.ExpectedDigest, err.ActualDigest) +} + +type signerInfo struct { + Version int `asn1:"default:1"` + IssuerAndSerialNumber issuerAndSerial + DigestAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + AuthenticatedAttributes []attribute `asn1:"optional,tag:0"` + DigestEncryptionAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + EncryptedDigest []byte + UnauthenticatedAttributes []attribute `asn1:"optional,tag:1"` +} + +// ParsePKCS7 decodes a DER encoded PKCS7. +func ParsePKCS7(data []byte) (p7 *PKCS7, err error) { + if len(data) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("pkcs7: input data is empty") + } + var info contentInfo + der, err := ber2der(data) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &info) + if len(rest) > 0 { + err = asn1.SyntaxError{Msg: "trailing data"} + return + } + + if err != nil { + return + } + + // fmt.Printf("--> Content Type: %s", info.ContentType) + switch { + case info.ContentType.Equal(oidSignedData): + return parseSignedData(info.Content.Bytes) + case info.ContentType.Equal(oidSMSignedData): + return parseSignedData(info.Content.Bytes) + case info.ContentType.Equal(oidEnvelopedData): + return parseEnvelopedData(info.Content.Bytes) + } + return nil, ErrUnsupportedContentType +} + +func parseSignedData(data []byte) (*PKCS7, error) { + var sd signedData + asn1.Unmarshal(data, &sd) + certs, err := sd.Certificates.Parse() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // fmt.Printf("--> Signed Data Version %d\n", sd.Version) + + var compound asn1.RawValue + var content unsignedData + + // The Content.Bytes maybe empty on PKI responses. + if len(sd.ContentInfo.Content.Bytes) > 0 { + if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(sd.ContentInfo.Content.Bytes, &compound); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + // Compound octet string + if compound.IsCompound { + if _, err = asn1.Unmarshal(compound.Bytes, &content); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } else { + // assuming this is tag 04 + content = compound.Bytes + } + return &PKCS7{ + Content: content, + Certificates: certs, + CRLs: sd.CRLs, + Signers: sd.SignerInfos, + raw: sd}, nil +} + +func (raw rawCertificates) Parse() ([]*Certificate, error) { + if len(raw.Raw) == 0 { + return nil, nil + } + + var val asn1.RawValue + if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(raw.Raw, &val); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return ParseCertificates(val.Bytes) +} + +func parseEnvelopedData(data []byte) (*PKCS7, error) { + var ed envelopedData + if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(data, &ed); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &PKCS7{ + raw: ed, + }, nil +} + +// Verify checks the signatures of a PKCS7 object +// WARNING: Verify does not check signing time or verify certificate chains at +// this time. +func (p7 *PKCS7) Verify() (err error) { + if len(p7.Signers) == 0 { + return errors.New("pkcs7: Message has no signers") + } + for _, signer := range p7.Signers { + if err := verifySignature(p7, signer); err != nil { + return err + } + } + return nil +} + +func verifySignature(p7 *PKCS7, signer signerInfo) error { + signedData := p7.Content + hash, err := getHashForOID(signer.DigestAlgorithm.Algorithm) + if err != nil { + return err + } + // fmt.Println("===== hash algo=====:", hash) + if len(signer.AuthenticatedAttributes) > 0 { + var digest []byte + err := unmarshalAttribute(signer.AuthenticatedAttributes, oidAttributeMessageDigest, &digest) + if err != nil { + return err + } + h := hash.New() + h.Write(p7.Content) + computed := h.Sum(nil) + if !hmac.Equal(digest, computed) { + return &MessageDigestMismatchError{ + ExpectedDigest: digest, + ActualDigest: computed, + } + } + // TODO(shengzhi): Optionally verify certificate chain + // TODO(shengzhi): Optionally verify signingTime against certificate NotAfter/NotBefore + signedData, err = marshalAttributes(signer.AuthenticatedAttributes) + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + cert := getCertFromCertsByIssuerAndSerial(p7.Certificates, signer.IssuerAndSerialNumber) + if cert == nil { + return errors.New("pkcs7: No certificate for signer") + } + + algo := getSignatureAlgorithmByHash(hash, signer.DigestEncryptionAlgorithm.Algorithm) + if algo == UnknownSignatureAlgorithm { + return ErrPKCS7UnsupportedAlgorithm + } + return cert.CheckSignature(algo, signedData, signer.EncryptedDigest) +} + +func getSignatureAlgorithmByHash(hash Hash, oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) SignatureAlgorithm { + switch hash { + case SM3: + switch { + case oid.Equal(oidSM3withSM2): + return SM2WithSM3 + } + case SHA256: + switch { + case oid.Equal(oidDSASM2): + return SM2WithSHA256 + } + } + return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm +} + +func marshalAttributes(attrs []attribute) ([]byte, error) { + encodedAttributes, err := asn1.Marshal(struct { + A []attribute `asn1:"set"` + }{A: attrs}) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Remove the leading sequence octets + var raw asn1.RawValue + _, err = asn1.Unmarshal(encodedAttributes, &raw) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return raw.Bytes, nil +} + +var ( + oidDigestAlgorithmSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 14, 3, 2, 26} + oidEncryptionAlgorithmRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1} +) + +func getCertFromCertsByIssuerAndSerial(certs []*Certificate, ias issuerAndSerial) *Certificate { + for _, cert := range certs { + if isCertMatchForIssuerAndSerial(cert, ias) { + return cert + } + } + return nil +} + +func getHashForOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) (Hash, error) { + switch { + case oid.Equal(oidDigestAlgorithmSHA1): + return SHA1, nil + case oid.Equal(oidSHA256): + return SHA256, nil + case oid.Equal(oidSM3): + case oid.Equal(oidHashSM3): + return SM3, nil + } + return Hash(0), ErrPKCS7UnsupportedAlgorithm +} + +// GetOnlySigner returns an x509.Certificate for the first signer of the signed +// data payload. If there are more or less than one signer, nil is returned +func (p7 *PKCS7) GetOnlySigner() *Certificate { + if len(p7.Signers) != 1 { + return nil + } + signer := p7.Signers[0] + return getCertFromCertsByIssuerAndSerial(p7.Certificates, signer.IssuerAndSerialNumber) +} + +// ErrPKCS7UnsupportedAlgorithm tells you when our quick dev assumptions have failed +var ErrPKCS7UnsupportedAlgorithm = errors.New("pkcs7: cannot decrypt data: only RSA, DES, DES-EDE3, AES-256-CBC and AES-128-GCM supported") + +// ErrNotEncryptedContent is returned when attempting to Decrypt data that is not encrypted data +var ErrNotEncryptedContent = errors.New("pkcs7: content data is a decryptable data type") + +// Decrypt decrypts encrypted content info for recipient cert and private key +func (p7 *PKCS7) Decrypt(cert *Certificate, pk crypto.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) { + data, ok := p7.raw.(envelopedData) + if !ok { + return nil, ErrNotEncryptedContent + } + recipient := selectRecipientForCertificate(data.RecipientInfos, cert) + if recipient.EncryptedKey == nil { + return nil, errors.New("pkcs7: no enveloped recipient for provided certificate") + } + if priv := pk.(*rsa.PrivateKey); priv != nil { + var contentKey []byte + contentKey, err := rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, priv, recipient.EncryptedKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return data.EncryptedContentInfo.decrypt(contentKey) + } + fmt.Printf("Unsupported Private Key: %v\n", pk) + // TODO: SM decript + return nil, ErrPKCS7UnsupportedAlgorithm +} + +func (p7 *PKCS7) DecryptSM2(cert *Certificate, pk crypto.PrivateKey, mode int) ([]byte, error) { + data, ok := p7.raw.(envelopedData) + if !ok { + return nil, ErrNotEncryptedContent + } + recipient := selectRecipientForCertificate(data.RecipientInfos, cert) + if recipient.EncryptedKey == nil { + return nil, errors.New("pkcs7: no enveloped recipient for provided certificate") + } + + if priv := pk.(*sm2.PrivateKey); priv != nil { + var contentKey []byte + contentKey, err := sm2.Decrypt(priv, recipient.EncryptedKey, mode) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return data.EncryptedContentInfo.decrypt(contentKey) + } + + fmt.Printf("Unsupported Private Key: %v\n", pk) + // TODO: SM decript + return nil, ErrPKCS7UnsupportedAlgorithm +} + +var oidEncryptionAlgorithmDESCBC = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 14, 3, 2, 7} +var oidEncryptionAlgorithmDESEDE3CBC = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 3, 7} +var oidEncryptionAlgorithmAES256CBC = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 1, 42} +var oidEncryptionAlgorithmAES128GCM = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 1, 6} +var oidEncryptionAlgorithmAES128CBC = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 1, 2} + +func (eci encryptedContentInfo) decrypt(key []byte) ([]byte, error) { + alg := eci.ContentEncryptionAlgorithm.Algorithm + if !alg.Equal(oidEncryptionAlgorithmDESCBC) && + !alg.Equal(oidEncryptionAlgorithmDESEDE3CBC) && + !alg.Equal(oidEncryptionAlgorithmAES256CBC) && + !alg.Equal(oidEncryptionAlgorithmAES128CBC) && + !alg.Equal(oidEncryptionAlgorithmAES128GCM) { + fmt.Printf("Unsupported Content Encryption Algorithm: %s\n", alg) + return nil, ErrPKCS7UnsupportedAlgorithm + } + + // EncryptedContent can either be constructed of multple OCTET STRINGs + // or _be_ a tagged OCTET STRING + var cyphertext []byte + if eci.EncryptedContent.IsCompound { + // Complex case to concat all of the children OCTET STRINGs + var buf bytes.Buffer + cypherbytes := eci.EncryptedContent.Bytes + for { + var part []byte + cypherbytes, _ = asn1.Unmarshal(cypherbytes, &part) + buf.Write(part) + if cypherbytes == nil { + break + } + } + cyphertext = buf.Bytes() + } else { + // Simple case, the bytes _are_ the cyphertext + cyphertext = eci.EncryptedContent.Bytes + } + + var block cipher.Block + var err error + + switch { + case alg.Equal(oidEncryptionAlgorithmDESCBC): + block, err = des.NewCipher(key) + case alg.Equal(oidEncryptionAlgorithmDESEDE3CBC): + block, err = des.NewTripleDESCipher(key) + case alg.Equal(oidEncryptionAlgorithmAES256CBC): + fallthrough + case alg.Equal(oidEncryptionAlgorithmAES128GCM), alg.Equal(oidEncryptionAlgorithmAES128CBC): + block, err = aes.NewCipher(key) + } + + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if alg.Equal(oidEncryptionAlgorithmAES128GCM) { + params := aesGCMParameters{} + paramBytes := eci.ContentEncryptionAlgorithm.Parameters.Bytes + + _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(paramBytes, ¶ms) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if len(params.Nonce) != gcm.NonceSize() { + return nil, errors.New("pkcs7: encryption algorithm parameters are incorrect") + } + if params.ICVLen != gcm.Overhead() { + return nil, errors.New("pkcs7: encryption algorithm parameters are incorrect") + } + + plaintext, err := gcm.Open(nil, params.Nonce, cyphertext, nil) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return plaintext, nil + } + + iv := eci.ContentEncryptionAlgorithm.Parameters.Bytes + if len(iv) != block.BlockSize() { + return nil, errors.New("pkcs7: encryption algorithm parameters are malformed") + } + mode := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv) + plaintext := make([]byte, len(cyphertext)) + mode.CryptBlocks(plaintext, cyphertext) + if plaintext, err = unpad(plaintext, mode.BlockSize()); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return plaintext, nil +} + +func selectRecipientForCertificate(recipients []recipientInfo, cert *Certificate) recipientInfo { + for _, recp := range recipients { + if isCertMatchForIssuerAndSerial(cert, recp.IssuerAndSerialNumber) { + return recp + } + } + return recipientInfo{} +} + +func isCertMatchForIssuerAndSerial(cert *Certificate, ias issuerAndSerial) bool { + return cert.SerialNumber.Cmp(ias.SerialNumber) == 0 && bytes.Compare(cert.RawIssuer, ias.IssuerName.FullBytes) == 0 +} + +func pad(data []byte, blocklen int) ([]byte, error) { + if blocklen < 1 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid blocklen %d", blocklen) + } + padlen := blocklen - (len(data) % blocklen) + if padlen == 0 { + padlen = blocklen + } + pad := bytes.Repeat([]byte{byte(padlen)}, padlen) + return append(data, pad...), nil +} + +func unpad(data []byte, blocklen int) ([]byte, error) { + if blocklen < 1 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid blocklen %d", blocklen) + } + if len(data)%blocklen != 0 || len(data) == 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid data len %d", len(data)) + } + + // the last byte is the length of padding + padlen := int(data[len(data)-1]) + + // check padding integrity, all bytes should be the same + pad := data[len(data)-padlen:] + for _, padbyte := range pad { + if padbyte != byte(padlen) { + return nil, errors.New("invalid padding") + } + } + + return data[:len(data)-padlen], nil +} + +func unmarshalAttribute(attrs []attribute, attributeType asn1.ObjectIdentifier, out interface{}) error { + for _, attr := range attrs { + if attr.Type.Equal(attributeType) { + _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(attr.Value.Bytes, out) + return err + } + } + return errors.New("pkcs7: attribute type not in attributes") +} + +// UnmarshalSignedAttribute decodes a single attribute from the signer info +func (p7 *PKCS7) UnmarshalSignedAttribute(attributeType asn1.ObjectIdentifier, out interface{}) error { + sd, ok := p7.raw.(signedData) + if !ok { + return errors.New("pkcs7: payload is not signedData content") + } + if len(sd.SignerInfos) < 1 { + return errors.New("pkcs7: payload has no signers") + } + attributes := sd.SignerInfos[0].AuthenticatedAttributes + return unmarshalAttribute(attributes, attributeType, out) +} + +// SignedData is an opaque data structure for creating signed data payloads +type SignedData struct { + sd signedData + certs []*Certificate + messageDigest []byte +} + +// Attribute represents a key value pair attribute. Value must be marshalable byte +// `encoding/asn1` +type Attribute struct { + Type asn1.ObjectIdentifier + Value interface{} +} + +// SignerInfoConfig are optional values to include when adding a signer +type SignerInfoConfig struct { + ExtraSignedAttributes []Attribute +} + +// NewSignedData initializes a SignedData with content +func NewSignedData(data []byte) (*SignedData, error) { + content, err := asn1.Marshal(data) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ci := contentInfo{ + ContentType: oidData, + Content: asn1.RawValue{Class: 2, Tag: 0, Bytes: content, IsCompound: true}, + } + digAlg := pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{ + Algorithm: oidDigestAlgorithmSHA1, + } + h := crypto.SHA1.New() + h.Write(data) + md := h.Sum(nil) + sd := signedData{ + ContentInfo: ci, + Version: 1, + DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers: []pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{digAlg}, + } + return &SignedData{sd: sd, messageDigest: md}, nil +} + +type attributes struct { + types []asn1.ObjectIdentifier + values []interface{} +} + +// Add adds the attribute, maintaining insertion order +func (attrs *attributes) Add(attrType asn1.ObjectIdentifier, value interface{}) { + attrs.types = append(attrs.types, attrType) + attrs.values = append(attrs.values, value) +} + +type sortableAttribute struct { + SortKey []byte + Attribute attribute +} + +type attributeSet []sortableAttribute + +func (sa attributeSet) Len() int { + return len(sa) +} + +func (sa attributeSet) Less(i, j int) bool { + return bytes.Compare(sa[i].SortKey, sa[j].SortKey) < 0 +} + +func (sa attributeSet) Swap(i, j int) { + sa[i], sa[j] = sa[j], sa[i] +} + +func (sa attributeSet) Attributes() []attribute { + attrs := make([]attribute, len(sa)) + for i, attr := range sa { + attrs[i] = attr.Attribute + } + return attrs +} + +func (attrs *attributes) ForMarshaling() ([]attribute, error) { + sortables := make(attributeSet, len(attrs.types)) + for i := range sortables { + attrType := attrs.types[i] + attrValue := attrs.values[i] + asn1Value, err := asn1.Marshal(attrValue) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + attr := attribute{ + Type: attrType, + Value: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 17, IsCompound: true, Bytes: asn1Value}, // 17 == SET tag + } + encoded, err := asn1.Marshal(attr) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + sortables[i] = sortableAttribute{ + SortKey: encoded, + Attribute: attr, + } + } + sort.Sort(sortables) + return sortables.Attributes(), nil +} + +// AddSigner signs attributes about the content and adds certificate to payload +func (sd *SignedData) AddSigner(cert *Certificate, pkey crypto.PrivateKey, config SignerInfoConfig) error { + attrs := &attributes{} + attrs.Add(oidAttributeContentType, sd.sd.ContentInfo.ContentType) + attrs.Add(oidAttributeMessageDigest, sd.messageDigest) + attrs.Add(oidAttributeSigningTime, time.Now()) + for _, attr := range config.ExtraSignedAttributes { + attrs.Add(attr.Type, attr.Value) + } + finalAttrs, err := attrs.ForMarshaling() + if err != nil { + return err + } + signature, err := signAttributes(finalAttrs, pkey, crypto.SHA1) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + ias, err := cert2issuerAndSerial(cert) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + signer := signerInfo{ + AuthenticatedAttributes: finalAttrs, + DigestAlgorithm: pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{Algorithm: oidDigestAlgorithmSHA1}, + DigestEncryptionAlgorithm: pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{Algorithm: oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA}, + IssuerAndSerialNumber: ias, + EncryptedDigest: signature, + Version: 1, + } + // create signature of signed attributes + sd.certs = append(sd.certs, cert) + sd.sd.SignerInfos = append(sd.sd.SignerInfos, signer) + return nil +} + +// AddCertificate adds the certificate to the payload. Useful for parent certificates +func (sd *SignedData) AddCertificate(cert *Certificate) { + sd.certs = append(sd.certs, cert) +} + +// Detach removes content from the signed data struct to make it a detached signature. +// This must be called right before Finish() +func (sd *SignedData) Detach() { + sd.sd.ContentInfo = contentInfo{ContentType: oidData} +} + +// Finish marshals the content and its signers +func (sd *SignedData) Finish() ([]byte, error) { + sd.sd.Certificates = marshalCertificates(sd.certs) + inner, err := asn1.Marshal(sd.sd) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + outer := contentInfo{ + ContentType: oidSignedData, + Content: asn1.RawValue{Class: 2, Tag: 0, Bytes: inner, IsCompound: true}, + } + return asn1.Marshal(outer) +} + +func cert2issuerAndSerial(cert *Certificate) (issuerAndSerial, error) { + var ias issuerAndSerial + // The issuer RDNSequence has to match exactly the sequence in the certificate + // We cannot use cert.Issuer.ToRDNSequence() here since it mangles the sequence + ias.IssuerName = asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: cert.RawIssuer} + ias.SerialNumber = cert.SerialNumber + + return ias, nil +} + +// signs the DER encoded form of the attributes with the private key +func signAttributes(attrs []attribute, pkey crypto.PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash) ([]byte, error) { + attrBytes, err := marshalAttributes(attrs) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + h := hash.New() + h.Write(attrBytes) + hashed := h.Sum(nil) + switch priv := pkey.(type) { + case *rsa.PrivateKey: + return rsa.SignPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, priv, crypto.SHA1, hashed) + } + return nil, ErrPKCS7UnsupportedAlgorithm +} + +// concats and wraps the certificates in the RawValue structure +func marshalCertificates(certs []*Certificate) rawCertificates { + var buf bytes.Buffer + for _, cert := range certs { + buf.Write(cert.Raw) + } + rawCerts, _ := marshalCertificateBytes(buf.Bytes()) + return rawCerts +} + +// Even though, the tag & length are stripped out during marshalling the +// RawContent, we have to encode it into the RawContent. If its missing, +// then `asn1.Marshal()` will strip out the certificate wrapper instead. +func marshalCertificateBytes(certs []byte) (rawCertificates, error) { + var val = asn1.RawValue{Bytes: certs, Class: 2, Tag: 0, IsCompound: true} + b, err := asn1.Marshal(val) + if err != nil { + return rawCertificates{}, err + } + return rawCertificates{Raw: b}, nil +} + +// DegenerateCertificate creates a signed data structure containing only the +// provided certificate or certificate chain. +func DegenerateCertificate(cert []byte) ([]byte, error) { + rawCert, err := marshalCertificateBytes(cert) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + emptyContent := contentInfo{ContentType: oidData} + sd := signedData{ + Version: 1, + ContentInfo: emptyContent, + Certificates: rawCert, + CRLs: []pkix.CertificateList{}, + } + content, err := asn1.Marshal(sd) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + signedContent := contentInfo{ + ContentType: oidSignedData, + Content: asn1.RawValue{Class: 2, Tag: 0, Bytes: content, IsCompound: true}, + } + return asn1.Marshal(signedContent) +} + +const ( + EncryptionAlgorithmDESCBC = iota + EncryptionAlgorithmAES128GCM +) + +// ContentEncryptionAlgorithm determines the algorithm used to encrypt the +// plaintext message. Change the value of this variable to change which +// algorithm is used in the Encrypt() function. +var ContentEncryptionAlgorithm = EncryptionAlgorithmDESCBC + +// ErrUnsupportedEncryptionAlgorithm is returned when attempting to encrypt +// content with an unsupported algorithm. +var ErrUnsupportedEncryptionAlgorithm = errors.New("pkcs7: cannot encrypt content: only DES-CBC and AES-128-GCM supported") + +const nonceSize = 12 + +type aesGCMParameters struct { + Nonce []byte `asn1:"tag:4"` + ICVLen int +} + +func encryptAES128GCM(content []byte) ([]byte, *encryptedContentInfo, error) { + // Create AES key and nonce + key := make([]byte, 16) + nonce := make([]byte, nonceSize) + + _, err := rand.Read(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + _, err = rand.Read(nonce) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + // Encrypt content + block, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + ciphertext := gcm.Seal(nil, nonce, content, nil) + + // Prepare ASN.1 Encrypted Content Info + paramSeq := aesGCMParameters{ + Nonce: nonce, + ICVLen: gcm.Overhead(), + } + + paramBytes, err := asn1.Marshal(paramSeq) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + eci := encryptedContentInfo{ + ContentType: oidData, + ContentEncryptionAlgorithm: pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{ + Algorithm: oidEncryptionAlgorithmAES128GCM, + Parameters: asn1.RawValue{ + Tag: asn1.TagSequence, + Bytes: paramBytes, + }, + }, + EncryptedContent: marshalEncryptedContent(ciphertext), + } + + return key, &eci, nil +} + +func encryptDESCBC(content []byte) ([]byte, *encryptedContentInfo, error) { + // Create DES key & CBC IV + key := make([]byte, 8) + iv := make([]byte, des.BlockSize) + _, err := rand.Read(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + _, err = rand.Read(iv) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + // Encrypt padded content + block, err := des.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + mode := cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv) + plaintext, err := pad(content, mode.BlockSize()) + cyphertext := make([]byte, len(plaintext)) + mode.CryptBlocks(cyphertext, plaintext) + + // Prepare ASN.1 Encrypted Content Info + eci := encryptedContentInfo{ + ContentType: oidData, + ContentEncryptionAlgorithm: pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{ + Algorithm: oidEncryptionAlgorithmDESCBC, + Parameters: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 4, Bytes: iv}, + }, + EncryptedContent: marshalEncryptedContent(cyphertext), + } + + return key, &eci, nil +} + +// Encrypt creates and returns an envelope data PKCS7 structure with encrypted +// recipient keys for each recipient public key. +// +// The algorithm used to perform encryption is determined by the current value +// of the global ContentEncryptionAlgorithm package variable. By default, the +// value is EncryptionAlgorithmDESCBC. To use a different algorithm, change the +// value before calling Encrypt(). For example: +// +// ContentEncryptionAlgorithm = EncryptionAlgorithmAES128GCM +// +// TODO(fullsailor): Add support for encrypting content with other algorithms +func PKCS7Encrypt(content []byte, recipients []*Certificate) ([]byte, error) { + var eci *encryptedContentInfo + var key []byte + var err error + + // Apply chosen symmetric encryption method + switch ContentEncryptionAlgorithm { + case EncryptionAlgorithmDESCBC: + key, eci, err = encryptDESCBC(content) + + case EncryptionAlgorithmAES128GCM: + key, eci, err = encryptAES128GCM(content) + + default: + return nil, ErrUnsupportedEncryptionAlgorithm + } + + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Prepare each recipient's encrypted cipher key + recipientInfos := make([]recipientInfo, len(recipients)) + for i, recipient := range recipients { + encrypted, err := encryptKey(key, recipient) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ias, err := cert2issuerAndSerial(recipient) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + info := recipientInfo{ + Version: 0, + IssuerAndSerialNumber: ias, + KeyEncryptionAlgorithm: pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{ + Algorithm: oidEncryptionAlgorithmRSA, + }, + EncryptedKey: encrypted, + } + recipientInfos[i] = info + } + + // Prepare envelope content + envelope := envelopedData{ + EncryptedContentInfo: *eci, + Version: 0, + RecipientInfos: recipientInfos, + } + innerContent, err := asn1.Marshal(envelope) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Prepare outer payload structure + wrapper := contentInfo{ + ContentType: oidEnvelopedData, + Content: asn1.RawValue{Class: 2, Tag: 0, IsCompound: true, Bytes: innerContent}, + } + + return asn1.Marshal(wrapper) +} + +func marshalEncryptedContent(content []byte) asn1.RawValue { + asn1Content, _ := asn1.Marshal(content) + return asn1.RawValue{Tag: 0, Class: 2, Bytes: asn1Content, IsCompound: true} +} + +func encryptKey(key []byte, recipient *Certificate) ([]byte, error) { + if pub := recipient.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey); pub != nil { + return rsa.EncryptPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, pub, key) + } + return nil, ErrPKCS7UnsupportedAlgorithm +} + + + +func PKCS7EncryptSM2(content []byte, recipients []*Certificate, mode int) ([]byte, error) { + var eci *encryptedContentInfo + var key []byte + var err error + + // Apply chosen symmetric encryption method + switch ContentEncryptionAlgorithm { + case EncryptionAlgorithmDESCBC: + key, eci, err = encryptDESCBC(content) + + case EncryptionAlgorithmAES128GCM: + key, eci, err = encryptAES128GCM(content) + + default: + return nil, ErrUnsupportedEncryptionAlgorithm + } + + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Prepare each recipient's encrypted cipher key + recipientInfos := make([]recipientInfo, len(recipients)) + for i, recipient := range recipients { + encrypted, err := encryptKeySM2(key, recipient, mode) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ias, err := cert2issuerAndSerial(recipient) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + info := recipientInfo{ + Version: 0, + IssuerAndSerialNumber: ias, + KeyEncryptionAlgorithm: pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{ + Algorithm: oidSM3withSM2, + }, + EncryptedKey: encrypted, + } + recipientInfos[i] = info + } + + // Prepare envelope content + envelope := envelopedData{ + EncryptedContentInfo: *eci, + Version: 0, + RecipientInfos: recipientInfos, + } + innerContent, err := asn1.Marshal(envelope) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Prepare outer payload structure + wrapper := contentInfo{ + ContentType: oidEnvelopedData, + Content: asn1.RawValue{Class: 2, Tag: 0, IsCompound: true, Bytes: innerContent}, + } + + return asn1.Marshal(wrapper) +} + + +func encryptKeySM2(key []byte, recipient *Certificate, mode int) ([]byte, error) { + if pub := recipient.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey); pub != nil { + pubkey := &sm2.PublicKey{} + pubkey.Curve = pub.Curve + pubkey.Y = pub.Y + pubkey.X = pub.X + return sm2.Encrypt(pubkey, key, rand.Reader, mode) + } + return nil, ErrPKCS7UnsupportedAlgorithm +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/pkcs8.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/pkcs8.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7e4f51c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/pkcs8.go @@ -0,0 +1,371 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package x509 + +import ( + "crypto/aes" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/md5" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/sha1" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/sha512" + "crypto/x509/pkix" + "encoding/asn1" + "errors" + "hash" + "math/big" + "reflect" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2" +) + +/* + * reference to RFC5959 and RFC2898 + */ + +var ( + oidPBES1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 5, 3} // pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC(PBES1) + oidPBES2 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 5, 13} // id-PBES2(PBES2) + oidPBKDF2 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 5, 12} // id-PBKDF2 + + oidKEYMD5 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 2, 5} + oidKEYSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 2, 7} + oidKEYSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 2, 9} + oidKEYSHA512 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 2, 11} + + oidAES128CBC = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 1, 2} + oidAES256CBC = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 1, 42} + + oidSM2 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 2, 1} +) + +// reference to https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5958.txt +type PrivateKeyInfo struct { + Version int // v1 or v2 + PrivateKeyAlgorithm []asn1.ObjectIdentifier + PrivateKey []byte +} + +// reference to https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5958.txt +type EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo struct { + EncryptionAlgorithm Pbes2Algorithms + EncryptedData []byte +} + +// reference to https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt +type Pbes2Algorithms struct { + IdPBES2 asn1.ObjectIdentifier + Pbes2Params Pbes2Params +} + +// reference to https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt +type Pbes2Params struct { + KeyDerivationFunc Pbes2KDfs // PBES2-KDFs + EncryptionScheme Pbes2Encs // PBES2-Encs +} + +// reference to https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt +type Pbes2KDfs struct { + IdPBKDF2 asn1.ObjectIdentifier + Pkdf2Params Pkdf2Params +} + +type Pbes2Encs struct { + EncryAlgo asn1.ObjectIdentifier + IV []byte +} + +// reference to https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt +type Pkdf2Params struct { + Salt []byte + IterationCount int + Prf pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier +} + +type sm2PrivateKey struct { + Version int + PrivateKey []byte + NamedCurveOID asn1.ObjectIdentifier `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:0"` + PublicKey asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:1"` +} + +type pkcs8 struct { + Version int + Algo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + PrivateKey []byte +} + +// copy from crypto/pbkdf2.go +func pbkdf(password, salt []byte, iter, keyLen int, h func() hash.Hash) []byte { + prf := hmac.New(h, password) + hashLen := prf.Size() + numBlocks := (keyLen + hashLen - 1) / hashLen + + var buf [4]byte + dk := make([]byte, 0, numBlocks*hashLen) + U := make([]byte, hashLen) + for block := 1; block <= numBlocks; block++ { + // N.B.: || means concatenation, ^ means XOR + // for each block T_i = U_1 ^ U_2 ^ ... ^ U_iter + // U_1 = PRF(password, salt || uint(i)) + prf.Reset() + prf.Write(salt) + buf[0] = byte(block >> 24) + buf[1] = byte(block >> 16) + buf[2] = byte(block >> 8) + buf[3] = byte(block) + prf.Write(buf[:4]) + dk = prf.Sum(dk) + T := dk[len(dk)-hashLen:] + copy(U, T) + + // U_n = PRF(password, U_(n-1)) + for n := 2; n <= iter; n++ { + prf.Reset() + prf.Write(U) + U = U[:0] + U = prf.Sum(U) + for x := range U { + T[x] ^= U[x] + } + } + } + return dk[:keyLen] +} + +func ParseSm2PublicKey(der []byte) (*sm2.PublicKey, error) { + var pubkey pkixPublicKey + + if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &pubkey); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if !reflect.DeepEqual(pubkey.Algo.Algorithm, oidSM2) { + return nil, errors.New("x509: not sm2 elliptic curve") + } + curve := sm2.P256Sm2() + x, y := elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, pubkey.BitString.Bytes) + pub := sm2.PublicKey{ + Curve: curve, + X: x, + Y: y, + } + return &pub, nil +} + +func MarshalSm2PublicKey(key *sm2.PublicKey) ([]byte, error) { + var r pkixPublicKey + var algo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + + if key.Curve.Params() != sm2.P256Sm2().Params() { + return nil, errors.New("x509: unsupported elliptic curve") + } + algo.Algorithm = oidSM2 + algo.Parameters.Class = 0 + algo.Parameters.Tag = 6 + algo.Parameters.IsCompound = false + algo.Parameters.FullBytes = []byte{6, 8, 42, 129, 28, 207, 85, 1, 130, 45} // asn1.Marshal(asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 301}) + r.Algo = algo + r.BitString = asn1.BitString{Bytes: elliptic.Marshal(key.Curve, key.X, key.Y)} + return asn1.Marshal(r) +} + +func ParseSm2PrivateKey(der []byte) (*sm2.PrivateKey, error) { + var privKey sm2PrivateKey + + if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &privKey); err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to parse SM2 private key: " + err.Error()) + } + curve := sm2.P256Sm2() + k := new(big.Int).SetBytes(privKey.PrivateKey) + curveOrder := curve.Params().N + if k.Cmp(curveOrder) >= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid elliptic curve private key value") + } + priv := new(sm2.PrivateKey) + priv.Curve = curve + priv.D = k + privateKey := make([]byte, (curveOrder.BitLen()+7)/8) + for len(privKey.PrivateKey) > len(privateKey) { + if privKey.PrivateKey[0] != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: invalid private key length") + } + privKey.PrivateKey = privKey.PrivateKey[1:] + } + copy(privateKey[len(privateKey)-len(privKey.PrivateKey):], privKey.PrivateKey) + priv.X, priv.Y = curve.ScalarBaseMult(privateKey) + return priv, nil +} + +func ParsePKCS8UnecryptedPrivateKey(der []byte) (*sm2.PrivateKey, error) { + var privKey pkcs8 + + if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &privKey); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if !reflect.DeepEqual(privKey.Algo.Algorithm, oidSM2) { + return nil, errors.New("x509: not sm2 elliptic curve") + } + return ParseSm2PrivateKey(privKey.PrivateKey) +} + +func ParsePKCS8EcryptedPrivateKey(der, pwd []byte) (*sm2.PrivateKey, error) { + var keyInfo EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo + + _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &keyInfo) + if err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("x509: unknown format") + } + if !reflect.DeepEqual(keyInfo.EncryptionAlgorithm.IdPBES2, oidPBES2) { + return nil, errors.New("x509: only support PBES2") + } + encryptionScheme := keyInfo.EncryptionAlgorithm.Pbes2Params.EncryptionScheme + keyDerivationFunc := keyInfo.EncryptionAlgorithm.Pbes2Params.KeyDerivationFunc + if !reflect.DeepEqual(keyDerivationFunc.IdPBKDF2, oidPBKDF2) { + return nil, errors.New("x509: only support PBKDF2") + } + pkdf2Params := keyDerivationFunc.Pkdf2Params + if !reflect.DeepEqual(encryptionScheme.EncryAlgo, oidAES128CBC) && + !reflect.DeepEqual(encryptionScheme.EncryAlgo, oidAES256CBC) { + return nil, errors.New("x509: unknow encryption algorithm") + } + iv := encryptionScheme.IV + salt := pkdf2Params.Salt + iter := pkdf2Params.IterationCount + encryptedKey := keyInfo.EncryptedData + var key []byte + switch { + case pkdf2Params.Prf.Algorithm.Equal(oidKEYMD5): + key = pbkdf(pwd, salt, iter, 32, md5.New) + break + case pkdf2Params.Prf.Algorithm.Equal(oidKEYSHA1): + key = pbkdf(pwd, salt, iter, 32, sha1.New) + break + case pkdf2Params.Prf.Algorithm.Equal(oidKEYSHA256): + key = pbkdf(pwd, salt, iter, 32, sha256.New) + break + case pkdf2Params.Prf.Algorithm.Equal(oidKEYSHA512): + key = pbkdf(pwd, salt, iter, 32, sha512.New) + break + default: + return nil, errors.New("x509: unknown hash algorithm") + } + block, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + mode := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv) + mode.CryptBlocks(encryptedKey, encryptedKey) + rKey, err := ParsePKCS8UnecryptedPrivateKey(encryptedKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("pkcs8: incorrect password") + } + return rKey, nil +} + +func ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der, pwd []byte) (*sm2.PrivateKey, error) { + if pwd == nil { + + return ParsePKCS8UnecryptedPrivateKey(der) + } + return ParsePKCS8EcryptedPrivateKey(der, pwd) +} + +func MarshalSm2UnecryptedPrivateKey(key *sm2.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) { + var r pkcs8 + var priv sm2PrivateKey + var algo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + + algo.Algorithm = oidSM2 + algo.Parameters.Class = 0 + algo.Parameters.Tag = 6 + algo.Parameters.IsCompound = false + algo.Parameters.FullBytes = []byte{6, 8, 42, 129, 28, 207, 85, 1, 130, 45} // asn1.Marshal(asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 301}) + priv.Version = 1 + priv.NamedCurveOID = oidNamedCurveP256SM2 + priv.PublicKey = asn1.BitString{Bytes: elliptic.Marshal(key.Curve, key.X, key.Y)} + priv.PrivateKey = key.D.Bytes() + r.Version = 0 + r.Algo = algo + r.PrivateKey, _ = asn1.Marshal(priv) + return asn1.Marshal(r) +} + +func MarshalSm2EcryptedPrivateKey(PrivKey *sm2.PrivateKey, pwd []byte) ([]byte, error) { + der, err := MarshalSm2UnecryptedPrivateKey(PrivKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + iter := 2048 + salt := make([]byte, 8) + iv := make([]byte, 16) + rand.Reader.Read(salt) + rand.Reader.Read(iv) + key := pbkdf(pwd, salt, iter, 32, sha1.New) // 默认是SHA1 + padding := aes.BlockSize - len(der)%aes.BlockSize + if padding > 0 { + n := len(der) + der = append(der, make([]byte, padding)...) + for i := 0; i < padding; i++ { + der[n+i] = byte(padding) + } + } + encryptedKey := make([]byte, len(der)) + block, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + mode := cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv) + mode.CryptBlocks(encryptedKey, der) + var algorithmIdentifier pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + algorithmIdentifier.Algorithm = oidKEYSHA1 + algorithmIdentifier.Parameters.Tag = 5 + algorithmIdentifier.Parameters.IsCompound = false + algorithmIdentifier.Parameters.FullBytes = []byte{5, 0} + keyDerivationFunc := Pbes2KDfs{ + oidPBKDF2, + Pkdf2Params{ + salt, + iter, + algorithmIdentifier, + }, + } + encryptionScheme := Pbes2Encs{ + oidAES256CBC, + iv, + } + pbes2Algorithms := Pbes2Algorithms{ + oidPBES2, + Pbes2Params{ + keyDerivationFunc, + encryptionScheme, + }, + } + encryptedPkey := EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo{ + pbes2Algorithms, + encryptedKey, + } + return asn1.Marshal(encryptedPkey) +} + +func MarshalSm2PrivateKey(key *sm2.PrivateKey, pwd []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if pwd == nil { + return MarshalSm2UnecryptedPrivateKey(key) + } + return MarshalSm2EcryptedPrivateKey(key, pwd) +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/utils.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/utils.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..07e0f420 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/utils.go @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +package x509 + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/x509" + "encoding/asn1" + "encoding/hex" + "encoding/pem" + "errors" + "math/big" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2" +) + +func ReadPrivateKeyFromPem(privateKeyPem []byte, pwd []byte) (*sm2.PrivateKey, error) { + var block *pem.Block + block, _ = pem.Decode(privateKeyPem) + if block == nil { + return nil, errors.New("failed to decode private key") + } + priv, err := ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes, pwd) + return priv, err +} + +func WritePrivateKeyToPem(key *sm2.PrivateKey, pwd []byte) ([]byte, error) { + var block *pem.Block + der, err := MarshalSm2PrivateKey(key, pwd) //Convert private key to DER format + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if pwd != nil { + block = &pem.Block{ + Type: "ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY", + Bytes: der, + } + } else { + block = &pem.Block{ + Type: "PRIVATE KEY", + Bytes: der, + } + } + certPem := pem.EncodeToMemory(block) + return certPem, nil +} + +func ReadPublicKeyFromPem(publicKeyPem []byte) (*sm2.PublicKey, error) { + block, _ := pem.Decode(publicKeyPem) + if block == nil || block.Type != "PUBLIC KEY" { + return nil, errors.New("failed to decode public key") + } + return ParseSm2PublicKey(block.Bytes) +} + +func WritePublicKeyToPem(key *sm2.PublicKey) ([]byte, error) { + der, err := MarshalSm2PublicKey(key) //Convert publick key to DER format + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + block := &pem.Block{ + Type: "PUBLIC KEY", + Bytes: der, + } + certPem := pem.EncodeToMemory(block) + return certPem, nil +} + +//DHex是sm2私钥的真正关键数值 +func ReadPrivateKeyFromHex(Dhex string) (*sm2.PrivateKey,error) { + c := sm2.P256Sm2() + d,err:=hex.DecodeString(Dhex) + if err!=nil{ + return nil,err + } + k:= new(big.Int).SetBytes(d) + params := c.Params() + one := new(big.Int).SetInt64(1) + n := new(big.Int).Sub(params.N, one) + if k.Cmp(n)>=0{ + return nil,errors.New("privateKey's D is overflow.") + } + priv := new(sm2.PrivateKey) + priv.PublicKey.Curve = c + priv.D = k + priv.PublicKey.X, priv.PublicKey.Y = c.ScalarBaseMult(k.Bytes()) + return priv,nil +} + + + +func WritePrivateKeyToHex(key *sm2.PrivateKey) string { + return key.D.Text(16) +} + +func ReadPublicKeyFromHex(Qhex string) (*sm2.PublicKey, error) { + q,err:=hex.DecodeString(Qhex) + if err!=nil{ + return nil,err + } + if len(q)==65&&q[0]==byte(0x04){ + q=q[1:] + } + if len(q)!=64{ + return nil,errors.New("publicKey is not uncompressed.") + } + pub := new(sm2.PublicKey) + pub.Curve = sm2.P256Sm2() + pub.X = new(big.Int).SetBytes(q[:32]) + pub.Y = new(big.Int).SetBytes(q[32:]) + return pub, nil +} + + +func WritePublicKeyToHex(key *sm2.PublicKey) string { + x := key.X.Bytes() + y := key.Y.Bytes() + if n := len(x); n < 32 { + x = append(zeroByteSlice()[:32-n], x...) + } + if n := len(y); n < 32 { + y = append(zeroByteSlice()[:32-n], y...) + } + c := []byte{} + c = append(c, x...) + c = append(c, y...) + c = append([]byte{0x04}, c...) + return hex.EncodeToString(c) +} + + +func ReadCertificateRequestFromPem(certPem []byte) (*CertificateRequest, error) { + block, _ := pem.Decode(certPem) + if block == nil { + return nil, errors.New("failed to decode certificate request") + } + return ParseCertificateRequest(block.Bytes) +} + +func CreateCertificateRequestToPem(template *CertificateRequest, signer crypto.Signer) ([]byte, error) { + der, err := CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, template, signer) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + block := &pem.Block{ + Type: "CERTIFICATE REQUEST", + Bytes: der, + } + certPem := pem.EncodeToMemory(block) + return certPem, nil +} + +func ReadCertificateFromPem(certPem []byte) (*Certificate, error) { + block, _ := pem.Decode(certPem) + if block == nil { + return nil, errors.New("failed to decode certificate request") + } + return ParseCertificate(block.Bytes) +} + +// CreateCertificate creates a new certificate based on a template. The +// following members of template are used: SerialNumber, Subject, NotBefore, +// NotAfter, KeyUsage, ExtKeyUsage, UnknownExtKeyUsage, BasicConstraintsValid, +// IsCA, MaxPathLen, SubjectKeyId, DNSNames, PermittedDNSDomainsCritical, +// PermittedDNSDomains, SignatureAlgorithm. +// +// The certificate is signed by parent. If parent is equal to template then the +// certificate is self-signed. The parameter pub is the public key of the +// signee and priv is the private key of the signer. +// +// The returned slice is the certificate in DER encoding. +// +// All keys types that are implemented via crypto.Signer are supported (This +// includes *rsa.PublicKey and *ecdsa.PublicKey.) +func CreateCertificate(template, parent *Certificate, publicKey *sm2.PublicKey, signer crypto.Signer) ([]byte, error) { + if template.SerialNumber == nil { + return nil, errors.New("x509: no SerialNumber given") + } + + hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(signer.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err := marshalPublicKey(publicKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + asn1Issuer, err := subjectBytes(parent) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + asn1Subject, err := subjectBytes(template) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if !bytes.Equal(asn1Issuer, asn1Subject) && len(parent.SubjectKeyId) > 0 { + template.AuthorityKeyId = parent.SubjectKeyId + } + + extensions, err := buildExtensions(template) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + encodedPublicKey := asn1.BitString{BitLength: len(publicKeyBytes) * 8, Bytes: publicKeyBytes} + c := tbsCertificate{ + Version: 2, + SerialNumber: template.SerialNumber, + SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm, + Issuer: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Issuer}, + Validity: validity{template.NotBefore.UTC(), template.NotAfter.UTC()}, + Subject: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Subject}, + PublicKey: publicKeyInfo{nil, publicKeyAlgorithm, encodedPublicKey}, + Extensions: extensions, + } + + tbsCertContents, err := asn1.Marshal(c) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + c.Raw = tbsCertContents + + digest := tbsCertContents + switch template.SignatureAlgorithm { + case SM2WithSM3, SM2WithSHA1, SM2WithSHA256: + break + default: + h := hashFunc.New() + h.Write(tbsCertContents) + digest = h.Sum(nil) + } + + var signerOpts crypto.SignerOpts + signerOpts = hashFunc + if template.SignatureAlgorithm != 0 && template.SignatureAlgorithm.isRSAPSS() { + signerOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{ + SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, + Hash: crypto.Hash(hashFunc), + } + } + + var signature []byte + signature, err = signer.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, signerOpts) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return asn1.Marshal(certificate{ + nil, + c, + signatureAlgorithm, + asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8}, + }) +} + +// CreateCertificateToPem creates a new certificate based on a template and +// encodes it to PEM format. It uses CreateCertificate to create certificate +// and returns its PEM format. +func CreateCertificateToPem(template, parent *Certificate, pubKey *sm2.PublicKey, signer crypto.Signer) ([]byte, error) { + der, err := CreateCertificate(template, parent, pubKey, signer) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + block := &pem.Block{ + Type: "CERTIFICATE", + Bytes: der, + } + certPem := pem.EncodeToMemory(block) + return certPem, nil +} + +func ParseSm2CertifateToX509(asn1data []byte) (*x509.Certificate, error) { + sm2Cert, err := ParseCertificate(asn1data) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return sm2Cert.ToX509Certificate(), nil +} +// 32byte +func zeroByteSlice() []byte { + return []byte{ + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, + } +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/verify.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/verify.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..74419ecb --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/verify.go @@ -0,0 +1,568 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +package x509 + +import ( + "bytes" + "errors" + "fmt" + "net" + "runtime" + "strings" + "time" + "unicode/utf8" +) + +type InvalidReason int + +const ( + // NotAuthorizedToSign results when a certificate is signed by another + // which isn't marked as a CA certificate. + NotAuthorizedToSign InvalidReason = iota + // Expired results when a certificate has expired, based on the time + // given in the VerifyOptions. + Expired + // CANotAuthorizedForThisName results when an intermediate or root + // certificate has a name constraint which doesn't include the name + // being checked. + CANotAuthorizedForThisName + // TooManyIntermediates results when a path length constraint is + // violated. + TooManyIntermediates + // IncompatibleUsage results when the certificate's key usage indicates + // that it may only be used for a different purpose. + IncompatibleUsage + // NameMismatch results when the subject name of a parent certificate + // does not match the issuer name in the child. + NameMismatch +) + +// CertificateInvalidError results when an odd error occurs. Users of this +// library probably want to handle all these errors uniformly. +type CertificateInvalidError struct { + Cert *Certificate + Reason InvalidReason +} + +func (e CertificateInvalidError) Error() string { + switch e.Reason { + case NotAuthorizedToSign: + return "x509: certificate is not authorized to sign other certificates" + case Expired: + return "x509: certificate has expired or is not yet valid" + case CANotAuthorizedForThisName: + return "x509: a root or intermediate certificate is not authorized to sign in this domain" + case TooManyIntermediates: + return "x509: too many intermediates for path length constraint" + case IncompatibleUsage: + return "x509: certificate specifies an incompatible key usage" + case NameMismatch: + return "x509: issuer name does not match subject from issuing certificate" + } + return "x509: unknown error" +} + +// HostnameError results when the set of authorized names doesn't match the +// requested name. +type HostnameError struct { + Certificate *Certificate + Host string +} + +func (h HostnameError) Error() string { + c := h.Certificate + + var valid string + if ip := net.ParseIP(h.Host); ip != nil { + // Trying to validate an IP + if len(c.IPAddresses) == 0 { + return "x509: cannot validate certificate for " + h.Host + " because it doesn't contain any IP SANs" + } + for _, san := range c.IPAddresses { + if len(valid) > 0 { + valid += ", " + } + valid += san.String() + } + } else { + if len(c.DNSNames) > 0 { + valid = strings.Join(c.DNSNames, ", ") + } else { + valid = c.Subject.CommonName + } + } + + if len(valid) == 0 { + return "x509: certificate is not valid for any names, but wanted to match " + h.Host + } + return "x509: certificate is valid for " + valid + ", not " + h.Host +} + +// UnknownAuthorityError results when the certificate issuer is unknown +type UnknownAuthorityError struct { + Cert *Certificate + // hintErr contains an error that may be helpful in determining why an + // authority wasn't found. + hintErr error + // hintCert contains a possible authority certificate that was rejected + // because of the error in hintErr. + hintCert *Certificate +} + +func (e UnknownAuthorityError) Error() string { + s := "x509: certificate signed by unknown authority" + if e.hintErr != nil { + certName := e.hintCert.Subject.CommonName + if len(certName) == 0 { + if len(e.hintCert.Subject.Organization) > 0 { + certName = e.hintCert.Subject.Organization[0] + } else { + certName = "serial:" + e.hintCert.SerialNumber.String() + } + } + s += fmt.Sprintf(" (possibly because of %q while trying to verify candidate authority certificate %q)", e.hintErr, certName) + } + return s +} + +// SystemRootsError results when we fail to load the system root certificates. +type SystemRootsError struct { + Err error +} + +func (se SystemRootsError) Error() string { + msg := "x509: failed to load system roots and no roots provided" + if se.Err != nil { + return msg + "; " + se.Err.Error() + } + return msg +} + +// errNotParsed is returned when a certificate without ASN.1 contents is +// verified. Platform-specific verification needs the ASN.1 contents. +var errNotParsed = errors.New("x509: missing ASN.1 contents; use ParseCertificate") + +// VerifyOptions contains parameters for Certificate.Verify. It's a structure +// because other PKIX verification APIs have ended up needing many options. +type VerifyOptions struct { + DNSName string + Intermediates *CertPool + Roots *CertPool // if nil, the system roots are used + CurrentTime time.Time // if zero, the current time is used + // KeyUsage specifies which Extended Key Usage values are acceptable. + // An empty list means ExtKeyUsageServerAuth. Key usage is considered a + // constraint down the chain which mirrors Windows CryptoAPI behavior, + // but not the spec. To accept any key usage, include ExtKeyUsageAny. + KeyUsages []ExtKeyUsage +} + +const ( + leafCertificate = iota + intermediateCertificate + rootCertificate +) + +func matchNameConstraint(domain, constraint string) bool { + // The meaning of zero length constraints is not specified, but this + // code follows NSS and accepts them as valid for everything. + if len(constraint) == 0 { + return true + } + + if len(domain) < len(constraint) { + return false + } + + prefixLen := len(domain) - len(constraint) + if !strings.EqualFold(domain[prefixLen:], constraint) { + return false + } + + if prefixLen == 0 { + return true + } + + isSubdomain := domain[prefixLen-1] == '.' + constraintHasLeadingDot := constraint[0] == '.' + return isSubdomain != constraintHasLeadingDot +} + +// isValid performs validity checks on the c. +func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *VerifyOptions) error { + if len(currentChain) > 0 { + child := currentChain[len(currentChain)-1] + if !bytes.Equal(child.RawIssuer, c.RawSubject) { + return CertificateInvalidError{c, NameMismatch} + } + } + now := opts.CurrentTime + if now.IsZero() { + now = time.Now() + } + if now.Before(c.NotBefore) || now.After(c.NotAfter) { + return CertificateInvalidError{c, Expired} + } + if len(c.PermittedDNSDomains) > 0 { + ok := false + for _, constraint := range c.PermittedDNSDomains { + ok = matchNameConstraint(opts.DNSName, constraint) + if ok { + break + } + } + + if !ok { + return CertificateInvalidError{c, CANotAuthorizedForThisName} + } + } + + // KeyUsage status flags are ignored. From Engineering Security, Peter + // Gutmann: A European government CA marked its signing certificates as + // being valid for encryption only, but no-one noticed. Another + // European CA marked its signature keys as not being valid for + // signatures. A different CA marked its own trusted root certificate + // as being invalid for certificate signing. Another national CA + // distributed a certificate to be used to encrypt data for the + // country’s tax authority that was marked as only being usable for + // digital signatures but not for encryption. Yet another CA reversed + // the order of the bit flags in the keyUsage due to confusion over + // encoding endianness, essentially setting a random keyUsage in + // certificates that it issued. Another CA created a self-invalidating + // certificate by adding a certificate policy statement stipulating + // that the certificate had to be used strictly as specified in the + // keyUsage, and a keyUsage containing a flag indicating that the RSA + // encryption key could only be used for Diffie-Hellman key agreement. + + if certType == intermediateCertificate && (!c.BasicConstraintsValid || !c.IsCA) { + return CertificateInvalidError{c, NotAuthorizedToSign} + } + + if c.BasicConstraintsValid && c.MaxPathLen >= 0 { + numIntermediates := len(currentChain) - 1 + if numIntermediates > c.MaxPathLen { + return CertificateInvalidError{c, TooManyIntermediates} + } + } + + return nil +} + +// Verify attempts to verify c by building one or more chains from c to a +// certificate in opts.Roots, using certificates in opts.Intermediates if +// needed. If successful, it returns one or more chains where the first +// element of the chain is c and the last element is from opts.Roots. +// +// If opts.Roots is nil and system roots are unavailable the returned error +// will be of type SystemRootsError. +// +// WARNING: this doesn't do any revocation checking. +func (c *Certificate) Verify(opts VerifyOptions) (chains [][]*Certificate, err error) { + // Platform-specific verification needs the ASN.1 contents so + // this makes the behavior consistent across platforms. + if len(c.Raw) == 0 { + return nil, errNotParsed + } + if opts.Intermediates != nil { + for _, intermediate := range opts.Intermediates.certs { + if len(intermediate.Raw) == 0 { + return nil, errNotParsed + } + } + } + + // Use Windows's own verification and chain building. + if opts.Roots == nil && runtime.GOOS == "windows" { + return c.systemVerify(&opts) + } + + if len(c.UnhandledCriticalExtensions) > 0 { + return nil, UnhandledCriticalExtension{} + } + + if opts.Roots == nil { + opts.Roots = systemRootsPool() + if opts.Roots == nil { + return nil, SystemRootsError{systemRootsErr} + } + } + + err = c.isValid(leafCertificate, nil, &opts) + if err != nil { + return + } + + if len(opts.DNSName) > 0 { + err = c.VerifyHostname(opts.DNSName) + if err != nil { + return + } + } + + var candidateChains [][]*Certificate + if opts.Roots.contains(c) { + candidateChains = append(candidateChains, []*Certificate{c}) + } else { + if candidateChains, err = c.buildChains(make(map[int][][]*Certificate), []*Certificate{c}, &opts); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + + keyUsages := opts.KeyUsages + if len(keyUsages) == 0 { + keyUsages = []ExtKeyUsage{ExtKeyUsageServerAuth} + } + + // If any key usage is acceptable then we're done. + for _, usage := range keyUsages { + if usage == ExtKeyUsageAny { + chains = candidateChains + return + } + } + + for _, candidate := range candidateChains { + if checkChainForKeyUsage(candidate, keyUsages) { + chains = append(chains, candidate) + } + } + + if len(chains) == 0 { + err = CertificateInvalidError{c, IncompatibleUsage} + } + + return +} + +func appendToFreshChain(chain []*Certificate, cert *Certificate) []*Certificate { + n := make([]*Certificate, len(chain)+1) + copy(n, chain) + n[len(chain)] = cert + return n +} + +func (c *Certificate) buildChains(cache map[int][][]*Certificate, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *VerifyOptions) (chains [][]*Certificate, err error) { + possibleRoots, failedRoot, rootErr := opts.Roots.findVerifiedParents(c) +nextRoot: + for _, rootNum := range possibleRoots { + root := opts.Roots.certs[rootNum] + + for _, cert := range currentChain { + if cert.Equal(root) { + continue nextRoot + } + } + + err = root.isValid(rootCertificate, currentChain, opts) + if err != nil { + continue + } + chains = append(chains, appendToFreshChain(currentChain, root)) + } + + possibleIntermediates, failedIntermediate, intermediateErr := opts.Intermediates.findVerifiedParents(c) +nextIntermediate: + for _, intermediateNum := range possibleIntermediates { + intermediate := opts.Intermediates.certs[intermediateNum] + for _, cert := range currentChain { + if cert.Equal(intermediate) { + continue nextIntermediate + } + } + err = intermediate.isValid(intermediateCertificate, currentChain, opts) + if err != nil { + continue + } + var childChains [][]*Certificate + childChains, ok := cache[intermediateNum] + if !ok { + childChains, err = intermediate.buildChains(cache, appendToFreshChain(currentChain, intermediate), opts) + cache[intermediateNum] = childChains + } + chains = append(chains, childChains...) + } + + if len(chains) > 0 { + err = nil + } + + if len(chains) == 0 && err == nil { + hintErr := rootErr + hintCert := failedRoot + if hintErr == nil { + hintErr = intermediateErr + hintCert = failedIntermediate + } + err = UnknownAuthorityError{c, hintErr, hintCert} + } + + return +} + +func matchHostnames(pattern, host string) bool { + host = strings.TrimSuffix(host, ".") + pattern = strings.TrimSuffix(pattern, ".") + + if len(pattern) == 0 || len(host) == 0 { + return false + } + + patternParts := strings.Split(pattern, ".") + hostParts := strings.Split(host, ".") + + if len(patternParts) != len(hostParts) { + return false + } + + for i, patternPart := range patternParts { + if i == 0 && patternPart == "*" { + continue + } + if patternPart != hostParts[i] { + return false + } + } + + return true +} + +// toLowerCaseASCII returns a lower-case version of in. See RFC 6125 6.4.1. We use +// an explicitly ASCII function to avoid any sharp corners resulting from +// performing Unicode operations on DNS labels. +func toLowerCaseASCII(in string) string { + // If the string is already lower-case then there's nothing to do. + isAlreadyLowerCase := true + for _, c := range in { + if c == utf8.RuneError { + // If we get a UTF-8 error then there might be + // upper-case ASCII bytes in the invalid sequence. + isAlreadyLowerCase = false + break + } + if 'A' <= c && c <= 'Z' { + isAlreadyLowerCase = false + break + } + } + + if isAlreadyLowerCase { + return in + } + + out := []byte(in) + for i, c := range out { + if 'A' <= c && c <= 'Z' { + out[i] += 'a' - 'A' + } + } + return string(out) +} + +// VerifyHostname returns nil if c is a valid certificate for the named host. +// Otherwise it returns an error describing the mismatch. +func (c *Certificate) VerifyHostname(h string) error { + // IP addresses may be written in [ ]. + candidateIP := h + if len(h) >= 3 && h[0] == '[' && h[len(h)-1] == ']' { + candidateIP = h[1 : len(h)-1] + } + if ip := net.ParseIP(candidateIP); ip != nil { + // We only match IP addresses against IP SANs. + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#appendix-B.2 + for _, candidate := range c.IPAddresses { + if ip.Equal(candidate) { + return nil + } + } + return HostnameError{c, candidateIP} + } + + lowered := toLowerCaseASCII(h) + + if len(c.DNSNames) > 0 { + for _, match := range c.DNSNames { + if matchHostnames(toLowerCaseASCII(match), lowered) { + return nil + } + } + // If Subject Alt Name is given, we ignore the common name. + } else if matchHostnames(toLowerCaseASCII(c.Subject.CommonName), lowered) { + return nil + } + + return HostnameError{c, h} +} + +func checkChainForKeyUsage(chain []*Certificate, keyUsages []ExtKeyUsage) bool { + usages := make([]ExtKeyUsage, len(keyUsages)) + copy(usages, keyUsages) + + if len(chain) == 0 { + return false + } + + usagesRemaining := len(usages) + + // We walk down the list and cross out any usages that aren't supported + // by each certificate. If we cross out all the usages, then the chain + // is unacceptable. + +NextCert: + for i := len(chain) - 1; i >= 0; i-- { + cert := chain[i] + if len(cert.ExtKeyUsage) == 0 && len(cert.UnknownExtKeyUsage) == 0 { + // The certificate doesn't have any extended key usage specified. + continue + } + + for _, usage := range cert.ExtKeyUsage { + if usage == ExtKeyUsageAny { + // The certificate is explicitly good for any usage. + continue NextCert + } + } + + const invalidUsage ExtKeyUsage = -1 + + NextRequestedUsage: + for i, requestedUsage := range usages { + if requestedUsage == invalidUsage { + continue + } + + for _, usage := range cert.ExtKeyUsage { + if requestedUsage == usage { + continue NextRequestedUsage + } else if requestedUsage == ExtKeyUsageServerAuth && + (usage == ExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto || + usage == ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto) { + // In order to support COMODO + // certificate chains, we have to + // accept Netscape or Microsoft SGC + // usages as equal to ServerAuth. + continue NextRequestedUsage + } + } + + usages[i] = invalidUsage + usagesRemaining-- + if usagesRemaining == 0 { + return false + } + } + } + + return true +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/x509.go b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/x509.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ea92800a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509/x509.go @@ -0,0 +1,2609 @@ +/* +Copyright Suzhou Tongji Fintech Research Institute 2017 All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +limitations under the License. +*/ + +// crypto/x509 add sm2 support +package x509 + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/dsa" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/md5" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/sha1" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/sha512" + "crypto/x509" + "crypto/x509/pkix" + "encoding/asn1" + "encoding/pem" + "errors" + "fmt" + "hash" + "io" + "math/big" + "net" + "strconv" + "time" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2" + + "github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm3" + "golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160" + "golang.org/x/crypto/sha3" +) + +// pkixPublicKey reflects a PKIX public key structure. See SubjectPublicKeyInfo +// in RFC 3280. +type pkixPublicKey struct { + Algo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + BitString asn1.BitString +} + +// ParsePKIXPublicKey parses a DER encoded public key. These values are +// typically found in PEM blocks with "BEGIN PUBLIC KEY". +// +// Supported key types include RSA, DSA, and ECDSA. Unknown key +// types result in an error. +// +// On success, pub will be of type *rsa.PublicKey, *dsa.PublicKey, +// or *ecdsa.PublicKey. +func ParsePKIXPublicKey(derBytes []byte) (pub interface{}, err error) { + var pki publicKeyInfo + + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, &pki); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after ASN.1 of public-key") + } + algo := getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(pki.Algorithm.Algorithm) + if algo == UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm { + return nil, errors.New("x509: unknown public key algorithm") + } + return parsePublicKey(algo, &pki) +} + +func marshalPublicKey(pub interface{}) (publicKeyBytes []byte, publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier, err error) { + switch pub := pub.(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey: + publicKeyBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(rsaPublicKey{ + N: pub.N, + E: pub.E, + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, err + } + publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyRSA + // This is a NULL parameters value which is required by + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3279#section-2.3.1. + publicKeyAlgorithm.Parameters = asn1.RawValue{ + Tag: 5, + } + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + publicKeyBytes = elliptic.Marshal(pub.Curve, pub.X, pub.Y) + oid, ok := oidFromNamedCurve(pub.Curve) + if !ok { + return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, errors.New("x509: unsupported elliptic curve") + } + publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyECDSA + var paramBytes []byte + paramBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(oid) + if err != nil { + return + } + publicKeyAlgorithm.Parameters.FullBytes = paramBytes + case *sm2.PublicKey: + publicKeyBytes = elliptic.Marshal(pub.Curve, pub.X, pub.Y) + oid, ok := oidFromNamedCurve(pub.Curve) + if !ok { + return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, errors.New("x509: unsupported SM2 curve") + } + publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyECDSA + var paramBytes []byte + paramBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(oid) + if err != nil { + return + } + publicKeyAlgorithm.Parameters.FullBytes = paramBytes + default: + return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, errors.New("x509: only RSA and ECDSA(SM2) public keys supported") + } + + return publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, nil +} + +// MarshalPKIXPublicKey serialises a public key to DER-encoded PKIX format. +func MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pub interface{}) ([]byte, error) { + var publicKeyBytes []byte + var publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + var err error + + if publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err = marshalPublicKey(pub); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + pkix := pkixPublicKey{ + Algo: publicKeyAlgorithm, + BitString: asn1.BitString{ + Bytes: publicKeyBytes, + BitLength: 8 * len(publicKeyBytes), + }, + } + + ret, _ := asn1.Marshal(pkix) + return ret, nil +} + +// These structures reflect the ASN.1 structure of X.509 certificates.: + +type certificate struct { + Raw asn1.RawContent + TBSCertificate tbsCertificate + SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + SignatureValue asn1.BitString +} + +type tbsCertificate struct { + Raw asn1.RawContent + Version int `asn1:"optional,explicit,default:0,tag:0"` + SerialNumber *big.Int + SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + Issuer asn1.RawValue + Validity validity + Subject asn1.RawValue + PublicKey publicKeyInfo + UniqueId asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:1"` + SubjectUniqueId asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:2"` + Extensions []pkix.Extension `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:3"` +} + +type dsaAlgorithmParameters struct { + P, Q, G *big.Int +} + +type dsaSignature struct { + R, S *big.Int +} + +type ecdsaSignature dsaSignature + +type validity struct { + NotBefore, NotAfter time.Time +} + +type publicKeyInfo struct { + Raw asn1.RawContent + Algorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + PublicKey asn1.BitString +} + +// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.1 +type authKeyId struct { + Id []byte `asn1:"optional,tag:0"` +} + +type SignatureAlgorithm int + +type Hash uint + +func init() { + RegisterHash(MD4, nil) + RegisterHash(MD5, md5.New) + RegisterHash(SHA1, sha1.New) + RegisterHash(SHA224, sha256.New224) + RegisterHash(SHA256, sha256.New) + RegisterHash(SHA384, sha512.New384) + RegisterHash(SHA512, sha512.New) + RegisterHash(MD5SHA1, nil) + RegisterHash(RIPEMD160, ripemd160.New) + RegisterHash(SHA3_224, sha3.New224) + RegisterHash(SHA3_256, sha3.New256) + RegisterHash(SHA3_384, sha3.New384) + RegisterHash(SHA3_512, sha3.New512) + RegisterHash(SHA512_224, sha512.New512_224) + RegisterHash(SHA512_256, sha512.New512_256) + RegisterHash(SM3, sm3.New) +} + +// HashFunc simply returns the value of h so that Hash implements SignerOpts. +func (h Hash) HashFunc() crypto.Hash { + return crypto.Hash(h) +} + +const ( + MD4 Hash = 1 + iota // import golang.org/x/crypto/md4 + MD5 // import crypto/md5 + SHA1 // import crypto/sha1 + SHA224 // import crypto/sha256 + SHA256 // import crypto/sha256 + SHA384 // import crypto/sha512 + SHA512 // import crypto/sha512 + MD5SHA1 // no implementation; MD5+SHA1 used for TLS RSA + RIPEMD160 // import golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160 + SHA3_224 // import golang.org/x/crypto/sha3 + SHA3_256 // import golang.org/x/crypto/sha3 + SHA3_384 // import golang.org/x/crypto/sha3 + SHA3_512 // import golang.org/x/crypto/sha3 + SHA512_224 // import crypto/sha512 + SHA512_256 // import crypto/sha512 + SM3 + maxHash +) + +var digestSizes = []uint8{ + MD4: 16, + MD5: 16, + SHA1: 20, + SHA224: 28, + SHA256: 32, + SHA384: 48, + SHA512: 64, + SHA512_224: 28, + SHA512_256: 32, + SHA3_224: 28, + SHA3_256: 32, + SHA3_384: 48, + SHA3_512: 64, + MD5SHA1: 36, + RIPEMD160: 20, + SM3: 32, +} + +// Size returns the length, in bytes, of a digest resulting from the given hash +// function. It doesn't require that the hash function in question be linked +// into the program. +func (h Hash) Size() int { + if h > 0 && h < maxHash { + return int(digestSizes[h]) + } + panic("crypto: Size of unknown hash function") +} + +var hashes = make([]func() hash.Hash, maxHash) + +// New returns a new hash.Hash calculating the given hash function. New panics +// if the hash function is not linked into the binary. +func (h Hash) New() hash.Hash { + if h > 0 && h < maxHash { + f := hashes[h] + if f != nil { + return f() + } + } + panic("crypto: requested hash function #" + strconv.Itoa(int(h)) + " is unavailable") +} + +// Available reports whether the given hash function is linked into the binary. +func (h Hash) Available() bool { + return h < maxHash && hashes[h] != nil +} + +// RegisterHash registers a function that returns a new instance of the given +// hash function. This is intended to be called from the init function in +// packages that implement hash functions. +func RegisterHash(h Hash, f func() hash.Hash) { + if h >= maxHash { + panic("crypto: RegisterHash of unknown hash function") + } + hashes[h] = f +} + +const ( + UnknownSignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm = iota + MD2WithRSA + MD5WithRSA + // SM3WithRSA reserve + SHA1WithRSA + SHA256WithRSA + SHA384WithRSA + SHA512WithRSA + DSAWithSHA1 + DSAWithSHA256 + ECDSAWithSHA1 + ECDSAWithSHA256 + ECDSAWithSHA384 + ECDSAWithSHA512 + SHA256WithRSAPSS + SHA384WithRSAPSS + SHA512WithRSAPSS + SM2WithSM3 + SM2WithSHA1 + SM2WithSHA256 +) + +func (algo SignatureAlgorithm) isRSAPSS() bool { + switch algo { + case SHA256WithRSAPSS, SHA384WithRSAPSS, SHA512WithRSAPSS: + return true + default: + return false + } +} + +var algoName = [...]string{ + MD2WithRSA: "MD2-RSA", + MD5WithRSA: "MD5-RSA", + SHA1WithRSA: "SHA1-RSA", + // SM3WithRSA: "SM3-RSA", reserve + SHA256WithRSA: "SHA256-RSA", + SHA384WithRSA: "SHA384-RSA", + SHA512WithRSA: "SHA512-RSA", + SHA256WithRSAPSS: "SHA256-RSAPSS", + SHA384WithRSAPSS: "SHA384-RSAPSS", + SHA512WithRSAPSS: "SHA512-RSAPSS", + DSAWithSHA1: "DSA-SHA1", + DSAWithSHA256: "DSA-SHA256", + ECDSAWithSHA1: "ECDSA-SHA1", + ECDSAWithSHA256: "ECDSA-SHA256", + ECDSAWithSHA384: "ECDSA-SHA384", + ECDSAWithSHA512: "ECDSA-SHA512", + SM2WithSM3: "SM2-SM3", + SM2WithSHA1: "SM2-SHA1", + SM2WithSHA256: "SM2-SHA256", +} + +func (algo SignatureAlgorithm) String() string { + if 0 < algo && int(algo) < len(algoName) { + return algoName[algo] + } + return strconv.Itoa(int(algo)) +} + +type PublicKeyAlgorithm int + +const ( + UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm PublicKeyAlgorithm = iota + RSA + DSA + ECDSA + SM2 +) + +// OIDs for signature algorithms +// +// pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +// iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } +// +// +// RFC 3279 2.2.1 RSA Signature Algorithms +// +// md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 2 } +// +// md5WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 4 } +// +// sha-1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 5 } +// +// dsaWithSha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +// iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 3 } +// +// RFC 3279 2.2.3 ECDSA Signature Algorithm +// +// ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +// iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x962(10045) +// signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA1(1)} +// +// +// RFC 4055 5 PKCS #1 Version 1.5 +// +// sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 11 } +// +// sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 12 } +// +// sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 13 } +// +// +// RFC 5758 3.1 DSA Signature Algorithms +// +// dsaWithSha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +// joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) +// csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 2} +// +// RFC 5758 3.2 ECDSA Signature Algorithm +// +// ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) +// us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 } +// +// ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) +// us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 } +// +// ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) +// us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } + +var ( + oidSignatureMD2WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 2} + oidSignatureMD5WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 4} + oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 5} + oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 11} + oidSignatureSHA384WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 12} + oidSignatureSHA512WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 13} + oidSignatureRSAPSS = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 10} + oidSignatureDSAWithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10040, 4, 3} + oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 3, 2} + oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 1} + oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 2} + oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 3} + oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 4} + oidSignatureSM2WithSM3 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 501} + oidSignatureSM2WithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 502} + oidSignatureSM2WithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 503} + // oidSignatureSM3WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 504} + + oidSM3 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 401, 1} + oidSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1} + oidSHA384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2} + oidSHA512 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3} + oidHashSM3 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 401} + + oidMGF1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 8} + + // oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA means the same as oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA + // but it's specified by ISO. Microsoft's makecert.exe has been known + // to produce certificates with this OID. + oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 14, 3, 2, 29} +) + +var signatureAlgorithmDetails = []struct { + algo SignatureAlgorithm + oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier + pubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm + hash Hash +}{ + {MD2WithRSA, oidSignatureMD2WithRSA, RSA, Hash(0) /* no value for MD2 */}, + {MD5WithRSA, oidSignatureMD5WithRSA, RSA, MD5}, + {SHA1WithRSA, oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA, RSA, SHA1}, + {SHA1WithRSA, oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA, RSA, SHA1}, + {SHA256WithRSA, oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA, RSA, SHA256}, + {SHA384WithRSA, oidSignatureSHA384WithRSA, RSA, SHA384}, + {SHA512WithRSA, oidSignatureSHA512WithRSA, RSA, SHA512}, + {SHA256WithRSAPSS, oidSignatureRSAPSS, RSA, SHA256}, + {SHA384WithRSAPSS, oidSignatureRSAPSS, RSA, SHA384}, + {SHA512WithRSAPSS, oidSignatureRSAPSS, RSA, SHA512}, + {DSAWithSHA1, oidSignatureDSAWithSHA1, DSA, SHA1}, + {DSAWithSHA256, oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256, DSA, SHA256}, + {ECDSAWithSHA1, oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA1, ECDSA, SHA1}, + {ECDSAWithSHA256, oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256, ECDSA, SHA256}, + {ECDSAWithSHA384, oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384, ECDSA, SHA384}, + {ECDSAWithSHA512, oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512, ECDSA, SHA512}, + {SM2WithSM3, oidSignatureSM2WithSM3, ECDSA, SM3}, + {SM2WithSHA1, oidSignatureSM2WithSHA1, ECDSA, SHA1}, + {SM2WithSHA256, oidSignatureSM2WithSHA256, ECDSA, SHA256}, + // {SM3WithRSA, oidSignatureSM3WithRSA, RSA, SM3}, +} + +// pssParameters reflects the parameters in an AlgorithmIdentifier that +// specifies RSA PSS. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.2.3 +type pssParameters struct { + // The following three fields are not marked as + // optional because the default values specify SHA-1, + // which is no longer suitable for use in signatures. + Hash pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier `asn1:"explicit,tag:0"` + MGF pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier `asn1:"explicit,tag:1"` + SaltLength int `asn1:"explicit,tag:2"` + TrailerField int `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:3,default:1"` +} + +// rsaPSSParameters returns an asn1.RawValue suitable for use as the Parameters +// in an AlgorithmIdentifier that specifies RSA PSS. +func rsaPSSParameters(hashFunc Hash) asn1.RawValue { + var hashOID asn1.ObjectIdentifier + + switch hashFunc { + case SHA256: + hashOID = oidSHA256 + case SHA384: + hashOID = oidSHA384 + case SHA512: + hashOID = oidSHA512 + } + + params := pssParameters{ + Hash: pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{ + Algorithm: hashOID, + Parameters: asn1.RawValue{ + Tag: 5, /* ASN.1 NULL */ + }, + }, + MGF: pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{ + Algorithm: oidMGF1, + }, + SaltLength: hashFunc.Size(), + TrailerField: 1, + } + + mgf1Params := pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{ + Algorithm: hashOID, + Parameters: asn1.RawValue{ + Tag: 5, /* ASN.1 NULL */ + }, + } + + var err error + params.MGF.Parameters.FullBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(mgf1Params) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + + serialized, err := asn1.Marshal(params) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + + return asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: serialized} +} + +func getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(ai pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier) SignatureAlgorithm { + if !ai.Algorithm.Equal(oidSignatureRSAPSS) { + for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails { + if ai.Algorithm.Equal(details.oid) { + return details.algo + } + } + return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm + } + + // RSA PSS is special because it encodes important parameters + // in the Parameters. + + var params pssParameters + if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(ai.Parameters.FullBytes, ¶ms); err != nil { + return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm + } + + var mgf1HashFunc pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(params.MGF.Parameters.FullBytes, &mgf1HashFunc); err != nil { + return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm + } + + // PSS is greatly overburdened with options. This code forces + // them into three buckets by requiring that the MGF1 hash + // function always match the message hash function (as + // recommended in + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#section-8.1), that the + // salt length matches the hash length, and that the trailer + // field has the default value. + asn1NULL := []byte{0x05, 0x00} + if !bytes.Equal(params.Hash.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1NULL) || + !params.MGF.Algorithm.Equal(oidMGF1) || + !mgf1HashFunc.Algorithm.Equal(params.Hash.Algorithm) || + !bytes.Equal(mgf1HashFunc.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1NULL) || + params.TrailerField != 1 { + return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm + } + + switch { + case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA256) && params.SaltLength == 32: + return SHA256WithRSAPSS + case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA384) && params.SaltLength == 48: + return SHA384WithRSAPSS + case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA512) && params.SaltLength == 64: + return SHA512WithRSAPSS + } + + return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm +} + +// RFC 3279, 2.3 Public Key Algorithms +// +// pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) +// rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } +// +// rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { pkcs1-1 1 } +// +// id-dsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) +// x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 1 } +// +// RFC 5480, 2.1.1 Unrestricted Algorithm Identifier and Parameters +// +// id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +// iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } +var ( + oidPublicKeyRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1} + oidPublicKeyDSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10040, 4, 1} + oidPublicKeyECDSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 2, 1} +) + +func getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) PublicKeyAlgorithm { + switch { + case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyRSA): + return RSA + case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyDSA): + return DSA + case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyECDSA): + return ECDSA + } + return UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm +} + +// RFC 5480, 2.1.1.1. Named Curve +// +// secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +// iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 } +// +// secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +// iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) +// prime(1) 7 } +// +// secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +// iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 } +// +// secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +// iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 } +// +// NB: secp256r1 is equivalent to prime256v1 +var ( + oidNamedCurveP224 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 33} + oidNamedCurveP256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 3, 1, 7} + oidNamedCurveP384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 34} + oidNamedCurveP521 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 35} + oidNamedCurveP256SM2 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 301} // I get the SM2 ID through parsing the pem file generated by gmssl +) + +func namedCurveFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) elliptic.Curve { + switch { + case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP224): + return elliptic.P224() + case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP256): + return elliptic.P256() + case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP384): + return elliptic.P384() + case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP521): + return elliptic.P521() + case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP256SM2): + return sm2.P256Sm2() + } + return nil +} + +func oidFromNamedCurve(curve elliptic.Curve) (asn1.ObjectIdentifier, bool) { + switch curve { + case elliptic.P224(): + return oidNamedCurveP224, true + case elliptic.P256(): + return oidNamedCurveP256, true + case elliptic.P384(): + return oidNamedCurveP384, true + case elliptic.P521(): + return oidNamedCurveP521, true + case sm2.P256Sm2(): + return oidNamedCurveP256SM2, true + } + return nil, false +} + +// KeyUsage represents the set of actions that are valid for a given key. It's +// a bitmap of the KeyUsage* constants. +type KeyUsage int + +const ( + KeyUsageDigitalSignature KeyUsage = 1 << iota + KeyUsageContentCommitment + KeyUsageKeyEncipherment + KeyUsageDataEncipherment + KeyUsageKeyAgreement + KeyUsageCertSign + KeyUsageCRLSign + KeyUsageEncipherOnly + KeyUsageDecipherOnly +) + +// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.12 Extended Key Usage +// +// anyExtendedKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-extKeyUsage 0 } +// +// id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 } +// +// id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } +// id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 } +// id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 } +// id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 } +// id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 } +// id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } +var ( + oidExtKeyUsageAny = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 37, 0} + oidExtKeyUsageServerAuth = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 1} + oidExtKeyUsageClientAuth = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 2} + oidExtKeyUsageCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 3} + oidExtKeyUsageEmailProtection = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 4} + oidExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 5} + oidExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 6} + oidExtKeyUsageIPSECUser = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 7} + oidExtKeyUsageTimeStamping = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 8} + oidExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 9} + oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 10, 3, 3} + oidExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 113730, 4, 1} +) + +// ExtKeyUsage represents an extended set of actions that are valid for a given key. +// Each of the ExtKeyUsage* constants define a unique action. +type ExtKeyUsage int + +const ( + ExtKeyUsageAny ExtKeyUsage = iota + ExtKeyUsageServerAuth + ExtKeyUsageClientAuth + ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning + ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection + ExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem + ExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel + ExtKeyUsageIPSECUser + ExtKeyUsageTimeStamping + ExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning + ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto + ExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto +) + +// extKeyUsageOIDs contains the mapping between an ExtKeyUsage and its OID. +var extKeyUsageOIDs = []struct { + extKeyUsage ExtKeyUsage + oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier +}{ + {ExtKeyUsageAny, oidExtKeyUsageAny}, + {ExtKeyUsageServerAuth, oidExtKeyUsageServerAuth}, + {ExtKeyUsageClientAuth, oidExtKeyUsageClientAuth}, + {ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageCodeSigning}, + {ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection, oidExtKeyUsageEmailProtection}, + {ExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem}, + {ExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel}, + {ExtKeyUsageIPSECUser, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECUser}, + {ExtKeyUsageTimeStamping, oidExtKeyUsageTimeStamping}, + {ExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning, oidExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning}, + {ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto}, + {ExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto, oidExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto}, +} + +func extKeyUsageFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) (eku ExtKeyUsage, ok bool) { + for _, pair := range extKeyUsageOIDs { + if oid.Equal(pair.oid) { + return pair.extKeyUsage, true + } + } + return +} + +func oidFromExtKeyUsage(eku ExtKeyUsage) (oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier, ok bool) { + for _, pair := range extKeyUsageOIDs { + if eku == pair.extKeyUsage { + return pair.oid, true + } + } + return +} + +// A Certificate represents an X.509 certificate. +type Certificate struct { + Raw []byte // Complete ASN.1 DER content (certificate, signature algorithm and signature). + RawTBSCertificate []byte // Certificate part of raw ASN.1 DER content. + RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo []byte // DER encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo. + RawSubject []byte // DER encoded Subject + RawIssuer []byte // DER encoded Issuer + + Signature []byte + SignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm + + PublicKeyAlgorithm PublicKeyAlgorithm + PublicKey interface{} + + Version int + SerialNumber *big.Int + Issuer pkix.Name + Subject pkix.Name + NotBefore, NotAfter time.Time // Validity bounds. + KeyUsage KeyUsage + + // Extensions contains raw X.509 extensions. When parsing certificates, + // this can be used to extract non-critical extensions that are not + // parsed by this package. When marshaling certificates, the Extensions + // field is ignored, see ExtraExtensions. + Extensions []pkix.Extension + + // ExtraExtensions contains extensions to be copied, raw, into any + // marshaled certificates. Values override any extensions that would + // otherwise be produced based on the other fields. The ExtraExtensions + // field is not populated when parsing certificates, see Extensions. + ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension + + // UnhandledCriticalExtensions contains a list of extension IDs that + // were not (fully) processed when parsing. Verify will fail if this + // slice is non-empty, unless verification is delegated to an OS + // library which understands all the critical extensions. + // + // Users can access these extensions using Extensions and can remove + // elements from this slice if they believe that they have been + // handled. + UnhandledCriticalExtensions []asn1.ObjectIdentifier + + ExtKeyUsage []ExtKeyUsage // Sequence of extended key usages. + UnknownExtKeyUsage []asn1.ObjectIdentifier // Encountered extended key usages unknown to this package. + + BasicConstraintsValid bool // if true then the next two fields are valid. + IsCA bool + MaxPathLen int + // MaxPathLenZero indicates that BasicConstraintsValid==true and + // MaxPathLen==0 should be interpreted as an actual maximum path length + // of zero. Otherwise, that combination is interpreted as MaxPathLen + // not being set. + MaxPathLenZero bool + + SubjectKeyId []byte + AuthorityKeyId []byte + + // RFC 5280, 4.2.2.1 (Authority Information Access) + OCSPServer []string + IssuingCertificateURL []string + + // Subject Alternate Name values + DNSNames []string + EmailAddresses []string + IPAddresses []net.IP + + // Name constraints + PermittedDNSDomainsCritical bool // if true then the name constraints are marked critical. + PermittedDNSDomains []string + + // CRL Distribution Points + CRLDistributionPoints []string + + PolicyIdentifiers []asn1.ObjectIdentifier +} + +// ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm results from attempting to perform an operation that +// involves algorithms that are not currently implemented. +var ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm = errors.New("x509: cannot verify signature: algorithm unimplemented") + +// An InsecureAlgorithmError +type InsecureAlgorithmError SignatureAlgorithm + +func (e InsecureAlgorithmError) Error() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("x509: cannot verify signature: insecure algorithm %v", SignatureAlgorithm(e)) +} + +// ConstraintViolationError results when a requested usage is not permitted by +// a certificate. For example: checking a signature when the public key isn't a +// certificate signing key. +type ConstraintViolationError struct{} + +func (ConstraintViolationError) Error() string { + return "x509: invalid signature: parent certificate cannot sign this kind of certificate" +} + +func (c *Certificate) Equal(other *Certificate) bool { + return bytes.Equal(c.Raw, other.Raw) +} + +// Entrust have a broken root certificate (CN=Entrust.net Certification +// Authority (2048)) which isn't marked as a CA certificate and is thus invalid +// according to PKIX. +// We recognise this certificate by its SubjectPublicKeyInfo and exempt it +// from the Basic Constraints requirement. +// See http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=7869 +// +// TODO(agl): remove this hack once their reissued root is sufficiently +// widespread. +var entrustBrokenSPKI = []byte{ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, + 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, + 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, + 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x97, 0xa3, 0x2d, 0x3c, 0x9e, 0xde, 0x05, + 0xda, 0x13, 0xc2, 0x11, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x8e, 0xe3, + 0x7f, 0xc7, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x5a, 0x9f, 0xb3, 0xff, + 0x62, 0xab, 0x73, 0xc8, 0x28, 0x6b, 0xba, 0x10, + 0x64, 0x82, 0x87, 0x13, 0xcd, 0x57, 0x18, 0xff, + 0x28, 0xce, 0xc0, 0xe6, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x91, 0x50, + 0x29, 0x83, 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xc3, 0x2a, 0xdb, 0xd8, + 0xdb, 0x4e, 0x04, 0xcc, 0x00, 0xeb, 0x8b, 0xb6, + 0x96, 0xdc, 0xbc, 0xaa, 0xfa, 0x52, 0x77, 0x04, + 0xc1, 0xdb, 0x19, 0xe4, 0xae, 0x9c, 0xfd, 0x3c, + 0x8b, 0x03, 0xef, 0x4d, 0xbc, 0x1a, 0x03, 0x65, + 0xf9, 0xc1, 0xb1, 0x3f, 0x72, 0x86, 0xf2, 0x38, + 0xaa, 0x19, 0xae, 0x10, 0x88, 0x78, 0x28, 0xda, + 0x75, 0xc3, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x82, 0x02, 0x9c, 0xb9, + 0xc1, 0x65, 0x77, 0x76, 0x24, 0x4c, 0x98, 0xf7, + 0x6d, 0x31, 0x38, 0xfb, 0xdb, 0xfe, 0xdb, 0x37, + 0x02, 0x76, 0xa1, 0x18, 0x97, 0xa6, 0xcc, 0xde, + 0x20, 0x09, 0x49, 0x36, 0x24, 0x69, 0x42, 0xf6, + 0xe4, 0x37, 0x62, 0xf1, 0x59, 0x6d, 0xa9, 0x3c, + 0xed, 0x34, 0x9c, 0xa3, 0x8e, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0x3a, + 0xd7, 0xf7, 0x0a, 0x6f, 0xef, 0x2e, 0xd8, 0xd5, + 0x93, 0x5a, 0x7a, 0xed, 0x08, 0x49, 0x68, 0xe2, + 0x41, 0xe3, 0x5a, 0x90, 0xc1, 0x86, 0x55, 0xfc, + 0x51, 0x43, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0xb2, 0xc4, 0x67, 0xb4, + 0xcb, 0x32, 0x31, 0x25, 0xf0, 0x54, 0x9f, 0x4b, + 0xd1, 0x6f, 0xdb, 0xd4, 0xdd, 0xfc, 0xaf, 0x5e, + 0x6c, 0x78, 0x90, 0x95, 0xde, 0xca, 0x3a, 0x48, + 0xb9, 0x79, 0x3c, 0x9b, 0x19, 0xd6, 0x75, 0x05, + 0xa0, 0xf9, 0x88, 0xd7, 0xc1, 0xe8, 0xa5, 0x09, + 0xe4, 0x1a, 0x15, 0xdc, 0x87, 0x23, 0xaa, 0xb2, + 0x75, 0x8c, 0x63, 0x25, 0x87, 0xd8, 0xf8, 0x3d, + 0xa6, 0xc2, 0xcc, 0x66, 0xff, 0xa5, 0x66, 0x68, + 0x55, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, +} + +// CheckSignatureFrom verifies that the signature on c is a valid signature +// from parent. +func (c *Certificate) CheckSignatureFrom(parent *Certificate) error { + // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.9: + // "If the basic constraints extension is not present in a version 3 + // certificate, or the extension is present but the cA boolean is not + // asserted, then the certified public key MUST NOT be used to verify + // certificate signatures." + // (except for Entrust, see comment above entrustBrokenSPKI) + if (parent.Version == 3 && !parent.BasicConstraintsValid || + parent.BasicConstraintsValid && !parent.IsCA) && + !bytes.Equal(c.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo, entrustBrokenSPKI) { + return ConstraintViolationError{} + } + + if parent.KeyUsage != 0 && parent.KeyUsage&KeyUsageCertSign == 0 { + return ConstraintViolationError{} + } + + if parent.PublicKeyAlgorithm == UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm { + return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm + } + + // TODO(agl): don't ignore the path length constraint. + + return parent.CheckSignature(c.SignatureAlgorithm, c.RawTBSCertificate, c.Signature) +} + +// CheckSignature verifies that signature is a valid signature over signed from +// c's public key. +func (c *Certificate) CheckSignature(algo SignatureAlgorithm, signed, signature []byte) error { + return checkSignature(algo, signed, signature, c.PublicKey) +} + +// CheckSignature verifies that signature is a valid signature over signed from +// a crypto.PublicKey. +func checkSignature(algo SignatureAlgorithm, signed, signature []byte, publicKey crypto.PublicKey) (err error) { + var hashType Hash + switch algo { + case SHA1WithRSA, DSAWithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1, SM2WithSHA1: + hashType = SHA1 + case SHA256WithRSA, SHA256WithRSAPSS, DSAWithSHA256, ECDSAWithSHA256, SM2WithSHA256: + hashType = SHA256 + case SHA384WithRSA, SHA384WithRSAPSS, ECDSAWithSHA384: + hashType = SHA384 + case SHA512WithRSA, SHA512WithRSAPSS, ECDSAWithSHA512: + hashType = SHA512 + case MD2WithRSA, MD5WithRSA: + return InsecureAlgorithmError(algo) + case SM2WithSM3: // SM3WithRSA reserve + hashType = SM3 + default: + return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm + } + + if !hashType.Available() { + return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm + } + fnHash := func() []byte { + h := hashType.New() + h.Write(signed) + return h.Sum(nil) + } + switch pub := publicKey.(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey: + if algo.isRSAPSS() { + return rsa.VerifyPSS(pub, crypto.Hash(hashType), fnHash(), signature, &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash}) + } else { + return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pub, crypto.Hash(hashType), fnHash(), signature) + } + case *dsa.PublicKey: + dsaSig := new(dsaSignature) + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(signature, dsaSig); err != nil { + return err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return errors.New("x509: trailing data after DSA signature") + } + if dsaSig.R.Sign() <= 0 || dsaSig.S.Sign() <= 0 { + return errors.New("x509: DSA signature contained zero or negative values") + } + if !dsa.Verify(pub, fnHash(), dsaSig.R, dsaSig.S) { + return errors.New("x509: DSA verification failure") + } + return + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + ecdsaSig := new(ecdsaSignature) + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(signature, ecdsaSig); err != nil { + return err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return errors.New("x509: trailing data after ECDSA signature") + } + if ecdsaSig.R.Sign() <= 0 || ecdsaSig.S.Sign() <= 0 { + return errors.New("x509: ECDSA signature contained zero or negative values") + } + switch pub.Curve { + case sm2.P256Sm2(): + sm2pub := &sm2.PublicKey{ + Curve: pub.Curve, + X: pub.X, + Y: pub.Y, + } + if !sm2.Sm2Verify(sm2pub, signed, nil, ecdsaSig.R, ecdsaSig.S) { + return errors.New("x509: SM2 verification failure") + } + default: + if !ecdsa.Verify(pub, fnHash(), ecdsaSig.R, ecdsaSig.S) { + return errors.New("x509: ECDSA verification failure") + } + } + return + } + return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm +} + +// CheckCRLSignature checks that the signature in crl is from c. +func (c *Certificate) CheckCRLSignature(crl *pkix.CertificateList) error { + algo := getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(crl.SignatureAlgorithm) + return c.CheckSignature(algo, crl.TBSCertList.Raw, crl.SignatureValue.RightAlign()) +} + +type UnhandledCriticalExtension struct{} + +func (h UnhandledCriticalExtension) Error() string { + return "x509: unhandled critical extension" +} + +type basicConstraints struct { + IsCA bool `asn1:"optional"` + MaxPathLen int `asn1:"optional,default:-1"` +} + +// RFC 5280 4.2.1.4 +type policyInformation struct { + Policy asn1.ObjectIdentifier + // policyQualifiers omitted +} + +// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.10 +type nameConstraints struct { + Permitted []generalSubtree `asn1:"optional,tag:0"` + Excluded []generalSubtree `asn1:"optional,tag:1"` +} + +type generalSubtree struct { + Name string `asn1:"tag:2,optional,ia5"` +} + +// RFC 5280, 4.2.2.1 +type authorityInfoAccess struct { + Method asn1.ObjectIdentifier + Location asn1.RawValue +} + +// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.14 +type distributionPoint struct { + DistributionPoint distributionPointName `asn1:"optional,tag:0"` + Reason asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:1"` + CRLIssuer asn1.RawValue `asn1:"optional,tag:2"` +} + +type distributionPointName struct { + FullName asn1.RawValue `asn1:"optional,tag:0"` + RelativeName pkix.RDNSequence `asn1:"optional,tag:1"` +} + +// asn1Null is the ASN.1 encoding of a NULL value. +var asn1Null = []byte{5, 0} + +func parsePublicKey(algo PublicKeyAlgorithm, keyData *publicKeyInfo) (interface{}, error) { + asn1Data := keyData.PublicKey.RightAlign() + switch algo { + case RSA: + // RSA public keys must have a NULL in the parameters + // (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3279#section-2.3.1). + if !bytes.Equal(keyData.Algorithm.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1Null) { + return nil, errors.New("x509: RSA key missing NULL parameters") + } + + p := new(rsaPublicKey) + rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, p) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after RSA public key") + } + + if p.N.Sign() <= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: RSA modulus is not a positive number") + } + if p.E <= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: RSA public exponent is not a positive number") + } + + pub := &rsa.PublicKey{ + E: p.E, + N: p.N, + } + return pub, nil + case DSA: + var p *big.Int + rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, &p) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after DSA public key") + } + paramsData := keyData.Algorithm.Parameters.FullBytes + params := new(dsaAlgorithmParameters) + rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(paramsData, params) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after DSA parameters") + } + if p.Sign() <= 0 || params.P.Sign() <= 0 || params.Q.Sign() <= 0 || params.G.Sign() <= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: zero or negative DSA parameter") + } + pub := &dsa.PublicKey{ + Parameters: dsa.Parameters{ + P: params.P, + Q: params.Q, + G: params.G, + }, + Y: p, + } + return pub, nil + case ECDSA: + paramsData := keyData.Algorithm.Parameters.FullBytes + namedCurveOID := new(asn1.ObjectIdentifier) + rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(paramsData, namedCurveOID) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after ECDSA parameters") + } + namedCurve := namedCurveFromOID(*namedCurveOID) + if namedCurve == nil { + return nil, errors.New("x509: unsupported elliptic curve") + } + x, y := elliptic.Unmarshal(namedCurve, asn1Data) + if x == nil { + return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to unmarshal elliptic curve point") + } + pub := &ecdsa.PublicKey{ + Curve: namedCurve, + X: x, + Y: y, + } + return pub, nil + default: + return nil, nil + } +} + +func parseSANExtension(value []byte) (dnsNames, emailAddresses []string, ipAddresses []net.IP, err error) { + // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.6 + + // SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames + // + // GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName + // + // GeneralName ::= CHOICE { + // otherName [0] OtherName, + // rfc822Name [1] IA5String, + // dNSName [2] IA5String, + // x400Address [3] ORAddress, + // directoryName [4] Name, + // ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, + // uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, + // iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, + // registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } + var seq asn1.RawValue + var rest []byte + if rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(value, &seq); err != nil { + return + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + err = errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 extension") + return + } + if !seq.IsCompound || seq.Tag != 16 || seq.Class != 0 { + err = asn1.StructuralError{Msg: "bad SAN sequence"} + return + } + + rest = seq.Bytes + for len(rest) > 0 { + var v asn1.RawValue + rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(rest, &v) + if err != nil { + return + } + switch v.Tag { + case 1: + emailAddresses = append(emailAddresses, string(v.Bytes)) + case 2: + dnsNames = append(dnsNames, string(v.Bytes)) + case 7: + switch len(v.Bytes) { + case net.IPv4len, net.IPv6len: + ipAddresses = append(ipAddresses, v.Bytes) + default: + err = errors.New("x509: certificate contained IP address of length " + strconv.Itoa(len(v.Bytes))) + return + } + } + } + + return +} + +func parseCertificate(in *certificate) (*Certificate, error) { + out := new(Certificate) + out.Raw = in.Raw + out.RawTBSCertificate = in.TBSCertificate.Raw + out.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo = in.TBSCertificate.PublicKey.Raw + out.RawSubject = in.TBSCertificate.Subject.FullBytes + out.RawIssuer = in.TBSCertificate.Issuer.FullBytes + + out.Signature = in.SignatureValue.RightAlign() + out.SignatureAlgorithm = + getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(in.TBSCertificate.SignatureAlgorithm) + + out.PublicKeyAlgorithm = + getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(in.TBSCertificate.PublicKey.Algorithm.Algorithm) + var err error + out.PublicKey, err = parsePublicKey(out.PublicKeyAlgorithm, &in.TBSCertificate.PublicKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + out.Version = in.TBSCertificate.Version + 1 + out.SerialNumber = in.TBSCertificate.SerialNumber + + var issuer, subject pkix.RDNSequence + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(in.TBSCertificate.Subject.FullBytes, &subject); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 subject") + } + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(in.TBSCertificate.Issuer.FullBytes, &issuer); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 subject") + } + + out.Issuer.FillFromRDNSequence(&issuer) + out.Subject.FillFromRDNSequence(&subject) + + out.NotBefore = in.TBSCertificate.Validity.NotBefore + out.NotAfter = in.TBSCertificate.Validity.NotAfter + + for _, e := range in.TBSCertificate.Extensions { + out.Extensions = append(out.Extensions, e) + unhandled := false + + if len(e.Id) == 4 && e.Id[0] == 2 && e.Id[1] == 5 && e.Id[2] == 29 { + switch e.Id[3] { + case 15: + // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.3 + var usageBits asn1.BitString + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &usageBits); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 KeyUsage") + } + + var usage int + for i := 0; i < 9; i++ { + if usageBits.At(i) != 0 { + usage |= 1 << uint(i) + } + } + out.KeyUsage = KeyUsage(usage) + + case 19: + // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.9 + var constraints basicConstraints + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &constraints); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 BasicConstraints") + } + + out.BasicConstraintsValid = true + out.IsCA = constraints.IsCA + out.MaxPathLen = constraints.MaxPathLen + out.MaxPathLenZero = out.MaxPathLen == 0 + + case 17: + out.DNSNames, out.EmailAddresses, out.IPAddresses, err = parseSANExtension(e.Value) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if len(out.DNSNames) == 0 && len(out.EmailAddresses) == 0 && len(out.IPAddresses) == 0 { + // If we didn't parse anything then we do the critical check, below. + unhandled = true + } + + case 30: + // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.10 + + // NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { + // permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL, + // excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL } + // + // GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree + // + // GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE { + // base GeneralName, + // minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0, + // maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL } + // + // BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) + + var constraints nameConstraints + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &constraints); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 NameConstraints") + } + + if len(constraints.Excluded) > 0 && e.Critical { + return out, UnhandledCriticalExtension{} + } + + for _, subtree := range constraints.Permitted { + if len(subtree.Name) == 0 { + if e.Critical { + return out, UnhandledCriticalExtension{} + } + continue + } + out.PermittedDNSDomains = append(out.PermittedDNSDomains, subtree.Name) + } + + case 31: + // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.13 + + // CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint + // + // DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { + // distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, + // reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, + // cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL } + // + // DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE { + // fullName [0] GeneralNames, + // nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName } + + var cdp []distributionPoint + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &cdp); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 CRL distribution point") + } + + for _, dp := range cdp { + // Per RFC 5280, 4.2.1.13, one of distributionPoint or cRLIssuer may be empty. + if len(dp.DistributionPoint.FullName.Bytes) == 0 { + continue + } + + var n asn1.RawValue + if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(dp.DistributionPoint.FullName.Bytes, &n); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // Trailing data after the fullName is + // allowed because other elements of + // the SEQUENCE can appear. + + if n.Tag == 6 { + out.CRLDistributionPoints = append(out.CRLDistributionPoints, string(n.Bytes)) + } + } + + case 35: + // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.1 + var a authKeyId + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &a); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 authority key-id") + } + out.AuthorityKeyId = a.Id + + case 37: + // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage + + // id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 } + // + // ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId + // + // KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + var keyUsage []asn1.ObjectIdentifier + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &keyUsage); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 ExtendedKeyUsage") + } + + for _, u := range keyUsage { + if extKeyUsage, ok := extKeyUsageFromOID(u); ok { + out.ExtKeyUsage = append(out.ExtKeyUsage, extKeyUsage) + } else { + out.UnknownExtKeyUsage = append(out.UnknownExtKeyUsage, u) + } + } + + case 14: + // RFC 5280, 4.2.1.2 + var keyid []byte + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &keyid); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 key-id") + } + out.SubjectKeyId = keyid + + case 32: + // RFC 5280 4.2.1.4: Certificate Policies + var policies []policyInformation + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &policies); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 certificate policies") + } + out.PolicyIdentifiers = make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, len(policies)) + for i, policy := range policies { + out.PolicyIdentifiers[i] = policy.Policy + } + + default: + // Unknown extensions are recorded if critical. + unhandled = true + } + } else if e.Id.Equal(oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess) { + // RFC 5280 4.2.2.1: Authority Information Access + var aia []authorityInfoAccess + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &aia); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 authority information") + } + + for _, v := range aia { + // GeneralName: uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String + if v.Location.Tag != 6 { + continue + } + if v.Method.Equal(oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp) { + out.OCSPServer = append(out.OCSPServer, string(v.Location.Bytes)) + } else if v.Method.Equal(oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers) { + out.IssuingCertificateURL = append(out.IssuingCertificateURL, string(v.Location.Bytes)) + } + } + } else { + // Unknown extensions are recorded if critical. + unhandled = true + } + + if e.Critical && unhandled { + out.UnhandledCriticalExtensions = append(out.UnhandledCriticalExtensions, e.Id) + } + } + + return out, nil +} + +// ParseCertificate parses a single certificate from the given ASN.1 DER data. +func ParseCertificate(asn1Data []byte) (*Certificate, error) { + var cert certificate + rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, &cert) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(rest) > 0 { + return nil, asn1.SyntaxError{Msg: "trailing data"} + } + + return parseCertificate(&cert) +} + +// ParseCertificates parses one or more certificates from the given ASN.1 DER +// data. The certificates must be concatenated with no intermediate padding. +func ParseCertificates(asn1Data []byte) ([]*Certificate, error) { + var v []*certificate + + for len(asn1Data) > 0 { + cert := new(certificate) + var err error + asn1Data, err = asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, cert) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + v = append(v, cert) + } + + ret := make([]*Certificate, len(v)) + for i, ci := range v { + cert, err := parseCertificate(ci) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ret[i] = cert + } + + return ret, nil +} + +func reverseBitsInAByte(in byte) byte { + b1 := in>>4 | in<<4 + b2 := b1>>2&0x33 | b1<<2&0xcc + b3 := b2>>1&0x55 | b2<<1&0xaa + return b3 +} + +// asn1BitLength returns the bit-length of bitString by considering the +// most-significant bit in a byte to be the "first" bit. This convention +// matches ASN.1, but differs from almost everything else. +func asn1BitLength(bitString []byte) int { + bitLen := len(bitString) * 8 + + for i := range bitString { + b := bitString[len(bitString)-i-1] + + for bit := uint(0); bit < 8; bit++ { + if (b>>bit)&1 == 1 { + return bitLen + } + bitLen-- + } + } + + return 0 +} + +var ( + oidExtensionSubjectKeyId = []int{2, 5, 29, 14} + oidExtensionKeyUsage = []int{2, 5, 29, 15} + oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage = []int{2, 5, 29, 37} + oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId = []int{2, 5, 29, 35} + oidExtensionBasicConstraints = []int{2, 5, 29, 19} + oidExtensionSubjectAltName = []int{2, 5, 29, 17} + oidExtensionCertificatePolicies = []int{2, 5, 29, 32} + oidExtensionNameConstraints = []int{2, 5, 29, 30} + oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints = []int{2, 5, 29, 31} + oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess = []int{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 1} + oidExtensionCRLNumber = []int{2, 5, 29, 20} +) + +var ( + oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 1} + oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 2} +) + +// oidNotInExtensions returns whether an extension with the given oid exists in +// extensions. +func oidInExtensions(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier, extensions []pkix.Extension) bool { + for _, e := range extensions { + if e.Id.Equal(oid) { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// marshalSANs marshals a list of addresses into a the contents of an X.509 +// SubjectAlternativeName extension. +func marshalSANs(dnsNames, emailAddresses []string, ipAddresses []net.IP) (derBytes []byte, err error) { + var rawValues []asn1.RawValue + for _, name := range dnsNames { + rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: 2, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)}) + } + for _, email := range emailAddresses { + rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: 1, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(email)}) + } + for _, rawIP := range ipAddresses { + // If possible, we always want to encode IPv4 addresses in 4 bytes. + ip := rawIP.To4() + if ip == nil { + ip = rawIP + } + rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: 7, Class: 2, Bytes: ip}) + } + return asn1.Marshal(rawValues) +} + +func buildExtensions(template *Certificate) (ret []pkix.Extension, err error) { + ret = make([]pkix.Extension, 10 /* maximum number of elements. */) + n := 0 + + if template.KeyUsage != 0 && + !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionKeyUsage, template.ExtraExtensions) { + ret[n].Id = oidExtensionKeyUsage + ret[n].Critical = true + + var a [2]byte + a[0] = reverseBitsInAByte(byte(template.KeyUsage)) + a[1] = reverseBitsInAByte(byte(template.KeyUsage >> 8)) + + l := 1 + if a[1] != 0 { + l = 2 + } + + bitString := a[:l] + ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(asn1.BitString{Bytes: bitString, BitLength: asn1BitLength(bitString)}) + if err != nil { + return + } + n++ + } + + if (len(template.ExtKeyUsage) > 0 || len(template.UnknownExtKeyUsage) > 0) && + !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage, template.ExtraExtensions) { + ret[n].Id = oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage + + var oids []asn1.ObjectIdentifier + for _, u := range template.ExtKeyUsage { + if oid, ok := oidFromExtKeyUsage(u); ok { + oids = append(oids, oid) + } else { + panic("internal error") + } + } + + oids = append(oids, template.UnknownExtKeyUsage...) + + ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(oids) + if err != nil { + return + } + n++ + } + + if template.BasicConstraintsValid && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionBasicConstraints, template.ExtraExtensions) { + // Leaving MaxPathLen as zero indicates that no maximum path + // length is desired, unless MaxPathLenZero is set. A value of + // -1 causes encoding/asn1 to omit the value as desired. + maxPathLen := template.MaxPathLen + if maxPathLen == 0 && !template.MaxPathLenZero { + maxPathLen = -1 + } + ret[n].Id = oidExtensionBasicConstraints + ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(basicConstraints{template.IsCA, maxPathLen}) + ret[n].Critical = true + if err != nil { + return + } + n++ + } + + if len(template.SubjectKeyId) > 0 && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectKeyId, template.ExtraExtensions) { + ret[n].Id = oidExtensionSubjectKeyId + ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(template.SubjectKeyId) + if err != nil { + return + } + n++ + } + + if len(template.AuthorityKeyId) > 0 && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId, template.ExtraExtensions) { + ret[n].Id = oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId + ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{template.AuthorityKeyId}) + if err != nil { + return + } + n++ + } + + if (len(template.OCSPServer) > 0 || len(template.IssuingCertificateURL) > 0) && + !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess, template.ExtraExtensions) { + ret[n].Id = oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess + var aiaValues []authorityInfoAccess + for _, name := range template.OCSPServer { + aiaValues = append(aiaValues, authorityInfoAccess{ + Method: oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp, + Location: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)}, + }) + } + for _, name := range template.IssuingCertificateURL { + aiaValues = append(aiaValues, authorityInfoAccess{ + Method: oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers, + Location: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)}, + }) + } + ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(aiaValues) + if err != nil { + return + } + n++ + } + + if (len(template.DNSNames) > 0 || len(template.EmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.IPAddresses) > 0) && + !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, template.ExtraExtensions) { + ret[n].Id = oidExtensionSubjectAltName + ret[n].Value, err = marshalSANs(template.DNSNames, template.EmailAddresses, template.IPAddresses) + if err != nil { + return + } + n++ + } + + if len(template.PolicyIdentifiers) > 0 && + !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionCertificatePolicies, template.ExtraExtensions) { + ret[n].Id = oidExtensionCertificatePolicies + policies := make([]policyInformation, len(template.PolicyIdentifiers)) + for i, policy := range template.PolicyIdentifiers { + policies[i].Policy = policy + } + ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(policies) + if err != nil { + return + } + n++ + } + + if len(template.PermittedDNSDomains) > 0 && + !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionNameConstraints, template.ExtraExtensions) { + ret[n].Id = oidExtensionNameConstraints + ret[n].Critical = template.PermittedDNSDomainsCritical + + var out nameConstraints + out.Permitted = make([]generalSubtree, len(template.PermittedDNSDomains)) + for i, permitted := range template.PermittedDNSDomains { + out.Permitted[i] = generalSubtree{Name: permitted} + } + ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(out) + if err != nil { + return + } + n++ + } + + if len(template.CRLDistributionPoints) > 0 && + !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints, template.ExtraExtensions) { + ret[n].Id = oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints + + var crlDp []distributionPoint + for _, name := range template.CRLDistributionPoints { + rawFullName, _ := asn1.Marshal(asn1.RawValue{Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)}) + + dp := distributionPoint{ + DistributionPoint: distributionPointName{ + FullName: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 0, Class: 2, IsCompound: true, Bytes: rawFullName}, + }, + } + crlDp = append(crlDp, dp) + } + + ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(crlDp) + if err != nil { + return + } + n++ + } + + // Adding another extension here? Remember to update the maximum number + // of elements in the make() at the top of the function. + + return append(ret[:n], template.ExtraExtensions...), nil +} + +func subjectBytes(cert *Certificate) ([]byte, error) { + if len(cert.RawSubject) > 0 { + return cert.RawSubject, nil + } + + return asn1.Marshal(cert.Subject.ToRDNSequence()) +} + +// signingParamsForPublicKey returns the parameters to use for signing with +// priv. If requestedSigAlgo is not zero then it overrides the default +// signature algorithm. +func signingParamsForPublicKey(pub interface{}, requestedSigAlgo SignatureAlgorithm) (hashFunc Hash, sigAlgo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier, err error) { + var pubType PublicKeyAlgorithm + + switch pub := pub.(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey: + pubType = RSA + hashFunc = SHA256 + sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA + sigAlgo.Parameters = asn1.RawValue{ + Tag: 5, + } + + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + pubType = ECDSA + switch pub.Curve { + case elliptic.P224(), elliptic.P256(): + hashFunc = SHA256 + sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256 + case elliptic.P384(): + hashFunc = SHA384 + sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384 + case elliptic.P521(): + hashFunc = SHA512 + sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512 + default: + err = errors.New("x509: unknown elliptic curve") + } + case *sm2.PublicKey: + pubType = ECDSA + switch pub.Curve { + case sm2.P256Sm2(): + hashFunc = SM3 + sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureSM2WithSM3 + default: + err = errors.New("x509: unknown SM2 curve") + } + default: + err = errors.New("x509: only RSA and ECDSA keys supported") + } + + if err != nil { + return + } + + if requestedSigAlgo == 0 { + return + } + + found := false + for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails { + if details.algo == requestedSigAlgo { + if details.pubKeyAlgo != pubType { + err = errors.New("x509: requested SignatureAlgorithm does not match private key type") + return + } + sigAlgo.Algorithm, hashFunc = details.oid, details.hash + if hashFunc == 0 { + err = errors.New("x509: cannot sign with hash function requested") + return + } + if requestedSigAlgo.isRSAPSS() { + sigAlgo.Parameters = rsaPSSParameters(hashFunc) + } + found = true + break + } + } + + if !found { + err = errors.New("x509: unknown SignatureAlgorithm") + } + + return +} + +// CreateCertificateToMem creates a new certificate based on a template. The +// following members of template are used: SerialNumber, Subject, NotBefore, +// NotAfter, KeyUsage, ExtKeyUsage, UnknownExtKeyUsage, BasicConstraintsValid, +// IsCA, MaxPathLen, SubjectKeyId, DNSNames, PermittedDNSDomainsCritical, +// PermittedDNSDomains, SignatureAlgorithm. +// +// The certificate is signed by parent. If parent is equal to template then the +// certificate is self-signed. The parameter pub is the public key of the +// signer and priv is the private key of the signer. +// +// The returned slice is the certificate in PEM encoding. +// +// All keys types that are implemented via crypto.Signer are supported (This +// includes *rsa.PublicKey and *ecdsa.PublicKey.) + +// pemCRLPrefix is the magic string that indicates that we have a PEM encoded +// CRL. +var pemCRLPrefix = []byte("-----BEGIN X509 CRL") + +// pemType is the type of a PEM encoded CRL. +var pemType = "X509 CRL" + +// ParseCRL parses a CRL from the given bytes. It's often the case that PEM +// encoded CRLs will appear where they should be DER encoded, so this function +// will transparently handle PEM encoding as long as there isn't any leading +// garbage. +func ParseCRL(crlBytes []byte) (*pkix.CertificateList, error) { + if bytes.HasPrefix(crlBytes, pemCRLPrefix) { + block, _ := pem.Decode(crlBytes) + if block != nil && block.Type == pemType { + crlBytes = block.Bytes + } + } + return ParseDERCRL(crlBytes) +} + +// ParseDERCRL parses a DER encoded CRL from the given bytes. +func ParseDERCRL(derBytes []byte) (*pkix.CertificateList, error) { + certList := new(pkix.CertificateList) + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, certList); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after CRL") + } + return certList, nil +} + +// CreateCRL returns a DER encoded CRL, signed by this Certificate, that +// contains the given list of revoked certificates. +// +// Note: this method does not generate an RFC 5280 conformant X.509 v2 CRL. +// To generate a standards compliant CRL, use CreateRevocationList instead. +func (c *Certificate) CreateCRL(rand io.Reader, priv interface{}, revokedCerts []pkix.RevokedCertificate, now, expiry time.Time) (crlBytes []byte, err error) { + key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer") + } + + hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(key.Public(), 0) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Force revocation times to UTC per RFC 5280. + revokedCertsUTC := make([]pkix.RevokedCertificate, len(revokedCerts)) + for i, rc := range revokedCerts { + rc.RevocationTime = rc.RevocationTime.UTC() + revokedCertsUTC[i] = rc + } + + tbsCertList := pkix.TBSCertificateList{ + Version: 1, + Signature: signatureAlgorithm, + Issuer: c.Subject.ToRDNSequence(), + ThisUpdate: now.UTC(), + NextUpdate: expiry.UTC(), + RevokedCertificates: revokedCertsUTC, + } + + // Authority Key Id + if len(c.SubjectKeyId) > 0 { + var aki pkix.Extension + aki.Id = oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId + aki.Value, err = asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{Id: c.SubjectKeyId}) + if err != nil { + return + } + tbsCertList.Extensions = append(tbsCertList.Extensions, aki) + } + + tbsCertListContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCertList) + if err != nil { + return + } + + digest := tbsCertListContents + switch hashFunc { + case SM3: + break + default: + h := hashFunc.New() + h.Write(tbsCertListContents) + digest = h.Sum(nil) + } + + var signature []byte + signature, err = key.Sign(rand, digest, hashFunc) + if err != nil { + return + } + + return asn1.Marshal(pkix.CertificateList{ + TBSCertList: tbsCertList, + SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm, + SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8}, + }) +} + +// CertificateRequest represents a PKCS #10, certificate signature request. +type CertificateRequest struct { + Raw []byte // Complete ASN.1 DER content (CSR, signature algorithm and signature). + RawTBSCertificateRequest []byte // Certificate request info part of raw ASN.1 DER content. + RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo []byte // DER encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo. + RawSubject []byte // DER encoded Subject. + + Version int + Signature []byte + SignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm + + PublicKeyAlgorithm PublicKeyAlgorithm + PublicKey interface{} + + Subject pkix.Name + + // Attributes is the dried husk of a bug and shouldn't be used. + Attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET + + // Extensions contains raw X.509 extensions. When parsing CSRs, this + // can be used to extract extensions that are not parsed by this + // package. + Extensions []pkix.Extension + + // ExtraExtensions contains extensions to be copied, raw, into any + // marshaled CSR. Values override any extensions that would otherwise + // be produced based on the other fields but are overridden by any + // extensions specified in Attributes. + // + // The ExtraExtensions field is not populated when parsing CSRs, see + // Extensions. + ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension + + // Subject Alternate Name values. + DNSNames []string + EmailAddresses []string + IPAddresses []net.IP +} + +// These structures reflect the ASN.1 structure of X.509 certificate +// signature requests (see RFC 2986): + +type tbsCertificateRequest struct { + Raw asn1.RawContent + Version int + Subject asn1.RawValue + PublicKey publicKeyInfo + RawAttributes []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"tag:0"` +} + +type certificateRequest struct { + Raw asn1.RawContent + TBSCSR tbsCertificateRequest + SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + SignatureValue asn1.BitString +} + +// oidExtensionRequest is a PKCS#9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER that indicates requested +// extensions in a CSR. +var oidExtensionRequest = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 14} + +// newRawAttributes converts AttributeTypeAndValueSETs from a template +// CertificateRequest's Attributes into tbsCertificateRequest RawAttributes. +func newRawAttributes(attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET) ([]asn1.RawValue, error) { + var rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue + b, err := asn1.Marshal(attributes) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(b, &rawAttributes) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to unmarshal raw CSR Attributes") + } + return rawAttributes, nil +} + +// parseRawAttributes Unmarshals RawAttributes intos AttributeTypeAndValueSETs. +func parseRawAttributes(rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue) []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET { + var attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET + for _, rawAttr := range rawAttributes { + var attr pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET + rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(rawAttr.FullBytes, &attr) + // Ignore attributes that don't parse into pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET + // (i.e.: challengePassword or unstructuredName). + if err == nil && len(rest) == 0 { + attributes = append(attributes, attr) + } + } + return attributes +} + +// parseCSRExtensions parses the attributes from a CSR and extracts any +// requested extensions. +func parseCSRExtensions(rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue) ([]pkix.Extension, error) { + // pkcs10Attribute reflects the Attribute structure from section 4.1 of + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2986. + type pkcs10Attribute struct { + Id asn1.ObjectIdentifier + Values []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"set"` + } + + var ret []pkix.Extension + for _, rawAttr := range rawAttributes { + var attr pkcs10Attribute + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(rawAttr.FullBytes, &attr); err != nil || len(rest) != 0 || len(attr.Values) == 0 { + // Ignore attributes that don't parse. + continue + } + + if !attr.Id.Equal(oidExtensionRequest) { + continue + } + + var extensions []pkix.Extension + if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(attr.Values[0].FullBytes, &extensions); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ret = append(ret, extensions...) + } + + return ret, nil +} + +// CreateCertificateRequest creates a new certificate request based on a template. +// The following members of template are used: Subject, Attributes, +// SignatureAlgorithm, Extensions, DNSNames, EmailAddresses, and IPAddresses. +// The private key is the private key of the signer. +// +// The returned slice is the certificate request in DER encoding. +// +// All keys types that are implemented via crypto.Signer are supported (This +// includes *rsa.PublicKey and *ecdsa.PublicKey.) +func CreateCertificateRequest(rand io.Reader, template *CertificateRequest, signer crypto.Signer) (csr []byte, err error) { + var hashFunc Hash + var sigAlgo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + hashFunc, sigAlgo, err = signingParamsForPublicKey(signer.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var publicKeyBytes []byte + var publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier + publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err = marshalPublicKey(signer.Public()) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var extensions []pkix.Extension + + if (len(template.DNSNames) > 0 || len(template.EmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.IPAddresses) > 0) && + !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, template.ExtraExtensions) { + sanBytes, err := marshalSANs(template.DNSNames, template.EmailAddresses, template.IPAddresses) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + extensions = append(extensions, pkix.Extension{ + Id: oidExtensionSubjectAltName, + Value: sanBytes, + }) + } + + extensions = append(extensions, template.ExtraExtensions...) + + var attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET + attributes = append(attributes, template.Attributes...) + + if len(extensions) > 0 { + // specifiedExtensions contains all the extensions that we + // found specified via template.Attributes. + specifiedExtensions := make(map[string]bool) + + for _, atvSet := range template.Attributes { + if !atvSet.Type.Equal(oidExtensionRequest) { + continue + } + + for _, atvs := range atvSet.Value { + for _, atv := range atvs { + specifiedExtensions[atv.Type.String()] = true + } + } + } + + atvs := make([]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue, 0, len(extensions)) + for _, e := range extensions { + if specifiedExtensions[e.Id.String()] { + // Attributes already contained a value for + // this extension and it takes priority. + continue + } + + atvs = append(atvs, pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue{ + // There is no place for the critical flag in a CSR. + Type: e.Id, + Value: e.Value, + }) + } + + // Append the extensions to an existing attribute if possible. + appended := false + for _, atvSet := range attributes { + if !atvSet.Type.Equal(oidExtensionRequest) || len(atvSet.Value) == 0 { + continue + } + + atvSet.Value[0] = append(atvSet.Value[0], atvs...) + appended = true + break + } + + // Otherwise, add a new attribute for the extensions. + if !appended { + attributes = append(attributes, pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET{ + Type: oidExtensionRequest, + Value: [][]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue{ + atvs, + }, + }) + } + } + + asn1Subject := template.RawSubject + if len(asn1Subject) == 0 { + asn1Subject, err = asn1.Marshal(template.Subject.ToRDNSequence()) + if err != nil { + return + } + } + + rawAttributes, err := newRawAttributes(attributes) + if err != nil { + return + } + + tbsCSR := tbsCertificateRequest{ + Version: 0, // PKCS #10, RFC 2986 + Subject: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Subject}, + PublicKey: publicKeyInfo{ + Algorithm: publicKeyAlgorithm, + PublicKey: asn1.BitString{ + Bytes: publicKeyBytes, + BitLength: len(publicKeyBytes) * 8, + }, + }, + RawAttributes: rawAttributes, + } + + tbsCSRContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCSR) + if err != nil { + return + } + tbsCSR.Raw = tbsCSRContents + + digest := tbsCSRContents + switch template.SignatureAlgorithm { + case SM2WithSM3, SM2WithSHA1, SM2WithSHA256, UnknownSignatureAlgorithm: + break + default: + h := hashFunc.New() + h.Write(tbsCSRContents) + digest = h.Sum(nil) + } + + var signature []byte + signature, err = signer.Sign(rand, digest, hashFunc) + if err != nil { + return + } + + return asn1.Marshal(certificateRequest{ + TBSCSR: tbsCSR, + SignatureAlgorithm: sigAlgo, + SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{ + Bytes: signature, + BitLength: len(signature) * 8, + }, + }) +} + +// ParseCertificateRequest parses a single certificate request from the +// given ASN.1 DER data. +func ParseCertificateRequest(asn1Data []byte) (*CertificateRequest, error) { + var csr certificateRequest + + rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, &csr) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, asn1.SyntaxError{Msg: "trailing data"} + } + + return parseCertificateRequest(&csr) +} + +func parseCertificateRequest(in *certificateRequest) (*CertificateRequest, error) { + out := &CertificateRequest{ + Raw: in.Raw, + RawTBSCertificateRequest: in.TBSCSR.Raw, + RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo: in.TBSCSR.PublicKey.Raw, + RawSubject: in.TBSCSR.Subject.FullBytes, + + Signature: in.SignatureValue.RightAlign(), + SignatureAlgorithm: getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(in.SignatureAlgorithm), + + PublicKeyAlgorithm: getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(in.TBSCSR.PublicKey.Algorithm.Algorithm), + + Version: in.TBSCSR.Version, + Attributes: parseRawAttributes(in.TBSCSR.RawAttributes), + } + + var err error + out.PublicKey, err = parsePublicKey(out.PublicKeyAlgorithm, &in.TBSCSR.PublicKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var subject pkix.RDNSequence + if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(in.TBSCSR.Subject.FullBytes, &subject); err != nil { + return nil, err + } else if len(rest) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 Subject") + } + + out.Subject.FillFromRDNSequence(&subject) + + if out.Extensions, err = parseCSRExtensions(in.TBSCSR.RawAttributes); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + for _, extension := range out.Extensions { + if extension.Id.Equal(oidExtensionSubjectAltName) { + out.DNSNames, out.EmailAddresses, out.IPAddresses, err = parseSANExtension(extension.Value) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + } + + return out, nil +} + +// CheckSignature reports whether the signature on c is valid. +func (c *CertificateRequest) CheckSignature() error { + return checkSignature(c.SignatureAlgorithm, c.RawTBSCertificateRequest, c.Signature, c.PublicKey) +} + +func (c *Certificate) ToX509Certificate() *x509.Certificate { + x509cert := &x509.Certificate{ + Raw: c.Raw, + RawTBSCertificate: c.RawTBSCertificate, + RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo: c.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo, + RawSubject: c.RawSubject, + RawIssuer: c.RawIssuer, + + Signature: c.Signature, + SignatureAlgorithm: x509.SignatureAlgorithm(c.SignatureAlgorithm), + + PublicKeyAlgorithm: x509.PublicKeyAlgorithm(c.PublicKeyAlgorithm), + PublicKey: c.PublicKey, + + Version: c.Version, + SerialNumber: c.SerialNumber, + Issuer: c.Issuer, + Subject: c.Subject, + NotBefore: c.NotBefore, + NotAfter: c.NotAfter, + KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsage(c.KeyUsage), + + Extensions: c.Extensions, + + ExtraExtensions: c.ExtraExtensions, + + UnhandledCriticalExtensions: c.UnhandledCriticalExtensions, + + //ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage(c.ExtKeyUsage) , + UnknownExtKeyUsage: c.UnknownExtKeyUsage, + + BasicConstraintsValid: c.BasicConstraintsValid, + IsCA: c.IsCA, + MaxPathLen: c.MaxPathLen, + // MaxPathLenZero indicates that BasicConstraintsValid==true and + // MaxPathLen==0 should be interpreted as an actual maximum path length + // of zero. Otherwise, that combination is interpreted as MaxPathLen + // not being set. + MaxPathLenZero: c.MaxPathLenZero, + + SubjectKeyId: c.SubjectKeyId, + AuthorityKeyId: c.AuthorityKeyId, + + // RFC 5280, 4.2.2.1 (Authority Information Access) + OCSPServer: c.OCSPServer, + IssuingCertificateURL: c.IssuingCertificateURL, + + // Subject Alternate Name values + DNSNames: c.DNSNames, + EmailAddresses: c.EmailAddresses, + IPAddresses: c.IPAddresses, + + // Name constraints + PermittedDNSDomainsCritical: c.PermittedDNSDomainsCritical, + PermittedDNSDomains: c.PermittedDNSDomains, + + // CRL Distribution Points + CRLDistributionPoints: c.CRLDistributionPoints, + + PolicyIdentifiers: c.PolicyIdentifiers, + } + + for _, val := range c.ExtKeyUsage { + x509cert.ExtKeyUsage = append(x509cert.ExtKeyUsage, x509.ExtKeyUsage(val)) + } + + return x509cert +} + +func (c *Certificate) FromX509Certificate(x509Cert *x509.Certificate) { + c.Raw = x509Cert.Raw + c.RawTBSCertificate = x509Cert.RawTBSCertificate + c.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo = x509Cert.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo + c.RawSubject = x509Cert.RawSubject + c.RawIssuer = x509Cert.RawIssuer + c.Signature = x509Cert.Signature + c.SignatureAlgorithm = SM2WithSM3 + c.PublicKeyAlgorithm = PublicKeyAlgorithm(x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm) + c.PublicKey = x509Cert.PublicKey + c.Version = x509Cert.Version + c.SerialNumber = x509Cert.SerialNumber + c.Issuer = x509Cert.Issuer + c.Subject = x509Cert.Subject + c.NotBefore = x509Cert.NotBefore + c.NotAfter = x509Cert.NotAfter + c.KeyUsage = KeyUsage(x509Cert.KeyUsage) + c.Extensions = x509Cert.Extensions + c.ExtraExtensions = x509Cert.ExtraExtensions + c.UnhandledCriticalExtensions = x509Cert.UnhandledCriticalExtensions + c.UnknownExtKeyUsage = x509Cert.UnknownExtKeyUsage + c.BasicConstraintsValid = x509Cert.BasicConstraintsValid + c.IsCA = x509Cert.IsCA + c.MaxPathLen = x509Cert.MaxPathLen + c.MaxPathLenZero = x509Cert.MaxPathLenZero + c.SubjectKeyId = x509Cert.SubjectKeyId + c.AuthorityKeyId = x509Cert.AuthorityKeyId + c.OCSPServer = x509Cert.OCSPServer + c.IssuingCertificateURL = x509Cert.IssuingCertificateURL + c.DNSNames = x509Cert.DNSNames + c.EmailAddresses = x509Cert.EmailAddresses + c.IPAddresses = x509Cert.IPAddresses + c.PermittedDNSDomainsCritical = x509Cert.PermittedDNSDomainsCritical + c.PermittedDNSDomains = x509Cert.PermittedDNSDomains + c.CRLDistributionPoints = x509Cert.CRLDistributionPoints + c.PolicyIdentifiers = x509Cert.PolicyIdentifiers + + for _, val := range x509Cert.ExtKeyUsage { + c.ExtKeyUsage = append(c.ExtKeyUsage, ExtKeyUsage(val)) + } +} + +// RevocationList contains the fields used to create an X.509 v2 Certificate +// Revocation list with CreateRevocationList. +type RevocationList struct { + // SignatureAlgorithm is used to determine the signature algorithm to be + // used when signing the CRL. If 0 the default algorithm for the signing + // key will be used. + SignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm + + // RevokedCertificates is used to populate the revokedCertificates + // sequence in the CRL, it may be empty. RevokedCertificates may be nil, + // in which case an empty CRL will be created. + RevokedCertificates []pkix.RevokedCertificate + + // Number is used to populate the X.509 v2 cRLNumber extension in the CRL, + // which should be a monotonically increasing sequence number for a given + // CRL scope and CRL issuer. + Number *big.Int + // ThisUpdate is used to populate the thisUpdate field in the CRL, which + // indicates the issuance date of the CRL. + ThisUpdate time.Time + // NextUpdate is used to populate the nextUpdate field in the CRL, which + // indicates the date by which the next CRL will be issued. NextUpdate + // must be greater than ThisUpdate. + NextUpdate time.Time + // ExtraExtensions contains any additional extensions to add directly to + // the CRL. + ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension +} + +// CreateRevocationList creates a new X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation List, +// according to RFC 5280, based on template. +// +// The CRL is signed by priv which should be the private key associated with +// the public key in the issuer certificate. +// +// The issuer may not be nil, and the crlSign bit must be set in KeyUsage in +// order to use it as a CRL issuer. +// +// The issuer distinguished name CRL field and authority key identifier +// extension are populated using the issuer certificate. issuer must have +// SubjectKeyId set. +func CreateRevocationList(rand io.Reader, template *RevocationList, issuer *Certificate, priv crypto.Signer) ([]byte, error) { + if template == nil { + return nil, errors.New("x509: template can not be nil") + } + if issuer == nil { + return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer can not be nil") + } + if (issuer.KeyUsage & KeyUsageCRLSign) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer must have the crlSign key usage bit set") + } + if len(issuer.SubjectKeyId) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer certificate doesn't contain a subject key identifier") + } + if template.NextUpdate.Before(template.ThisUpdate) { + return nil, errors.New("x509: template.ThisUpdate is after template.NextUpdate") + } + if template.Number == nil { + return nil, errors.New("x509: template contains nil Number field") + } + + hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(priv.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Force revocation times to UTC per RFC 5280. + revokedCertsUTC := make([]pkix.RevokedCertificate, len(template.RevokedCertificates)) + for i, rc := range template.RevokedCertificates { + rc.RevocationTime = rc.RevocationTime.UTC() + revokedCertsUTC[i] = rc + } + + aki, err := asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{Id: issuer.SubjectKeyId}) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + crlNum, err := asn1.Marshal(template.Number) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + tbsCertList := pkix.TBSCertificateList{ + Version: 1, // v2 + Signature: signatureAlgorithm, + Issuer: issuer.Subject.ToRDNSequence(), + ThisUpdate: template.ThisUpdate.UTC(), + NextUpdate: template.NextUpdate.UTC(), + Extensions: []pkix.Extension{ + { + Id: oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId, + Value: aki, + }, + { + Id: oidExtensionCRLNumber, + Value: crlNum, + }, + }, + } + if len(revokedCertsUTC) > 0 { + tbsCertList.RevokedCertificates = revokedCertsUTC + } + + if len(template.ExtraExtensions) > 0 { + tbsCertList.Extensions = append(tbsCertList.Extensions, template.ExtraExtensions...) + } + + tbsCertListContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCertList) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + digest := tbsCertListContents + switch hashFunc { + case SM3: + break + default: + h := hashFunc.New() + h.Write(tbsCertListContents) + digest = h.Sum(nil) + } + var signerOpts crypto.SignerOpts = hashFunc + if template.SignatureAlgorithm.isRSAPSS() { + signerOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{ + SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, + Hash: crypto.Hash(hashFunc), + } + } + + signature, err := priv.Sign(rand, digest, signerOpts) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return asn1.Marshal(pkix.CertificateList{ + TBSCertList: tbsCertList, + SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm, + SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8}, + }) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/LICENSE b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/LICENSE new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6a66aea5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/LICENSE @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +Copyright (c) 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are +met: + + * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above +copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer +in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the +distribution. + * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its +contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from +this software without specific prior written permission. + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS +"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT +LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR +A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT +OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT +LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE +OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/PATENTS b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/PATENTS new file mode 100644 index 00000000..73309904 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/PATENTS @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +Additional IP Rights Grant (Patents) + +"This implementation" means the copyrightable works distributed by +Google as part of the Go project. + +Google hereby grants to You a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, +no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable (except as stated in this section) +patent license to make, have made, use, offer to sell, sell, import, +transfer and otherwise run, modify and propagate the contents of this +implementation of Go, where such license applies only to those patent +claims, both currently owned or controlled by Google and acquired in +the future, licensable by Google that are necessarily infringed by this +implementation of Go. This grant does not include claims that would be +infringed only as a consequence of further modification of this +implementation. If you or your agent or exclusive licensee institute or +order or agree to the institution of patent litigation against any +entity (including a cross-claim or counterclaim in a lawsuit) alleging +that this implementation of Go or any code incorporated within this +implementation of Go constitutes direct or contributory patent +infringement, or inducement of patent infringement, then any patent +rights granted to you under this License for this implementation of Go +shall terminate as of the date such litigation is filed. diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5dfacbb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +package chacha20 + +const bufSize = 256 + +//go:noescape +func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f1f66230 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s @@ -0,0 +1,308 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +#define NUM_ROUNDS 10 + +// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) +TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + MOVD dst+0(FP), R1 + MOVD src+24(FP), R2 + MOVD src_len+32(FP), R3 + MOVD key+48(FP), R4 + MOVD nonce+56(FP), R6 + MOVD counter+64(FP), R7 + + MOVD $·constants(SB), R10 + MOVD $·incRotMatrix(SB), R11 + + MOVW (R7), R20 + + AND $~255, R3, R13 + ADD R2, R13, R12 // R12 for block end + AND $255, R3, R13 +loop: + MOVD $NUM_ROUNDS, R21 + VLD1 (R11), [V30.S4, V31.S4] + + // load contants + // VLD4R (R10), [V0.S4, V1.S4, V2.S4, V3.S4] + WORD $0x4D60E940 + + // load keys + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V4.S4, V5.S4, V6.S4, V7.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE884 + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V8.S4, V9.S4, V10.S4, V11.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE888 + SUB $32, R4 + + // load counter + nonce + // VLD1R (R7), [V12.S4] + WORD $0x4D40C8EC + + // VLD3R (R6), [V13.S4, V14.S4, V15.S4] + WORD $0x4D40E8CD + + // update counter + VADD V30.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4 + +chacha: + // V0..V3 += V4..V7 + // V12..V15 <<<= ((V12..V15 XOR V0..V3), 16) + VADD V0.S4, V4.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V1.S4, V5.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V2.S4, V6.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V3.S4, V7.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V12.B16, V0.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V1.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V2.B16, V14.B16 + VEOR V15.B16, V3.B16, V15.B16 + VREV32 V12.H8, V12.H8 + VREV32 V13.H8, V13.H8 + VREV32 V14.H8, V14.H8 + VREV32 V15.H8, V15.H8 + // V8..V11 += V12..V15 + // V4..V7 <<<= ((V4..V7 XOR V8..V11), 12) + VADD V8.S4, V12.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V9.S4, V13.S4, V9.S4 + VADD V10.S4, V14.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V11.S4, V15.S4, V11.S4 + VEOR V8.B16, V4.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V5.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V10.B16, V6.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V7.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $12, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSHL $12, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $12, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $12, V19.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $20, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $20, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $20, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $20, V19.S4, V7.S4 + + // V0..V3 += V4..V7 + // V12..V15 <<<= ((V12..V15 XOR V0..V3), 8) + VADD V0.S4, V4.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V1.S4, V5.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V2.S4, V6.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V3.S4, V7.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V12.B16, V0.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V1.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V2.B16, V14.B16 + VEOR V15.B16, V3.B16, V15.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V12.B16], V12.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V13.B16], V13.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V14.B16], V14.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V15.B16], V15.B16 + + // V8..V11 += V12..V15 + // V4..V7 <<<= ((V4..V7 XOR V8..V11), 7) + VADD V12.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V13.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VADD V14.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V15.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VEOR V8.B16, V4.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V5.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V10.B16, V6.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V7.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $7, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSHL $7, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $7, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $7, V19.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $25, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $25, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $25, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $25, V19.S4, V7.S4 + + // V0..V3 += V5..V7, V4 + // V15,V12-V14 <<<= ((V15,V12-V14 XOR V0..V3), 16) + VADD V0.S4, V5.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V1.S4, V6.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V2.S4, V7.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V3.S4, V4.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V15.B16, V0.B16, V15.B16 + VEOR V12.B16, V1.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V2.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V3.B16, V14.B16 + VREV32 V12.H8, V12.H8 + VREV32 V13.H8, V13.H8 + VREV32 V14.H8, V14.H8 + VREV32 V15.H8, V15.H8 + + // V10 += V15; V5 <<<= ((V10 XOR V5), 12) + // ... + VADD V15.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V12.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VADD V13.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V14.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VEOR V10.B16, V5.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V6.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V8.B16, V7.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V4.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $12, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $12, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $12, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSHL $12, V19.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $20, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $20, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $20, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $20, V19.S4, V4.S4 + + // V0 += V5; V15 <<<= ((V0 XOR V15), 8) + // ... + VADD V5.S4, V0.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V6.S4, V1.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V7.S4, V2.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V4.S4, V3.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V0.B16, V15.B16, V15.B16 + VEOR V1.B16, V12.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V2.B16, V13.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V3.B16, V14.B16, V14.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V12.B16], V12.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V13.B16], V13.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V14.B16], V14.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V15.B16], V15.B16 + + // V10 += V15; V5 <<<= ((V10 XOR V5), 7) + // ... + VADD V15.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V12.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VADD V13.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V14.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VEOR V10.B16, V5.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V6.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V8.B16, V7.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V4.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $7, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $7, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $7, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSHL $7, V19.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $25, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $25, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $25, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $25, V19.S4, V4.S4 + + SUB $1, R21 + CBNZ R21, chacha + + // VLD4R (R10), [V16.S4, V17.S4, V18.S4, V19.S4] + WORD $0x4D60E950 + + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V20.S4, V21.S4, V22.S4, V23.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE894 + VADD V30.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4 + VADD V16.S4, V0.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V17.S4, V1.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V18.S4, V2.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V19.S4, V3.S4, V3.S4 + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V24.S4, V25.S4, V26.S4, V27.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE898 + // restore R4 + SUB $32, R4 + + // load counter + nonce + // VLD1R (R7), [V28.S4] + WORD $0x4D40C8FC + // VLD3R (R6), [V29.S4, V30.S4, V31.S4] + WORD $0x4D40E8DD + + VADD V20.S4, V4.S4, V4.S4 + VADD V21.S4, V5.S4, V5.S4 + VADD V22.S4, V6.S4, V6.S4 + VADD V23.S4, V7.S4, V7.S4 + VADD V24.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V25.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VADD V26.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V27.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VADD V28.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4 + VADD V29.S4, V13.S4, V13.S4 + VADD V30.S4, V14.S4, V14.S4 + VADD V31.S4, V15.S4, V15.S4 + + VZIP1 V1.S4, V0.S4, V16.S4 + VZIP2 V1.S4, V0.S4, V17.S4 + VZIP1 V3.S4, V2.S4, V18.S4 + VZIP2 V3.S4, V2.S4, V19.S4 + VZIP1 V5.S4, V4.S4, V20.S4 + VZIP2 V5.S4, V4.S4, V21.S4 + VZIP1 V7.S4, V6.S4, V22.S4 + VZIP2 V7.S4, V6.S4, V23.S4 + VZIP1 V9.S4, V8.S4, V24.S4 + VZIP2 V9.S4, V8.S4, V25.S4 + VZIP1 V11.S4, V10.S4, V26.S4 + VZIP2 V11.S4, V10.S4, V27.S4 + VZIP1 V13.S4, V12.S4, V28.S4 + VZIP2 V13.S4, V12.S4, V29.S4 + VZIP1 V15.S4, V14.S4, V30.S4 + VZIP2 V15.S4, V14.S4, V31.S4 + VZIP1 V18.D2, V16.D2, V0.D2 + VZIP2 V18.D2, V16.D2, V4.D2 + VZIP1 V19.D2, V17.D2, V8.D2 + VZIP2 V19.D2, V17.D2, V12.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V16.B16, V17.B16, V18.B16, V19.B16] + + VZIP1 V22.D2, V20.D2, V1.D2 + VZIP2 V22.D2, V20.D2, V5.D2 + VZIP1 V23.D2, V21.D2, V9.D2 + VZIP2 V23.D2, V21.D2, V13.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V20.B16, V21.B16, V22.B16, V23.B16] + VZIP1 V26.D2, V24.D2, V2.D2 + VZIP2 V26.D2, V24.D2, V6.D2 + VZIP1 V27.D2, V25.D2, V10.D2 + VZIP2 V27.D2, V25.D2, V14.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V24.B16, V25.B16, V26.B16, V27.B16] + VZIP1 V30.D2, V28.D2, V3.D2 + VZIP2 V30.D2, V28.D2, V7.D2 + VZIP1 V31.D2, V29.D2, V11.D2 + VZIP2 V31.D2, V29.D2, V15.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V28.B16, V29.B16, V30.B16, V31.B16] + VEOR V0.B16, V16.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V1.B16, V17.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V2.B16, V18.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V3.B16, V19.B16, V19.B16 + VST1.P [V16.B16, V17.B16, V18.B16, V19.B16], 64(R1) + VEOR V4.B16, V20.B16, V20.B16 + VEOR V5.B16, V21.B16, V21.B16 + VEOR V6.B16, V22.B16, V22.B16 + VEOR V7.B16, V23.B16, V23.B16 + VST1.P [V20.B16, V21.B16, V22.B16, V23.B16], 64(R1) + VEOR V8.B16, V24.B16, V24.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V25.B16, V25.B16 + VEOR V10.B16, V26.B16, V26.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V27.B16, V27.B16 + VST1.P [V24.B16, V25.B16, V26.B16, V27.B16], 64(R1) + VEOR V12.B16, V28.B16, V28.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V29.B16, V29.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V30.B16, V30.B16 + VEOR V15.B16, V31.B16, V31.B16 + VST1.P [V28.B16, V29.B16, V30.B16, V31.B16], 64(R1) + + ADD $4, R20 + MOVW R20, (R7) // update counter + + CMP R2, R12 + BGT loop + + RET + + +DATA ·constants+0x00(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA ·constants+0x04(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA ·constants+0x08(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA ·constants+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 +GLOBL ·constants(SB), NOPTR|RODATA, $32 + +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x00(SB)/4, $0x00000000 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x04(SB)/4, $0x00000001 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x08(SB)/4, $0x00000002 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x00000003 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x10(SB)/4, $0x02010003 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x14(SB)/4, $0x06050407 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x18(SB)/4, $0x0A09080B +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x0E0D0C0F +GLOBL ·incRotMatrix(SB), NOPTR|RODATA, $32 diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..93eb5ae6 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,398 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package chacha20 implements the ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 encryption algorithms +// as specified in RFC 8439 and draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01. +package chacha20 + +import ( + "crypto/cipher" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "math/bits" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias" +) + +const ( + // KeySize is the size of the key used by this cipher, in bytes. + KeySize = 32 + + // NonceSize is the size of the nonce used with the standard variant of this + // cipher, in bytes. + // + // Note that this is too short to be safely generated at random if the same + // key is reused more than 2³² times. + NonceSize = 12 + + // NonceSizeX is the size of the nonce used with the XChaCha20 variant of + // this cipher, in bytes. + NonceSizeX = 24 +) + +// Cipher is a stateful instance of ChaCha20 or XChaCha20 using a particular key +// and nonce. A *Cipher implements the cipher.Stream interface. +type Cipher struct { + // The ChaCha20 state is 16 words: 4 constant, 8 of key, 1 of counter + // (incremented after each block), and 3 of nonce. + key [8]uint32 + counter uint32 + nonce [3]uint32 + + // The last len bytes of buf are leftover key stream bytes from the previous + // XORKeyStream invocation. The size of buf depends on how many blocks are + // computed at a time by xorKeyStreamBlocks. + buf [bufSize]byte + len int + + // overflow is set when the counter overflowed, no more blocks can be + // generated, and the next XORKeyStream call should panic. + overflow bool + + // The counter-independent results of the first round are cached after they + // are computed the first time. + precompDone bool + p1, p5, p9, p13 uint32 + p2, p6, p10, p14 uint32 + p3, p7, p11, p15 uint32 +} + +var _ cipher.Stream = (*Cipher)(nil) + +// NewUnauthenticatedCipher creates a new ChaCha20 stream cipher with the given +// 32 bytes key and a 12 or 24 bytes nonce. If a nonce of 24 bytes is provided, +// the XChaCha20 construction will be used. It returns an error if key or nonce +// have any other length. +// +// Note that ChaCha20, like all stream ciphers, is not authenticated and allows +// attackers to silently tamper with the plaintext. For this reason, it is more +// appropriate as a building block than as a standalone encryption mechanism. +// Instead, consider using package golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305. +func NewUnauthenticatedCipher(key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) { + // This function is split into a wrapper so that the Cipher allocation will + // be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't + // escape to the heap. + c := &Cipher{} + return newUnauthenticatedCipher(c, key, nonce) +} + +func newUnauthenticatedCipher(c *Cipher, key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) { + if len(key) != KeySize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong key size") + } + if len(nonce) == NonceSizeX { + // XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to mix 16 bytes of the nonce into a + // derived key, allowing it to operate on a nonce of 24 bytes. See + // draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01, Section 2.3. + key, _ = HChaCha20(key, nonce[0:16]) + cNonce := make([]byte, NonceSize) + copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24]) + nonce = cNonce + } else if len(nonce) != NonceSize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong nonce size") + } + + key, nonce = key[:KeySize], nonce[:NonceSize] // bounds check elimination hint + c.key = [8]uint32{ + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]), + } + c.nonce = [3]uint32{ + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12]), + } + return c, nil +} + +// The constant first 4 words of the ChaCha20 state. +const ( + j0 uint32 = 0x61707865 // expa + j1 uint32 = 0x3320646e // nd 3 + j2 uint32 = 0x79622d32 // 2-by + j3 uint32 = 0x6b206574 // te k +) + +const blockSize = 64 + +// quarterRound is the core of ChaCha20. It shuffles the bits of 4 state words. +// It's executed 4 times for each of the 20 ChaCha20 rounds, operating on all 16 +// words each round, in columnar or diagonal groups of 4 at a time. +func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) { + a += b + d ^= a + d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 16) + c += d + b ^= c + b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 12) + a += b + d ^= a + d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 8) + c += d + b ^= c + b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 7) + return a, b, c, d +} + +// SetCounter sets the Cipher counter. The next invocation of XORKeyStream will +// behave as if (64 * counter) bytes had been encrypted so far. +// +// To prevent accidental counter reuse, SetCounter panics if counter is less +// than the current value. +// +// Note that the execution time of XORKeyStream is not independent of the +// counter value. +func (s *Cipher) SetCounter(counter uint32) { + // Internally, s may buffer multiple blocks, which complicates this + // implementation slightly. When checking whether the counter has rolled + // back, we must use both s.counter and s.len to determine how many blocks + // we have already output. + outputCounter := s.counter - uint32(s.len)/blockSize + if s.overflow || counter < outputCounter { + panic("chacha20: SetCounter attempted to rollback counter") + } + + // In the general case, we set the new counter value and reset s.len to 0, + // causing the next call to XORKeyStream to refill the buffer. However, if + // we're advancing within the existing buffer, we can save work by simply + // setting s.len. + if counter < s.counter { + s.len = int(s.counter-counter) * blockSize + } else { + s.counter = counter + s.len = 0 + } +} + +// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the +// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all. +// +// If len(dst) < len(src), XORKeyStream will panic. It is acceptable +// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, XORKeyStream will +// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst. +// +// Multiple calls to XORKeyStream behave as if the concatenation of +// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, Cipher +// maintains state and does not reset at each XORKeyStream call. +func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) { + if len(src) == 0 { + return + } + if len(dst) < len(src) { + panic("chacha20: output smaller than input") + } + dst = dst[:len(src)] + if alias.InexactOverlap(dst, src) { + panic("chacha20: invalid buffer overlap") + } + + // First, drain any remaining key stream from a previous XORKeyStream. + if s.len != 0 { + keyStream := s.buf[bufSize-s.len:] + if len(src) < len(keyStream) { + keyStream = keyStream[:len(src)] + } + _ = src[len(keyStream)-1] // bounds check elimination hint + for i, b := range keyStream { + dst[i] = src[i] ^ b + } + s.len -= len(keyStream) + dst, src = dst[len(keyStream):], src[len(keyStream):] + } + if len(src) == 0 { + return + } + + // If we'd need to let the counter overflow and keep generating output, + // panic immediately. If instead we'd only reach the last block, remember + // not to generate any more output after the buffer is drained. + numBlocks := (uint64(len(src)) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize + if s.overflow || uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks > 1<<32 { + panic("chacha20: counter overflow") + } else if uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks == 1<<32 { + s.overflow = true + } + + // xorKeyStreamBlocks implementations expect input lengths that are a + // multiple of bufSize. Platform-specific ones process multiple blocks at a + // time, so have bufSizes that are a multiple of blockSize. + + full := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize + if full > 0 { + s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst[:full], src[:full]) + } + dst, src = dst[full:], src[full:] + + // If using a multi-block xorKeyStreamBlocks would overflow, use the generic + // one that does one block at a time. + const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize + if uint64(s.counter)+blocksPerBuf > 1<<32 { + s.buf = [bufSize]byte{} + numBlocks := (len(src) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize + buf := s.buf[bufSize-numBlocks*blockSize:] + copy(buf, src) + s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(buf, buf) + s.len = len(buf) - copy(dst, buf) + return + } + + // If we have a partial (multi-)block, pad it for xorKeyStreamBlocks, and + // keep the leftover keystream for the next XORKeyStream invocation. + if len(src) > 0 { + s.buf = [bufSize]byte{} + copy(s.buf[:], src) + s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(s.buf[:], s.buf[:]) + s.len = bufSize - copy(dst, s.buf[:]) + } +} + +func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src []byte) { + if len(dst) != len(src) || len(dst)%blockSize != 0 { + panic("chacha20: internal error: wrong dst and/or src length") + } + + // To generate each block of key stream, the initial cipher state + // (represented below) is passed through 20 rounds of shuffling, + // alternatively applying quarterRounds by columns (like 1, 5, 9, 13) + // or by diagonals (like 1, 6, 11, 12). + // + // 0:cccccccc 1:cccccccc 2:cccccccc 3:cccccccc + // 4:kkkkkkkk 5:kkkkkkkk 6:kkkkkkkk 7:kkkkkkkk + // 8:kkkkkkkk 9:kkkkkkkk 10:kkkkkkkk 11:kkkkkkkk + // 12:bbbbbbbb 13:nnnnnnnn 14:nnnnnnnn 15:nnnnnnnn + // + // c=constant k=key b=blockcount n=nonce + var ( + c0, c1, c2, c3 = j0, j1, j2, j3 + c4, c5, c6, c7 = s.key[0], s.key[1], s.key[2], s.key[3] + c8, c9, c10, c11 = s.key[4], s.key[5], s.key[6], s.key[7] + _, c13, c14, c15 = s.counter, s.nonce[0], s.nonce[1], s.nonce[2] + ) + + // Three quarters of the first round don't depend on the counter, so we can + // calculate them here, and reuse them for multiple blocks in the loop, and + // for future XORKeyStream invocations. + if !s.precompDone { + s.p1, s.p5, s.p9, s.p13 = quarterRound(c1, c5, c9, c13) + s.p2, s.p6, s.p10, s.p14 = quarterRound(c2, c6, c10, c14) + s.p3, s.p7, s.p11, s.p15 = quarterRound(c3, c7, c11, c15) + s.precompDone = true + } + + // A condition of len(src) > 0 would be sufficient, but this also + // acts as a bounds check elimination hint. + for len(src) >= 64 && len(dst) >= 64 { + // The remainder of the first column round. + fcr0, fcr4, fcr8, fcr12 := quarterRound(c0, c4, c8, s.counter) + + // The second diagonal round. + x0, x5, x10, x15 := quarterRound(fcr0, s.p5, s.p10, s.p15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 := quarterRound(s.p1, s.p6, s.p11, fcr12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 := quarterRound(s.p2, s.p7, fcr8, s.p13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 := quarterRound(s.p3, fcr4, s.p9, s.p14) + + // The remaining 18 rounds. + for i := 0; i < 9; i++ { + // Column round. + x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12) + x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13) + x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14) + x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15) + + // Diagonal round. + x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14) + } + + // Add back the initial state to generate the key stream, then + // XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result. + addXor(dst[0:4], src[0:4], x0, c0) + addXor(dst[4:8], src[4:8], x1, c1) + addXor(dst[8:12], src[8:12], x2, c2) + addXor(dst[12:16], src[12:16], x3, c3) + addXor(dst[16:20], src[16:20], x4, c4) + addXor(dst[20:24], src[20:24], x5, c5) + addXor(dst[24:28], src[24:28], x6, c6) + addXor(dst[28:32], src[28:32], x7, c7) + addXor(dst[32:36], src[32:36], x8, c8) + addXor(dst[36:40], src[36:40], x9, c9) + addXor(dst[40:44], src[40:44], x10, c10) + addXor(dst[44:48], src[44:48], x11, c11) + addXor(dst[48:52], src[48:52], x12, s.counter) + addXor(dst[52:56], src[52:56], x13, c13) + addXor(dst[56:60], src[56:60], x14, c14) + addXor(dst[60:64], src[60:64], x15, c15) + + s.counter += 1 + + src, dst = src[blockSize:], dst[blockSize:] + } +} + +// HChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to generate a derived key from a 32 bytes +// key and a 16 bytes nonce. It returns an error if key or nonce have any other +// length. It is used as part of the XChaCha20 construction. +func HChaCha20(key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) { + // This function is split into a wrapper so that the slice allocation will + // be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't + // escape to the heap. + out := make([]byte, 32) + return hChaCha20(out, key, nonce) +} + +func hChaCha20(out, key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if len(key) != KeySize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 key size") + } + if len(nonce) != 16 { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 nonce size") + } + + x0, x1, x2, x3 := j0, j1, j2, j3 + x4 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]) + x5 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]) + x6 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]) + x7 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]) + x8 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]) + x9 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]) + x10 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]) + x11 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]) + x12 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4]) + x13 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8]) + x14 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12]) + x15 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[12:16]) + + for i := 0; i < 10; i++ { + // Diagonal round. + x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12) + x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13) + x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14) + x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15) + + // Column round. + x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14) + } + + _ = out[31] // bounds check elimination hint + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:4], x0) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:8], x1) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:12], x2) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:16], x3) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[16:20], x12) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[20:24], x13) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[24:28], x14) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[28:32], x15) + return out, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..02ff3d05 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (!arm64 && !s390x && !ppc64le) || !gc || purego +// +build !arm64,!s390x,!ppc64le !gc purego + +package chacha20 + +const bufSize = blockSize + +func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..da420b2e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +package chacha20 + +const bufSize = 256 + +//go:noescape +func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(&dst[0], &src[0], len(src), &c.key, &c.counter) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5c0fed26 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s @@ -0,0 +1,450 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Based on CRYPTOGAMS code with the following comment: +// # ==================================================================== +// # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL +// # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and +// # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further +// # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. +// # ==================================================================== + +// Code for the perl script that generates the ppc64 assembler +// can be found in the cryptogams repository at the link below. It is based on +// the original from openssl. + +// https://github.com/dot-asm/cryptogams/commit/a60f5b50ed908e91 + +// The differences in this and the original implementation are +// due to the calling conventions and initialization of constants. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +#define OUT R3 +#define INP R4 +#define LEN R5 +#define KEY R6 +#define CNT R7 +#define TMP R15 + +#define CONSTBASE R16 +#define BLOCKS R17 + +DATA consts<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x3320646e61707865 +DATA consts<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x6b20657479622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000001 +DATA consts<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA consts<>+0x20(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000004 +DATA consts<>+0x28(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA consts<>+0x30(SB)/8, $0x0a0b08090e0f0c0d +DATA consts<>+0x38(SB)/8, $0x0203000106070405 +DATA consts<>+0x40(SB)/8, $0x090a0b080d0e0f0c +DATA consts<>+0x48(SB)/8, $0x0102030005060704 +DATA consts<>+0x50(SB)/8, $0x6170786561707865 +DATA consts<>+0x58(SB)/8, $0x6170786561707865 +DATA consts<>+0x60(SB)/8, $0x3320646e3320646e +DATA consts<>+0x68(SB)/8, $0x3320646e3320646e +DATA consts<>+0x70(SB)/8, $0x79622d3279622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x78(SB)/8, $0x79622d3279622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x80(SB)/8, $0x6b2065746b206574 +DATA consts<>+0x88(SB)/8, $0x6b2065746b206574 +DATA consts<>+0x90(SB)/8, $0x0000000100000000 +DATA consts<>+0x98(SB)/8, $0x0000000300000002 +GLOBL consts<>(SB), RODATA, $0xa0 + +//func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32) +TEXT ·chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(SB),NOSPLIT,$64-40 + MOVD out+0(FP), OUT + MOVD inp+8(FP), INP + MOVD len+16(FP), LEN + MOVD key+24(FP), KEY + MOVD counter+32(FP), CNT + + // Addressing for constants + MOVD $consts<>+0x00(SB), CONSTBASE + MOVD $16, R8 + MOVD $32, R9 + MOVD $48, R10 + MOVD $64, R11 + SRD $6, LEN, BLOCKS + // V16 + LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R0), VS48 + ADD $80,CONSTBASE + + // Load key into V17,V18 + LXVW4X (KEY)(R0), VS49 + LXVW4X (KEY)(R8), VS50 + + // Load CNT, NONCE into V19 + LXVW4X (CNT)(R0), VS51 + + // Clear V27 + VXOR V27, V27, V27 + + // V28 + LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R11), VS60 + + // splat slot from V19 -> V26 + VSPLTW $0, V19, V26 + + VSLDOI $4, V19, V27, V19 + VSLDOI $12, V27, V19, V19 + + VADDUWM V26, V28, V26 + + MOVD $10, R14 + MOVD R14, CTR + +loop_outer_vsx: + // V0, V1, V2, V3 + LXVW4X (R0)(CONSTBASE), VS32 + LXVW4X (R8)(CONSTBASE), VS33 + LXVW4X (R9)(CONSTBASE), VS34 + LXVW4X (R10)(CONSTBASE), VS35 + + // splat values from V17, V18 into V4-V11 + VSPLTW $0, V17, V4 + VSPLTW $1, V17, V5 + VSPLTW $2, V17, V6 + VSPLTW $3, V17, V7 + VSPLTW $0, V18, V8 + VSPLTW $1, V18, V9 + VSPLTW $2, V18, V10 + VSPLTW $3, V18, V11 + + // VOR + VOR V26, V26, V12 + + // splat values from V19 -> V13, V14, V15 + VSPLTW $1, V19, V13 + VSPLTW $2, V19, V14 + VSPLTW $3, V19, V15 + + // splat const values + VSPLTISW $-16, V27 + VSPLTISW $12, V28 + VSPLTISW $8, V29 + VSPLTISW $7, V30 + +loop_vsx: + VADDUWM V0, V4, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V5, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V6, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V7, V3 + + VXOR V12, V0, V12 + VXOR V13, V1, V13 + VXOR V14, V2, V14 + VXOR V15, V3, V15 + + VRLW V12, V27, V12 + VRLW V13, V27, V13 + VRLW V14, V27, V14 + VRLW V15, V27, V15 + + VADDUWM V8, V12, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V13, V9 + VADDUWM V10, V14, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V15, V11 + + VXOR V4, V8, V4 + VXOR V5, V9, V5 + VXOR V6, V10, V6 + VXOR V7, V11, V7 + + VRLW V4, V28, V4 + VRLW V5, V28, V5 + VRLW V6, V28, V6 + VRLW V7, V28, V7 + + VADDUWM V0, V4, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V5, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V6, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V7, V3 + + VXOR V12, V0, V12 + VXOR V13, V1, V13 + VXOR V14, V2, V14 + VXOR V15, V3, V15 + + VRLW V12, V29, V12 + VRLW V13, V29, V13 + VRLW V14, V29, V14 + VRLW V15, V29, V15 + + VADDUWM V8, V12, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V13, V9 + VADDUWM V10, V14, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V15, V11 + + VXOR V4, V8, V4 + VXOR V5, V9, V5 + VXOR V6, V10, V6 + VXOR V7, V11, V7 + + VRLW V4, V30, V4 + VRLW V5, V30, V5 + VRLW V6, V30, V6 + VRLW V7, V30, V7 + + VADDUWM V0, V5, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V6, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V7, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V4, V3 + + VXOR V15, V0, V15 + VXOR V12, V1, V12 + VXOR V13, V2, V13 + VXOR V14, V3, V14 + + VRLW V15, V27, V15 + VRLW V12, V27, V12 + VRLW V13, V27, V13 + VRLW V14, V27, V14 + + VADDUWM V10, V15, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V12, V11 + VADDUWM V8, V13, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V14, V9 + + VXOR V5, V10, V5 + VXOR V6, V11, V6 + VXOR V7, V8, V7 + VXOR V4, V9, V4 + + VRLW V5, V28, V5 + VRLW V6, V28, V6 + VRLW V7, V28, V7 + VRLW V4, V28, V4 + + VADDUWM V0, V5, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V6, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V7, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V4, V3 + + VXOR V15, V0, V15 + VXOR V12, V1, V12 + VXOR V13, V2, V13 + VXOR V14, V3, V14 + + VRLW V15, V29, V15 + VRLW V12, V29, V12 + VRLW V13, V29, V13 + VRLW V14, V29, V14 + + VADDUWM V10, V15, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V12, V11 + VADDUWM V8, V13, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V14, V9 + + VXOR V5, V10, V5 + VXOR V6, V11, V6 + VXOR V7, V8, V7 + VXOR V4, V9, V4 + + VRLW V5, V30, V5 + VRLW V6, V30, V6 + VRLW V7, V30, V7 + VRLW V4, V30, V4 + BC 16, LT, loop_vsx + + VADDUWM V12, V26, V12 + + WORD $0x13600F8C // VMRGEW V0, V1, V27 + WORD $0x13821F8C // VMRGEW V2, V3, V28 + + WORD $0x10000E8C // VMRGOW V0, V1, V0 + WORD $0x10421E8C // VMRGOW V2, V3, V2 + + WORD $0x13A42F8C // VMRGEW V4, V5, V29 + WORD $0x13C63F8C // VMRGEW V6, V7, V30 + + XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $0, VS33 + XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $3, VS35 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS32 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS34 + + WORD $0x10842E8C // VMRGOW V4, V5, V4 + WORD $0x10C63E8C // VMRGOW V6, V7, V6 + + WORD $0x13684F8C // VMRGEW V8, V9, V27 + WORD $0x138A5F8C // VMRGEW V10, V11, V28 + + XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $0, VS37 + XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $3, VS39 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $0, VS36 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $3, VS38 + + WORD $0x11084E8C // VMRGOW V8, V9, V8 + WORD $0x114A5E8C // VMRGOW V10, V11, V10 + + WORD $0x13AC6F8C // VMRGEW V12, V13, V29 + WORD $0x13CE7F8C // VMRGEW V14, V15, V30 + + XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $0, VS41 + XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $3, VS43 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS40 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS42 + + WORD $0x118C6E8C // VMRGOW V12, V13, V12 + WORD $0x11CE7E8C // VMRGOW V14, V15, V14 + + VSPLTISW $4, V27 + VADDUWM V26, V27, V26 + + XXPERMDI VS44, VS46, $0, VS45 + XXPERMDI VS44, VS46, $3, VS47 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $0, VS44 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $3, VS46 + + VADDUWM V0, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V4, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V8, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V12, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + // Bottom of loop + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10) + ADD $64, OUT + BEQ done_vsx + + VADDUWM V1, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V5, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V9, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V13, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(V10) + ADD $64, OUT + BEQ done_vsx + + VADDUWM V2, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V6, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V10, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V14, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10) + ADD $64, OUT + BEQ done_vsx + + VADDUWM V3, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V7, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V11, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V15, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10) + ADD $64, OUT + + MOVD $10, R14 + MOVD R14, CTR + BNE loop_outer_vsx + +done_vsx: + // Increment counter by number of 64 byte blocks + MOVD (CNT), R14 + ADD BLOCKS, R14 + MOVD R14, (CNT) + RET + +tail_vsx: + ADD $32, R1, R11 + MOVD LEN, CTR + + // Save values on stack to copy from + STXVW4X VS32, (R11)(R0) + STXVW4X VS36, (R11)(R8) + STXVW4X VS40, (R11)(R9) + STXVW4X VS44, (R11)(R10) + ADD $-1, R11, R12 + ADD $-1, INP + ADD $-1, OUT + +looptail_vsx: + // Copying the result to OUT + // in bytes. + MOVBZU 1(R12), KEY + MOVBZU 1(INP), TMP + XOR KEY, TMP, KEY + MOVBU KEY, 1(OUT) + BC 16, LT, looptail_vsx + + // Clear the stack values + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R0) + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R8) + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R9) + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R10) + BR done_vsx diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4652247b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +package chacha20 + +import "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" + +var haveAsm = cpu.S390X.HasVX + +const bufSize = 256 + +// xorKeyStreamVX is an assembly implementation of XORKeyStream. It must only +// be called when the vector facility is available. Implementation in asm_s390x.s. +// +//go:noescape +func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + if cpu.S390X.HasVX { + xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter) + } else { + c.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f3ef5a01 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +#include "go_asm.h" +#include "textflag.h" + +// This is an implementation of the ChaCha20 encryption algorithm as +// specified in RFC 7539. It uses vector instructions to compute +// 4 keystream blocks in parallel (256 bytes) which are then XORed +// with the bytes in the input slice. + +GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA|NOPTR, $32 +// BSWAP: swap bytes in each 4-byte element +DATA ·constants<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x03020100 +DATA ·constants<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x07060504 +DATA ·constants<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x0b0a0908 +DATA ·constants<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x0f0e0d0c +// J0: [j0, j1, j2, j3] +DATA ·constants<>+0x10(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA ·constants<>+0x14(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA ·constants<>+0x18(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA ·constants<>+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 + +#define BSWAP V5 +#define J0 V6 +#define KEY0 V7 +#define KEY1 V8 +#define NONCE V9 +#define CTR V10 +#define M0 V11 +#define M1 V12 +#define M2 V13 +#define M3 V14 +#define INC V15 +#define X0 V16 +#define X1 V17 +#define X2 V18 +#define X3 V19 +#define X4 V20 +#define X5 V21 +#define X6 V22 +#define X7 V23 +#define X8 V24 +#define X9 V25 +#define X10 V26 +#define X11 V27 +#define X12 V28 +#define X13 V29 +#define X14 V30 +#define X15 V31 + +#define NUM_ROUNDS 20 + +#define ROUND4(a0, a1, a2, a3, b0, b1, b2, b3, c0, c1, c2, c3, d0, d1, d2, d3) \ + VAF a1, a0, a0 \ + VAF b1, b0, b0 \ + VAF c1, c0, c0 \ + VAF d1, d0, d0 \ + VX a0, a2, a2 \ + VX b0, b2, b2 \ + VX c0, c2, c2 \ + VX d0, d2, d2 \ + VERLLF $16, a2, a2 \ + VERLLF $16, b2, b2 \ + VERLLF $16, c2, c2 \ + VERLLF $16, d2, d2 \ + VAF a2, a3, a3 \ + VAF b2, b3, b3 \ + VAF c2, c3, c3 \ + VAF d2, d3, d3 \ + VX a3, a1, a1 \ + VX b3, b1, b1 \ + VX c3, c1, c1 \ + VX d3, d1, d1 \ + VERLLF $12, a1, a1 \ + VERLLF $12, b1, b1 \ + VERLLF $12, c1, c1 \ + VERLLF $12, d1, d1 \ + VAF a1, a0, a0 \ + VAF b1, b0, b0 \ + VAF c1, c0, c0 \ + VAF d1, d0, d0 \ + VX a0, a2, a2 \ + VX b0, b2, b2 \ + VX c0, c2, c2 \ + VX d0, d2, d2 \ + VERLLF $8, a2, a2 \ + VERLLF $8, b2, b2 \ + VERLLF $8, c2, c2 \ + VERLLF $8, d2, d2 \ + VAF a2, a3, a3 \ + VAF b2, b3, b3 \ + VAF c2, c3, c3 \ + VAF d2, d3, d3 \ + VX a3, a1, a1 \ + VX b3, b1, b1 \ + VX c3, c1, c1 \ + VX d3, d1, d1 \ + VERLLF $7, a1, a1 \ + VERLLF $7, b1, b1 \ + VERLLF $7, c1, c1 \ + VERLLF $7, d1, d1 + +#define PERMUTE(mask, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VPERM v0, v0, mask, v0 \ + VPERM v1, v1, mask, v1 \ + VPERM v2, v2, mask, v2 \ + VPERM v3, v3, mask, v3 + +#define ADDV(x, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VAF x, v0, v0 \ + VAF x, v1, v1 \ + VAF x, v2, v2 \ + VAF x, v3, v3 + +#define XORV(off, dst, src, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VLM off(src), M0, M3 \ + PERMUTE(BSWAP, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VX v0, M0, M0 \ + VX v1, M1, M1 \ + VX v2, M2, M2 \ + VX v3, M3, M3 \ + VSTM M0, M3, off(dst) + +#define SHUFFLE(a, b, c, d, t, u, v, w) \ + VMRHF a, c, t \ // t = {a[0], c[0], a[1], c[1]} + VMRHF b, d, u \ // u = {b[0], d[0], b[1], d[1]} + VMRLF a, c, v \ // v = {a[2], c[2], a[3], c[3]} + VMRLF b, d, w \ // w = {b[2], d[2], b[3], d[3]} + VMRHF t, u, a \ // a = {a[0], b[0], c[0], d[0]} + VMRLF t, u, b \ // b = {a[1], b[1], c[1], d[1]} + VMRHF v, w, c \ // c = {a[2], b[2], c[2], d[2]} + VMRLF v, w, d // d = {a[3], b[3], c[3], d[3]} + +// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) +TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R1 + MOVD dst+0(FP), R2 // R2=&dst[0] + LMG src+24(FP), R3, R4 // R3=&src[0] R4=len(src) + MOVD key+48(FP), R5 // R5=key + MOVD nonce+56(FP), R6 // R6=nonce + MOVD counter+64(FP), R7 // R7=counter + + // load BSWAP and J0 + VLM (R1), BSWAP, J0 + + // setup + MOVD $95, R0 + VLM (R5), KEY0, KEY1 + VLL R0, (R6), NONCE + VZERO M0 + VLEIB $7, $32, M0 + VSRLB M0, NONCE, NONCE + + // initialize counter values + VLREPF (R7), CTR + VZERO INC + VLEIF $1, $1, INC + VLEIF $2, $2, INC + VLEIF $3, $3, INC + VAF INC, CTR, CTR + VREPIF $4, INC + +chacha: + VREPF $0, J0, X0 + VREPF $1, J0, X1 + VREPF $2, J0, X2 + VREPF $3, J0, X3 + VREPF $0, KEY0, X4 + VREPF $1, KEY0, X5 + VREPF $2, KEY0, X6 + VREPF $3, KEY0, X7 + VREPF $0, KEY1, X8 + VREPF $1, KEY1, X9 + VREPF $2, KEY1, X10 + VREPF $3, KEY1, X11 + VLR CTR, X12 + VREPF $1, NONCE, X13 + VREPF $2, NONCE, X14 + VREPF $3, NONCE, X15 + + MOVD $(NUM_ROUNDS/2), R1 + +loop: + ROUND4(X0, X4, X12, X8, X1, X5, X13, X9, X2, X6, X14, X10, X3, X7, X15, X11) + ROUND4(X0, X5, X15, X10, X1, X6, X12, X11, X2, X7, X13, X8, X3, X4, X14, X9) + + ADD $-1, R1 + BNE loop + + // decrement length + ADD $-256, R4 + + // rearrange vectors + SHUFFLE(X0, X1, X2, X3, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(J0, X0, X1, X2, X3) + SHUFFLE(X4, X5, X6, X7, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(KEY0, X4, X5, X6, X7) + SHUFFLE(X8, X9, X10, X11, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(KEY1, X8, X9, X10, X11) + VAF CTR, X12, X12 + SHUFFLE(X12, X13, X14, X15, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(NONCE, X12, X13, X14, X15) + + // increment counters + VAF INC, CTR, CTR + + // xor keystream with plaintext + XORV(0*64, R2, R3, X0, X4, X8, X12) + XORV(1*64, R2, R3, X1, X5, X9, X13) + XORV(2*64, R2, R3, X2, X6, X10, X14) + XORV(3*64, R2, R3, X3, X7, X11, X15) + + // increment pointers + MOVD $256(R2), R2 + MOVD $256(R3), R3 + + CMPBNE R4, $0, chacha + + VSTEF $0, CTR, (R7) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c2d04851 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found src the LICENSE file. + +package chacha20 + +import "runtime" + +// Platforms that have fast unaligned 32-bit little endian accesses. +const unaligned = runtime.GOARCH == "386" || + runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" || + runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" || + runtime.GOARCH == "ppc64le" || + runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" + +// addXor reads a little endian uint32 from src, XORs it with (a + b) and +// places the result in little endian byte order in dst. +func addXor(dst, src []byte, a, b uint32) { + _, _ = src[3], dst[3] // bounds check elimination hint + if unaligned { + // The compiler should optimize this code into + // 32-bit unaligned little endian loads and stores. + // TODO: delete once the compiler does a reliably + // good job with the generic code below. + // See issue #25111 for more details. + v := uint32(src[0]) + v |= uint32(src[1]) << 8 + v |= uint32(src[2]) << 16 + v |= uint32(src[3]) << 24 + v ^= a + b + dst[0] = byte(v) + dst[1] = byte(v >> 8) + dst[2] = byte(v >> 16) + dst[3] = byte(v >> 24) + } else { + a += b + dst[0] = src[0] ^ byte(a) + dst[1] = src[1] ^ byte(a>>8) + dst[2] = src[2] ^ byte(a>>16) + dst[3] = src[3] ^ byte(a>>24) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..93da7322 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305.go @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package chacha20poly1305 implements the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD and its +// extended nonce variant XChaCha20-Poly1305, as specified in RFC 8439 and +// draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01. +package chacha20poly1305 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305" + +import ( + "crypto/cipher" + "errors" +) + +const ( + // KeySize is the size of the key used by this AEAD, in bytes. + KeySize = 32 + + // NonceSize is the size of the nonce used with the standard variant of this + // AEAD, in bytes. + // + // Note that this is too short to be safely generated at random if the same + // key is reused more than 2³² times. + NonceSize = 12 + + // NonceSizeX is the size of the nonce used with the XChaCha20-Poly1305 + // variant of this AEAD, in bytes. + NonceSizeX = 24 + + // Overhead is the size of the Poly1305 authentication tag, and the + // difference between a ciphertext length and its plaintext. + Overhead = 16 +) + +type chacha20poly1305 struct { + key [KeySize]byte +} + +// New returns a ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD that uses the given 256-bit key. +func New(key []byte) (cipher.AEAD, error) { + if len(key) != KeySize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20poly1305: bad key length") + } + ret := new(chacha20poly1305) + copy(ret.key[:], key) + return ret, nil +} + +func (c *chacha20poly1305) NonceSize() int { + return NonceSize +} + +func (c *chacha20poly1305) Overhead() int { + return Overhead +} + +func (c *chacha20poly1305) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { + if len(nonce) != NonceSize { + panic("chacha20poly1305: bad nonce length passed to Seal") + } + + if uint64(len(plaintext)) > (1<<38)-64 { + panic("chacha20poly1305: plaintext too large") + } + + return c.seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData) +} + +var errOpen = errors.New("chacha20poly1305: message authentication failed") + +func (c *chacha20poly1305) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if len(nonce) != NonceSize { + panic("chacha20poly1305: bad nonce length passed to Open") + } + if len(ciphertext) < 16 { + return nil, errOpen + } + if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > (1<<38)-48 { + panic("chacha20poly1305: ciphertext too large") + } + + return c.open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData) +} + +// sliceForAppend takes a slice and a requested number of bytes. It returns a +// slice with the contents of the given slice followed by that many bytes and a +// second slice that aliases into it and contains only the extra bytes. If the +// original slice has sufficient capacity then no allocation is performed. +func sliceForAppend(in []byte, n int) (head, tail []byte) { + if total := len(in) + n; cap(in) >= total { + head = in[:total] + } else { + head = make([]byte, total) + copy(head, in) + } + tail = head[len(in):] + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_amd64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_amd64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0c408c57 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_amd64.go @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +package chacha20poly1305 + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias" + "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" +) + +//go:noescape +func chacha20Poly1305Open(dst []byte, key []uint32, src, ad []byte) bool + +//go:noescape +func chacha20Poly1305Seal(dst []byte, key []uint32, src, ad []byte) + +var ( + useAVX2 = cpu.X86.HasAVX2 && cpu.X86.HasBMI2 +) + +// setupState writes a ChaCha20 input matrix to state. See +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539#section-2.3. +func setupState(state *[16]uint32, key *[32]byte, nonce []byte) { + state[0] = 0x61707865 + state[1] = 0x3320646e + state[2] = 0x79622d32 + state[3] = 0x6b206574 + + state[4] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]) + state[5] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]) + state[6] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]) + state[7] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]) + state[8] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]) + state[9] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]) + state[10] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]) + state[11] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]) + + state[12] = 0 + state[13] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4]) + state[14] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8]) + state[15] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12]) +} + +func (c *chacha20poly1305) seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { + if !cpu.X86.HasSSSE3 { + return c.sealGeneric(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData) + } + + var state [16]uint32 + setupState(&state, &c.key, nonce) + + ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+16) + if alias.InexactOverlap(out, plaintext) { + panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap") + } + chacha20Poly1305Seal(out[:], state[:], plaintext, additionalData) + return ret +} + +func (c *chacha20poly1305) open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if !cpu.X86.HasSSSE3 { + return c.openGeneric(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData) + } + + var state [16]uint32 + setupState(&state, &c.key, nonce) + + ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-16] + ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext)) + if alias.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) { + panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap") + } + if !chacha20Poly1305Open(out, state[:], ciphertext, additionalData) { + for i := range out { + out[i] = 0 + } + return nil, errOpen + } + + return ret, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_amd64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..867c181a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_amd64.s @@ -0,0 +1,2696 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// This file was originally from https://golang.org/cl/24717 by Vlad Krasnov of CloudFlare. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" +// General register allocation +#define oup DI +#define inp SI +#define inl BX +#define adp CX // free to reuse, after we hash the additional data +#define keyp R8 // free to reuse, when we copy the key to stack +#define itr2 R9 // general iterator +#define itr1 CX // general iterator +#define acc0 R10 +#define acc1 R11 +#define acc2 R12 +#define t0 R13 +#define t1 R14 +#define t2 R15 +#define t3 R8 +// Register and stack allocation for the SSE code +#define rStore (0*16)(BP) +#define sStore (1*16)(BP) +#define state1Store (2*16)(BP) +#define state2Store (3*16)(BP) +#define tmpStore (4*16)(BP) +#define ctr0Store (5*16)(BP) +#define ctr1Store (6*16)(BP) +#define ctr2Store (7*16)(BP) +#define ctr3Store (8*16)(BP) +#define A0 X0 +#define A1 X1 +#define A2 X2 +#define B0 X3 +#define B1 X4 +#define B2 X5 +#define C0 X6 +#define C1 X7 +#define C2 X8 +#define D0 X9 +#define D1 X10 +#define D2 X11 +#define T0 X12 +#define T1 X13 +#define T2 X14 +#define T3 X15 +#define A3 T0 +#define B3 T1 +#define C3 T2 +#define D3 T3 +// Register and stack allocation for the AVX2 code +#define rsStoreAVX2 (0*32)(BP) +#define state1StoreAVX2 (1*32)(BP) +#define state2StoreAVX2 (2*32)(BP) +#define ctr0StoreAVX2 (3*32)(BP) +#define ctr1StoreAVX2 (4*32)(BP) +#define ctr2StoreAVX2 (5*32)(BP) +#define ctr3StoreAVX2 (6*32)(BP) +#define tmpStoreAVX2 (7*32)(BP) // 256 bytes on stack +#define AA0 Y0 +#define AA1 Y5 +#define AA2 Y6 +#define AA3 Y7 +#define BB0 Y14 +#define BB1 Y9 +#define BB2 Y10 +#define BB3 Y11 +#define CC0 Y12 +#define CC1 Y13 +#define CC2 Y8 +#define CC3 Y15 +#define DD0 Y4 +#define DD1 Y1 +#define DD2 Y2 +#define DD3 Y3 +#define TT0 DD3 +#define TT1 AA3 +#define TT2 BB3 +#define TT3 CC3 +// ChaCha20 constants +DATA ·chacha20Constants<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA ·chacha20Constants<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA ·chacha20Constants<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA ·chacha20Constants<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 +DATA ·chacha20Constants<>+0x10(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA ·chacha20Constants<>+0x14(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA ·chacha20Constants<>+0x18(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA ·chacha20Constants<>+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 +// <<< 16 with PSHUFB +DATA ·rol16<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0504070601000302 +DATA ·rol16<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0D0C0F0E09080B0A +DATA ·rol16<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x0504070601000302 +DATA ·rol16<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0D0C0F0E09080B0A +// <<< 8 with PSHUFB +DATA ·rol8<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0605040702010003 +DATA ·rol8<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0E0D0C0F0A09080B +DATA ·rol8<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x0605040702010003 +DATA ·rol8<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0E0D0C0F0A09080B + +DATA ·avx2InitMask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0 +DATA ·avx2InitMask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0 +DATA ·avx2InitMask<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x1 +DATA ·avx2InitMask<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0 + +DATA ·avx2IncMask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x2 +DATA ·avx2IncMask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0 +DATA ·avx2IncMask<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x2 +DATA ·avx2IncMask<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0 +// Poly1305 key clamp +DATA ·polyClampMask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF +DATA ·polyClampMask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC +DATA ·polyClampMask<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF +DATA ·polyClampMask<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF + +DATA ·sseIncMask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x1 +DATA ·sseIncMask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0 +// To load/store the last < 16 bytes in a buffer +DATA ·andMask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x00000000000000ff +DATA ·andMask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA ·andMask<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x000000000000ffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA ·andMask<>+0x20(SB)/8, $0x0000000000ffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0x28(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA ·andMask<>+0x30(SB)/8, $0x00000000ffffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0x38(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA ·andMask<>+0x40(SB)/8, $0x000000ffffffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0x48(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA ·andMask<>+0x50(SB)/8, $0x0000ffffffffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0x58(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA ·andMask<>+0x60(SB)/8, $0x00ffffffffffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0x68(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA ·andMask<>+0x70(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0x78(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA ·andMask<>+0x80(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0x88(SB)/8, $0x00000000000000ff +DATA ·andMask<>+0x90(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0x98(SB)/8, $0x000000000000ffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0xa0(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0xa8(SB)/8, $0x0000000000ffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0xb0(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0xb8(SB)/8, $0x00000000ffffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0xc0(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0xc8(SB)/8, $0x000000ffffffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0xd0(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0xd8(SB)/8, $0x0000ffffffffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0xe0(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff +DATA ·andMask<>+0xe8(SB)/8, $0x00ffffffffffffff + +GLOBL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $32 +GLOBL ·rol16<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $32 +GLOBL ·rol8<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $32 +GLOBL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 +GLOBL ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $32 +GLOBL ·avx2InitMask<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $32 +GLOBL ·polyClampMask<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $32 +GLOBL ·andMask<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $240 +// No PALIGNR in Go ASM yet (but VPALIGNR is present). +#define shiftB0Left BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xdb; BYTE $0x04 // PALIGNR $4, X3, X3 +#define shiftB1Left BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xe4; BYTE $0x04 // PALIGNR $4, X4, X4 +#define shiftB2Left BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xed; BYTE $0x04 // PALIGNR $4, X5, X5 +#define shiftB3Left BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x45; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xed; BYTE $0x04 // PALIGNR $4, X13, X13 +#define shiftC0Left BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xf6; BYTE $0x08 // PALIGNR $8, X6, X6 +#define shiftC1Left BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xff; BYTE $0x08 // PALIGNR $8, X7, X7 +#define shiftC2Left BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x45; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xc0; BYTE $0x08 // PALIGNR $8, X8, X8 +#define shiftC3Left BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x45; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xf6; BYTE $0x08 // PALIGNR $8, X14, X14 +#define shiftD0Left BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x45; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xc9; BYTE $0x0c // PALIGNR $12, X9, X9 +#define shiftD1Left BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x45; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xd2; BYTE $0x0c // PALIGNR $12, X10, X10 +#define shiftD2Left BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x45; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xdb; BYTE $0x0c // PALIGNR $12, X11, X11 +#define shiftD3Left BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x45; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xff; BYTE $0x0c // PALIGNR $12, X15, X15 +#define shiftB0Right BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xdb; BYTE $0x0c // PALIGNR $12, X3, X3 +#define shiftB1Right BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xe4; BYTE $0x0c // PALIGNR $12, X4, X4 +#define shiftB2Right BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xed; BYTE $0x0c // PALIGNR $12, X5, X5 +#define shiftB3Right BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x45; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xed; BYTE $0x0c // PALIGNR $12, X13, X13 +#define shiftC0Right shiftC0Left +#define shiftC1Right shiftC1Left +#define shiftC2Right shiftC2Left +#define shiftC3Right shiftC3Left +#define shiftD0Right BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x45; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xc9; BYTE $0x04 // PALIGNR $4, X9, X9 +#define shiftD1Right BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x45; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xd2; BYTE $0x04 // PALIGNR $4, X10, X10 +#define shiftD2Right BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x45; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xdb; BYTE $0x04 // PALIGNR $4, X11, X11 +#define shiftD3Right BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x45; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x0f; BYTE $0xff; BYTE $0x04 // PALIGNR $4, X15, X15 +// Some macros +#define chachaQR(A, B, C, D, T) \ + PADDD B, A; PXOR A, D; PSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), D \ + PADDD D, C; PXOR C, B; MOVO B, T; PSLLL $12, T; PSRLL $20, B; PXOR T, B \ + PADDD B, A; PXOR A, D; PSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), D \ + PADDD D, C; PXOR C, B; MOVO B, T; PSLLL $7, T; PSRLL $25, B; PXOR T, B + +#define chachaQR_AVX2(A, B, C, D, T) \ + VPADDD B, A, A; VPXOR A, D, D; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), D, D \ + VPADDD D, C, C; VPXOR C, B, B; VPSLLD $12, B, T; VPSRLD $20, B, B; VPXOR T, B, B \ + VPADDD B, A, A; VPXOR A, D, D; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), D, D \ + VPADDD D, C, C; VPXOR C, B, B; VPSLLD $7, B, T; VPSRLD $25, B, B; VPXOR T, B, B + +#define polyAdd(S) ADDQ S, acc0; ADCQ 8+S, acc1; ADCQ $1, acc2 +#define polyMulStage1 MOVQ (0*8)(BP), AX; MOVQ AX, t2; MULQ acc0; MOVQ AX, t0; MOVQ DX, t1; MOVQ (0*8)(BP), AX; MULQ acc1; IMULQ acc2, t2; ADDQ AX, t1; ADCQ DX, t2 +#define polyMulStage2 MOVQ (1*8)(BP), AX; MOVQ AX, t3; MULQ acc0; ADDQ AX, t1; ADCQ $0, DX; MOVQ DX, acc0; MOVQ (1*8)(BP), AX; MULQ acc1; ADDQ AX, t2; ADCQ $0, DX +#define polyMulStage3 IMULQ acc2, t3; ADDQ acc0, t2; ADCQ DX, t3 +#define polyMulReduceStage MOVQ t0, acc0; MOVQ t1, acc1; MOVQ t2, acc2; ANDQ $3, acc2; MOVQ t2, t0; ANDQ $-4, t0; MOVQ t3, t1; SHRQ $2, t3, t2; SHRQ $2, t3; ADDQ t0, acc0; ADCQ t1, acc1; ADCQ $0, acc2; ADDQ t2, acc0; ADCQ t3, acc1; ADCQ $0, acc2 + +#define polyMulStage1_AVX2 MOVQ (0*8)(BP), DX; MOVQ DX, t2; MULXQ acc0, t0, t1; IMULQ acc2, t2; MULXQ acc1, AX, DX; ADDQ AX, t1; ADCQ DX, t2 +#define polyMulStage2_AVX2 MOVQ (1*8)(BP), DX; MULXQ acc0, acc0, AX; ADDQ acc0, t1; MULXQ acc1, acc1, t3; ADCQ acc1, t2; ADCQ $0, t3 +#define polyMulStage3_AVX2 IMULQ acc2, DX; ADDQ AX, t2; ADCQ DX, t3 + +#define polyMul polyMulStage1; polyMulStage2; polyMulStage3; polyMulReduceStage +#define polyMulAVX2 polyMulStage1_AVX2; polyMulStage2_AVX2; polyMulStage3_AVX2; polyMulReduceStage +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +TEXT polyHashADInternal<>(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + // adp points to beginning of additional data + // itr2 holds ad length + XORQ acc0, acc0 + XORQ acc1, acc1 + XORQ acc2, acc2 + CMPQ itr2, $13 + JNE hashADLoop + +openFastTLSAD: + // Special treatment for the TLS case of 13 bytes + MOVQ (adp), acc0 + MOVQ 5(adp), acc1 + SHRQ $24, acc1 + MOVQ $1, acc2 + polyMul + RET + +hashADLoop: + // Hash in 16 byte chunks + CMPQ itr2, $16 + JB hashADTail + polyAdd(0(adp)) + LEAQ (1*16)(adp), adp + SUBQ $16, itr2 + polyMul + JMP hashADLoop + +hashADTail: + CMPQ itr2, $0 + JE hashADDone + + // Hash last < 16 byte tail + XORQ t0, t0 + XORQ t1, t1 + XORQ t2, t2 + ADDQ itr2, adp + +hashADTailLoop: + SHLQ $8, t0, t1 + SHLQ $8, t0 + MOVB -1(adp), t2 + XORQ t2, t0 + DECQ adp + DECQ itr2 + JNE hashADTailLoop + +hashADTailFinish: + ADDQ t0, acc0; ADCQ t1, acc1; ADCQ $1, acc2 + polyMul + + // Finished AD +hashADDone: + RET + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// func chacha20Poly1305Open(dst, key, src, ad []byte) bool +TEXT ·chacha20Poly1305Open(SB), 0, $288-97 + // For aligned stack access + MOVQ SP, BP + ADDQ $32, BP + ANDQ $-32, BP + MOVQ dst+0(FP), oup + MOVQ key+24(FP), keyp + MOVQ src+48(FP), inp + MOVQ src_len+56(FP), inl + MOVQ ad+72(FP), adp + + // Check for AVX2 support + CMPB ·useAVX2(SB), $1 + JE chacha20Poly1305Open_AVX2 + + // Special optimization, for very short buffers + CMPQ inl, $128 + JBE openSSE128 // About 16% faster + + // For long buffers, prepare the poly key first + MOVOU ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0 + MOVOU (1*16)(keyp), B0 + MOVOU (2*16)(keyp), C0 + MOVOU (3*16)(keyp), D0 + MOVO D0, T1 + + // Store state on stack for future use + MOVO B0, state1Store + MOVO C0, state2Store + MOVO D0, ctr3Store + MOVQ $10, itr2 + +openSSEPreparePolyKey: + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0) + shiftB0Left; shiftC0Left; shiftD0Left + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0) + shiftB0Right; shiftC0Right; shiftD0Right + DECQ itr2 + JNE openSSEPreparePolyKey + + // A0|B0 hold the Poly1305 32-byte key, C0,D0 can be discarded + PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; PADDL state1Store, B0 + + // Clamp and store the key + PAND ·polyClampMask<>(SB), A0 + MOVO A0, rStore; MOVO B0, sStore + + // Hash AAD + MOVQ ad_len+80(FP), itr2 + CALL polyHashADInternal<>(SB) + +openSSEMainLoop: + CMPQ inl, $256 + JB openSSEMainLoopDone + + // Load state, increment counter blocks + MOVO ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; MOVO state1Store, B0; MOVO state2Store, C0; MOVO ctr3Store, D0; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D0 + MOVO A0, A1; MOVO B0, B1; MOVO C0, C1; MOVO D0, D1; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D1 + MOVO A1, A2; MOVO B1, B2; MOVO C1, C2; MOVO D1, D2; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D2 + MOVO A2, A3; MOVO B2, B3; MOVO C2, C3; MOVO D2, D3; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D3 + + // Store counters + MOVO D0, ctr0Store; MOVO D1, ctr1Store; MOVO D2, ctr2Store; MOVO D3, ctr3Store + + // There are 10 ChaCha20 iterations of 2QR each, so for 6 iterations we hash 2 blocks, and for the remaining 4 only 1 block - for a total of 16 + MOVQ $4, itr1 + MOVQ inp, itr2 + +openSSEInternalLoop: + MOVO C3, tmpStore + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, C3); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, C3); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, C3) + MOVO tmpStore, C3 + MOVO C1, tmpStore + chachaQR(A3, B3, C3, D3, C1) + MOVO tmpStore, C1 + polyAdd(0(itr2)) + shiftB0Left; shiftB1Left; shiftB2Left; shiftB3Left + shiftC0Left; shiftC1Left; shiftC2Left; shiftC3Left + shiftD0Left; shiftD1Left; shiftD2Left; shiftD3Left + polyMulStage1 + polyMulStage2 + LEAQ (2*8)(itr2), itr2 + MOVO C3, tmpStore + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, C3); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, C3); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, C3) + MOVO tmpStore, C3 + MOVO C1, tmpStore + polyMulStage3 + chachaQR(A3, B3, C3, D3, C1) + MOVO tmpStore, C1 + polyMulReduceStage + shiftB0Right; shiftB1Right; shiftB2Right; shiftB3Right + shiftC0Right; shiftC1Right; shiftC2Right; shiftC3Right + shiftD0Right; shiftD1Right; shiftD2Right; shiftD3Right + DECQ itr1 + JGE openSSEInternalLoop + + polyAdd(0(itr2)) + polyMul + LEAQ (2*8)(itr2), itr2 + + CMPQ itr1, $-6 + JG openSSEInternalLoop + + // Add in the state + PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A1; PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A2; PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A3 + PADDD state1Store, B0; PADDD state1Store, B1; PADDD state1Store, B2; PADDD state1Store, B3 + PADDD state2Store, C0; PADDD state2Store, C1; PADDD state2Store, C2; PADDD state2Store, C3 + PADDD ctr0Store, D0; PADDD ctr1Store, D1; PADDD ctr2Store, D2; PADDD ctr3Store, D3 + + // Load - xor - store + MOVO D3, tmpStore + MOVOU (0*16)(inp), D3; PXOR D3, A0; MOVOU A0, (0*16)(oup) + MOVOU (1*16)(inp), D3; PXOR D3, B0; MOVOU B0, (1*16)(oup) + MOVOU (2*16)(inp), D3; PXOR D3, C0; MOVOU C0, (2*16)(oup) + MOVOU (3*16)(inp), D3; PXOR D3, D0; MOVOU D0, (3*16)(oup) + MOVOU (4*16)(inp), D0; PXOR D0, A1; MOVOU A1, (4*16)(oup) + MOVOU (5*16)(inp), D0; PXOR D0, B1; MOVOU B1, (5*16)(oup) + MOVOU (6*16)(inp), D0; PXOR D0, C1; MOVOU C1, (6*16)(oup) + MOVOU (7*16)(inp), D0; PXOR D0, D1; MOVOU D1, (7*16)(oup) + MOVOU (8*16)(inp), D0; PXOR D0, A2; MOVOU A2, (8*16)(oup) + MOVOU (9*16)(inp), D0; PXOR D0, B2; MOVOU B2, (9*16)(oup) + MOVOU (10*16)(inp), D0; PXOR D0, C2; MOVOU C2, (10*16)(oup) + MOVOU (11*16)(inp), D0; PXOR D0, D2; MOVOU D2, (11*16)(oup) + MOVOU (12*16)(inp), D0; PXOR D0, A3; MOVOU A3, (12*16)(oup) + MOVOU (13*16)(inp), D0; PXOR D0, B3; MOVOU B3, (13*16)(oup) + MOVOU (14*16)(inp), D0; PXOR D0, C3; MOVOU C3, (14*16)(oup) + MOVOU (15*16)(inp), D0; PXOR tmpStore, D0; MOVOU D0, (15*16)(oup) + LEAQ 256(inp), inp + LEAQ 256(oup), oup + SUBQ $256, inl + JMP openSSEMainLoop + +openSSEMainLoopDone: + // Handle the various tail sizes efficiently + TESTQ inl, inl + JE openSSEFinalize + CMPQ inl, $64 + JBE openSSETail64 + CMPQ inl, $128 + JBE openSSETail128 + CMPQ inl, $192 + JBE openSSETail192 + JMP openSSETail256 + +openSSEFinalize: + // Hash in the PT, AAD lengths + ADDQ ad_len+80(FP), acc0; ADCQ src_len+56(FP), acc1; ADCQ $1, acc2 + polyMul + + // Final reduce + MOVQ acc0, t0 + MOVQ acc1, t1 + MOVQ acc2, t2 + SUBQ $-5, acc0 + SBBQ $-1, acc1 + SBBQ $3, acc2 + CMOVQCS t0, acc0 + CMOVQCS t1, acc1 + CMOVQCS t2, acc2 + + // Add in the "s" part of the key + ADDQ 0+sStore, acc0 + ADCQ 8+sStore, acc1 + + // Finally, constant time compare to the tag at the end of the message + XORQ AX, AX + MOVQ $1, DX + XORQ (0*8)(inp), acc0 + XORQ (1*8)(inp), acc1 + ORQ acc1, acc0 + CMOVQEQ DX, AX + + // Return true iff tags are equal + MOVB AX, ret+96(FP) + RET + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for buffers smaller than 129 bytes +openSSE128: + // For up to 128 bytes of ciphertext and 64 bytes for the poly key, we require to process three blocks + MOVOU ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; MOVOU (1*16)(keyp), B0; MOVOU (2*16)(keyp), C0; MOVOU (3*16)(keyp), D0 + MOVO A0, A1; MOVO B0, B1; MOVO C0, C1; MOVO D0, D1; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D1 + MOVO A1, A2; MOVO B1, B2; MOVO C1, C2; MOVO D1, D2; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D2 + MOVO B0, T1; MOVO C0, T2; MOVO D1, T3 + MOVQ $10, itr2 + +openSSE128InnerCipherLoop: + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, T0); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, T0) + shiftB0Left; shiftB1Left; shiftB2Left + shiftC0Left; shiftC1Left; shiftC2Left + shiftD0Left; shiftD1Left; shiftD2Left + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, T0); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, T0) + shiftB0Right; shiftB1Right; shiftB2Right + shiftC0Right; shiftC1Right; shiftC2Right + shiftD0Right; shiftD1Right; shiftD2Right + DECQ itr2 + JNE openSSE128InnerCipherLoop + + // A0|B0 hold the Poly1305 32-byte key, C0,D0 can be discarded + PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A1; PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A2 + PADDL T1, B0; PADDL T1, B1; PADDL T1, B2 + PADDL T2, C1; PADDL T2, C2 + PADDL T3, D1; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), T3; PADDL T3, D2 + + // Clamp and store the key + PAND ·polyClampMask<>(SB), A0 + MOVOU A0, rStore; MOVOU B0, sStore + + // Hash + MOVQ ad_len+80(FP), itr2 + CALL polyHashADInternal<>(SB) + +openSSE128Open: + CMPQ inl, $16 + JB openSSETail16 + SUBQ $16, inl + + // Load for hashing + polyAdd(0(inp)) + + // Load for decryption + MOVOU (inp), T0; PXOR T0, A1; MOVOU A1, (oup) + LEAQ (1*16)(inp), inp + LEAQ (1*16)(oup), oup + polyMul + + // Shift the stream "left" + MOVO B1, A1 + MOVO C1, B1 + MOVO D1, C1 + MOVO A2, D1 + MOVO B2, A2 + MOVO C2, B2 + MOVO D2, C2 + JMP openSSE128Open + +openSSETail16: + TESTQ inl, inl + JE openSSEFinalize + + // We can safely load the CT from the end, because it is padded with the MAC + MOVQ inl, itr2 + SHLQ $4, itr2 + LEAQ ·andMask<>(SB), t0 + MOVOU (inp), T0 + ADDQ inl, inp + PAND -16(t0)(itr2*1), T0 + MOVO T0, 0+tmpStore + MOVQ T0, t0 + MOVQ 8+tmpStore, t1 + PXOR A1, T0 + + // We can only store one byte at a time, since plaintext can be shorter than 16 bytes +openSSETail16Store: + MOVQ T0, t3 + MOVB t3, (oup) + PSRLDQ $1, T0 + INCQ oup + DECQ inl + JNE openSSETail16Store + ADDQ t0, acc0; ADCQ t1, acc1; ADCQ $1, acc2 + polyMul + JMP openSSEFinalize + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for the last 64 bytes of ciphertext +openSSETail64: + // Need to decrypt up to 64 bytes - prepare single block + MOVO ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; MOVO state1Store, B0; MOVO state2Store, C0; MOVO ctr3Store, D0; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D0; MOVO D0, ctr0Store + XORQ itr2, itr2 + MOVQ inl, itr1 + CMPQ itr1, $16 + JB openSSETail64LoopB + +openSSETail64LoopA: + // Perform ChaCha rounds, while hashing the remaining input + polyAdd(0(inp)(itr2*1)) + polyMul + SUBQ $16, itr1 + +openSSETail64LoopB: + ADDQ $16, itr2 + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0) + shiftB0Left; shiftC0Left; shiftD0Left + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0) + shiftB0Right; shiftC0Right; shiftD0Right + + CMPQ itr1, $16 + JAE openSSETail64LoopA + + CMPQ itr2, $160 + JNE openSSETail64LoopB + + PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; PADDL state1Store, B0; PADDL state2Store, C0; PADDL ctr0Store, D0 + +openSSETail64DecLoop: + CMPQ inl, $16 + JB openSSETail64DecLoopDone + SUBQ $16, inl + MOVOU (inp), T0 + PXOR T0, A0 + MOVOU A0, (oup) + LEAQ 16(inp), inp + LEAQ 16(oup), oup + MOVO B0, A0 + MOVO C0, B0 + MOVO D0, C0 + JMP openSSETail64DecLoop + +openSSETail64DecLoopDone: + MOVO A0, A1 + JMP openSSETail16 + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for the last 128 bytes of ciphertext +openSSETail128: + // Need to decrypt up to 128 bytes - prepare two blocks + MOVO ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A1; MOVO state1Store, B1; MOVO state2Store, C1; MOVO ctr3Store, D1; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D1; MOVO D1, ctr0Store + MOVO A1, A0; MOVO B1, B0; MOVO C1, C0; MOVO D1, D0; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D0; MOVO D0, ctr1Store + XORQ itr2, itr2 + MOVQ inl, itr1 + ANDQ $-16, itr1 + +openSSETail128LoopA: + // Perform ChaCha rounds, while hashing the remaining input + polyAdd(0(inp)(itr2*1)) + polyMul + +openSSETail128LoopB: + ADDQ $16, itr2 + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, T0) + shiftB0Left; shiftC0Left; shiftD0Left + shiftB1Left; shiftC1Left; shiftD1Left + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, T0) + shiftB0Right; shiftC0Right; shiftD0Right + shiftB1Right; shiftC1Right; shiftD1Right + + CMPQ itr2, itr1 + JB openSSETail128LoopA + + CMPQ itr2, $160 + JNE openSSETail128LoopB + + PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A1 + PADDL state1Store, B0; PADDL state1Store, B1 + PADDL state2Store, C0; PADDL state2Store, C1 + PADDL ctr1Store, D0; PADDL ctr0Store, D1 + + MOVOU (0*16)(inp), T0; MOVOU (1*16)(inp), T1; MOVOU (2*16)(inp), T2; MOVOU (3*16)(inp), T3 + PXOR T0, A1; PXOR T1, B1; PXOR T2, C1; PXOR T3, D1 + MOVOU A1, (0*16)(oup); MOVOU B1, (1*16)(oup); MOVOU C1, (2*16)(oup); MOVOU D1, (3*16)(oup) + + SUBQ $64, inl + LEAQ 64(inp), inp + LEAQ 64(oup), oup + JMP openSSETail64DecLoop + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for the last 192 bytes of ciphertext +openSSETail192: + // Need to decrypt up to 192 bytes - prepare three blocks + MOVO ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A2; MOVO state1Store, B2; MOVO state2Store, C2; MOVO ctr3Store, D2; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D2; MOVO D2, ctr0Store + MOVO A2, A1; MOVO B2, B1; MOVO C2, C1; MOVO D2, D1; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D1; MOVO D1, ctr1Store + MOVO A1, A0; MOVO B1, B0; MOVO C1, C0; MOVO D1, D0; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D0; MOVO D0, ctr2Store + + MOVQ inl, itr1 + MOVQ $160, itr2 + CMPQ itr1, $160 + CMOVQGT itr2, itr1 + ANDQ $-16, itr1 + XORQ itr2, itr2 + +openSSLTail192LoopA: + // Perform ChaCha rounds, while hashing the remaining input + polyAdd(0(inp)(itr2*1)) + polyMul + +openSSLTail192LoopB: + ADDQ $16, itr2 + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, T0); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, T0) + shiftB0Left; shiftC0Left; shiftD0Left + shiftB1Left; shiftC1Left; shiftD1Left + shiftB2Left; shiftC2Left; shiftD2Left + + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, T0); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, T0) + shiftB0Right; shiftC0Right; shiftD0Right + shiftB1Right; shiftC1Right; shiftD1Right + shiftB2Right; shiftC2Right; shiftD2Right + + CMPQ itr2, itr1 + JB openSSLTail192LoopA + + CMPQ itr2, $160 + JNE openSSLTail192LoopB + + CMPQ inl, $176 + JB openSSLTail192Store + + polyAdd(160(inp)) + polyMul + + CMPQ inl, $192 + JB openSSLTail192Store + + polyAdd(176(inp)) + polyMul + +openSSLTail192Store: + PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A1; PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A2 + PADDL state1Store, B0; PADDL state1Store, B1; PADDL state1Store, B2 + PADDL state2Store, C0; PADDL state2Store, C1; PADDL state2Store, C2 + PADDL ctr2Store, D0; PADDL ctr1Store, D1; PADDL ctr0Store, D2 + + MOVOU (0*16)(inp), T0; MOVOU (1*16)(inp), T1; MOVOU (2*16)(inp), T2; MOVOU (3*16)(inp), T3 + PXOR T0, A2; PXOR T1, B2; PXOR T2, C2; PXOR T3, D2 + MOVOU A2, (0*16)(oup); MOVOU B2, (1*16)(oup); MOVOU C2, (2*16)(oup); MOVOU D2, (3*16)(oup) + + MOVOU (4*16)(inp), T0; MOVOU (5*16)(inp), T1; MOVOU (6*16)(inp), T2; MOVOU (7*16)(inp), T3 + PXOR T0, A1; PXOR T1, B1; PXOR T2, C1; PXOR T3, D1 + MOVOU A1, (4*16)(oup); MOVOU B1, (5*16)(oup); MOVOU C1, (6*16)(oup); MOVOU D1, (7*16)(oup) + + SUBQ $128, inl + LEAQ 128(inp), inp + LEAQ 128(oup), oup + JMP openSSETail64DecLoop + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for the last 256 bytes of ciphertext +openSSETail256: + // Need to decrypt up to 256 bytes - prepare four blocks + MOVO ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; MOVO state1Store, B0; MOVO state2Store, C0; MOVO ctr3Store, D0; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D0 + MOVO A0, A1; MOVO B0, B1; MOVO C0, C1; MOVO D0, D1; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D1 + MOVO A1, A2; MOVO B1, B2; MOVO C1, C2; MOVO D1, D2; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D2 + MOVO A2, A3; MOVO B2, B3; MOVO C2, C3; MOVO D2, D3; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D3 + + // Store counters + MOVO D0, ctr0Store; MOVO D1, ctr1Store; MOVO D2, ctr2Store; MOVO D3, ctr3Store + XORQ itr2, itr2 + +openSSETail256Loop: + // This loop inteleaves 8 ChaCha quarter rounds with 1 poly multiplication + polyAdd(0(inp)(itr2*1)) + MOVO C3, tmpStore + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, C3); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, C3); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, C3) + MOVO tmpStore, C3 + MOVO C1, tmpStore + chachaQR(A3, B3, C3, D3, C1) + MOVO tmpStore, C1 + shiftB0Left; shiftB1Left; shiftB2Left; shiftB3Left + shiftC0Left; shiftC1Left; shiftC2Left; shiftC3Left + shiftD0Left; shiftD1Left; shiftD2Left; shiftD3Left + polyMulStage1 + polyMulStage2 + MOVO C3, tmpStore + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, C3); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, C3); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, C3) + MOVO tmpStore, C3 + MOVO C1, tmpStore + chachaQR(A3, B3, C3, D3, C1) + MOVO tmpStore, C1 + polyMulStage3 + polyMulReduceStage + shiftB0Right; shiftB1Right; shiftB2Right; shiftB3Right + shiftC0Right; shiftC1Right; shiftC2Right; shiftC3Right + shiftD0Right; shiftD1Right; shiftD2Right; shiftD3Right + ADDQ $2*8, itr2 + CMPQ itr2, $160 + JB openSSETail256Loop + MOVQ inl, itr1 + ANDQ $-16, itr1 + +openSSETail256HashLoop: + polyAdd(0(inp)(itr2*1)) + polyMul + ADDQ $2*8, itr2 + CMPQ itr2, itr1 + JB openSSETail256HashLoop + + // Add in the state + PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A1; PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A2; PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A3 + PADDD state1Store, B0; PADDD state1Store, B1; PADDD state1Store, B2; PADDD state1Store, B3 + PADDD state2Store, C0; PADDD state2Store, C1; PADDD state2Store, C2; PADDD state2Store, C3 + PADDD ctr0Store, D0; PADDD ctr1Store, D1; PADDD ctr2Store, D2; PADDD ctr3Store, D3 + MOVO D3, tmpStore + + // Load - xor - store + MOVOU (0*16)(inp), D3; PXOR D3, A0 + MOVOU (1*16)(inp), D3; PXOR D3, B0 + MOVOU (2*16)(inp), D3; PXOR D3, C0 + MOVOU (3*16)(inp), D3; PXOR D3, D0 + MOVOU A0, (0*16)(oup) + MOVOU B0, (1*16)(oup) + MOVOU C0, (2*16)(oup) + MOVOU D0, (3*16)(oup) + MOVOU (4*16)(inp), A0; MOVOU (5*16)(inp), B0; MOVOU (6*16)(inp), C0; MOVOU (7*16)(inp), D0 + PXOR A0, A1; PXOR B0, B1; PXOR C0, C1; PXOR D0, D1 + MOVOU A1, (4*16)(oup); MOVOU B1, (5*16)(oup); MOVOU C1, (6*16)(oup); MOVOU D1, (7*16)(oup) + MOVOU (8*16)(inp), A0; MOVOU (9*16)(inp), B0; MOVOU (10*16)(inp), C0; MOVOU (11*16)(inp), D0 + PXOR A0, A2; PXOR B0, B2; PXOR C0, C2; PXOR D0, D2 + MOVOU A2, (8*16)(oup); MOVOU B2, (9*16)(oup); MOVOU C2, (10*16)(oup); MOVOU D2, (11*16)(oup) + LEAQ 192(inp), inp + LEAQ 192(oup), oup + SUBQ $192, inl + MOVO A3, A0 + MOVO B3, B0 + MOVO C3, C0 + MOVO tmpStore, D0 + + JMP openSSETail64DecLoop + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// ------------------------- AVX2 Code ---------------------------------------- +chacha20Poly1305Open_AVX2: + VZEROUPPER + VMOVDQU ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0 + BYTE $0xc4; BYTE $0x42; BYTE $0x7d; BYTE $0x5a; BYTE $0x70; BYTE $0x10 // broadcasti128 16(r8), ymm14 + BYTE $0xc4; BYTE $0x42; BYTE $0x7d; BYTE $0x5a; BYTE $0x60; BYTE $0x20 // broadcasti128 32(r8), ymm12 + BYTE $0xc4; BYTE $0xc2; BYTE $0x7d; BYTE $0x5a; BYTE $0x60; BYTE $0x30 // broadcasti128 48(r8), ymm4 + VPADDD ·avx2InitMask<>(SB), DD0, DD0 + + // Special optimization, for very short buffers + CMPQ inl, $192 + JBE openAVX2192 + CMPQ inl, $320 + JBE openAVX2320 + + // For the general key prepare the key first - as a byproduct we have 64 bytes of cipher stream + VMOVDQA BB0, state1StoreAVX2 + VMOVDQA CC0, state2StoreAVX2 + VMOVDQA DD0, ctr3StoreAVX2 + MOVQ $10, itr2 + +openAVX2PreparePolyKey: + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0) + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0) + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0 + DECQ itr2 + JNE openAVX2PreparePolyKey + + VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0, AA0 + VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB0, BB0 + VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC0, CC0 + VPADDD ctr3StoreAVX2, DD0, DD0 + + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA0, BB0, TT0 + + // Clamp and store poly key + VPAND ·polyClampMask<>(SB), TT0, TT0 + VMOVDQA TT0, rsStoreAVX2 + + // Stream for the first 64 bytes + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA0, BB0, AA0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC0, DD0, BB0 + + // Hash AD + first 64 bytes + MOVQ ad_len+80(FP), itr2 + CALL polyHashADInternal<>(SB) + XORQ itr1, itr1 + +openAVX2InitialHash64: + polyAdd(0(inp)(itr1*1)) + polyMulAVX2 + ADDQ $16, itr1 + CMPQ itr1, $64 + JNE openAVX2InitialHash64 + + // Decrypt the first 64 bytes + VPXOR (0*32)(inp), AA0, AA0 + VPXOR (1*32)(inp), BB0, BB0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (0*32)(oup) + VMOVDQU BB0, (1*32)(oup) + LEAQ (2*32)(inp), inp + LEAQ (2*32)(oup), oup + SUBQ $64, inl + +openAVX2MainLoop: + CMPQ inl, $512 + JB openAVX2MainLoopDone + + // Load state, increment counter blocks, store the incremented counters + VMOVDQU ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0; VMOVDQA AA0, AA1; VMOVDQA AA0, AA2; VMOVDQA AA0, AA3 + VMOVDQA state1StoreAVX2, BB0; VMOVDQA BB0, BB1; VMOVDQA BB0, BB2; VMOVDQA BB0, BB3 + VMOVDQA state2StoreAVX2, CC0; VMOVDQA CC0, CC1; VMOVDQA CC0, CC2; VMOVDQA CC0, CC3 + VMOVDQA ctr3StoreAVX2, DD0; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD1; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD1, DD2; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD2, DD3 + VMOVDQA DD0, ctr0StoreAVX2; VMOVDQA DD1, ctr1StoreAVX2; VMOVDQA DD2, ctr2StoreAVX2; VMOVDQA DD3, ctr3StoreAVX2 + XORQ itr1, itr1 + +openAVX2InternalLoop: + // Lets just say this spaghetti loop interleaves 2 quarter rounds with 3 poly multiplications + // Effectively per 512 bytes of stream we hash 480 bytes of ciphertext + polyAdd(0*8(inp)(itr1*1)) + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + polyMulStage1_AVX2 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + polyMulStage2_AVX2 + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + polyMulStage3_AVX2 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $12, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $12, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $12, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $12, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + polyMulReduceStage + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + polyAdd(2*8(inp)(itr1*1)) + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + polyMulStage1_AVX2 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $7, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $7, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $7, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $7, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + polyMulStage2_AVX2 + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $4, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $4, BB2, BB2, BB2; VPALIGNR $4, BB3, BB3, BB3 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2; VPALIGNR $8, CC3, CC3, CC3 + VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $12, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $12, DD2, DD2, DD2; VPALIGNR $12, DD3, DD3, DD3 + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + polyMulStage3_AVX2 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + polyMulReduceStage + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + polyAdd(4*8(inp)(itr1*1)) + LEAQ (6*8)(itr1), itr1 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $12, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $12, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $12, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $12, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + polyMulStage1_AVX2 + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + polyMulStage2_AVX2 + VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + polyMulStage3_AVX2 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $7, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $7, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $7, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $7, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + polyMulReduceStage + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $12, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $12, BB2, BB2, BB2; VPALIGNR $12, BB3, BB3, BB3 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2; VPALIGNR $8, CC3, CC3, CC3 + VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $4, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $4, DD2, DD2, DD2; VPALIGNR $4, DD3, DD3, DD3 + CMPQ itr1, $480 + JNE openAVX2InternalLoop + + VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0, AA0; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA1, AA1; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA2, AA2; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA3, AA3 + VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB0, BB0; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB1, BB1; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB2, BB2; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB3, BB3 + VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC0, CC0; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC1, CC1; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC3, CC3 + VPADDD ctr0StoreAVX2, DD0, DD0; VPADDD ctr1StoreAVX2, DD1, DD1; VPADDD ctr2StoreAVX2, DD2, DD2; VPADDD ctr3StoreAVX2, DD3, DD3 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + + // We only hashed 480 of the 512 bytes available - hash the remaining 32 here + polyAdd(480(inp)) + polyMulAVX2 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA0, BB0, CC3; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA0, BB0, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC0, DD0, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC0, DD0, CC0 + VPXOR (0*32)(inp), CC3, CC3; VPXOR (1*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (2*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (3*32)(inp), CC0, CC0 + VMOVDQU CC3, (0*32)(oup); VMOVDQU AA0, (1*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (2*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (3*32)(oup) + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA1, BB1, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC1, DD1, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA1, BB1, CC0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC1, DD1, DD0 + VPXOR (4*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (5*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (6*32)(inp), CC0, CC0; VPXOR (7*32)(inp), DD0, DD0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (4*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (5*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (6*32)(oup); VMOVDQU DD0, (7*32)(oup) + + // and here + polyAdd(496(inp)) + polyMulAVX2 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA2, BB2, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC2, DD2, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA2, BB2, CC0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC2, DD2, DD0 + VPXOR (8*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (9*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (10*32)(inp), CC0, CC0; VPXOR (11*32)(inp), DD0, DD0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (8*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (9*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (10*32)(oup); VMOVDQU DD0, (11*32)(oup) + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA3, BB3, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, tmpStoreAVX2, DD3, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA3, BB3, CC0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, tmpStoreAVX2, DD3, DD0 + VPXOR (12*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (13*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (14*32)(inp), CC0, CC0; VPXOR (15*32)(inp), DD0, DD0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (12*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (13*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (14*32)(oup); VMOVDQU DD0, (15*32)(oup) + LEAQ (32*16)(inp), inp + LEAQ (32*16)(oup), oup + SUBQ $(32*16), inl + JMP openAVX2MainLoop + +openAVX2MainLoopDone: + // Handle the various tail sizes efficiently + TESTQ inl, inl + JE openSSEFinalize + CMPQ inl, $128 + JBE openAVX2Tail128 + CMPQ inl, $256 + JBE openAVX2Tail256 + CMPQ inl, $384 + JBE openAVX2Tail384 + JMP openAVX2Tail512 + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for buffers smaller than 193 bytes +openAVX2192: + // For up to 192 bytes of ciphertext and 64 bytes for the poly key, we process four blocks + VMOVDQA AA0, AA1 + VMOVDQA BB0, BB1 + VMOVDQA CC0, CC1 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD1 + VMOVDQA AA0, AA2 + VMOVDQA BB0, BB2 + VMOVDQA CC0, CC2 + VMOVDQA DD0, DD2 + VMOVDQA DD1, TT3 + MOVQ $10, itr2 + +openAVX2192InnerCipherLoop: + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0) + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $4, BB1, BB1, BB1 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1 + VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $12, DD1, DD1, DD1 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0) + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $12, BB1, BB1, BB1 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1 + VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $4, DD1, DD1, DD1 + DECQ itr2 + JNE openAVX2192InnerCipherLoop + VPADDD AA2, AA0, AA0; VPADDD AA2, AA1, AA1 + VPADDD BB2, BB0, BB0; VPADDD BB2, BB1, BB1 + VPADDD CC2, CC0, CC0; VPADDD CC2, CC1, CC1 + VPADDD DD2, DD0, DD0; VPADDD TT3, DD1, DD1 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA0, BB0, TT0 + + // Clamp and store poly key + VPAND ·polyClampMask<>(SB), TT0, TT0 + VMOVDQA TT0, rsStoreAVX2 + + // Stream for up to 192 bytes + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA0, BB0, AA0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC0, DD0, BB0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA1, BB1, CC0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC1, DD1, DD0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA1, BB1, AA1 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC1, DD1, BB1 + +openAVX2ShortOpen: + // Hash + MOVQ ad_len+80(FP), itr2 + CALL polyHashADInternal<>(SB) + +openAVX2ShortOpenLoop: + CMPQ inl, $32 + JB openAVX2ShortTail32 + SUBQ $32, inl + + // Load for hashing + polyAdd(0*8(inp)) + polyMulAVX2 + polyAdd(2*8(inp)) + polyMulAVX2 + + // Load for decryption + VPXOR (inp), AA0, AA0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (oup) + LEAQ (1*32)(inp), inp + LEAQ (1*32)(oup), oup + + // Shift stream left + VMOVDQA BB0, AA0 + VMOVDQA CC0, BB0 + VMOVDQA DD0, CC0 + VMOVDQA AA1, DD0 + VMOVDQA BB1, AA1 + VMOVDQA CC1, BB1 + VMOVDQA DD1, CC1 + VMOVDQA AA2, DD1 + VMOVDQA BB2, AA2 + JMP openAVX2ShortOpenLoop + +openAVX2ShortTail32: + CMPQ inl, $16 + VMOVDQA A0, A1 + JB openAVX2ShortDone + + SUBQ $16, inl + + // Load for hashing + polyAdd(0*8(inp)) + polyMulAVX2 + + // Load for decryption + VPXOR (inp), A0, T0 + VMOVDQU T0, (oup) + LEAQ (1*16)(inp), inp + LEAQ (1*16)(oup), oup + VPERM2I128 $0x11, AA0, AA0, AA0 + VMOVDQA A0, A1 + +openAVX2ShortDone: + VZEROUPPER + JMP openSSETail16 + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for buffers smaller than 321 bytes +openAVX2320: + // For up to 320 bytes of ciphertext and 64 bytes for the poly key, we process six blocks + VMOVDQA AA0, AA1; VMOVDQA BB0, BB1; VMOVDQA CC0, CC1; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD1 + VMOVDQA AA0, AA2; VMOVDQA BB0, BB2; VMOVDQA CC0, CC2; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD1, DD2 + VMOVDQA BB0, TT1; VMOVDQA CC0, TT2; VMOVDQA DD0, TT3 + MOVQ $10, itr2 + +openAVX2320InnerCipherLoop: + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA2, BB2, CC2, DD2, TT0) + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $4, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $4, BB2, BB2, BB2 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2 + VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $12, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $12, DD2, DD2, DD2 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA2, BB2, CC2, DD2, TT0) + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $12, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $12, BB2, BB2, BB2 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2 + VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $4, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $4, DD2, DD2, DD2 + DECQ itr2 + JNE openAVX2320InnerCipherLoop + + VMOVDQA ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), TT0 + VPADDD TT0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD TT0, AA1, AA1; VPADDD TT0, AA2, AA2 + VPADDD TT1, BB0, BB0; VPADDD TT1, BB1, BB1; VPADDD TT1, BB2, BB2 + VPADDD TT2, CC0, CC0; VPADDD TT2, CC1, CC1; VPADDD TT2, CC2, CC2 + VMOVDQA ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), TT0 + VPADDD TT3, DD0, DD0; VPADDD TT0, TT3, TT3 + VPADDD TT3, DD1, DD1; VPADDD TT0, TT3, TT3 + VPADDD TT3, DD2, DD2 + + // Clamp and store poly key + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA0, BB0, TT0 + VPAND ·polyClampMask<>(SB), TT0, TT0 + VMOVDQA TT0, rsStoreAVX2 + + // Stream for up to 320 bytes + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA0, BB0, AA0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC0, DD0, BB0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA1, BB1, CC0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC1, DD1, DD0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA1, BB1, AA1 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC1, DD1, BB1 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA2, BB2, CC1 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC2, DD2, DD1 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA2, BB2, AA2 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC2, DD2, BB2 + JMP openAVX2ShortOpen + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for the last 128 bytes of ciphertext +openAVX2Tail128: + // Need to decrypt up to 128 bytes - prepare two blocks + VMOVDQA ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA1 + VMOVDQA state1StoreAVX2, BB1 + VMOVDQA state2StoreAVX2, CC1 + VMOVDQA ctr3StoreAVX2, DD1 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD1, DD1 + VMOVDQA DD1, DD0 + + XORQ itr2, itr2 + MOVQ inl, itr1 + ANDQ $-16, itr1 + TESTQ itr1, itr1 + JE openAVX2Tail128LoopB + +openAVX2Tail128LoopA: + // Perform ChaCha rounds, while hashing the remaining input + polyAdd(0(inp)(itr2*1)) + polyMulAVX2 + +openAVX2Tail128LoopB: + ADDQ $16, itr2 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0) + VPALIGNR $4, BB1, BB1, BB1 + VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1 + VPALIGNR $12, DD1, DD1, DD1 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0) + VPALIGNR $12, BB1, BB1, BB1 + VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1 + VPALIGNR $4, DD1, DD1, DD1 + CMPQ itr2, itr1 + JB openAVX2Tail128LoopA + CMPQ itr2, $160 + JNE openAVX2Tail128LoopB + + VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA1, AA1 + VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB1, BB1 + VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC1, CC1 + VPADDD DD0, DD1, DD1 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA1, BB1, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC1, DD1, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA1, BB1, CC0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC1, DD1, DD0 + +openAVX2TailLoop: + CMPQ inl, $32 + JB openAVX2Tail + SUBQ $32, inl + + // Load for decryption + VPXOR (inp), AA0, AA0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (oup) + LEAQ (1*32)(inp), inp + LEAQ (1*32)(oup), oup + VMOVDQA BB0, AA0 + VMOVDQA CC0, BB0 + VMOVDQA DD0, CC0 + JMP openAVX2TailLoop + +openAVX2Tail: + CMPQ inl, $16 + VMOVDQA A0, A1 + JB openAVX2TailDone + SUBQ $16, inl + + // Load for decryption + VPXOR (inp), A0, T0 + VMOVDQU T0, (oup) + LEAQ (1*16)(inp), inp + LEAQ (1*16)(oup), oup + VPERM2I128 $0x11, AA0, AA0, AA0 + VMOVDQA A0, A1 + +openAVX2TailDone: + VZEROUPPER + JMP openSSETail16 + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for the last 256 bytes of ciphertext +openAVX2Tail256: + // Need to decrypt up to 256 bytes - prepare four blocks + VMOVDQA ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0; VMOVDQA AA0, AA1 + VMOVDQA state1StoreAVX2, BB0; VMOVDQA BB0, BB1 + VMOVDQA state2StoreAVX2, CC0; VMOVDQA CC0, CC1 + VMOVDQA ctr3StoreAVX2, DD0 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD0 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD1 + VMOVDQA DD0, TT1 + VMOVDQA DD1, TT2 + + // Compute the number of iterations that will hash data + MOVQ inl, tmpStoreAVX2 + MOVQ inl, itr1 + SUBQ $128, itr1 + SHRQ $4, itr1 + MOVQ $10, itr2 + CMPQ itr1, $10 + CMOVQGT itr2, itr1 + MOVQ inp, inl + XORQ itr2, itr2 + +openAVX2Tail256LoopA: + polyAdd(0(inl)) + polyMulAVX2 + LEAQ 16(inl), inl + + // Perform ChaCha rounds, while hashing the remaining input +openAVX2Tail256LoopB: + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0) + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $4, BB1, BB1, BB1 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1 + VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $12, DD1, DD1, DD1 + INCQ itr2 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0) + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $12, BB1, BB1, BB1 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1 + VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $4, DD1, DD1, DD1 + CMPQ itr2, itr1 + JB openAVX2Tail256LoopA + + CMPQ itr2, $10 + JNE openAVX2Tail256LoopB + + MOVQ inl, itr2 + SUBQ inp, inl + MOVQ inl, itr1 + MOVQ tmpStoreAVX2, inl + + // Hash the remainder of data (if any) +openAVX2Tail256Hash: + ADDQ $16, itr1 + CMPQ itr1, inl + JGT openAVX2Tail256HashEnd + polyAdd (0(itr2)) + polyMulAVX2 + LEAQ 16(itr2), itr2 + JMP openAVX2Tail256Hash + +// Store 128 bytes safely, then go to store loop +openAVX2Tail256HashEnd: + VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0, AA0; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA1, AA1 + VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB0, BB0; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB1, BB1 + VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC0, CC0; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC1, CC1 + VPADDD TT1, DD0, DD0; VPADDD TT2, DD1, DD1 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA0, BB0, AA2; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC0, DD0, BB2; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA0, BB0, CC2; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC0, DD0, DD2 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA1, BB1, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC1, DD1, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA1, BB1, CC0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC1, DD1, DD0 + + VPXOR (0*32)(inp), AA2, AA2; VPXOR (1*32)(inp), BB2, BB2; VPXOR (2*32)(inp), CC2, CC2; VPXOR (3*32)(inp), DD2, DD2 + VMOVDQU AA2, (0*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB2, (1*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC2, (2*32)(oup); VMOVDQU DD2, (3*32)(oup) + LEAQ (4*32)(inp), inp + LEAQ (4*32)(oup), oup + SUBQ $4*32, inl + + JMP openAVX2TailLoop + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for the last 384 bytes of ciphertext +openAVX2Tail384: + // Need to decrypt up to 384 bytes - prepare six blocks + VMOVDQA ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0; VMOVDQA AA0, AA1; VMOVDQA AA0, AA2 + VMOVDQA state1StoreAVX2, BB0; VMOVDQA BB0, BB1; VMOVDQA BB0, BB2 + VMOVDQA state2StoreAVX2, CC0; VMOVDQA CC0, CC1; VMOVDQA CC0, CC2 + VMOVDQA ctr3StoreAVX2, DD0 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD0 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD1 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD1, DD2 + VMOVDQA DD0, ctr0StoreAVX2 + VMOVDQA DD1, ctr1StoreAVX2 + VMOVDQA DD2, ctr2StoreAVX2 + + // Compute the number of iterations that will hash two blocks of data + MOVQ inl, tmpStoreAVX2 + MOVQ inl, itr1 + SUBQ $256, itr1 + SHRQ $4, itr1 + ADDQ $6, itr1 + MOVQ $10, itr2 + CMPQ itr1, $10 + CMOVQGT itr2, itr1 + MOVQ inp, inl + XORQ itr2, itr2 + + // Perform ChaCha rounds, while hashing the remaining input +openAVX2Tail384LoopB: + polyAdd(0(inl)) + polyMulAVX2 + LEAQ 16(inl), inl + +openAVX2Tail384LoopA: + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA2, BB2, CC2, DD2, TT0) + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $4, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $4, BB2, BB2, BB2 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2 + VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $12, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $12, DD2, DD2, DD2 + polyAdd(0(inl)) + polyMulAVX2 + LEAQ 16(inl), inl + INCQ itr2 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA2, BB2, CC2, DD2, TT0) + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $12, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $12, BB2, BB2, BB2 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2 + VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $4, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $4, DD2, DD2, DD2 + + CMPQ itr2, itr1 + JB openAVX2Tail384LoopB + + CMPQ itr2, $10 + JNE openAVX2Tail384LoopA + + MOVQ inl, itr2 + SUBQ inp, inl + MOVQ inl, itr1 + MOVQ tmpStoreAVX2, inl + +openAVX2Tail384Hash: + ADDQ $16, itr1 + CMPQ itr1, inl + JGT openAVX2Tail384HashEnd + polyAdd(0(itr2)) + polyMulAVX2 + LEAQ 16(itr2), itr2 + JMP openAVX2Tail384Hash + +// Store 256 bytes safely, then go to store loop +openAVX2Tail384HashEnd: + VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0, AA0; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA1, AA1; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA2, AA2 + VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB0, BB0; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB1, BB1; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB2, BB2 + VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC0, CC0; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC1, CC1; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC2, CC2 + VPADDD ctr0StoreAVX2, DD0, DD0; VPADDD ctr1StoreAVX2, DD1, DD1; VPADDD ctr2StoreAVX2, DD2, DD2 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA0, BB0, TT0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC0, DD0, TT1; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA0, BB0, TT2; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC0, DD0, TT3 + VPXOR (0*32)(inp), TT0, TT0; VPXOR (1*32)(inp), TT1, TT1; VPXOR (2*32)(inp), TT2, TT2; VPXOR (3*32)(inp), TT3, TT3 + VMOVDQU TT0, (0*32)(oup); VMOVDQU TT1, (1*32)(oup); VMOVDQU TT2, (2*32)(oup); VMOVDQU TT3, (3*32)(oup) + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA1, BB1, TT0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC1, DD1, TT1; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA1, BB1, TT2; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC1, DD1, TT3 + VPXOR (4*32)(inp), TT0, TT0; VPXOR (5*32)(inp), TT1, TT1; VPXOR (6*32)(inp), TT2, TT2; VPXOR (7*32)(inp), TT3, TT3 + VMOVDQU TT0, (4*32)(oup); VMOVDQU TT1, (5*32)(oup); VMOVDQU TT2, (6*32)(oup); VMOVDQU TT3, (7*32)(oup) + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA2, BB2, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC2, DD2, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA2, BB2, CC0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC2, DD2, DD0 + LEAQ (8*32)(inp), inp + LEAQ (8*32)(oup), oup + SUBQ $8*32, inl + JMP openAVX2TailLoop + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for the last 512 bytes of ciphertext +openAVX2Tail512: + VMOVDQU ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0; VMOVDQA AA0, AA1; VMOVDQA AA0, AA2; VMOVDQA AA0, AA3 + VMOVDQA state1StoreAVX2, BB0; VMOVDQA BB0, BB1; VMOVDQA BB0, BB2; VMOVDQA BB0, BB3 + VMOVDQA state2StoreAVX2, CC0; VMOVDQA CC0, CC1; VMOVDQA CC0, CC2; VMOVDQA CC0, CC3 + VMOVDQA ctr3StoreAVX2, DD0; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD1; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD1, DD2; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD2, DD3 + VMOVDQA DD0, ctr0StoreAVX2; VMOVDQA DD1, ctr1StoreAVX2; VMOVDQA DD2, ctr2StoreAVX2; VMOVDQA DD3, ctr3StoreAVX2 + XORQ itr1, itr1 + MOVQ inp, itr2 + +openAVX2Tail512LoopB: + polyAdd(0(itr2)) + polyMulAVX2 + LEAQ (2*8)(itr2), itr2 + +openAVX2Tail512LoopA: + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $12, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $12, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $12, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $12, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + polyAdd(0*8(itr2)) + polyMulAVX2 + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $7, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $7, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $7, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $7, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $4, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $4, BB2, BB2, BB2; VPALIGNR $4, BB3, BB3, BB3 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2; VPALIGNR $8, CC3, CC3, CC3 + VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $12, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $12, DD2, DD2, DD2; VPALIGNR $12, DD3, DD3, DD3 + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + polyAdd(2*8(itr2)) + polyMulAVX2 + LEAQ (4*8)(itr2), itr2 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $12, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $12, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $12, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $12, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $7, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $7, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $7, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $7, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $12, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $12, BB2, BB2, BB2; VPALIGNR $12, BB3, BB3, BB3 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2; VPALIGNR $8, CC3, CC3, CC3 + VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $4, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $4, DD2, DD2, DD2; VPALIGNR $4, DD3, DD3, DD3 + INCQ itr1 + CMPQ itr1, $4 + JLT openAVX2Tail512LoopB + + CMPQ itr1, $10 + JNE openAVX2Tail512LoopA + + MOVQ inl, itr1 + SUBQ $384, itr1 + ANDQ $-16, itr1 + +openAVX2Tail512HashLoop: + TESTQ itr1, itr1 + JE openAVX2Tail512HashEnd + polyAdd(0(itr2)) + polyMulAVX2 + LEAQ 16(itr2), itr2 + SUBQ $16, itr1 + JMP openAVX2Tail512HashLoop + +openAVX2Tail512HashEnd: + VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0, AA0; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA1, AA1; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA2, AA2; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA3, AA3 + VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB0, BB0; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB1, BB1; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB2, BB2; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB3, BB3 + VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC0, CC0; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC1, CC1; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC3, CC3 + VPADDD ctr0StoreAVX2, DD0, DD0; VPADDD ctr1StoreAVX2, DD1, DD1; VPADDD ctr2StoreAVX2, DD2, DD2; VPADDD ctr3StoreAVX2, DD3, DD3 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA0, BB0, CC3; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA0, BB0, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC0, DD0, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC0, DD0, CC0 + VPXOR (0*32)(inp), CC3, CC3; VPXOR (1*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (2*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (3*32)(inp), CC0, CC0 + VMOVDQU CC3, (0*32)(oup); VMOVDQU AA0, (1*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (2*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (3*32)(oup) + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA1, BB1, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC1, DD1, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA1, BB1, CC0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC1, DD1, DD0 + VPXOR (4*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (5*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (6*32)(inp), CC0, CC0; VPXOR (7*32)(inp), DD0, DD0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (4*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (5*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (6*32)(oup); VMOVDQU DD0, (7*32)(oup) + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA2, BB2, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC2, DD2, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA2, BB2, CC0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC2, DD2, DD0 + VPXOR (8*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (9*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (10*32)(inp), CC0, CC0; VPXOR (11*32)(inp), DD0, DD0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (8*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (9*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (10*32)(oup); VMOVDQU DD0, (11*32)(oup) + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA3, BB3, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, tmpStoreAVX2, DD3, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA3, BB3, CC0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, tmpStoreAVX2, DD3, DD0 + + LEAQ (12*32)(inp), inp + LEAQ (12*32)(oup), oup + SUBQ $12*32, inl + + JMP openAVX2TailLoop + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// func chacha20Poly1305Seal(dst, key, src, ad []byte) +TEXT ·chacha20Poly1305Seal(SB), 0, $288-96 + // For aligned stack access + MOVQ SP, BP + ADDQ $32, BP + ANDQ $-32, BP + MOVQ dst+0(FP), oup + MOVQ key+24(FP), keyp + MOVQ src+48(FP), inp + MOVQ src_len+56(FP), inl + MOVQ ad+72(FP), adp + + CMPB ·useAVX2(SB), $1 + JE chacha20Poly1305Seal_AVX2 + + // Special optimization, for very short buffers + CMPQ inl, $128 + JBE sealSSE128 // About 15% faster + + // In the seal case - prepare the poly key + 3 blocks of stream in the first iteration + MOVOU ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0 + MOVOU (1*16)(keyp), B0 + MOVOU (2*16)(keyp), C0 + MOVOU (3*16)(keyp), D0 + + // Store state on stack for future use + MOVO B0, state1Store + MOVO C0, state2Store + + // Load state, increment counter blocks + MOVO A0, A1; MOVO B0, B1; MOVO C0, C1; MOVO D0, D1; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D1 + MOVO A1, A2; MOVO B1, B2; MOVO C1, C2; MOVO D1, D2; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D2 + MOVO A2, A3; MOVO B2, B3; MOVO C2, C3; MOVO D2, D3; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D3 + + // Store counters + MOVO D0, ctr0Store; MOVO D1, ctr1Store; MOVO D2, ctr2Store; MOVO D3, ctr3Store + MOVQ $10, itr2 + +sealSSEIntroLoop: + MOVO C3, tmpStore + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, C3); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, C3); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, C3) + MOVO tmpStore, C3 + MOVO C1, tmpStore + chachaQR(A3, B3, C3, D3, C1) + MOVO tmpStore, C1 + shiftB0Left; shiftB1Left; shiftB2Left; shiftB3Left + shiftC0Left; shiftC1Left; shiftC2Left; shiftC3Left + shiftD0Left; shiftD1Left; shiftD2Left; shiftD3Left + + MOVO C3, tmpStore + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, C3); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, C3); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, C3) + MOVO tmpStore, C3 + MOVO C1, tmpStore + chachaQR(A3, B3, C3, D3, C1) + MOVO tmpStore, C1 + shiftB0Right; shiftB1Right; shiftB2Right; shiftB3Right + shiftC0Right; shiftC1Right; shiftC2Right; shiftC3Right + shiftD0Right; shiftD1Right; shiftD2Right; shiftD3Right + DECQ itr2 + JNE sealSSEIntroLoop + + // Add in the state + PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A1; PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A2; PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A3 + PADDD state1Store, B0; PADDD state1Store, B1; PADDD state1Store, B2; PADDD state1Store, B3 + PADDD state2Store, C1; PADDD state2Store, C2; PADDD state2Store, C3 + PADDD ctr1Store, D1; PADDD ctr2Store, D2; PADDD ctr3Store, D3 + + // Clamp and store the key + PAND ·polyClampMask<>(SB), A0 + MOVO A0, rStore + MOVO B0, sStore + + // Hash AAD + MOVQ ad_len+80(FP), itr2 + CALL polyHashADInternal<>(SB) + + MOVOU (0*16)(inp), A0; MOVOU (1*16)(inp), B0; MOVOU (2*16)(inp), C0; MOVOU (3*16)(inp), D0 + PXOR A0, A1; PXOR B0, B1; PXOR C0, C1; PXOR D0, D1 + MOVOU A1, (0*16)(oup); MOVOU B1, (1*16)(oup); MOVOU C1, (2*16)(oup); MOVOU D1, (3*16)(oup) + MOVOU (4*16)(inp), A0; MOVOU (5*16)(inp), B0; MOVOU (6*16)(inp), C0; MOVOU (7*16)(inp), D0 + PXOR A0, A2; PXOR B0, B2; PXOR C0, C2; PXOR D0, D2 + MOVOU A2, (4*16)(oup); MOVOU B2, (5*16)(oup); MOVOU C2, (6*16)(oup); MOVOU D2, (7*16)(oup) + + MOVQ $128, itr1 + SUBQ $128, inl + LEAQ 128(inp), inp + + MOVO A3, A1; MOVO B3, B1; MOVO C3, C1; MOVO D3, D1 + + CMPQ inl, $64 + JBE sealSSE128SealHash + + MOVOU (0*16)(inp), A0; MOVOU (1*16)(inp), B0; MOVOU (2*16)(inp), C0; MOVOU (3*16)(inp), D0 + PXOR A0, A3; PXOR B0, B3; PXOR C0, C3; PXOR D0, D3 + MOVOU A3, (8*16)(oup); MOVOU B3, (9*16)(oup); MOVOU C3, (10*16)(oup); MOVOU D3, (11*16)(oup) + + ADDQ $64, itr1 + SUBQ $64, inl + LEAQ 64(inp), inp + + MOVQ $2, itr1 + MOVQ $8, itr2 + + CMPQ inl, $64 + JBE sealSSETail64 + CMPQ inl, $128 + JBE sealSSETail128 + CMPQ inl, $192 + JBE sealSSETail192 + +sealSSEMainLoop: + // Load state, increment counter blocks + MOVO ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; MOVO state1Store, B0; MOVO state2Store, C0; MOVO ctr3Store, D0; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D0 + MOVO A0, A1; MOVO B0, B1; MOVO C0, C1; MOVO D0, D1; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D1 + MOVO A1, A2; MOVO B1, B2; MOVO C1, C2; MOVO D1, D2; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D2 + MOVO A2, A3; MOVO B2, B3; MOVO C2, C3; MOVO D2, D3; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D3 + + // Store counters + MOVO D0, ctr0Store; MOVO D1, ctr1Store; MOVO D2, ctr2Store; MOVO D3, ctr3Store + +sealSSEInnerLoop: + MOVO C3, tmpStore + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, C3); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, C3); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, C3) + MOVO tmpStore, C3 + MOVO C1, tmpStore + chachaQR(A3, B3, C3, D3, C1) + MOVO tmpStore, C1 + polyAdd(0(oup)) + shiftB0Left; shiftB1Left; shiftB2Left; shiftB3Left + shiftC0Left; shiftC1Left; shiftC2Left; shiftC3Left + shiftD0Left; shiftD1Left; shiftD2Left; shiftD3Left + polyMulStage1 + polyMulStage2 + LEAQ (2*8)(oup), oup + MOVO C3, tmpStore + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, C3); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, C3); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, C3) + MOVO tmpStore, C3 + MOVO C1, tmpStore + polyMulStage3 + chachaQR(A3, B3, C3, D3, C1) + MOVO tmpStore, C1 + polyMulReduceStage + shiftB0Right; shiftB1Right; shiftB2Right; shiftB3Right + shiftC0Right; shiftC1Right; shiftC2Right; shiftC3Right + shiftD0Right; shiftD1Right; shiftD2Right; shiftD3Right + DECQ itr2 + JGE sealSSEInnerLoop + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + LEAQ (2*8)(oup), oup + DECQ itr1 + JG sealSSEInnerLoop + + // Add in the state + PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A1; PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A2; PADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A3 + PADDD state1Store, B0; PADDD state1Store, B1; PADDD state1Store, B2; PADDD state1Store, B3 + PADDD state2Store, C0; PADDD state2Store, C1; PADDD state2Store, C2; PADDD state2Store, C3 + PADDD ctr0Store, D0; PADDD ctr1Store, D1; PADDD ctr2Store, D2; PADDD ctr3Store, D3 + MOVO D3, tmpStore + + // Load - xor - store + MOVOU (0*16)(inp), D3; PXOR D3, A0 + MOVOU (1*16)(inp), D3; PXOR D3, B0 + MOVOU (2*16)(inp), D3; PXOR D3, C0 + MOVOU (3*16)(inp), D3; PXOR D3, D0 + MOVOU A0, (0*16)(oup) + MOVOU B0, (1*16)(oup) + MOVOU C0, (2*16)(oup) + MOVOU D0, (3*16)(oup) + MOVO tmpStore, D3 + + MOVOU (4*16)(inp), A0; MOVOU (5*16)(inp), B0; MOVOU (6*16)(inp), C0; MOVOU (7*16)(inp), D0 + PXOR A0, A1; PXOR B0, B1; PXOR C0, C1; PXOR D0, D1 + MOVOU A1, (4*16)(oup); MOVOU B1, (5*16)(oup); MOVOU C1, (6*16)(oup); MOVOU D1, (7*16)(oup) + MOVOU (8*16)(inp), A0; MOVOU (9*16)(inp), B0; MOVOU (10*16)(inp), C0; MOVOU (11*16)(inp), D0 + PXOR A0, A2; PXOR B0, B2; PXOR C0, C2; PXOR D0, D2 + MOVOU A2, (8*16)(oup); MOVOU B2, (9*16)(oup); MOVOU C2, (10*16)(oup); MOVOU D2, (11*16)(oup) + ADDQ $192, inp + MOVQ $192, itr1 + SUBQ $192, inl + MOVO A3, A1 + MOVO B3, B1 + MOVO C3, C1 + MOVO D3, D1 + CMPQ inl, $64 + JBE sealSSE128SealHash + MOVOU (0*16)(inp), A0; MOVOU (1*16)(inp), B0; MOVOU (2*16)(inp), C0; MOVOU (3*16)(inp), D0 + PXOR A0, A3; PXOR B0, B3; PXOR C0, C3; PXOR D0, D3 + MOVOU A3, (12*16)(oup); MOVOU B3, (13*16)(oup); MOVOU C3, (14*16)(oup); MOVOU D3, (15*16)(oup) + LEAQ 64(inp), inp + SUBQ $64, inl + MOVQ $6, itr1 + MOVQ $4, itr2 + CMPQ inl, $192 + JG sealSSEMainLoop + + MOVQ inl, itr1 + TESTQ inl, inl + JE sealSSE128SealHash + MOVQ $6, itr1 + CMPQ inl, $64 + JBE sealSSETail64 + CMPQ inl, $128 + JBE sealSSETail128 + JMP sealSSETail192 + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for the last 64 bytes of plaintext +sealSSETail64: + // Need to encrypt up to 64 bytes - prepare single block, hash 192 or 256 bytes + MOVO ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A1 + MOVO state1Store, B1 + MOVO state2Store, C1 + MOVO ctr3Store, D1 + PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D1 + MOVO D1, ctr0Store + +sealSSETail64LoopA: + // Perform ChaCha rounds, while hashing the previously encrypted ciphertext + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + LEAQ 16(oup), oup + +sealSSETail64LoopB: + chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, T1) + shiftB1Left; shiftC1Left; shiftD1Left + chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, T1) + shiftB1Right; shiftC1Right; shiftD1Right + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + LEAQ 16(oup), oup + + DECQ itr1 + JG sealSSETail64LoopA + + DECQ itr2 + JGE sealSSETail64LoopB + PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A1 + PADDL state1Store, B1 + PADDL state2Store, C1 + PADDL ctr0Store, D1 + + JMP sealSSE128Seal + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for the last 128 bytes of plaintext +sealSSETail128: + // Need to encrypt up to 128 bytes - prepare two blocks, hash 192 or 256 bytes + MOVO ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; MOVO state1Store, B0; MOVO state2Store, C0; MOVO ctr3Store, D0; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D0; MOVO D0, ctr0Store + MOVO A0, A1; MOVO B0, B1; MOVO C0, C1; MOVO D0, D1; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D1; MOVO D1, ctr1Store + +sealSSETail128LoopA: + // Perform ChaCha rounds, while hashing the previously encrypted ciphertext + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + LEAQ 16(oup), oup + +sealSSETail128LoopB: + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, T0) + shiftB0Left; shiftC0Left; shiftD0Left + shiftB1Left; shiftC1Left; shiftD1Left + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + LEAQ 16(oup), oup + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, T0) + shiftB0Right; shiftC0Right; shiftD0Right + shiftB1Right; shiftC1Right; shiftD1Right + + DECQ itr1 + JG sealSSETail128LoopA + + DECQ itr2 + JGE sealSSETail128LoopB + + PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A1 + PADDL state1Store, B0; PADDL state1Store, B1 + PADDL state2Store, C0; PADDL state2Store, C1 + PADDL ctr0Store, D0; PADDL ctr1Store, D1 + + MOVOU (0*16)(inp), T0; MOVOU (1*16)(inp), T1; MOVOU (2*16)(inp), T2; MOVOU (3*16)(inp), T3 + PXOR T0, A0; PXOR T1, B0; PXOR T2, C0; PXOR T3, D0 + MOVOU A0, (0*16)(oup); MOVOU B0, (1*16)(oup); MOVOU C0, (2*16)(oup); MOVOU D0, (3*16)(oup) + + MOVQ $64, itr1 + LEAQ 64(inp), inp + SUBQ $64, inl + + JMP sealSSE128SealHash + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for the last 192 bytes of plaintext +sealSSETail192: + // Need to encrypt up to 192 bytes - prepare three blocks, hash 192 or 256 bytes + MOVO ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; MOVO state1Store, B0; MOVO state2Store, C0; MOVO ctr3Store, D0; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D0; MOVO D0, ctr0Store + MOVO A0, A1; MOVO B0, B1; MOVO C0, C1; MOVO D0, D1; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D1; MOVO D1, ctr1Store + MOVO A1, A2; MOVO B1, B2; MOVO C1, C2; MOVO D1, D2; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D2; MOVO D2, ctr2Store + +sealSSETail192LoopA: + // Perform ChaCha rounds, while hashing the previously encrypted ciphertext + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + LEAQ 16(oup), oup + +sealSSETail192LoopB: + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, T0); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, T0) + shiftB0Left; shiftC0Left; shiftD0Left + shiftB1Left; shiftC1Left; shiftD1Left + shiftB2Left; shiftC2Left; shiftD2Left + + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + LEAQ 16(oup), oup + + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, T0); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, T0) + shiftB0Right; shiftC0Right; shiftD0Right + shiftB1Right; shiftC1Right; shiftD1Right + shiftB2Right; shiftC2Right; shiftD2Right + + DECQ itr1 + JG sealSSETail192LoopA + + DECQ itr2 + JGE sealSSETail192LoopB + + PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A1; PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A2 + PADDL state1Store, B0; PADDL state1Store, B1; PADDL state1Store, B2 + PADDL state2Store, C0; PADDL state2Store, C1; PADDL state2Store, C2 + PADDL ctr0Store, D0; PADDL ctr1Store, D1; PADDL ctr2Store, D2 + + MOVOU (0*16)(inp), T0; MOVOU (1*16)(inp), T1; MOVOU (2*16)(inp), T2; MOVOU (3*16)(inp), T3 + PXOR T0, A0; PXOR T1, B0; PXOR T2, C0; PXOR T3, D0 + MOVOU A0, (0*16)(oup); MOVOU B0, (1*16)(oup); MOVOU C0, (2*16)(oup); MOVOU D0, (3*16)(oup) + MOVOU (4*16)(inp), T0; MOVOU (5*16)(inp), T1; MOVOU (6*16)(inp), T2; MOVOU (7*16)(inp), T3 + PXOR T0, A1; PXOR T1, B1; PXOR T2, C1; PXOR T3, D1 + MOVOU A1, (4*16)(oup); MOVOU B1, (5*16)(oup); MOVOU C1, (6*16)(oup); MOVOU D1, (7*16)(oup) + + MOVO A2, A1 + MOVO B2, B1 + MOVO C2, C1 + MOVO D2, D1 + MOVQ $128, itr1 + LEAQ 128(inp), inp + SUBQ $128, inl + + JMP sealSSE128SealHash + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special seal optimization for buffers smaller than 129 bytes +sealSSE128: + // For up to 128 bytes of ciphertext and 64 bytes for the poly key, we require to process three blocks + MOVOU ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; MOVOU (1*16)(keyp), B0; MOVOU (2*16)(keyp), C0; MOVOU (3*16)(keyp), D0 + MOVO A0, A1; MOVO B0, B1; MOVO C0, C1; MOVO D0, D1; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D1 + MOVO A1, A2; MOVO B1, B2; MOVO C1, C2; MOVO D1, D2; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), D2 + MOVO B0, T1; MOVO C0, T2; MOVO D1, T3 + MOVQ $10, itr2 + +sealSSE128InnerCipherLoop: + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, T0); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, T0) + shiftB0Left; shiftB1Left; shiftB2Left + shiftC0Left; shiftC1Left; shiftC2Left + shiftD0Left; shiftD1Left; shiftD2Left + chachaQR(A0, B0, C0, D0, T0); chachaQR(A1, B1, C1, D1, T0); chachaQR(A2, B2, C2, D2, T0) + shiftB0Right; shiftB1Right; shiftB2Right + shiftC0Right; shiftC1Right; shiftC2Right + shiftD0Right; shiftD1Right; shiftD2Right + DECQ itr2 + JNE sealSSE128InnerCipherLoop + + // A0|B0 hold the Poly1305 32-byte key, C0,D0 can be discarded + PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A0; PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A1; PADDL ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), A2 + PADDL T1, B0; PADDL T1, B1; PADDL T1, B2 + PADDL T2, C1; PADDL T2, C2 + PADDL T3, D1; PADDL ·sseIncMask<>(SB), T3; PADDL T3, D2 + PAND ·polyClampMask<>(SB), A0 + MOVOU A0, rStore + MOVOU B0, sStore + + // Hash + MOVQ ad_len+80(FP), itr2 + CALL polyHashADInternal<>(SB) + XORQ itr1, itr1 + +sealSSE128SealHash: + // itr1 holds the number of bytes encrypted but not yet hashed + CMPQ itr1, $16 + JB sealSSE128Seal + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + + SUBQ $16, itr1 + ADDQ $16, oup + + JMP sealSSE128SealHash + +sealSSE128Seal: + CMPQ inl, $16 + JB sealSSETail + SUBQ $16, inl + + // Load for decryption + MOVOU (inp), T0 + PXOR T0, A1 + MOVOU A1, (oup) + LEAQ (1*16)(inp), inp + LEAQ (1*16)(oup), oup + + // Extract for hashing + MOVQ A1, t0 + PSRLDQ $8, A1 + MOVQ A1, t1 + ADDQ t0, acc0; ADCQ t1, acc1; ADCQ $1, acc2 + polyMul + + // Shift the stream "left" + MOVO B1, A1 + MOVO C1, B1 + MOVO D1, C1 + MOVO A2, D1 + MOVO B2, A2 + MOVO C2, B2 + MOVO D2, C2 + JMP sealSSE128Seal + +sealSSETail: + TESTQ inl, inl + JE sealSSEFinalize + + // We can only load the PT one byte at a time to avoid read after end of buffer + MOVQ inl, itr2 + SHLQ $4, itr2 + LEAQ ·andMask<>(SB), t0 + MOVQ inl, itr1 + LEAQ -1(inp)(inl*1), inp + XORQ t2, t2 + XORQ t3, t3 + XORQ AX, AX + +sealSSETailLoadLoop: + SHLQ $8, t2, t3 + SHLQ $8, t2 + MOVB (inp), AX + XORQ AX, t2 + LEAQ -1(inp), inp + DECQ itr1 + JNE sealSSETailLoadLoop + MOVQ t2, 0+tmpStore + MOVQ t3, 8+tmpStore + PXOR 0+tmpStore, A1 + MOVOU A1, (oup) + MOVOU -16(t0)(itr2*1), T0 + PAND T0, A1 + MOVQ A1, t0 + PSRLDQ $8, A1 + MOVQ A1, t1 + ADDQ t0, acc0; ADCQ t1, acc1; ADCQ $1, acc2 + polyMul + + ADDQ inl, oup + +sealSSEFinalize: + // Hash in the buffer lengths + ADDQ ad_len+80(FP), acc0 + ADCQ src_len+56(FP), acc1 + ADCQ $1, acc2 + polyMul + + // Final reduce + MOVQ acc0, t0 + MOVQ acc1, t1 + MOVQ acc2, t2 + SUBQ $-5, acc0 + SBBQ $-1, acc1 + SBBQ $3, acc2 + CMOVQCS t0, acc0 + CMOVQCS t1, acc1 + CMOVQCS t2, acc2 + + // Add in the "s" part of the key + ADDQ 0+sStore, acc0 + ADCQ 8+sStore, acc1 + + // Finally store the tag at the end of the message + MOVQ acc0, (0*8)(oup) + MOVQ acc1, (1*8)(oup) + RET + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// ------------------------- AVX2 Code ---------------------------------------- +chacha20Poly1305Seal_AVX2: + VZEROUPPER + VMOVDQU ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0 + BYTE $0xc4; BYTE $0x42; BYTE $0x7d; BYTE $0x5a; BYTE $0x70; BYTE $0x10 // broadcasti128 16(r8), ymm14 + BYTE $0xc4; BYTE $0x42; BYTE $0x7d; BYTE $0x5a; BYTE $0x60; BYTE $0x20 // broadcasti128 32(r8), ymm12 + BYTE $0xc4; BYTE $0xc2; BYTE $0x7d; BYTE $0x5a; BYTE $0x60; BYTE $0x30 // broadcasti128 48(r8), ymm4 + VPADDD ·avx2InitMask<>(SB), DD0, DD0 + + // Special optimizations, for very short buffers + CMPQ inl, $192 + JBE seal192AVX2 // 33% faster + CMPQ inl, $320 + JBE seal320AVX2 // 17% faster + + // For the general key prepare the key first - as a byproduct we have 64 bytes of cipher stream + VMOVDQA AA0, AA1; VMOVDQA AA0, AA2; VMOVDQA AA0, AA3 + VMOVDQA BB0, BB1; VMOVDQA BB0, BB2; VMOVDQA BB0, BB3; VMOVDQA BB0, state1StoreAVX2 + VMOVDQA CC0, CC1; VMOVDQA CC0, CC2; VMOVDQA CC0, CC3; VMOVDQA CC0, state2StoreAVX2 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD1; VMOVDQA DD0, ctr0StoreAVX2 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD1, DD2; VMOVDQA DD1, ctr1StoreAVX2 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD2, DD3; VMOVDQA DD2, ctr2StoreAVX2 + VMOVDQA DD3, ctr3StoreAVX2 + MOVQ $10, itr2 + +sealAVX2IntroLoop: + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, CC3); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, CC3); chachaQR_AVX2(AA2, BB2, CC2, DD2, CC3) + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + VMOVDQA CC1, tmpStoreAVX2 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA3, BB3, CC3, DD3, CC1) + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC1 + + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0 + VPALIGNR $4, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $12, DD1, DD1, DD1 + VPALIGNR $4, BB2, BB2, BB2; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2; VPALIGNR $12, DD2, DD2, DD2 + VPALIGNR $4, BB3, BB3, BB3; VPALIGNR $8, CC3, CC3, CC3; VPALIGNR $12, DD3, DD3, DD3 + + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, CC3); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, CC3); chachaQR_AVX2(AA2, BB2, CC2, DD2, CC3) + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + VMOVDQA CC1, tmpStoreAVX2 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA3, BB3, CC3, DD3, CC1) + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC1 + + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0 + VPALIGNR $12, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $4, DD1, DD1, DD1 + VPALIGNR $12, BB2, BB2, BB2; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2; VPALIGNR $4, DD2, DD2, DD2 + VPALIGNR $12, BB3, BB3, BB3; VPALIGNR $8, CC3, CC3, CC3; VPALIGNR $4, DD3, DD3, DD3 + DECQ itr2 + JNE sealAVX2IntroLoop + + VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0, AA0; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA1, AA1; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA2, AA2; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA3, AA3 + VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB0, BB0; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB1, BB1; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB2, BB2; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB3, BB3 + VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC0, CC0; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC1, CC1; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC3, CC3 + VPADDD ctr0StoreAVX2, DD0, DD0; VPADDD ctr1StoreAVX2, DD1, DD1; VPADDD ctr2StoreAVX2, DD2, DD2; VPADDD ctr3StoreAVX2, DD3, DD3 + + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC0, DD0, CC0 // Stream bytes 96 - 127 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA0, BB0, DD0 // The Poly1305 key + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA0, BB0, AA0 // Stream bytes 64 - 95 + + // Clamp and store poly key + VPAND ·polyClampMask<>(SB), DD0, DD0 + VMOVDQA DD0, rsStoreAVX2 + + // Hash AD + MOVQ ad_len+80(FP), itr2 + CALL polyHashADInternal<>(SB) + + // Can store at least 320 bytes + VPXOR (0*32)(inp), AA0, AA0 + VPXOR (1*32)(inp), CC0, CC0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (0*32)(oup) + VMOVDQU CC0, (1*32)(oup) + + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA1, BB1, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC1, DD1, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA1, BB1, CC0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC1, DD1, DD0 + VPXOR (2*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (3*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (4*32)(inp), CC0, CC0; VPXOR (5*32)(inp), DD0, DD0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (2*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (3*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (4*32)(oup); VMOVDQU DD0, (5*32)(oup) + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA2, BB2, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC2, DD2, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA2, BB2, CC0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC2, DD2, DD0 + VPXOR (6*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (7*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (8*32)(inp), CC0, CC0; VPXOR (9*32)(inp), DD0, DD0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (6*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (7*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (8*32)(oup); VMOVDQU DD0, (9*32)(oup) + + MOVQ $320, itr1 + SUBQ $320, inl + LEAQ 320(inp), inp + + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA3, BB3, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC3, DD3, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA3, BB3, CC0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC3, DD3, DD0 + CMPQ inl, $128 + JBE sealAVX2SealHash + + VPXOR (0*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (1*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (2*32)(inp), CC0, CC0; VPXOR (3*32)(inp), DD0, DD0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (10*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (11*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (12*32)(oup); VMOVDQU DD0, (13*32)(oup) + SUBQ $128, inl + LEAQ 128(inp), inp + + MOVQ $8, itr1 + MOVQ $2, itr2 + + CMPQ inl, $128 + JBE sealAVX2Tail128 + CMPQ inl, $256 + JBE sealAVX2Tail256 + CMPQ inl, $384 + JBE sealAVX2Tail384 + CMPQ inl, $512 + JBE sealAVX2Tail512 + + // We have 448 bytes to hash, but main loop hashes 512 bytes at a time - perform some rounds, before the main loop + VMOVDQA ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0; VMOVDQA AA0, AA1; VMOVDQA AA0, AA2; VMOVDQA AA0, AA3 + VMOVDQA state1StoreAVX2, BB0; VMOVDQA BB0, BB1; VMOVDQA BB0, BB2; VMOVDQA BB0, BB3 + VMOVDQA state2StoreAVX2, CC0; VMOVDQA CC0, CC1; VMOVDQA CC0, CC2; VMOVDQA CC0, CC3 + VMOVDQA ctr3StoreAVX2, DD0 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD1; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD1, DD2; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD2, DD3 + VMOVDQA DD0, ctr0StoreAVX2; VMOVDQA DD1, ctr1StoreAVX2; VMOVDQA DD2, ctr2StoreAVX2; VMOVDQA DD3, ctr3StoreAVX2 + + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, CC3); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, CC3); chachaQR_AVX2(AA2, BB2, CC2, DD2, CC3) + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + VMOVDQA CC1, tmpStoreAVX2 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA3, BB3, CC3, DD3, CC1) + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC1 + + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0 + VPALIGNR $4, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $12, DD1, DD1, DD1 + VPALIGNR $4, BB2, BB2, BB2; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2; VPALIGNR $12, DD2, DD2, DD2 + VPALIGNR $4, BB3, BB3, BB3; VPALIGNR $8, CC3, CC3, CC3; VPALIGNR $12, DD3, DD3, DD3 + + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, CC3); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, CC3); chachaQR_AVX2(AA2, BB2, CC2, DD2, CC3) + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + VMOVDQA CC1, tmpStoreAVX2 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA3, BB3, CC3, DD3, CC1) + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC1 + + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0 + VPALIGNR $12, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $4, DD1, DD1, DD1 + VPALIGNR $12, BB2, BB2, BB2; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2; VPALIGNR $4, DD2, DD2, DD2 + VPALIGNR $12, BB3, BB3, BB3; VPALIGNR $8, CC3, CC3, CC3; VPALIGNR $4, DD3, DD3, DD3 + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $12, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $12, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $12, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $12, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + + SUBQ $16, oup // Adjust the pointer + MOVQ $9, itr1 + JMP sealAVX2InternalLoopStart + +sealAVX2MainLoop: + // Load state, increment counter blocks, store the incremented counters + VMOVDQU ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0; VMOVDQA AA0, AA1; VMOVDQA AA0, AA2; VMOVDQA AA0, AA3 + VMOVDQA state1StoreAVX2, BB0; VMOVDQA BB0, BB1; VMOVDQA BB0, BB2; VMOVDQA BB0, BB3 + VMOVDQA state2StoreAVX2, CC0; VMOVDQA CC0, CC1; VMOVDQA CC0, CC2; VMOVDQA CC0, CC3 + VMOVDQA ctr3StoreAVX2, DD0; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD1; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD1, DD2; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD2, DD3 + VMOVDQA DD0, ctr0StoreAVX2; VMOVDQA DD1, ctr1StoreAVX2; VMOVDQA DD2, ctr2StoreAVX2; VMOVDQA DD3, ctr3StoreAVX2 + MOVQ $10, itr1 + +sealAVX2InternalLoop: + polyAdd(0*8(oup)) + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + polyMulStage1_AVX2 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + polyMulStage2_AVX2 + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + polyMulStage3_AVX2 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $12, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $12, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $12, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $12, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + polyMulReduceStage + +sealAVX2InternalLoopStart: + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + polyAdd(2*8(oup)) + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + polyMulStage1_AVX2 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $7, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $7, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $7, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $7, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + polyMulStage2_AVX2 + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $4, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $4, BB2, BB2, BB2; VPALIGNR $4, BB3, BB3, BB3 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2; VPALIGNR $8, CC3, CC3, CC3 + VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $12, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $12, DD2, DD2, DD2; VPALIGNR $12, DD3, DD3, DD3 + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + polyMulStage3_AVX2 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + polyMulReduceStage + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + polyAdd(4*8(oup)) + LEAQ (6*8)(oup), oup + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $12, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $12, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $12, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $12, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + polyMulStage1_AVX2 + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + polyMulStage2_AVX2 + VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + polyMulStage3_AVX2 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $7, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $7, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $7, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $7, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + polyMulReduceStage + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $12, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $12, BB2, BB2, BB2; VPALIGNR $12, BB3, BB3, BB3 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2; VPALIGNR $8, CC3, CC3, CC3 + VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $4, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $4, DD2, DD2, DD2; VPALIGNR $4, DD3, DD3, DD3 + DECQ itr1 + JNE sealAVX2InternalLoop + + VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0, AA0; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA1, AA1; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA2, AA2; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA3, AA3 + VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB0, BB0; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB1, BB1; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB2, BB2; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB3, BB3 + VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC0, CC0; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC1, CC1; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC3, CC3 + VPADDD ctr0StoreAVX2, DD0, DD0; VPADDD ctr1StoreAVX2, DD1, DD1; VPADDD ctr2StoreAVX2, DD2, DD2; VPADDD ctr3StoreAVX2, DD3, DD3 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + + // We only hashed 480 of the 512 bytes available - hash the remaining 32 here + polyAdd(0*8(oup)) + polyMulAVX2 + LEAQ (4*8)(oup), oup + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA0, BB0, CC3; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA0, BB0, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC0, DD0, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC0, DD0, CC0 + VPXOR (0*32)(inp), CC3, CC3; VPXOR (1*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (2*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (3*32)(inp), CC0, CC0 + VMOVDQU CC3, (0*32)(oup); VMOVDQU AA0, (1*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (2*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (3*32)(oup) + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA1, BB1, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC1, DD1, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA1, BB1, CC0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC1, DD1, DD0 + VPXOR (4*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (5*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (6*32)(inp), CC0, CC0; VPXOR (7*32)(inp), DD0, DD0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (4*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (5*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (6*32)(oup); VMOVDQU DD0, (7*32)(oup) + + // and here + polyAdd(-2*8(oup)) + polyMulAVX2 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA2, BB2, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC2, DD2, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA2, BB2, CC0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC2, DD2, DD0 + VPXOR (8*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (9*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (10*32)(inp), CC0, CC0; VPXOR (11*32)(inp), DD0, DD0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (8*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (9*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (10*32)(oup); VMOVDQU DD0, (11*32)(oup) + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA3, BB3, AA0; VPERM2I128 $0x02, tmpStoreAVX2, DD3, BB0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA3, BB3, CC0; VPERM2I128 $0x13, tmpStoreAVX2, DD3, DD0 + VPXOR (12*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (13*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (14*32)(inp), CC0, CC0; VPXOR (15*32)(inp), DD0, DD0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (12*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (13*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (14*32)(oup); VMOVDQU DD0, (15*32)(oup) + LEAQ (32*16)(inp), inp + SUBQ $(32*16), inl + CMPQ inl, $512 + JG sealAVX2MainLoop + + // Tail can only hash 480 bytes + polyAdd(0*8(oup)) + polyMulAVX2 + polyAdd(2*8(oup)) + polyMulAVX2 + LEAQ 32(oup), oup + + MOVQ $10, itr1 + MOVQ $0, itr2 + CMPQ inl, $128 + JBE sealAVX2Tail128 + CMPQ inl, $256 + JBE sealAVX2Tail256 + CMPQ inl, $384 + JBE sealAVX2Tail384 + JMP sealAVX2Tail512 + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for buffers smaller than 193 bytes +seal192AVX2: + // For up to 192 bytes of ciphertext and 64 bytes for the poly key, we process four blocks + VMOVDQA AA0, AA1 + VMOVDQA BB0, BB1 + VMOVDQA CC0, CC1 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD1 + VMOVDQA AA0, AA2 + VMOVDQA BB0, BB2 + VMOVDQA CC0, CC2 + VMOVDQA DD0, DD2 + VMOVDQA DD1, TT3 + MOVQ $10, itr2 + +sealAVX2192InnerCipherLoop: + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0) + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $4, BB1, BB1, BB1 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1 + VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $12, DD1, DD1, DD1 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0) + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $12, BB1, BB1, BB1 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1 + VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $4, DD1, DD1, DD1 + DECQ itr2 + JNE sealAVX2192InnerCipherLoop + VPADDD AA2, AA0, AA0; VPADDD AA2, AA1, AA1 + VPADDD BB2, BB0, BB0; VPADDD BB2, BB1, BB1 + VPADDD CC2, CC0, CC0; VPADDD CC2, CC1, CC1 + VPADDD DD2, DD0, DD0; VPADDD TT3, DD1, DD1 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA0, BB0, TT0 + + // Clamp and store poly key + VPAND ·polyClampMask<>(SB), TT0, TT0 + VMOVDQA TT0, rsStoreAVX2 + + // Stream for up to 192 bytes + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA0, BB0, AA0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC0, DD0, BB0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA1, BB1, CC0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC1, DD1, DD0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA1, BB1, AA1 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC1, DD1, BB1 + +sealAVX2ShortSeal: + // Hash aad + MOVQ ad_len+80(FP), itr2 + CALL polyHashADInternal<>(SB) + XORQ itr1, itr1 + +sealAVX2SealHash: + // itr1 holds the number of bytes encrypted but not yet hashed + CMPQ itr1, $16 + JB sealAVX2ShortSealLoop + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + SUBQ $16, itr1 + ADDQ $16, oup + JMP sealAVX2SealHash + +sealAVX2ShortSealLoop: + CMPQ inl, $32 + JB sealAVX2ShortTail32 + SUBQ $32, inl + + // Load for encryption + VPXOR (inp), AA0, AA0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (oup) + LEAQ (1*32)(inp), inp + + // Now can hash + polyAdd(0*8(oup)) + polyMulAVX2 + polyAdd(2*8(oup)) + polyMulAVX2 + LEAQ (1*32)(oup), oup + + // Shift stream left + VMOVDQA BB0, AA0 + VMOVDQA CC0, BB0 + VMOVDQA DD0, CC0 + VMOVDQA AA1, DD0 + VMOVDQA BB1, AA1 + VMOVDQA CC1, BB1 + VMOVDQA DD1, CC1 + VMOVDQA AA2, DD1 + VMOVDQA BB2, AA2 + JMP sealAVX2ShortSealLoop + +sealAVX2ShortTail32: + CMPQ inl, $16 + VMOVDQA A0, A1 + JB sealAVX2ShortDone + + SUBQ $16, inl + + // Load for encryption + VPXOR (inp), A0, T0 + VMOVDQU T0, (oup) + LEAQ (1*16)(inp), inp + + // Hash + polyAdd(0*8(oup)) + polyMulAVX2 + LEAQ (1*16)(oup), oup + VPERM2I128 $0x11, AA0, AA0, AA0 + VMOVDQA A0, A1 + +sealAVX2ShortDone: + VZEROUPPER + JMP sealSSETail + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for buffers smaller than 321 bytes +seal320AVX2: + // For up to 320 bytes of ciphertext and 64 bytes for the poly key, we process six blocks + VMOVDQA AA0, AA1; VMOVDQA BB0, BB1; VMOVDQA CC0, CC1; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD1 + VMOVDQA AA0, AA2; VMOVDQA BB0, BB2; VMOVDQA CC0, CC2; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD1, DD2 + VMOVDQA BB0, TT1; VMOVDQA CC0, TT2; VMOVDQA DD0, TT3 + MOVQ $10, itr2 + +sealAVX2320InnerCipherLoop: + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA2, BB2, CC2, DD2, TT0) + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $4, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $4, BB2, BB2, BB2 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2 + VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $12, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $12, DD2, DD2, DD2 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA2, BB2, CC2, DD2, TT0) + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $12, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $12, BB2, BB2, BB2 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2 + VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $4, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $4, DD2, DD2, DD2 + DECQ itr2 + JNE sealAVX2320InnerCipherLoop + + VMOVDQA ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), TT0 + VPADDD TT0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD TT0, AA1, AA1; VPADDD TT0, AA2, AA2 + VPADDD TT1, BB0, BB0; VPADDD TT1, BB1, BB1; VPADDD TT1, BB2, BB2 + VPADDD TT2, CC0, CC0; VPADDD TT2, CC1, CC1; VPADDD TT2, CC2, CC2 + VMOVDQA ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), TT0 + VPADDD TT3, DD0, DD0; VPADDD TT0, TT3, TT3 + VPADDD TT3, DD1, DD1; VPADDD TT0, TT3, TT3 + VPADDD TT3, DD2, DD2 + + // Clamp and store poly key + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA0, BB0, TT0 + VPAND ·polyClampMask<>(SB), TT0, TT0 + VMOVDQA TT0, rsStoreAVX2 + + // Stream for up to 320 bytes + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA0, BB0, AA0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC0, DD0, BB0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA1, BB1, CC0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC1, DD1, DD0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA1, BB1, AA1 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC1, DD1, BB1 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA2, BB2, CC1 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC2, DD2, DD1 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA2, BB2, AA2 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC2, DD2, BB2 + JMP sealAVX2ShortSeal + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for the last 128 bytes of ciphertext +sealAVX2Tail128: + // Need to decrypt up to 128 bytes - prepare two blocks + // If we got here after the main loop - there are 512 encrypted bytes waiting to be hashed + // If we got here before the main loop - there are 448 encrpyred bytes waiting to be hashed + VMOVDQA ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0 + VMOVDQA state1StoreAVX2, BB0 + VMOVDQA state2StoreAVX2, CC0 + VMOVDQA ctr3StoreAVX2, DD0 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD0 + VMOVDQA DD0, DD1 + +sealAVX2Tail128LoopA: + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + LEAQ 16(oup), oup + +sealAVX2Tail128LoopB: + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0) + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0 + VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0) + polyAdd(16(oup)) + polyMul + LEAQ 32(oup), oup + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0 + VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0 + DECQ itr1 + JG sealAVX2Tail128LoopA + DECQ itr2 + JGE sealAVX2Tail128LoopB + + VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0, AA1 + VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB0, BB1 + VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC0, CC1 + VPADDD DD1, DD0, DD1 + + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA1, BB1, AA0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC1, DD1, BB0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA1, BB1, CC0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC1, DD1, DD0 + JMP sealAVX2ShortSealLoop + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for the last 256 bytes of ciphertext +sealAVX2Tail256: + // Need to decrypt up to 256 bytes - prepare two blocks + // If we got here after the main loop - there are 512 encrypted bytes waiting to be hashed + // If we got here before the main loop - there are 448 encrpyred bytes waiting to be hashed + VMOVDQA ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0; VMOVDQA ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA1 + VMOVDQA state1StoreAVX2, BB0; VMOVDQA state1StoreAVX2, BB1 + VMOVDQA state2StoreAVX2, CC0; VMOVDQA state2StoreAVX2, CC1 + VMOVDQA ctr3StoreAVX2, DD0 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD0 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD1 + VMOVDQA DD0, TT1 + VMOVDQA DD1, TT2 + +sealAVX2Tail256LoopA: + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + LEAQ 16(oup), oup + +sealAVX2Tail256LoopB: + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0) + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $4, BB1, BB1, BB1 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1 + VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $12, DD1, DD1, DD1 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0) + polyAdd(16(oup)) + polyMul + LEAQ 32(oup), oup + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $12, BB1, BB1, BB1 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1 + VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $4, DD1, DD1, DD1 + DECQ itr1 + JG sealAVX2Tail256LoopA + DECQ itr2 + JGE sealAVX2Tail256LoopB + + VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0, AA0; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA1, AA1 + VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB0, BB0; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB1, BB1 + VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC0, CC0; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC1, CC1 + VPADDD TT1, DD0, DD0; VPADDD TT2, DD1, DD1 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA0, BB0, TT0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC0, DD0, TT1 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA0, BB0, TT2 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC0, DD0, TT3 + VPXOR (0*32)(inp), TT0, TT0; VPXOR (1*32)(inp), TT1, TT1; VPXOR (2*32)(inp), TT2, TT2; VPXOR (3*32)(inp), TT3, TT3 + VMOVDQU TT0, (0*32)(oup); VMOVDQU TT1, (1*32)(oup); VMOVDQU TT2, (2*32)(oup); VMOVDQU TT3, (3*32)(oup) + MOVQ $128, itr1 + LEAQ 128(inp), inp + SUBQ $128, inl + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA1, BB1, AA0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC1, DD1, BB0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA1, BB1, CC0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC1, DD1, DD0 + + JMP sealAVX2SealHash + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for the last 384 bytes of ciphertext +sealAVX2Tail384: + // Need to decrypt up to 384 bytes - prepare two blocks + // If we got here after the main loop - there are 512 encrypted bytes waiting to be hashed + // If we got here before the main loop - there are 448 encrpyred bytes waiting to be hashed + VMOVDQA ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0; VMOVDQA AA0, AA1; VMOVDQA AA0, AA2 + VMOVDQA state1StoreAVX2, BB0; VMOVDQA BB0, BB1; VMOVDQA BB0, BB2 + VMOVDQA state2StoreAVX2, CC0; VMOVDQA CC0, CC1; VMOVDQA CC0, CC2 + VMOVDQA ctr3StoreAVX2, DD0 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD1; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD1, DD2 + VMOVDQA DD0, TT1; VMOVDQA DD1, TT2; VMOVDQA DD2, TT3 + +sealAVX2Tail384LoopA: + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + LEAQ 16(oup), oup + +sealAVX2Tail384LoopB: + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA2, BB2, CC2, DD2, TT0) + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $4, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $4, BB2, BB2, BB2 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2 + VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $12, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $12, DD2, DD2, DD2 + chachaQR_AVX2(AA0, BB0, CC0, DD0, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA1, BB1, CC1, DD1, TT0); chachaQR_AVX2(AA2, BB2, CC2, DD2, TT0) + polyAdd(16(oup)) + polyMul + LEAQ 32(oup), oup + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $12, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $12, BB2, BB2, BB2 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2 + VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $4, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $4, DD2, DD2, DD2 + DECQ itr1 + JG sealAVX2Tail384LoopA + DECQ itr2 + JGE sealAVX2Tail384LoopB + + VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0, AA0; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA1, AA1; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA2, AA2 + VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB0, BB0; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB1, BB1; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB2, BB2 + VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC0, CC0; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC1, CC1; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC2, CC2 + VPADDD TT1, DD0, DD0; VPADDD TT2, DD1, DD1; VPADDD TT3, DD2, DD2 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA0, BB0, TT0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC0, DD0, TT1 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA0, BB0, TT2 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC0, DD0, TT3 + VPXOR (0*32)(inp), TT0, TT0; VPXOR (1*32)(inp), TT1, TT1; VPXOR (2*32)(inp), TT2, TT2; VPXOR (3*32)(inp), TT3, TT3 + VMOVDQU TT0, (0*32)(oup); VMOVDQU TT1, (1*32)(oup); VMOVDQU TT2, (2*32)(oup); VMOVDQU TT3, (3*32)(oup) + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA1, BB1, TT0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC1, DD1, TT1 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA1, BB1, TT2 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC1, DD1, TT3 + VPXOR (4*32)(inp), TT0, TT0; VPXOR (5*32)(inp), TT1, TT1; VPXOR (6*32)(inp), TT2, TT2; VPXOR (7*32)(inp), TT3, TT3 + VMOVDQU TT0, (4*32)(oup); VMOVDQU TT1, (5*32)(oup); VMOVDQU TT2, (6*32)(oup); VMOVDQU TT3, (7*32)(oup) + MOVQ $256, itr1 + LEAQ 256(inp), inp + SUBQ $256, inl + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA2, BB2, AA0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC2, DD2, BB0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA2, BB2, CC0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC2, DD2, DD0 + + JMP sealAVX2SealHash + +// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Special optimization for the last 512 bytes of ciphertext +sealAVX2Tail512: + // Need to decrypt up to 512 bytes - prepare two blocks + // If we got here after the main loop - there are 512 encrypted bytes waiting to be hashed + // If we got here before the main loop - there are 448 encrpyred bytes waiting to be hashed + VMOVDQA ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0; VMOVDQA AA0, AA1; VMOVDQA AA0, AA2; VMOVDQA AA0, AA3 + VMOVDQA state1StoreAVX2, BB0; VMOVDQA BB0, BB1; VMOVDQA BB0, BB2; VMOVDQA BB0, BB3 + VMOVDQA state2StoreAVX2, CC0; VMOVDQA CC0, CC1; VMOVDQA CC0, CC2; VMOVDQA CC0, CC3 + VMOVDQA ctr3StoreAVX2, DD0 + VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD0, DD1; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD1, DD2; VPADDD ·avx2IncMask<>(SB), DD2, DD3 + VMOVDQA DD0, ctr0StoreAVX2; VMOVDQA DD1, ctr1StoreAVX2; VMOVDQA DD2, ctr2StoreAVX2; VMOVDQA DD3, ctr3StoreAVX2 + +sealAVX2Tail512LoopA: + polyAdd(0(oup)) + polyMul + LEAQ 16(oup), oup + +sealAVX2Tail512LoopB: + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $12, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $12, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $12, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $12, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + polyAdd(0*8(oup)) + polyMulAVX2 + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $7, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $7, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $7, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $7, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + VPALIGNR $4, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $4, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $4, BB2, BB2, BB2; VPALIGNR $4, BB3, BB3, BB3 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2; VPALIGNR $8, CC3, CC3, CC3 + VPALIGNR $12, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $12, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $12, DD2, DD2, DD2; VPALIGNR $12, DD3, DD3, DD3 + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol16<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + polyAdd(2*8(oup)) + polyMulAVX2 + LEAQ (4*8)(oup), oup + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $12, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $12, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $12, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $12, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $20, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + VPADDD BB0, AA0, AA0; VPADDD BB1, AA1, AA1; VPADDD BB2, AA2, AA2; VPADDD BB3, AA3, AA3 + VPXOR AA0, DD0, DD0; VPXOR AA1, DD1, DD1; VPXOR AA2, DD2, DD2; VPXOR AA3, DD3, DD3 + VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD0, DD0; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD1, DD1; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD2, DD2; VPSHUFB ·rol8<>(SB), DD3, DD3 + VPADDD DD0, CC0, CC0; VPADDD DD1, CC1, CC1; VPADDD DD2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD DD3, CC3, CC3 + VPXOR CC0, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC1, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC2, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPSLLD $7, BB0, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB0, BB0; VPXOR CC3, BB0, BB0 + VPSLLD $7, BB1, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB1, BB1; VPXOR CC3, BB1, BB1 + VPSLLD $7, BB2, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB2, BB2; VPXOR CC3, BB2, BB2 + VPSLLD $7, BB3, CC3; VPSRLD $25, BB3, BB3; VPXOR CC3, BB3, BB3 + VMOVDQA tmpStoreAVX2, CC3 + VPALIGNR $12, BB0, BB0, BB0; VPALIGNR $12, BB1, BB1, BB1; VPALIGNR $12, BB2, BB2, BB2; VPALIGNR $12, BB3, BB3, BB3 + VPALIGNR $8, CC0, CC0, CC0; VPALIGNR $8, CC1, CC1, CC1; VPALIGNR $8, CC2, CC2, CC2; VPALIGNR $8, CC3, CC3, CC3 + VPALIGNR $4, DD0, DD0, DD0; VPALIGNR $4, DD1, DD1, DD1; VPALIGNR $4, DD2, DD2, DD2; VPALIGNR $4, DD3, DD3, DD3 + + DECQ itr1 + JG sealAVX2Tail512LoopA + DECQ itr2 + JGE sealAVX2Tail512LoopB + + VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA0, AA0; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA1, AA1; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA2, AA2; VPADDD ·chacha20Constants<>(SB), AA3, AA3 + VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB0, BB0; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB1, BB1; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB2, BB2; VPADDD state1StoreAVX2, BB3, BB3 + VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC0, CC0; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC1, CC1; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC2, CC2; VPADDD state2StoreAVX2, CC3, CC3 + VPADDD ctr0StoreAVX2, DD0, DD0; VPADDD ctr1StoreAVX2, DD1, DD1; VPADDD ctr2StoreAVX2, DD2, DD2; VPADDD ctr3StoreAVX2, DD3, DD3 + VMOVDQA CC3, tmpStoreAVX2 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA0, BB0, CC3 + VPXOR (0*32)(inp), CC3, CC3 + VMOVDQU CC3, (0*32)(oup) + VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC0, DD0, CC3 + VPXOR (1*32)(inp), CC3, CC3 + VMOVDQU CC3, (1*32)(oup) + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA0, BB0, CC3 + VPXOR (2*32)(inp), CC3, CC3 + VMOVDQU CC3, (2*32)(oup) + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC0, DD0, CC3 + VPXOR (3*32)(inp), CC3, CC3 + VMOVDQU CC3, (3*32)(oup) + + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA1, BB1, AA0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC1, DD1, BB0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA1, BB1, CC0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC1, DD1, DD0 + VPXOR (4*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (5*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (6*32)(inp), CC0, CC0; VPXOR (7*32)(inp), DD0, DD0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (4*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (5*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (6*32)(oup); VMOVDQU DD0, (7*32)(oup) + + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA2, BB2, AA0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, CC2, DD2, BB0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA2, BB2, CC0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, CC2, DD2, DD0 + VPXOR (8*32)(inp), AA0, AA0; VPXOR (9*32)(inp), BB0, BB0; VPXOR (10*32)(inp), CC0, CC0; VPXOR (11*32)(inp), DD0, DD0 + VMOVDQU AA0, (8*32)(oup); VMOVDQU BB0, (9*32)(oup); VMOVDQU CC0, (10*32)(oup); VMOVDQU DD0, (11*32)(oup) + + MOVQ $384, itr1 + LEAQ 384(inp), inp + SUBQ $384, inl + VPERM2I128 $0x02, AA3, BB3, AA0 + VPERM2I128 $0x02, tmpStoreAVX2, DD3, BB0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, AA3, BB3, CC0 + VPERM2I128 $0x13, tmpStoreAVX2, DD3, DD0 + + JMP sealAVX2SealHash diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6313898f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package chacha20poly1305 + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20" + "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias" + "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305" +) + +func writeWithPadding(p *poly1305.MAC, b []byte) { + p.Write(b) + if rem := len(b) % 16; rem != 0 { + var buf [16]byte + padLen := 16 - rem + p.Write(buf[:padLen]) + } +} + +func writeUint64(p *poly1305.MAC, n int) { + var buf [8]byte + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], uint64(n)) + p.Write(buf[:]) +} + +func (c *chacha20poly1305) sealGeneric(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { + ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+poly1305.TagSize) + ciphertext, tag := out[:len(plaintext)], out[len(plaintext):] + if alias.InexactOverlap(out, plaintext) { + panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap") + } + + var polyKey [32]byte + s, _ := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.key[:], nonce) + s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:]) + s.SetCounter(1) // set the counter to 1, skipping 32 bytes + s.XORKeyStream(ciphertext, plaintext) + + p := poly1305.New(&polyKey) + writeWithPadding(p, additionalData) + writeWithPadding(p, ciphertext) + writeUint64(p, len(additionalData)) + writeUint64(p, len(plaintext)) + p.Sum(tag[:0]) + + return ret +} + +func (c *chacha20poly1305) openGeneric(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { + tag := ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-16:] + ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-16] + + var polyKey [32]byte + s, _ := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.key[:], nonce) + s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:]) + s.SetCounter(1) // set the counter to 1, skipping 32 bytes + + p := poly1305.New(&polyKey) + writeWithPadding(p, additionalData) + writeWithPadding(p, ciphertext) + writeUint64(p, len(additionalData)) + writeUint64(p, len(ciphertext)) + + ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext)) + if alias.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) { + panic("chacha20poly1305: invalid buffer overlap") + } + if !p.Verify(tag) { + for i := range out { + out[i] = 0 + } + return nil, errOpen + } + + s.XORKeyStream(out, ciphertext) + return ret, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f832b33d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !amd64 || !gc || purego +// +build !amd64 !gc purego + +package chacha20poly1305 + +func (c *chacha20poly1305) seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { + return c.sealGeneric(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData) +} + +func (c *chacha20poly1305) open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { + return c.openGeneric(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/xchacha20poly1305.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/xchacha20poly1305.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1cebfe94 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/xchacha20poly1305.go @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package chacha20poly1305 + +import ( + "crypto/cipher" + "errors" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20" +) + +type xchacha20poly1305 struct { + key [KeySize]byte +} + +// NewX returns a XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD that uses the given 256-bit key. +// +// XChaCha20-Poly1305 is a ChaCha20-Poly1305 variant that takes a longer nonce, +// suitable to be generated randomly without risk of collisions. It should be +// preferred when nonce uniqueness cannot be trivially ensured, or whenever +// nonces are randomly generated. +func NewX(key []byte) (cipher.AEAD, error) { + if len(key) != KeySize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20poly1305: bad key length") + } + ret := new(xchacha20poly1305) + copy(ret.key[:], key) + return ret, nil +} + +func (*xchacha20poly1305) NonceSize() int { + return NonceSizeX +} + +func (*xchacha20poly1305) Overhead() int { + return Overhead +} + +func (x *xchacha20poly1305) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { + if len(nonce) != NonceSizeX { + panic("chacha20poly1305: bad nonce length passed to Seal") + } + + // XChaCha20-Poly1305 technically supports a 64-bit counter, so there is no + // size limit. However, since we reuse the ChaCha20-Poly1305 implementation, + // the second half of the counter is not available. This is unlikely to be + // an issue because the cipher.AEAD API requires the entire message to be in + // memory, and the counter overflows at 256 GB. + if uint64(len(plaintext)) > (1<<38)-64 { + panic("chacha20poly1305: plaintext too large") + } + + c := new(chacha20poly1305) + hKey, _ := chacha20.HChaCha20(x.key[:], nonce[0:16]) + copy(c.key[:], hKey) + + // The first 4 bytes of the final nonce are unused counter space. + cNonce := make([]byte, NonceSize) + copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24]) + + return c.seal(dst, cNonce[:], plaintext, additionalData) +} + +func (x *xchacha20poly1305) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if len(nonce) != NonceSizeX { + panic("chacha20poly1305: bad nonce length passed to Open") + } + if len(ciphertext) < 16 { + return nil, errOpen + } + if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > (1<<38)-48 { + panic("chacha20poly1305: ciphertext too large") + } + + c := new(chacha20poly1305) + hKey, _ := chacha20.HChaCha20(x.key[:], nonce[0:16]) + copy(c.key[:], hKey) + + // The first 4 bytes of the final nonce are unused counter space. + cNonce := make([]byte, NonceSize) + copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24]) + + return c.open(dst, cNonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6fc2838a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1.go @@ -0,0 +1,824 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cryptobyte + +import ( + encoding_asn1 "encoding/asn1" + "fmt" + "math/big" + "reflect" + "time" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1" +) + +// This file contains ASN.1-related methods for String and Builder. + +// Builder + +// AddASN1Int64 appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 INTEGER. +func (b *Builder) AddASN1Int64(v int64) { + b.addASN1Signed(asn1.INTEGER, v) +} + +// AddASN1Int64WithTag appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 INTEGER with the +// given tag. +func (b *Builder) AddASN1Int64WithTag(v int64, tag asn1.Tag) { + b.addASN1Signed(tag, v) +} + +// AddASN1Enum appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 ENUMERATION. +func (b *Builder) AddASN1Enum(v int64) { + b.addASN1Signed(asn1.ENUM, v) +} + +func (b *Builder) addASN1Signed(tag asn1.Tag, v int64) { + b.AddASN1(tag, func(c *Builder) { + length := 1 + for i := v; i >= 0x80 || i < -0x80; i >>= 8 { + length++ + } + + for ; length > 0; length-- { + i := v >> uint((length-1)*8) & 0xff + c.AddUint8(uint8(i)) + } + }) +} + +// AddASN1Uint64 appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 INTEGER. +func (b *Builder) AddASN1Uint64(v uint64) { + b.AddASN1(asn1.INTEGER, func(c *Builder) { + length := 1 + for i := v; i >= 0x80; i >>= 8 { + length++ + } + + for ; length > 0; length-- { + i := v >> uint((length-1)*8) & 0xff + c.AddUint8(uint8(i)) + } + }) +} + +// AddASN1BigInt appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 INTEGER. +func (b *Builder) AddASN1BigInt(n *big.Int) { + if b.err != nil { + return + } + + b.AddASN1(asn1.INTEGER, func(c *Builder) { + if n.Sign() < 0 { + // A negative number has to be converted to two's-complement form. So we + // invert and subtract 1. If the most-significant-bit isn't set then + // we'll need to pad the beginning with 0xff in order to keep the number + // negative. + nMinus1 := new(big.Int).Neg(n) + nMinus1.Sub(nMinus1, bigOne) + bytes := nMinus1.Bytes() + for i := range bytes { + bytes[i] ^= 0xff + } + if len(bytes) == 0 || bytes[0]&0x80 == 0 { + c.add(0xff) + } + c.add(bytes...) + } else if n.Sign() == 0 { + c.add(0) + } else { + bytes := n.Bytes() + if bytes[0]&0x80 != 0 { + c.add(0) + } + c.add(bytes...) + } + }) +} + +// AddASN1OctetString appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 OCTET STRING. +func (b *Builder) AddASN1OctetString(bytes []byte) { + b.AddASN1(asn1.OCTET_STRING, func(c *Builder) { + c.AddBytes(bytes) + }) +} + +const generalizedTimeFormatStr = "20060102150405Z0700" + +// AddASN1GeneralizedTime appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 GENERALIZEDTIME. +func (b *Builder) AddASN1GeneralizedTime(t time.Time) { + if t.Year() < 0 || t.Year() > 9999 { + b.err = fmt.Errorf("cryptobyte: cannot represent %v as a GeneralizedTime", t) + return + } + b.AddASN1(asn1.GeneralizedTime, func(c *Builder) { + c.AddBytes([]byte(t.Format(generalizedTimeFormatStr))) + }) +} + +// AddASN1UTCTime appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 UTCTime. +func (b *Builder) AddASN1UTCTime(t time.Time) { + b.AddASN1(asn1.UTCTime, func(c *Builder) { + // As utilized by the X.509 profile, UTCTime can only + // represent the years 1950 through 2049. + if t.Year() < 1950 || t.Year() >= 2050 { + b.err = fmt.Errorf("cryptobyte: cannot represent %v as a UTCTime", t) + return + } + c.AddBytes([]byte(t.Format(defaultUTCTimeFormatStr))) + }) +} + +// AddASN1BitString appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 BIT STRING. This does not +// support BIT STRINGs that are not a whole number of bytes. +func (b *Builder) AddASN1BitString(data []byte) { + b.AddASN1(asn1.BIT_STRING, func(b *Builder) { + b.AddUint8(0) + b.AddBytes(data) + }) +} + +func (b *Builder) addBase128Int(n int64) { + var length int + if n == 0 { + length = 1 + } else { + for i := n; i > 0; i >>= 7 { + length++ + } + } + + for i := length - 1; i >= 0; i-- { + o := byte(n >> uint(i*7)) + o &= 0x7f + if i != 0 { + o |= 0x80 + } + + b.add(o) + } +} + +func isValidOID(oid encoding_asn1.ObjectIdentifier) bool { + if len(oid) < 2 { + return false + } + + if oid[0] > 2 || (oid[0] <= 1 && oid[1] >= 40) { + return false + } + + for _, v := range oid { + if v < 0 { + return false + } + } + + return true +} + +func (b *Builder) AddASN1ObjectIdentifier(oid encoding_asn1.ObjectIdentifier) { + b.AddASN1(asn1.OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, func(b *Builder) { + if !isValidOID(oid) { + b.err = fmt.Errorf("cryptobyte: invalid OID: %v", oid) + return + } + + b.addBase128Int(int64(oid[0])*40 + int64(oid[1])) + for _, v := range oid[2:] { + b.addBase128Int(int64(v)) + } + }) +} + +func (b *Builder) AddASN1Boolean(v bool) { + b.AddASN1(asn1.BOOLEAN, func(b *Builder) { + if v { + b.AddUint8(0xff) + } else { + b.AddUint8(0) + } + }) +} + +func (b *Builder) AddASN1NULL() { + b.add(uint8(asn1.NULL), 0) +} + +// MarshalASN1 calls encoding_asn1.Marshal on its input and appends the result if +// successful or records an error if one occurred. +func (b *Builder) MarshalASN1(v interface{}) { + // NOTE(martinkr): This is somewhat of a hack to allow propagation of + // encoding_asn1.Marshal errors into Builder.err. N.B. if you call MarshalASN1 with a + // value embedded into a struct, its tag information is lost. + if b.err != nil { + return + } + bytes, err := encoding_asn1.Marshal(v) + if err != nil { + b.err = err + return + } + b.AddBytes(bytes) +} + +// AddASN1 appends an ASN.1 object. The object is prefixed with the given tag. +// Tags greater than 30 are not supported and result in an error (i.e. +// low-tag-number form only). The child builder passed to the +// BuilderContinuation can be used to build the content of the ASN.1 object. +func (b *Builder) AddASN1(tag asn1.Tag, f BuilderContinuation) { + if b.err != nil { + return + } + // Identifiers with the low five bits set indicate high-tag-number format + // (two or more octets), which we don't support. + if tag&0x1f == 0x1f { + b.err = fmt.Errorf("cryptobyte: high-tag number identifier octects not supported: 0x%x", tag) + return + } + b.AddUint8(uint8(tag)) + b.addLengthPrefixed(1, true, f) +} + +// String + +// ReadASN1Boolean decodes an ASN.1 BOOLEAN and converts it to a boolean +// representation into out and advances. It reports whether the read +// was successful. +func (s *String) ReadASN1Boolean(out *bool) bool { + var bytes String + if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.BOOLEAN) || len(bytes) != 1 { + return false + } + + switch bytes[0] { + case 0: + *out = false + case 0xff: + *out = true + default: + return false + } + + return true +} + +// ReadASN1Integer decodes an ASN.1 INTEGER into out and advances. If out does +// not point to an integer, to a big.Int, or to a []byte it panics. Only +// positive and zero values can be decoded into []byte, and they are returned as +// big-endian binary values that share memory with s. Positive values will have +// no leading zeroes, and zero will be returned as a single zero byte. +// ReadASN1Integer reports whether the read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadASN1Integer(out interface{}) bool { + switch out := out.(type) { + case *int, *int8, *int16, *int32, *int64: + var i int64 + if !s.readASN1Int64(&i) || reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().OverflowInt(i) { + return false + } + reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().SetInt(i) + return true + case *uint, *uint8, *uint16, *uint32, *uint64: + var u uint64 + if !s.readASN1Uint64(&u) || reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().OverflowUint(u) { + return false + } + reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().SetUint(u) + return true + case *big.Int: + return s.readASN1BigInt(out) + case *[]byte: + return s.readASN1Bytes(out) + default: + panic("out does not point to an integer type") + } +} + +func checkASN1Integer(bytes []byte) bool { + if len(bytes) == 0 { + // An INTEGER is encoded with at least one octet. + return false + } + if len(bytes) == 1 { + return true + } + if bytes[0] == 0 && bytes[1]&0x80 == 0 || bytes[0] == 0xff && bytes[1]&0x80 == 0x80 { + // Value is not minimally encoded. + return false + } + return true +} + +var bigOne = big.NewInt(1) + +func (s *String) readASN1BigInt(out *big.Int) bool { + var bytes String + if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.INTEGER) || !checkASN1Integer(bytes) { + return false + } + if bytes[0]&0x80 == 0x80 { + // Negative number. + neg := make([]byte, len(bytes)) + for i, b := range bytes { + neg[i] = ^b + } + out.SetBytes(neg) + out.Add(out, bigOne) + out.Neg(out) + } else { + out.SetBytes(bytes) + } + return true +} + +func (s *String) readASN1Bytes(out *[]byte) bool { + var bytes String + if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.INTEGER) || !checkASN1Integer(bytes) { + return false + } + if bytes[0]&0x80 == 0x80 { + return false + } + for len(bytes) > 1 && bytes[0] == 0 { + bytes = bytes[1:] + } + *out = bytes + return true +} + +func (s *String) readASN1Int64(out *int64) bool { + var bytes String + if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.INTEGER) || !checkASN1Integer(bytes) || !asn1Signed(out, bytes) { + return false + } + return true +} + +func asn1Signed(out *int64, n []byte) bool { + length := len(n) + if length > 8 { + return false + } + for i := 0; i < length; i++ { + *out <<= 8 + *out |= int64(n[i]) + } + // Shift up and down in order to sign extend the result. + *out <<= 64 - uint8(length)*8 + *out >>= 64 - uint8(length)*8 + return true +} + +func (s *String) readASN1Uint64(out *uint64) bool { + var bytes String + if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.INTEGER) || !checkASN1Integer(bytes) || !asn1Unsigned(out, bytes) { + return false + } + return true +} + +func asn1Unsigned(out *uint64, n []byte) bool { + length := len(n) + if length > 9 || length == 9 && n[0] != 0 { + // Too large for uint64. + return false + } + if n[0]&0x80 != 0 { + // Negative number. + return false + } + for i := 0; i < length; i++ { + *out <<= 8 + *out |= uint64(n[i]) + } + return true +} + +// ReadASN1Int64WithTag decodes an ASN.1 INTEGER with the given tag into out +// and advances. It reports whether the read was successful and resulted in a +// value that can be represented in an int64. +func (s *String) ReadASN1Int64WithTag(out *int64, tag asn1.Tag) bool { + var bytes String + return s.ReadASN1(&bytes, tag) && checkASN1Integer(bytes) && asn1Signed(out, bytes) +} + +// ReadASN1Enum decodes an ASN.1 ENUMERATION into out and advances. It reports +// whether the read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadASN1Enum(out *int) bool { + var bytes String + var i int64 + if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.ENUM) || !checkASN1Integer(bytes) || !asn1Signed(&i, bytes) { + return false + } + if int64(int(i)) != i { + return false + } + *out = int(i) + return true +} + +func (s *String) readBase128Int(out *int) bool { + ret := 0 + for i := 0; len(*s) > 0; i++ { + if i == 5 { + return false + } + // Avoid overflowing int on a 32-bit platform. + // We don't want different behavior based on the architecture. + if ret >= 1<<(31-7) { + return false + } + ret <<= 7 + b := s.read(1)[0] + + // ITU-T X.690, section 8.19.2: + // The subidentifier shall be encoded in the fewest possible octets, + // that is, the leading octet of the subidentifier shall not have the value 0x80. + if i == 0 && b == 0x80 { + return false + } + + ret |= int(b & 0x7f) + if b&0x80 == 0 { + *out = ret + return true + } + } + return false // truncated +} + +// ReadASN1ObjectIdentifier decodes an ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER into out and +// advances. It reports whether the read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadASN1ObjectIdentifier(out *encoding_asn1.ObjectIdentifier) bool { + var bytes String + if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.OBJECT_IDENTIFIER) || len(bytes) == 0 { + return false + } + + // In the worst case, we get two elements from the first byte (which is + // encoded differently) and then every varint is a single byte long. + components := make([]int, len(bytes)+1) + + // The first varint is 40*value1 + value2: + // According to this packing, value1 can take the values 0, 1 and 2 only. + // When value1 = 0 or value1 = 1, then value2 is <= 39. When value1 = 2, + // then there are no restrictions on value2. + var v int + if !bytes.readBase128Int(&v) { + return false + } + if v < 80 { + components[0] = v / 40 + components[1] = v % 40 + } else { + components[0] = 2 + components[1] = v - 80 + } + + i := 2 + for ; len(bytes) > 0; i++ { + if !bytes.readBase128Int(&v) { + return false + } + components[i] = v + } + *out = components[:i] + return true +} + +// ReadASN1GeneralizedTime decodes an ASN.1 GENERALIZEDTIME into out and +// advances. It reports whether the read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadASN1GeneralizedTime(out *time.Time) bool { + var bytes String + if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.GeneralizedTime) { + return false + } + t := string(bytes) + res, err := time.Parse(generalizedTimeFormatStr, t) + if err != nil { + return false + } + if serialized := res.Format(generalizedTimeFormatStr); serialized != t { + return false + } + *out = res + return true +} + +const defaultUTCTimeFormatStr = "060102150405Z0700" + +// ReadASN1UTCTime decodes an ASN.1 UTCTime into out and advances. +// It reports whether the read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadASN1UTCTime(out *time.Time) bool { + var bytes String + if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.UTCTime) { + return false + } + t := string(bytes) + + formatStr := defaultUTCTimeFormatStr + var err error + res, err := time.Parse(formatStr, t) + if err != nil { + // Fallback to minute precision if we can't parse second + // precision. If we are following X.509 or X.690 we shouldn't + // support this, but we do. + formatStr = "0601021504Z0700" + res, err = time.Parse(formatStr, t) + } + if err != nil { + return false + } + + if serialized := res.Format(formatStr); serialized != t { + return false + } + + if res.Year() >= 2050 { + // UTCTime interprets the low order digits 50-99 as 1950-99. + // This only applies to its use in the X.509 profile. + // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.2.5.1 + res = res.AddDate(-100, 0, 0) + } + *out = res + return true +} + +// ReadASN1BitString decodes an ASN.1 BIT STRING into out and advances. +// It reports whether the read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadASN1BitString(out *encoding_asn1.BitString) bool { + var bytes String + if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.BIT_STRING) || len(bytes) == 0 || + len(bytes)*8/8 != len(bytes) { + return false + } + + paddingBits := bytes[0] + bytes = bytes[1:] + if paddingBits > 7 || + len(bytes) == 0 && paddingBits != 0 || + len(bytes) > 0 && bytes[len(bytes)-1]&(1< 4 || len(*s) < int(2+lenLen) { + return false + } + + lenBytes := String((*s)[2 : 2+lenLen]) + if !lenBytes.readUnsigned(&len32, int(lenLen)) { + return false + } + + // ITU-T X.690 section 10.1 (DER length forms) requires encoding the length + // with the minimum number of octets. + if len32 < 128 { + // Length should have used short-form encoding. + return false + } + if len32>>((lenLen-1)*8) == 0 { + // Leading octet is 0. Length should have been at least one byte shorter. + return false + } + + headerLen = 2 + uint32(lenLen) + if headerLen+len32 < len32 { + // Overflow. + return false + } + length = headerLen + len32 + } + + if int(length) < 0 || !s.ReadBytes((*[]byte)(out), int(length)) { + return false + } + if skipHeader && !out.Skip(int(headerLen)) { + panic("cryptobyte: internal error") + } + + return true +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1/asn1.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1/asn1.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cda8e3ed --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1/asn1.go @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package asn1 contains supporting types for parsing and building ASN.1 +// messages with the cryptobyte package. +package asn1 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1" + +// Tag represents an ASN.1 identifier octet, consisting of a tag number +// (indicating a type) and class (such as context-specific or constructed). +// +// Methods in the cryptobyte package only support the low-tag-number form, i.e. +// a single identifier octet with bits 7-8 encoding the class and bits 1-6 +// encoding the tag number. +type Tag uint8 + +const ( + classConstructed = 0x20 + classContextSpecific = 0x80 +) + +// Constructed returns t with the constructed class bit set. +func (t Tag) Constructed() Tag { return t | classConstructed } + +// ContextSpecific returns t with the context-specific class bit set. +func (t Tag) ContextSpecific() Tag { return t | classContextSpecific } + +// The following is a list of standard tag and class combinations. +const ( + BOOLEAN = Tag(1) + INTEGER = Tag(2) + BIT_STRING = Tag(3) + OCTET_STRING = Tag(4) + NULL = Tag(5) + OBJECT_IDENTIFIER = Tag(6) + ENUM = Tag(10) + UTF8String = Tag(12) + SEQUENCE = Tag(16 | classConstructed) + SET = Tag(17 | classConstructed) + PrintableString = Tag(19) + T61String = Tag(20) + IA5String = Tag(22) + UTCTime = Tag(23) + GeneralizedTime = Tag(24) + GeneralString = Tag(27) +) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/builder.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/builder.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cf254f5f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/builder.go @@ -0,0 +1,350 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cryptobyte + +import ( + "errors" + "fmt" +) + +// A Builder builds byte strings from fixed-length and length-prefixed values. +// Builders either allocate space as needed, or are ‘fixed’, which means that +// they write into a given buffer and produce an error if it's exhausted. +// +// The zero value is a usable Builder that allocates space as needed. +// +// Simple values are marshaled and appended to a Builder using methods on the +// Builder. Length-prefixed values are marshaled by providing a +// BuilderContinuation, which is a function that writes the inner contents of +// the value to a given Builder. See the documentation for BuilderContinuation +// for details. +type Builder struct { + err error + result []byte + fixedSize bool + child *Builder + offset int + pendingLenLen int + pendingIsASN1 bool + inContinuation *bool +} + +// NewBuilder creates a Builder that appends its output to the given buffer. +// Like append(), the slice will be reallocated if its capacity is exceeded. +// Use Bytes to get the final buffer. +func NewBuilder(buffer []byte) *Builder { + return &Builder{ + result: buffer, + } +} + +// NewFixedBuilder creates a Builder that appends its output into the given +// buffer. This builder does not reallocate the output buffer. Writes that +// would exceed the buffer's capacity are treated as an error. +func NewFixedBuilder(buffer []byte) *Builder { + return &Builder{ + result: buffer, + fixedSize: true, + } +} + +// SetError sets the value to be returned as the error from Bytes. Writes +// performed after calling SetError are ignored. +func (b *Builder) SetError(err error) { + b.err = err +} + +// Bytes returns the bytes written by the builder or an error if one has +// occurred during building. +func (b *Builder) Bytes() ([]byte, error) { + if b.err != nil { + return nil, b.err + } + return b.result[b.offset:], nil +} + +// BytesOrPanic returns the bytes written by the builder or panics if an error +// has occurred during building. +func (b *Builder) BytesOrPanic() []byte { + if b.err != nil { + panic(b.err) + } + return b.result[b.offset:] +} + +// AddUint8 appends an 8-bit value to the byte string. +func (b *Builder) AddUint8(v uint8) { + b.add(byte(v)) +} + +// AddUint16 appends a big-endian, 16-bit value to the byte string. +func (b *Builder) AddUint16(v uint16) { + b.add(byte(v>>8), byte(v)) +} + +// AddUint24 appends a big-endian, 24-bit value to the byte string. The highest +// byte of the 32-bit input value is silently truncated. +func (b *Builder) AddUint24(v uint32) { + b.add(byte(v>>16), byte(v>>8), byte(v)) +} + +// AddUint32 appends a big-endian, 32-bit value to the byte string. +func (b *Builder) AddUint32(v uint32) { + b.add(byte(v>>24), byte(v>>16), byte(v>>8), byte(v)) +} + +// AddUint48 appends a big-endian, 48-bit value to the byte string. +func (b *Builder) AddUint48(v uint64) { + b.add(byte(v>>40), byte(v>>32), byte(v>>24), byte(v>>16), byte(v>>8), byte(v)) +} + +// AddUint64 appends a big-endian, 64-bit value to the byte string. +func (b *Builder) AddUint64(v uint64) { + b.add(byte(v>>56), byte(v>>48), byte(v>>40), byte(v>>32), byte(v>>24), byte(v>>16), byte(v>>8), byte(v)) +} + +// AddBytes appends a sequence of bytes to the byte string. +func (b *Builder) AddBytes(v []byte) { + b.add(v...) +} + +// BuilderContinuation is a continuation-passing interface for building +// length-prefixed byte sequences. Builder methods for length-prefixed +// sequences (AddUint8LengthPrefixed etc) will invoke the BuilderContinuation +// supplied to them. The child builder passed to the continuation can be used +// to build the content of the length-prefixed sequence. For example: +// +// parent := cryptobyte.NewBuilder() +// parent.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func (child *Builder) { +// child.AddUint8(42) +// child.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func (grandchild *Builder) { +// grandchild.AddUint8(5) +// }) +// }) +// +// It is an error to write more bytes to the child than allowed by the reserved +// length prefix. After the continuation returns, the child must be considered +// invalid, i.e. users must not store any copies or references of the child +// that outlive the continuation. +// +// If the continuation panics with a value of type BuildError then the inner +// error will be returned as the error from Bytes. If the child panics +// otherwise then Bytes will repanic with the same value. +type BuilderContinuation func(child *Builder) + +// BuildError wraps an error. If a BuilderContinuation panics with this value, +// the panic will be recovered and the inner error will be returned from +// Builder.Bytes. +type BuildError struct { + Err error +} + +// AddUint8LengthPrefixed adds a 8-bit length-prefixed byte sequence. +func (b *Builder) AddUint8LengthPrefixed(f BuilderContinuation) { + b.addLengthPrefixed(1, false, f) +} + +// AddUint16LengthPrefixed adds a big-endian, 16-bit length-prefixed byte sequence. +func (b *Builder) AddUint16LengthPrefixed(f BuilderContinuation) { + b.addLengthPrefixed(2, false, f) +} + +// AddUint24LengthPrefixed adds a big-endian, 24-bit length-prefixed byte sequence. +func (b *Builder) AddUint24LengthPrefixed(f BuilderContinuation) { + b.addLengthPrefixed(3, false, f) +} + +// AddUint32LengthPrefixed adds a big-endian, 32-bit length-prefixed byte sequence. +func (b *Builder) AddUint32LengthPrefixed(f BuilderContinuation) { + b.addLengthPrefixed(4, false, f) +} + +func (b *Builder) callContinuation(f BuilderContinuation, arg *Builder) { + if !*b.inContinuation { + *b.inContinuation = true + + defer func() { + *b.inContinuation = false + + r := recover() + if r == nil { + return + } + + if buildError, ok := r.(BuildError); ok { + b.err = buildError.Err + } else { + panic(r) + } + }() + } + + f(arg) +} + +func (b *Builder) addLengthPrefixed(lenLen int, isASN1 bool, f BuilderContinuation) { + // Subsequent writes can be ignored if the builder has encountered an error. + if b.err != nil { + return + } + + offset := len(b.result) + b.add(make([]byte, lenLen)...) + + if b.inContinuation == nil { + b.inContinuation = new(bool) + } + + b.child = &Builder{ + result: b.result, + fixedSize: b.fixedSize, + offset: offset, + pendingLenLen: lenLen, + pendingIsASN1: isASN1, + inContinuation: b.inContinuation, + } + + b.callContinuation(f, b.child) + b.flushChild() + if b.child != nil { + panic("cryptobyte: internal error") + } +} + +func (b *Builder) flushChild() { + if b.child == nil { + return + } + b.child.flushChild() + child := b.child + b.child = nil + + if child.err != nil { + b.err = child.err + return + } + + length := len(child.result) - child.pendingLenLen - child.offset + + if length < 0 { + panic("cryptobyte: internal error") // result unexpectedly shrunk + } + + if child.pendingIsASN1 { + // For ASN.1, we reserved a single byte for the length. If that turned out + // to be incorrect, we have to move the contents along in order to make + // space. + if child.pendingLenLen != 1 { + panic("cryptobyte: internal error") + } + var lenLen, lenByte uint8 + if int64(length) > 0xfffffffe { + b.err = errors.New("pending ASN.1 child too long") + return + } else if length > 0xffffff { + lenLen = 5 + lenByte = 0x80 | 4 + } else if length > 0xffff { + lenLen = 4 + lenByte = 0x80 | 3 + } else if length > 0xff { + lenLen = 3 + lenByte = 0x80 | 2 + } else if length > 0x7f { + lenLen = 2 + lenByte = 0x80 | 1 + } else { + lenLen = 1 + lenByte = uint8(length) + length = 0 + } + + // Insert the initial length byte, make space for successive length bytes, + // and adjust the offset. + child.result[child.offset] = lenByte + extraBytes := int(lenLen - 1) + if extraBytes != 0 { + child.add(make([]byte, extraBytes)...) + childStart := child.offset + child.pendingLenLen + copy(child.result[childStart+extraBytes:], child.result[childStart:]) + } + child.offset++ + child.pendingLenLen = extraBytes + } + + l := length + for i := child.pendingLenLen - 1; i >= 0; i-- { + child.result[child.offset+i] = uint8(l) + l >>= 8 + } + if l != 0 { + b.err = fmt.Errorf("cryptobyte: pending child length %d exceeds %d-byte length prefix", length, child.pendingLenLen) + return + } + + if b.fixedSize && &b.result[0] != &child.result[0] { + panic("cryptobyte: BuilderContinuation reallocated a fixed-size buffer") + } + + b.result = child.result +} + +func (b *Builder) add(bytes ...byte) { + if b.err != nil { + return + } + if b.child != nil { + panic("cryptobyte: attempted write while child is pending") + } + if len(b.result)+len(bytes) < len(bytes) { + b.err = errors.New("cryptobyte: length overflow") + } + if b.fixedSize && len(b.result)+len(bytes) > cap(b.result) { + b.err = errors.New("cryptobyte: Builder is exceeding its fixed-size buffer") + return + } + b.result = append(b.result, bytes...) +} + +// Unwrite rolls back non-negative n bytes written directly to the Builder. +// An attempt by a child builder passed to a continuation to unwrite bytes +// from its parent will panic. +func (b *Builder) Unwrite(n int) { + if b.err != nil { + return + } + if b.child != nil { + panic("cryptobyte: attempted unwrite while child is pending") + } + length := len(b.result) - b.pendingLenLen - b.offset + if length < 0 { + panic("cryptobyte: internal error") + } + if n < 0 { + panic("cryptobyte: attempted to unwrite negative number of bytes") + } + if n > length { + panic("cryptobyte: attempted to unwrite more than was written") + } + b.result = b.result[:len(b.result)-n] +} + +// A MarshalingValue marshals itself into a Builder. +type MarshalingValue interface { + // Marshal is called by Builder.AddValue. It receives a pointer to a builder + // to marshal itself into. It may return an error that occurred during + // marshaling, such as unset or invalid values. + Marshal(b *Builder) error +} + +// AddValue calls Marshal on v, passing a pointer to the builder to append to. +// If Marshal returns an error, it is set on the Builder so that subsequent +// appends don't have an effect. +func (b *Builder) AddValue(v MarshalingValue) { + err := v.Marshal(b) + if err != nil { + b.err = err + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/string.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/string.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..10692a8a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/string.go @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package cryptobyte contains types that help with parsing and constructing +// length-prefixed, binary messages, including ASN.1 DER. (The asn1 subpackage +// contains useful ASN.1 constants.) +// +// The String type is for parsing. It wraps a []byte slice and provides helper +// functions for consuming structures, value by value. +// +// The Builder type is for constructing messages. It providers helper functions +// for appending values and also for appending length-prefixed submessages – +// without having to worry about calculating the length prefix ahead of time. +// +// See the documentation and examples for the Builder and String types to get +// started. +package cryptobyte // import "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte" + +// String represents a string of bytes. It provides methods for parsing +// fixed-length and length-prefixed values from it. +type String []byte + +// read advances a String by n bytes and returns them. If less than n bytes +// remain, it returns nil. +func (s *String) read(n int) []byte { + if len(*s) < n || n < 0 { + return nil + } + v := (*s)[:n] + *s = (*s)[n:] + return v +} + +// Skip advances the String by n byte and reports whether it was successful. +func (s *String) Skip(n int) bool { + return s.read(n) != nil +} + +// ReadUint8 decodes an 8-bit value into out and advances over it. +// It reports whether the read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadUint8(out *uint8) bool { + v := s.read(1) + if v == nil { + return false + } + *out = uint8(v[0]) + return true +} + +// ReadUint16 decodes a big-endian, 16-bit value into out and advances over it. +// It reports whether the read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadUint16(out *uint16) bool { + v := s.read(2) + if v == nil { + return false + } + *out = uint16(v[0])<<8 | uint16(v[1]) + return true +} + +// ReadUint24 decodes a big-endian, 24-bit value into out and advances over it. +// It reports whether the read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadUint24(out *uint32) bool { + v := s.read(3) + if v == nil { + return false + } + *out = uint32(v[0])<<16 | uint32(v[1])<<8 | uint32(v[2]) + return true +} + +// ReadUint32 decodes a big-endian, 32-bit value into out and advances over it. +// It reports whether the read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadUint32(out *uint32) bool { + v := s.read(4) + if v == nil { + return false + } + *out = uint32(v[0])<<24 | uint32(v[1])<<16 | uint32(v[2])<<8 | uint32(v[3]) + return true +} + +// ReadUint48 decodes a big-endian, 48-bit value into out and advances over it. +// It reports whether the read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadUint48(out *uint64) bool { + v := s.read(6) + if v == nil { + return false + } + *out = uint64(v[0])<<40 | uint64(v[1])<<32 | uint64(v[2])<<24 | uint64(v[3])<<16 | uint64(v[4])<<8 | uint64(v[5]) + return true +} + +// ReadUint64 decodes a big-endian, 64-bit value into out and advances over it. +// It reports whether the read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadUint64(out *uint64) bool { + v := s.read(8) + if v == nil { + return false + } + *out = uint64(v[0])<<56 | uint64(v[1])<<48 | uint64(v[2])<<40 | uint64(v[3])<<32 | uint64(v[4])<<24 | uint64(v[5])<<16 | uint64(v[6])<<8 | uint64(v[7]) + return true +} + +func (s *String) readUnsigned(out *uint32, length int) bool { + v := s.read(length) + if v == nil { + return false + } + var result uint32 + for i := 0; i < length; i++ { + result <<= 8 + result |= uint32(v[i]) + } + *out = result + return true +} + +func (s *String) readLengthPrefixed(lenLen int, outChild *String) bool { + lenBytes := s.read(lenLen) + if lenBytes == nil { + return false + } + var length uint32 + for _, b := range lenBytes { + length = length << 8 + length = length | uint32(b) + } + v := s.read(int(length)) + if v == nil { + return false + } + *outChild = v + return true +} + +// ReadUint8LengthPrefixed reads the content of an 8-bit length-prefixed value +// into out and advances over it. It reports whether the read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadUint8LengthPrefixed(out *String) bool { + return s.readLengthPrefixed(1, out) +} + +// ReadUint16LengthPrefixed reads the content of a big-endian, 16-bit +// length-prefixed value into out and advances over it. It reports whether the +// read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(out *String) bool { + return s.readLengthPrefixed(2, out) +} + +// ReadUint24LengthPrefixed reads the content of a big-endian, 24-bit +// length-prefixed value into out and advances over it. It reports whether +// the read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadUint24LengthPrefixed(out *String) bool { + return s.readLengthPrefixed(3, out) +} + +// ReadBytes reads n bytes into out and advances over them. It reports +// whether the read was successful. +func (s *String) ReadBytes(out *[]byte, n int) bool { + v := s.read(n) + if v == nil { + return false + } + *out = v + return true +} + +// CopyBytes copies len(out) bytes into out and advances over them. It reports +// whether the copy operation was successful +func (s *String) CopyBytes(out []byte) bool { + n := len(out) + v := s.read(n) + if v == nil { + return false + } + return copy(out, v) == n +} + +// Empty reports whether the string does not contain any bytes. +func (s String) Empty() bool { + return len(s) == 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..00f963ea --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package curve25519 provides an implementation of the X25519 function, which +// performs scalar multiplication on the elliptic curve known as Curve25519. +// See RFC 7748. +// +// Starting in Go 1.20, this package is a wrapper for the X25519 implementation +// in the crypto/ecdh package. +package curve25519 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" + +// ScalarMult sets dst to the product scalar * point. +// +// Deprecated: when provided a low-order point, ScalarMult will set dst to all +// zeroes, irrespective of the scalar. Instead, use the X25519 function, which +// will return an error. +func ScalarMult(dst, scalar, point *[32]byte) { + scalarMult(dst, scalar, point) +} + +// ScalarBaseMult sets dst to the product scalar * base where base is the +// standard generator. +// +// It is recommended to use the X25519 function with Basepoint instead, as +// copying into fixed size arrays can lead to unexpected bugs. +func ScalarBaseMult(dst, scalar *[32]byte) { + scalarBaseMult(dst, scalar) +} + +const ( + // ScalarSize is the size of the scalar input to X25519. + ScalarSize = 32 + // PointSize is the size of the point input to X25519. + PointSize = 32 +) + +// Basepoint is the canonical Curve25519 generator. +var Basepoint []byte + +var basePoint = [32]byte{9} + +func init() { Basepoint = basePoint[:] } + +// X25519 returns the result of the scalar multiplication (scalar * point), +// according to RFC 7748, Section 5. scalar, point and the return value are +// slices of 32 bytes. +// +// scalar can be generated at random, for example with crypto/rand. point should +// be either Basepoint or the output of another X25519 call. +// +// If point is Basepoint (but not if it's a different slice with the same +// contents) a precomputed implementation might be used for performance. +func X25519(scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) { + // Outline the body of function, to let the allocation be inlined in the + // caller, and possibly avoid escaping to the heap. + var dst [32]byte + return x25519(&dst, scalar, point) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_compat.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_compat.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ba647e8d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_compat.go @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !go1.20 + +package curve25519 + +import ( + "crypto/subtle" + "errors" + "strconv" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field" +) + +func scalarMult(dst, scalar, point *[32]byte) { + var e [32]byte + + copy(e[:], scalar[:]) + e[0] &= 248 + e[31] &= 127 + e[31] |= 64 + + var x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, tmp0, tmp1 field.Element + x1.SetBytes(point[:]) + x2.One() + x3.Set(&x1) + z3.One() + + swap := 0 + for pos := 254; pos >= 0; pos-- { + b := e[pos/8] >> uint(pos&7) + b &= 1 + swap ^= int(b) + x2.Swap(&x3, swap) + z2.Swap(&z3, swap) + swap = int(b) + + tmp0.Subtract(&x3, &z3) + tmp1.Subtract(&x2, &z2) + x2.Add(&x2, &z2) + z2.Add(&x3, &z3) + z3.Multiply(&tmp0, &x2) + z2.Multiply(&z2, &tmp1) + tmp0.Square(&tmp1) + tmp1.Square(&x2) + x3.Add(&z3, &z2) + z2.Subtract(&z3, &z2) + x2.Multiply(&tmp1, &tmp0) + tmp1.Subtract(&tmp1, &tmp0) + z2.Square(&z2) + + z3.Mult32(&tmp1, 121666) + x3.Square(&x3) + tmp0.Add(&tmp0, &z3) + z3.Multiply(&x1, &z2) + z2.Multiply(&tmp1, &tmp0) + } + + x2.Swap(&x3, swap) + z2.Swap(&z3, swap) + + z2.Invert(&z2) + x2.Multiply(&x2, &z2) + copy(dst[:], x2.Bytes()) +} + +func scalarBaseMult(dst, scalar *[32]byte) { + checkBasepoint() + scalarMult(dst, scalar, &basePoint) +} + +func x25519(dst *[32]byte, scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) { + var in [32]byte + if l := len(scalar); l != 32 { + return nil, errors.New("bad scalar length: " + strconv.Itoa(l) + ", expected 32") + } + if l := len(point); l != 32 { + return nil, errors.New("bad point length: " + strconv.Itoa(l) + ", expected 32") + } + copy(in[:], scalar) + if &point[0] == &Basepoint[0] { + scalarBaseMult(dst, &in) + } else { + var base, zero [32]byte + copy(base[:], point) + scalarMult(dst, &in, &base) + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(dst[:], zero[:]) == 1 { + return nil, errors.New("bad input point: low order point") + } + } + return dst[:], nil +} + +func checkBasepoint() { + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(Basepoint, []byte{ + 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + }) != 1 { + panic("curve25519: global Basepoint value was modified") + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_go120.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_go120.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..627df497 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_go120.go @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build go1.20 + +package curve25519 + +import "crypto/ecdh" + +func x25519(dst *[32]byte, scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) { + curve := ecdh.X25519() + pub, err := curve.NewPublicKey(point) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + priv, err := curve.NewPrivateKey(scalar) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + out, err := priv.ECDH(pub) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + copy(dst[:], out) + return dst[:], nil +} + +func scalarMult(dst, scalar, point *[32]byte) { + if _, err := x25519(dst, scalar[:], point[:]); err != nil { + // The only error condition for x25519 when the inputs are 32 bytes long + // is if the output would have been the all-zero value. + for i := range dst { + dst[i] = 0 + } + } +} + +func scalarBaseMult(dst, scalar *[32]byte) { + curve := ecdh.X25519() + priv, err := curve.NewPrivateKey(scalar[:]) + if err != nil { + panic("curve25519: internal error: scalarBaseMult was not 32 bytes") + } + copy(dst[:], priv.PublicKey().Bytes()) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/README b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/README new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e25bca7d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/README @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +This package is kept in sync with crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519/field in +the standard library. + +If there are any changes in the standard library that need to be synced to this +package, run sync.sh. It will not overwrite any local changes made since the +previous sync, so it's ok to land changes in this package first, and then sync +to the standard library later. diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ca841ad9 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe.go @@ -0,0 +1,416 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package field implements fast arithmetic modulo 2^255-19. +package field + +import ( + "crypto/subtle" + "encoding/binary" + "math/bits" +) + +// Element represents an element of the field GF(2^255-19). Note that this +// is not a cryptographically secure group, and should only be used to interact +// with edwards25519.Point coordinates. +// +// This type works similarly to math/big.Int, and all arguments and receivers +// are allowed to alias. +// +// The zero value is a valid zero element. +type Element struct { + // An element t represents the integer + // t.l0 + t.l1*2^51 + t.l2*2^102 + t.l3*2^153 + t.l4*2^204 + // + // Between operations, all limbs are expected to be lower than 2^52. + l0 uint64 + l1 uint64 + l2 uint64 + l3 uint64 + l4 uint64 +} + +const maskLow51Bits uint64 = (1 << 51) - 1 + +var feZero = &Element{0, 0, 0, 0, 0} + +// Zero sets v = 0, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Zero() *Element { + *v = *feZero + return v +} + +var feOne = &Element{1, 0, 0, 0, 0} + +// One sets v = 1, and returns v. +func (v *Element) One() *Element { + *v = *feOne + return v +} + +// reduce reduces v modulo 2^255 - 19 and returns it. +func (v *Element) reduce() *Element { + v.carryPropagate() + + // After the light reduction we now have a field element representation + // v < 2^255 + 2^13 * 19, but need v < 2^255 - 19. + + // If v >= 2^255 - 19, then v + 19 >= 2^255, which would overflow 2^255 - 1, + // generating a carry. That is, c will be 0 if v < 2^255 - 19, and 1 otherwise. + c := (v.l0 + 19) >> 51 + c = (v.l1 + c) >> 51 + c = (v.l2 + c) >> 51 + c = (v.l3 + c) >> 51 + c = (v.l4 + c) >> 51 + + // If v < 2^255 - 19 and c = 0, this will be a no-op. Otherwise, it's + // effectively applying the reduction identity to the carry. + v.l0 += 19 * c + + v.l1 += v.l0 >> 51 + v.l0 = v.l0 & maskLow51Bits + v.l2 += v.l1 >> 51 + v.l1 = v.l1 & maskLow51Bits + v.l3 += v.l2 >> 51 + v.l2 = v.l2 & maskLow51Bits + v.l4 += v.l3 >> 51 + v.l3 = v.l3 & maskLow51Bits + // no additional carry + v.l4 = v.l4 & maskLow51Bits + + return v +} + +// Add sets v = a + b, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Add(a, b *Element) *Element { + v.l0 = a.l0 + b.l0 + v.l1 = a.l1 + b.l1 + v.l2 = a.l2 + b.l2 + v.l3 = a.l3 + b.l3 + v.l4 = a.l4 + b.l4 + // Using the generic implementation here is actually faster than the + // assembly. Probably because the body of this function is so simple that + // the compiler can figure out better optimizations by inlining the carry + // propagation. TODO + return v.carryPropagateGeneric() +} + +// Subtract sets v = a - b, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Subtract(a, b *Element) *Element { + // We first add 2 * p, to guarantee the subtraction won't underflow, and + // then subtract b (which can be up to 2^255 + 2^13 * 19). + v.l0 = (a.l0 + 0xFFFFFFFFFFFDA) - b.l0 + v.l1 = (a.l1 + 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE) - b.l1 + v.l2 = (a.l2 + 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE) - b.l2 + v.l3 = (a.l3 + 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE) - b.l3 + v.l4 = (a.l4 + 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE) - b.l4 + return v.carryPropagate() +} + +// Negate sets v = -a, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Negate(a *Element) *Element { + return v.Subtract(feZero, a) +} + +// Invert sets v = 1/z mod p, and returns v. +// +// If z == 0, Invert returns v = 0. +func (v *Element) Invert(z *Element) *Element { + // Inversion is implemented as exponentiation with exponent p − 2. It uses the + // same sequence of 255 squarings and 11 multiplications as [Curve25519]. + var z2, z9, z11, z2_5_0, z2_10_0, z2_20_0, z2_50_0, z2_100_0, t Element + + z2.Square(z) // 2 + t.Square(&z2) // 4 + t.Square(&t) // 8 + z9.Multiply(&t, z) // 9 + z11.Multiply(&z9, &z2) // 11 + t.Square(&z11) // 22 + z2_5_0.Multiply(&t, &z9) // 31 = 2^5 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&z2_5_0) // 2^6 - 2^1 + for i := 0; i < 4; i++ { + t.Square(&t) // 2^10 - 2^5 + } + z2_10_0.Multiply(&t, &z2_5_0) // 2^10 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&z2_10_0) // 2^11 - 2^1 + for i := 0; i < 9; i++ { + t.Square(&t) // 2^20 - 2^10 + } + z2_20_0.Multiply(&t, &z2_10_0) // 2^20 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&z2_20_0) // 2^21 - 2^1 + for i := 0; i < 19; i++ { + t.Square(&t) // 2^40 - 2^20 + } + t.Multiply(&t, &z2_20_0) // 2^40 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&t) // 2^41 - 2^1 + for i := 0; i < 9; i++ { + t.Square(&t) // 2^50 - 2^10 + } + z2_50_0.Multiply(&t, &z2_10_0) // 2^50 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&z2_50_0) // 2^51 - 2^1 + for i := 0; i < 49; i++ { + t.Square(&t) // 2^100 - 2^50 + } + z2_100_0.Multiply(&t, &z2_50_0) // 2^100 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&z2_100_0) // 2^101 - 2^1 + for i := 0; i < 99; i++ { + t.Square(&t) // 2^200 - 2^100 + } + t.Multiply(&t, &z2_100_0) // 2^200 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&t) // 2^201 - 2^1 + for i := 0; i < 49; i++ { + t.Square(&t) // 2^250 - 2^50 + } + t.Multiply(&t, &z2_50_0) // 2^250 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&t) // 2^251 - 2^1 + t.Square(&t) // 2^252 - 2^2 + t.Square(&t) // 2^253 - 2^3 + t.Square(&t) // 2^254 - 2^4 + t.Square(&t) // 2^255 - 2^5 + + return v.Multiply(&t, &z11) // 2^255 - 21 +} + +// Set sets v = a, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Set(a *Element) *Element { + *v = *a + return v +} + +// SetBytes sets v to x, which must be a 32-byte little-endian encoding. +// +// Consistent with RFC 7748, the most significant bit (the high bit of the +// last byte) is ignored, and non-canonical values (2^255-19 through 2^255-1) +// are accepted. Note that this is laxer than specified by RFC 8032. +func (v *Element) SetBytes(x []byte) *Element { + if len(x) != 32 { + panic("edwards25519: invalid field element input size") + } + + // Bits 0:51 (bytes 0:8, bits 0:64, shift 0, mask 51). + v.l0 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(x[0:8]) + v.l0 &= maskLow51Bits + // Bits 51:102 (bytes 6:14, bits 48:112, shift 3, mask 51). + v.l1 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(x[6:14]) >> 3 + v.l1 &= maskLow51Bits + // Bits 102:153 (bytes 12:20, bits 96:160, shift 6, mask 51). + v.l2 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(x[12:20]) >> 6 + v.l2 &= maskLow51Bits + // Bits 153:204 (bytes 19:27, bits 152:216, shift 1, mask 51). + v.l3 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(x[19:27]) >> 1 + v.l3 &= maskLow51Bits + // Bits 204:251 (bytes 24:32, bits 192:256, shift 12, mask 51). + // Note: not bytes 25:33, shift 4, to avoid overread. + v.l4 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(x[24:32]) >> 12 + v.l4 &= maskLow51Bits + + return v +} + +// Bytes returns the canonical 32-byte little-endian encoding of v. +func (v *Element) Bytes() []byte { + // This function is outlined to make the allocations inline in the caller + // rather than happen on the heap. + var out [32]byte + return v.bytes(&out) +} + +func (v *Element) bytes(out *[32]byte) []byte { + t := *v + t.reduce() + + var buf [8]byte + for i, l := range [5]uint64{t.l0, t.l1, t.l2, t.l3, t.l4} { + bitsOffset := i * 51 + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], l<= len(out) { + break + } + out[off] |= bb + } + } + + return out[:] +} + +// Equal returns 1 if v and u are equal, and 0 otherwise. +func (v *Element) Equal(u *Element) int { + sa, sv := u.Bytes(), v.Bytes() + return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(sa, sv) +} + +// mask64Bits returns 0xffffffff if cond is 1, and 0 otherwise. +func mask64Bits(cond int) uint64 { return ^(uint64(cond) - 1) } + +// Select sets v to a if cond == 1, and to b if cond == 0. +func (v *Element) Select(a, b *Element, cond int) *Element { + m := mask64Bits(cond) + v.l0 = (m & a.l0) | (^m & b.l0) + v.l1 = (m & a.l1) | (^m & b.l1) + v.l2 = (m & a.l2) | (^m & b.l2) + v.l3 = (m & a.l3) | (^m & b.l3) + v.l4 = (m & a.l4) | (^m & b.l4) + return v +} + +// Swap swaps v and u if cond == 1 or leaves them unchanged if cond == 0, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Swap(u *Element, cond int) { + m := mask64Bits(cond) + t := m & (v.l0 ^ u.l0) + v.l0 ^= t + u.l0 ^= t + t = m & (v.l1 ^ u.l1) + v.l1 ^= t + u.l1 ^= t + t = m & (v.l2 ^ u.l2) + v.l2 ^= t + u.l2 ^= t + t = m & (v.l3 ^ u.l3) + v.l3 ^= t + u.l3 ^= t + t = m & (v.l4 ^ u.l4) + v.l4 ^= t + u.l4 ^= t +} + +// IsNegative returns 1 if v is negative, and 0 otherwise. +func (v *Element) IsNegative() int { + return int(v.Bytes()[0] & 1) +} + +// Absolute sets v to |u|, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Absolute(u *Element) *Element { + return v.Select(new(Element).Negate(u), u, u.IsNegative()) +} + +// Multiply sets v = x * y, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Multiply(x, y *Element) *Element { + feMul(v, x, y) + return v +} + +// Square sets v = x * x, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Square(x *Element) *Element { + feSquare(v, x) + return v +} + +// Mult32 sets v = x * y, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Mult32(x *Element, y uint32) *Element { + x0lo, x0hi := mul51(x.l0, y) + x1lo, x1hi := mul51(x.l1, y) + x2lo, x2hi := mul51(x.l2, y) + x3lo, x3hi := mul51(x.l3, y) + x4lo, x4hi := mul51(x.l4, y) + v.l0 = x0lo + 19*x4hi // carried over per the reduction identity + v.l1 = x1lo + x0hi + v.l2 = x2lo + x1hi + v.l3 = x3lo + x2hi + v.l4 = x4lo + x3hi + // The hi portions are going to be only 32 bits, plus any previous excess, + // so we can skip the carry propagation. + return v +} + +// mul51 returns lo + hi * 2⁵¹ = a * b. +func mul51(a uint64, b uint32) (lo uint64, hi uint64) { + mh, ml := bits.Mul64(a, uint64(b)) + lo = ml & maskLow51Bits + hi = (mh << 13) | (ml >> 51) + return +} + +// Pow22523 set v = x^((p-5)/8), and returns v. (p-5)/8 is 2^252-3. +func (v *Element) Pow22523(x *Element) *Element { + var t0, t1, t2 Element + + t0.Square(x) // x^2 + t1.Square(&t0) // x^4 + t1.Square(&t1) // x^8 + t1.Multiply(x, &t1) // x^9 + t0.Multiply(&t0, &t1) // x^11 + t0.Square(&t0) // x^22 + t0.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // x^31 + t1.Square(&t0) // x^62 + for i := 1; i < 5; i++ { // x^992 + t1.Square(&t1) + } + t0.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // x^1023 -> 1023 = 2^10 - 1 + t1.Square(&t0) // 2^11 - 2 + for i := 1; i < 10; i++ { // 2^20 - 2^10 + t1.Square(&t1) + } + t1.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // 2^20 - 1 + t2.Square(&t1) // 2^21 - 2 + for i := 1; i < 20; i++ { // 2^40 - 2^20 + t2.Square(&t2) + } + t1.Multiply(&t2, &t1) // 2^40 - 1 + t1.Square(&t1) // 2^41 - 2 + for i := 1; i < 10; i++ { // 2^50 - 2^10 + t1.Square(&t1) + } + t0.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // 2^50 - 1 + t1.Square(&t0) // 2^51 - 2 + for i := 1; i < 50; i++ { // 2^100 - 2^50 + t1.Square(&t1) + } + t1.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // 2^100 - 1 + t2.Square(&t1) // 2^101 - 2 + for i := 1; i < 100; i++ { // 2^200 - 2^100 + t2.Square(&t2) + } + t1.Multiply(&t2, &t1) // 2^200 - 1 + t1.Square(&t1) // 2^201 - 2 + for i := 1; i < 50; i++ { // 2^250 - 2^50 + t1.Square(&t1) + } + t0.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // 2^250 - 1 + t0.Square(&t0) // 2^251 - 2 + t0.Square(&t0) // 2^252 - 4 + return v.Multiply(&t0, x) // 2^252 - 3 -> x^(2^252-3) +} + +// sqrtM1 is 2^((p-1)/4), which squared is equal to -1 by Euler's Criterion. +var sqrtM1 = &Element{1718705420411056, 234908883556509, + 2233514472574048, 2117202627021982, 765476049583133} + +// SqrtRatio sets r to the non-negative square root of the ratio of u and v. +// +// If u/v is square, SqrtRatio returns r and 1. If u/v is not square, SqrtRatio +// sets r according to Section 4.3 of draft-irtf-cfrg-ristretto255-decaf448-00, +// and returns r and 0. +func (r *Element) SqrtRatio(u, v *Element) (rr *Element, wasSquare int) { + var a, b Element + + // r = (u * v3) * (u * v7)^((p-5)/8) + v2 := a.Square(v) + uv3 := b.Multiply(u, b.Multiply(v2, v)) + uv7 := a.Multiply(uv3, a.Square(v2)) + r.Multiply(uv3, r.Pow22523(uv7)) + + check := a.Multiply(v, a.Square(r)) // check = v * r^2 + + uNeg := b.Negate(u) + correctSignSqrt := check.Equal(u) + flippedSignSqrt := check.Equal(uNeg) + flippedSignSqrtI := check.Equal(uNeg.Multiply(uNeg, sqrtM1)) + + rPrime := b.Multiply(r, sqrtM1) // r_prime = SQRT_M1 * r + // r = CT_SELECT(r_prime IF flipped_sign_sqrt | flipped_sign_sqrt_i ELSE r) + r.Select(rPrime, r, flippedSignSqrt|flippedSignSqrtI) + + r.Absolute(r) // Choose the nonnegative square root. + return r, correctSignSqrt | flippedSignSqrt +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..edcf163c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.go @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// Code generated by command: go run fe_amd64_asm.go -out ../fe_amd64.s -stubs ../fe_amd64.go -pkg field. DO NOT EDIT. + +//go:build amd64 && gc && !purego +// +build amd64,gc,!purego + +package field + +// feMul sets out = a * b. It works like feMulGeneric. +// +//go:noescape +func feMul(out *Element, a *Element, b *Element) + +// feSquare sets out = a * a. It works like feSquareGeneric. +// +//go:noescape +func feSquare(out *Element, a *Element) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..293f013c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.s @@ -0,0 +1,379 @@ +// Code generated by command: go run fe_amd64_asm.go -out ../fe_amd64.s -stubs ../fe_amd64.go -pkg field. DO NOT EDIT. + +//go:build amd64 && gc && !purego +// +build amd64,gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +// func feMul(out *Element, a *Element, b *Element) +TEXT ·feMul(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-24 + MOVQ a+8(FP), CX + MOVQ b+16(FP), BX + + // r0 = a0×b0 + MOVQ (CX), AX + MULQ (BX) + MOVQ AX, DI + MOVQ DX, SI + + // r0 += 19×a1×b4 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 32(BX) + ADDQ AX, DI + ADCQ DX, SI + + // r0 += 19×a2×b3 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 24(BX) + ADDQ AX, DI + ADCQ DX, SI + + // r0 += 19×a3×b2 + MOVQ 24(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 16(BX) + ADDQ AX, DI + ADCQ DX, SI + + // r0 += 19×a4×b1 + MOVQ 32(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 8(BX) + ADDQ AX, DI + ADCQ DX, SI + + // r1 = a0×b1 + MOVQ (CX), AX + MULQ 8(BX) + MOVQ AX, R9 + MOVQ DX, R8 + + // r1 += a1×b0 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + MULQ (BX) + ADDQ AX, R9 + ADCQ DX, R8 + + // r1 += 19×a2×b4 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 32(BX) + ADDQ AX, R9 + ADCQ DX, R8 + + // r1 += 19×a3×b3 + MOVQ 24(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 24(BX) + ADDQ AX, R9 + ADCQ DX, R8 + + // r1 += 19×a4×b2 + MOVQ 32(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 16(BX) + ADDQ AX, R9 + ADCQ DX, R8 + + // r2 = a0×b2 + MOVQ (CX), AX + MULQ 16(BX) + MOVQ AX, R11 + MOVQ DX, R10 + + // r2 += a1×b1 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + MULQ 8(BX) + ADDQ AX, R11 + ADCQ DX, R10 + + // r2 += a2×b0 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + MULQ (BX) + ADDQ AX, R11 + ADCQ DX, R10 + + // r2 += 19×a3×b4 + MOVQ 24(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 32(BX) + ADDQ AX, R11 + ADCQ DX, R10 + + // r2 += 19×a4×b3 + MOVQ 32(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 24(BX) + ADDQ AX, R11 + ADCQ DX, R10 + + // r3 = a0×b3 + MOVQ (CX), AX + MULQ 24(BX) + MOVQ AX, R13 + MOVQ DX, R12 + + // r3 += a1×b2 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + MULQ 16(BX) + ADDQ AX, R13 + ADCQ DX, R12 + + // r3 += a2×b1 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + MULQ 8(BX) + ADDQ AX, R13 + ADCQ DX, R12 + + // r3 += a3×b0 + MOVQ 24(CX), AX + MULQ (BX) + ADDQ AX, R13 + ADCQ DX, R12 + + // r3 += 19×a4×b4 + MOVQ 32(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 32(BX) + ADDQ AX, R13 + ADCQ DX, R12 + + // r4 = a0×b4 + MOVQ (CX), AX + MULQ 32(BX) + MOVQ AX, R15 + MOVQ DX, R14 + + // r4 += a1×b3 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + MULQ 24(BX) + ADDQ AX, R15 + ADCQ DX, R14 + + // r4 += a2×b2 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + MULQ 16(BX) + ADDQ AX, R15 + ADCQ DX, R14 + + // r4 += a3×b1 + MOVQ 24(CX), AX + MULQ 8(BX) + ADDQ AX, R15 + ADCQ DX, R14 + + // r4 += a4×b0 + MOVQ 32(CX), AX + MULQ (BX) + ADDQ AX, R15 + ADCQ DX, R14 + + // First reduction chain + MOVQ $0x0007ffffffffffff, AX + SHLQ $0x0d, DI, SI + SHLQ $0x0d, R9, R8 + SHLQ $0x0d, R11, R10 + SHLQ $0x0d, R13, R12 + SHLQ $0x0d, R15, R14 + ANDQ AX, DI + IMUL3Q $0x13, R14, R14 + ADDQ R14, DI + ANDQ AX, R9 + ADDQ SI, R9 + ANDQ AX, R11 + ADDQ R8, R11 + ANDQ AX, R13 + ADDQ R10, R13 + ANDQ AX, R15 + ADDQ R12, R15 + + // Second reduction chain (carryPropagate) + MOVQ DI, SI + SHRQ $0x33, SI + MOVQ R9, R8 + SHRQ $0x33, R8 + MOVQ R11, R10 + SHRQ $0x33, R10 + MOVQ R13, R12 + SHRQ $0x33, R12 + MOVQ R15, R14 + SHRQ $0x33, R14 + ANDQ AX, DI + IMUL3Q $0x13, R14, R14 + ADDQ R14, DI + ANDQ AX, R9 + ADDQ SI, R9 + ANDQ AX, R11 + ADDQ R8, R11 + ANDQ AX, R13 + ADDQ R10, R13 + ANDQ AX, R15 + ADDQ R12, R15 + + // Store output + MOVQ out+0(FP), AX + MOVQ DI, (AX) + MOVQ R9, 8(AX) + MOVQ R11, 16(AX) + MOVQ R13, 24(AX) + MOVQ R15, 32(AX) + RET + +// func feSquare(out *Element, a *Element) +TEXT ·feSquare(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-16 + MOVQ a+8(FP), CX + + // r0 = l0×l0 + MOVQ (CX), AX + MULQ (CX) + MOVQ AX, SI + MOVQ DX, BX + + // r0 += 38×l1×l4 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x26, AX, AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX, SI + ADCQ DX, BX + + // r0 += 38×l2×l3 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x26, AX, AX + MULQ 24(CX) + ADDQ AX, SI + ADCQ DX, BX + + // r1 = 2×l0×l1 + MOVQ (CX), AX + SHLQ $0x01, AX + MULQ 8(CX) + MOVQ AX, R8 + MOVQ DX, DI + + // r1 += 38×l2×l4 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x26, AX, AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX, R8 + ADCQ DX, DI + + // r1 += 19×l3×l3 + MOVQ 24(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 24(CX) + ADDQ AX, R8 + ADCQ DX, DI + + // r2 = 2×l0×l2 + MOVQ (CX), AX + SHLQ $0x01, AX + MULQ 16(CX) + MOVQ AX, R10 + MOVQ DX, R9 + + // r2 += l1×l1 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + MULQ 8(CX) + ADDQ AX, R10 + ADCQ DX, R9 + + // r2 += 38×l3×l4 + MOVQ 24(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x26, AX, AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX, R10 + ADCQ DX, R9 + + // r3 = 2×l0×l3 + MOVQ (CX), AX + SHLQ $0x01, AX + MULQ 24(CX) + MOVQ AX, R12 + MOVQ DX, R11 + + // r3 += 2×l1×l2 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x02, AX, AX + MULQ 16(CX) + ADDQ AX, R12 + ADCQ DX, R11 + + // r3 += 19×l4×l4 + MOVQ 32(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX, R12 + ADCQ DX, R11 + + // r4 = 2×l0×l4 + MOVQ (CX), AX + SHLQ $0x01, AX + MULQ 32(CX) + MOVQ AX, R14 + MOVQ DX, R13 + + // r4 += 2×l1×l3 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x02, AX, AX + MULQ 24(CX) + ADDQ AX, R14 + ADCQ DX, R13 + + // r4 += l2×l2 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + MULQ 16(CX) + ADDQ AX, R14 + ADCQ DX, R13 + + // First reduction chain + MOVQ $0x0007ffffffffffff, AX + SHLQ $0x0d, SI, BX + SHLQ $0x0d, R8, DI + SHLQ $0x0d, R10, R9 + SHLQ $0x0d, R12, R11 + SHLQ $0x0d, R14, R13 + ANDQ AX, SI + IMUL3Q $0x13, R13, R13 + ADDQ R13, SI + ANDQ AX, R8 + ADDQ BX, R8 + ANDQ AX, R10 + ADDQ DI, R10 + ANDQ AX, R12 + ADDQ R9, R12 + ANDQ AX, R14 + ADDQ R11, R14 + + // Second reduction chain (carryPropagate) + MOVQ SI, BX + SHRQ $0x33, BX + MOVQ R8, DI + SHRQ $0x33, DI + MOVQ R10, R9 + SHRQ $0x33, R9 + MOVQ R12, R11 + SHRQ $0x33, R11 + MOVQ R14, R13 + SHRQ $0x33, R13 + ANDQ AX, SI + IMUL3Q $0x13, R13, R13 + ADDQ R13, SI + ANDQ AX, R8 + ADDQ BX, R8 + ANDQ AX, R10 + ADDQ DI, R10 + ANDQ AX, R12 + ADDQ R9, R12 + ANDQ AX, R14 + ADDQ R11, R14 + + // Store output + MOVQ out+0(FP), AX + MOVQ SI, (AX) + MOVQ R8, 8(AX) + MOVQ R10, 16(AX) + MOVQ R12, 24(AX) + MOVQ R14, 32(AX) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ddb6c9b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !amd64 || !gc || purego +// +build !amd64 !gc purego + +package field + +func feMul(v, x, y *Element) { feMulGeneric(v, x, y) } + +func feSquare(v, x *Element) { feSquareGeneric(v, x) } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..af459ef5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build arm64 && gc && !purego +// +build arm64,gc,!purego + +package field + +//go:noescape +func carryPropagate(v *Element) + +func (v *Element) carryPropagate() *Element { + carryPropagate(v) + return v +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5c91e458 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.s @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build arm64 && gc && !purego +// +build arm64,gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +// carryPropagate works exactly like carryPropagateGeneric and uses the +// same AND, ADD, and LSR+MADD instructions emitted by the compiler, but +// avoids loading R0-R4 twice and uses LDP and STP. +// +// See https://golang.org/issues/43145 for the main compiler issue. +// +// func carryPropagate(v *Element) +TEXT ·carryPropagate(SB),NOFRAME|NOSPLIT,$0-8 + MOVD v+0(FP), R20 + + LDP 0(R20), (R0, R1) + LDP 16(R20), (R2, R3) + MOVD 32(R20), R4 + + AND $0x7ffffffffffff, R0, R10 + AND $0x7ffffffffffff, R1, R11 + AND $0x7ffffffffffff, R2, R12 + AND $0x7ffffffffffff, R3, R13 + AND $0x7ffffffffffff, R4, R14 + + ADD R0>>51, R11, R11 + ADD R1>>51, R12, R12 + ADD R2>>51, R13, R13 + ADD R3>>51, R14, R14 + // R4>>51 * 19 + R10 -> R10 + LSR $51, R4, R21 + MOVD $19, R22 + MADD R22, R10, R21, R10 + + STP (R10, R11), 0(R20) + STP (R12, R13), 16(R20) + MOVD R14, 32(R20) + + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..234a5b2e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2021 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !arm64 || !gc || purego +// +build !arm64 !gc purego + +package field + +func (v *Element) carryPropagate() *Element { + return v.carryPropagateGeneric() +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2671217d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package field + +import "math/bits" + +// uint128 holds a 128-bit number as two 64-bit limbs, for use with the +// bits.Mul64 and bits.Add64 intrinsics. +type uint128 struct { + lo, hi uint64 +} + +// mul64 returns a * b. +func mul64(a, b uint64) uint128 { + hi, lo := bits.Mul64(a, b) + return uint128{lo, hi} +} + +// addMul64 returns v + a * b. +func addMul64(v uint128, a, b uint64) uint128 { + hi, lo := bits.Mul64(a, b) + lo, c := bits.Add64(lo, v.lo, 0) + hi, _ = bits.Add64(hi, v.hi, c) + return uint128{lo, hi} +} + +// shiftRightBy51 returns a >> 51. a is assumed to be at most 115 bits. +func shiftRightBy51(a uint128) uint64 { + return (a.hi << (64 - 51)) | (a.lo >> 51) +} + +func feMulGeneric(v, a, b *Element) { + a0 := a.l0 + a1 := a.l1 + a2 := a.l2 + a3 := a.l3 + a4 := a.l4 + + b0 := b.l0 + b1 := b.l1 + b2 := b.l2 + b3 := b.l3 + b4 := b.l4 + + // Limb multiplication works like pen-and-paper columnar multiplication, but + // with 51-bit limbs instead of digits. + // + // a4 a3 a2 a1 a0 x + // b4 b3 b2 b1 b0 = + // ------------------------ + // a4b0 a3b0 a2b0 a1b0 a0b0 + + // a4b1 a3b1 a2b1 a1b1 a0b1 + + // a4b2 a3b2 a2b2 a1b2 a0b2 + + // a4b3 a3b3 a2b3 a1b3 a0b3 + + // a4b4 a3b4 a2b4 a1b4 a0b4 = + // ---------------------------------------------- + // r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 r2 r1 r0 + // + // We can then use the reduction identity (a * 2²⁵⁵ + b = a * 19 + b) to + // reduce the limbs that would overflow 255 bits. r5 * 2²⁵⁵ becomes 19 * r5, + // r6 * 2³⁰⁶ becomes 19 * r6 * 2⁵¹, etc. + // + // Reduction can be carried out simultaneously to multiplication. For + // example, we do not compute r5: whenever the result of a multiplication + // belongs to r5, like a1b4, we multiply it by 19 and add the result to r0. + // + // a4b0 a3b0 a2b0 a1b0 a0b0 + + // a3b1 a2b1 a1b1 a0b1 19×a4b1 + + // a2b2 a1b2 a0b2 19×a4b2 19×a3b2 + + // a1b3 a0b3 19×a4b3 19×a3b3 19×a2b3 + + // a0b4 19×a4b4 19×a3b4 19×a2b4 19×a1b4 = + // -------------------------------------- + // r4 r3 r2 r1 r0 + // + // Finally we add up the columns into wide, overlapping limbs. + + a1_19 := a1 * 19 + a2_19 := a2 * 19 + a3_19 := a3 * 19 + a4_19 := a4 * 19 + + // r0 = a0×b0 + 19×(a1×b4 + a2×b3 + a3×b2 + a4×b1) + r0 := mul64(a0, b0) + r0 = addMul64(r0, a1_19, b4) + r0 = addMul64(r0, a2_19, b3) + r0 = addMul64(r0, a3_19, b2) + r0 = addMul64(r0, a4_19, b1) + + // r1 = a0×b1 + a1×b0 + 19×(a2×b4 + a3×b3 + a4×b2) + r1 := mul64(a0, b1) + r1 = addMul64(r1, a1, b0) + r1 = addMul64(r1, a2_19, b4) + r1 = addMul64(r1, a3_19, b3) + r1 = addMul64(r1, a4_19, b2) + + // r2 = a0×b2 + a1×b1 + a2×b0 + 19×(a3×b4 + a4×b3) + r2 := mul64(a0, b2) + r2 = addMul64(r2, a1, b1) + r2 = addMul64(r2, a2, b0) + r2 = addMul64(r2, a3_19, b4) + r2 = addMul64(r2, a4_19, b3) + + // r3 = a0×b3 + a1×b2 + a2×b1 + a3×b0 + 19×a4×b4 + r3 := mul64(a0, b3) + r3 = addMul64(r3, a1, b2) + r3 = addMul64(r3, a2, b1) + r3 = addMul64(r3, a3, b0) + r3 = addMul64(r3, a4_19, b4) + + // r4 = a0×b4 + a1×b3 + a2×b2 + a3×b1 + a4×b0 + r4 := mul64(a0, b4) + r4 = addMul64(r4, a1, b3) + r4 = addMul64(r4, a2, b2) + r4 = addMul64(r4, a3, b1) + r4 = addMul64(r4, a4, b0) + + // After the multiplication, we need to reduce (carry) the five coefficients + // to obtain a result with limbs that are at most slightly larger than 2⁵¹, + // to respect the Element invariant. + // + // Overall, the reduction works the same as carryPropagate, except with + // wider inputs: we take the carry for each coefficient by shifting it right + // by 51, and add it to the limb above it. The top carry is multiplied by 19 + // according to the reduction identity and added to the lowest limb. + // + // The largest coefficient (r0) will be at most 111 bits, which guarantees + // that all carries are at most 111 - 51 = 60 bits, which fits in a uint64. + // + // r0 = a0×b0 + 19×(a1×b4 + a2×b3 + a3×b2 + a4×b1) + // r0 < 2⁵²×2⁵² + 19×(2⁵²×2⁵² + 2⁵²×2⁵² + 2⁵²×2⁵² + 2⁵²×2⁵²) + // r0 < (1 + 19 × 4) × 2⁵² × 2⁵² + // r0 < 2⁷ × 2⁵² × 2⁵² + // r0 < 2¹¹¹ + // + // Moreover, the top coefficient (r4) is at most 107 bits, so c4 is at most + // 56 bits, and c4 * 19 is at most 61 bits, which again fits in a uint64 and + // allows us to easily apply the reduction identity. + // + // r4 = a0×b4 + a1×b3 + a2×b2 + a3×b1 + a4×b0 + // r4 < 5 × 2⁵² × 2⁵² + // r4 < 2¹⁰⁷ + // + + c0 := shiftRightBy51(r0) + c1 := shiftRightBy51(r1) + c2 := shiftRightBy51(r2) + c3 := shiftRightBy51(r3) + c4 := shiftRightBy51(r4) + + rr0 := r0.lo&maskLow51Bits + c4*19 + rr1 := r1.lo&maskLow51Bits + c0 + rr2 := r2.lo&maskLow51Bits + c1 + rr3 := r3.lo&maskLow51Bits + c2 + rr4 := r4.lo&maskLow51Bits + c3 + + // Now all coefficients fit into 64-bit registers but are still too large to + // be passed around as a Element. We therefore do one last carry chain, + // where the carries will be small enough to fit in the wiggle room above 2⁵¹. + *v = Element{rr0, rr1, rr2, rr3, rr4} + v.carryPropagate() +} + +func feSquareGeneric(v, a *Element) { + l0 := a.l0 + l1 := a.l1 + l2 := a.l2 + l3 := a.l3 + l4 := a.l4 + + // Squaring works precisely like multiplication above, but thanks to its + // symmetry we get to group a few terms together. + // + // l4 l3 l2 l1 l0 x + // l4 l3 l2 l1 l0 = + // ------------------------ + // l4l0 l3l0 l2l0 l1l0 l0l0 + + // l4l1 l3l1 l2l1 l1l1 l0l1 + + // l4l2 l3l2 l2l2 l1l2 l0l2 + + // l4l3 l3l3 l2l3 l1l3 l0l3 + + // l4l4 l3l4 l2l4 l1l4 l0l4 = + // ---------------------------------------------- + // r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 r2 r1 r0 + // + // l4l0 l3l0 l2l0 l1l0 l0l0 + + // l3l1 l2l1 l1l1 l0l1 19×l4l1 + + // l2l2 l1l2 l0l2 19×l4l2 19×l3l2 + + // l1l3 l0l3 19×l4l3 19×l3l3 19×l2l3 + + // l0l4 19×l4l4 19×l3l4 19×l2l4 19×l1l4 = + // -------------------------------------- + // r4 r3 r2 r1 r0 + // + // With precomputed 2×, 19×, and 2×19× terms, we can compute each limb with + // only three Mul64 and four Add64, instead of five and eight. + + l0_2 := l0 * 2 + l1_2 := l1 * 2 + + l1_38 := l1 * 38 + l2_38 := l2 * 38 + l3_38 := l3 * 38 + + l3_19 := l3 * 19 + l4_19 := l4 * 19 + + // r0 = l0×l0 + 19×(l1×l4 + l2×l3 + l3×l2 + l4×l1) = l0×l0 + 19×2×(l1×l4 + l2×l3) + r0 := mul64(l0, l0) + r0 = addMul64(r0, l1_38, l4) + r0 = addMul64(r0, l2_38, l3) + + // r1 = l0×l1 + l1×l0 + 19×(l2×l4 + l3×l3 + l4×l2) = 2×l0×l1 + 19×2×l2×l4 + 19×l3×l3 + r1 := mul64(l0_2, l1) + r1 = addMul64(r1, l2_38, l4) + r1 = addMul64(r1, l3_19, l3) + + // r2 = l0×l2 + l1×l1 + l2×l0 + 19×(l3×l4 + l4×l3) = 2×l0×l2 + l1×l1 + 19×2×l3×l4 + r2 := mul64(l0_2, l2) + r2 = addMul64(r2, l1, l1) + r2 = addMul64(r2, l3_38, l4) + + // r3 = l0×l3 + l1×l2 + l2×l1 + l3×l0 + 19×l4×l4 = 2×l0×l3 + 2×l1×l2 + 19×l4×l4 + r3 := mul64(l0_2, l3) + r3 = addMul64(r3, l1_2, l2) + r3 = addMul64(r3, l4_19, l4) + + // r4 = l0×l4 + l1×l3 + l2×l2 + l3×l1 + l4×l0 = 2×l0×l4 + 2×l1×l3 + l2×l2 + r4 := mul64(l0_2, l4) + r4 = addMul64(r4, l1_2, l3) + r4 = addMul64(r4, l2, l2) + + c0 := shiftRightBy51(r0) + c1 := shiftRightBy51(r1) + c2 := shiftRightBy51(r2) + c3 := shiftRightBy51(r3) + c4 := shiftRightBy51(r4) + + rr0 := r0.lo&maskLow51Bits + c4*19 + rr1 := r1.lo&maskLow51Bits + c0 + rr2 := r2.lo&maskLow51Bits + c1 + rr3 := r3.lo&maskLow51Bits + c2 + rr4 := r4.lo&maskLow51Bits + c3 + + *v = Element{rr0, rr1, rr2, rr3, rr4} + v.carryPropagate() +} + +// carryPropagateGeneric brings the limbs below 52 bits by applying the reduction +// identity (a * 2²⁵⁵ + b = a * 19 + b) to the l4 carry. TODO inline +func (v *Element) carryPropagateGeneric() *Element { + c0 := v.l0 >> 51 + c1 := v.l1 >> 51 + c2 := v.l2 >> 51 + c3 := v.l3 >> 51 + c4 := v.l4 >> 51 + + v.l0 = v.l0&maskLow51Bits + c4*19 + v.l1 = v.l1&maskLow51Bits + c0 + v.l2 = v.l2&maskLow51Bits + c1 + v.l3 = v.l3&maskLow51Bits + c2 + v.l4 = v.l4&maskLow51Bits + c3 + + return v +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/sync.checkpoint b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/sync.checkpoint new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e3685f95 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/sync.checkpoint @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +b0c49ae9f59d233526f8934262c5bbbe14d4358d diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/sync.sh b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/sync.sh new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1ba22a8b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/sync.sh @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +#! /bin/bash +set -euo pipefail + +cd "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)" + +STD_PATH=src/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519/field +LOCAL_PATH=curve25519/internal/field +LAST_SYNC_REF=$(cat $LOCAL_PATH/sync.checkpoint) + +git fetch https://go.googlesource.com/go master + +if git diff --quiet $LAST_SYNC_REF:$STD_PATH FETCH_HEAD:$STD_PATH; then + echo "No changes." +else + NEW_REF=$(git rev-parse FETCH_HEAD | tee $LOCAL_PATH/sync.checkpoint) + echo "Applying changes from $LAST_SYNC_REF to $NEW_REF..." + git diff $LAST_SYNC_REF:$STD_PATH FETCH_HEAD:$STD_PATH | \ + git apply -3 --directory=$LOCAL_PATH +fi diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..69c17f82 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias.go @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !purego +// +build !purego + +// Package alias implements memory aliasing tests. +package alias + +import "unsafe" + +// AnyOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any (not necessarily +// corresponding) index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. +func AnyOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + return len(x) > 0 && len(y) > 0 && + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&x[0])) <= uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&y[len(y)-1])) && + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&y[0])) <= uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&x[len(x)-1])) +} + +// InexactOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any non-corresponding +// index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. Note that x and y can +// have different lengths and still not have any inexact overlap. +// +// InexactOverlap can be used to implement the requirements of the crypto/cipher +// AEAD, Block, BlockMode and Stream interfaces. +func InexactOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + if len(x) == 0 || len(y) == 0 || &x[0] == &y[0] { + return false + } + return AnyOverlap(x, y) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias_purego.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias_purego.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4775b0a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias_purego.go @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build purego +// +build purego + +// Package alias implements memory aliasing tests. +package alias + +// This is the Google App Engine standard variant based on reflect +// because the unsafe package and cgo are disallowed. + +import "reflect" + +// AnyOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any (not necessarily +// corresponding) index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. +func AnyOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + return len(x) > 0 && len(y) > 0 && + reflect.ValueOf(&x[0]).Pointer() <= reflect.ValueOf(&y[len(y)-1]).Pointer() && + reflect.ValueOf(&y[0]).Pointer() <= reflect.ValueOf(&x[len(x)-1]).Pointer() +} + +// InexactOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any non-corresponding +// index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. Note that x and y can +// have different lengths and still not have any inexact overlap. +// +// InexactOverlap can be used to implement the requirements of the crypto/cipher +// AEAD, Block, BlockMode and Stream interfaces. +func InexactOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + if len(x) == 0 || len(y) == 0 || &x[0] == &y[0] { + return false + } + return AnyOverlap(x, y) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_compat.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_compat.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..45b5c966 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_compat.go @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !go1.13 +// +build !go1.13 + +package poly1305 + +// Generic fallbacks for the math/bits intrinsics, copied from +// src/math/bits/bits.go. They were added in Go 1.12, but Add64 and Sum64 had +// variable time fallbacks until Go 1.13. + +func bitsAdd64(x, y, carry uint64) (sum, carryOut uint64) { + sum = x + y + carry + carryOut = ((x & y) | ((x | y) &^ sum)) >> 63 + return +} + +func bitsSub64(x, y, borrow uint64) (diff, borrowOut uint64) { + diff = x - y - borrow + borrowOut = ((^x & y) | (^(x ^ y) & diff)) >> 63 + return +} + +func bitsMul64(x, y uint64) (hi, lo uint64) { + const mask32 = 1<<32 - 1 + x0 := x & mask32 + x1 := x >> 32 + y0 := y & mask32 + y1 := y >> 32 + w0 := x0 * y0 + t := x1*y0 + w0>>32 + w1 := t & mask32 + w2 := t >> 32 + w1 += x0 * y1 + hi = x1*y1 + w2 + w1>>32 + lo = x * y + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ed52b341 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build go1.13 +// +build go1.13 + +package poly1305 + +import "math/bits" + +func bitsAdd64(x, y, carry uint64) (sum, carryOut uint64) { + return bits.Add64(x, y, carry) +} + +func bitsSub64(x, y, borrow uint64) (diff, borrowOut uint64) { + return bits.Sub64(x, y, borrow) +} + +func bitsMul64(x, y uint64) (hi, lo uint64) { + return bits.Mul64(x, y) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/mac_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/mac_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f184b67d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/mac_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (!amd64 && !ppc64le && !s390x) || !gc || purego +// +build !amd64,!ppc64le,!s390x !gc purego + +package poly1305 + +type mac struct{ macGeneric } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/poly1305.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/poly1305.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4aaea810 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/poly1305.go @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package poly1305 implements Poly1305 one-time message authentication code as +// specified in https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf. +// +// Poly1305 is a fast, one-time authentication function. It is infeasible for an +// attacker to generate an authenticator for a message without the key. However, a +// key must only be used for a single message. Authenticating two different +// messages with the same key allows an attacker to forge authenticators for other +// messages with the same key. +// +// Poly1305 was originally coupled with AES in order to make Poly1305-AES. AES was +// used with a fixed key in order to generate one-time keys from an nonce. +// However, in this package AES isn't used and the one-time key is specified +// directly. +package poly1305 + +import "crypto/subtle" + +// TagSize is the size, in bytes, of a poly1305 authenticator. +const TagSize = 16 + +// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the +// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same +// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. +func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { + h := New(key) + h.Write(m) + h.Sum(out[:0]) +} + +// Verify returns true if mac is a valid authenticator for m with the given key. +func Verify(mac *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) bool { + var tmp [16]byte + Sum(&tmp, m, key) + return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(tmp[:], mac[:]) == 1 +} + +// New returns a new MAC computing an authentication +// tag of all data written to it with the given key. +// This allows writing the message progressively instead +// of passing it as a single slice. Common users should use +// the Sum function instead. +// +// The key must be unique for each message, as authenticating +// two different messages with the same key allows an attacker +// to forge messages at will. +func New(key *[32]byte) *MAC { + m := &MAC{} + initialize(key, &m.macState) + return m +} + +// MAC is an io.Writer computing an authentication tag +// of the data written to it. +// +// MAC cannot be used like common hash.Hash implementations, +// because using a poly1305 key twice breaks its security. +// Therefore writing data to a running MAC after calling +// Sum or Verify causes it to panic. +type MAC struct { + mac // platform-dependent implementation + + finalized bool +} + +// Size returns the number of bytes Sum will return. +func (h *MAC) Size() int { return TagSize } + +// Write adds more data to the running message authentication code. +// It never returns an error. +// +// It must not be called after the first call of Sum or Verify. +func (h *MAC) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { + if h.finalized { + panic("poly1305: write to MAC after Sum or Verify") + } + return h.mac.Write(p) +} + +// Sum computes the authenticator of all data written to the +// message authentication code. +func (h *MAC) Sum(b []byte) []byte { + var mac [TagSize]byte + h.mac.Sum(&mac) + h.finalized = true + return append(b, mac[:]...) +} + +// Verify returns whether the authenticator of all data written to +// the message authentication code matches the expected value. +func (h *MAC) Verify(expected []byte) bool { + var mac [TagSize]byte + h.mac.Sum(&mac) + h.finalized = true + return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expected, mac[:]) == 1 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6d522333 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.go @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +package poly1305 + +//go:noescape +func update(state *macState, msg []byte) + +// mac is a wrapper for macGeneric that redirects calls that would have gone to +// updateGeneric to update. +// +// Its Write and Sum methods are otherwise identical to the macGeneric ones, but +// using function pointers would carry a major performance cost. +type mac struct{ macGeneric } + +func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) + if h.offset > 0 { + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < TagSize { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil + } + p = p[n:] + h.offset = 0 + update(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } + if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 { + update(&h.macState, p[:n]) + p = p[n:] + } + if len(p) > 0 { + h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + } + return nn, nil +} + +func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) { + state := h.macState + if h.offset > 0 { + update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset]) + } + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1d74f0f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.s @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +#define POLY1305_ADD(msg, h0, h1, h2) \ + ADDQ 0(msg), h0; \ + ADCQ 8(msg), h1; \ + ADCQ $1, h2; \ + LEAQ 16(msg), msg + +#define POLY1305_MUL(h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, t0, t1, t2, t3) \ + MOVQ r0, AX; \ + MULQ h0; \ + MOVQ AX, t0; \ + MOVQ DX, t1; \ + MOVQ r0, AX; \ + MULQ h1; \ + ADDQ AX, t1; \ + ADCQ $0, DX; \ + MOVQ r0, t2; \ + IMULQ h2, t2; \ + ADDQ DX, t2; \ + \ + MOVQ r1, AX; \ + MULQ h0; \ + ADDQ AX, t1; \ + ADCQ $0, DX; \ + MOVQ DX, h0; \ + MOVQ r1, t3; \ + IMULQ h2, t3; \ + MOVQ r1, AX; \ + MULQ h1; \ + ADDQ AX, t2; \ + ADCQ DX, t3; \ + ADDQ h0, t2; \ + ADCQ $0, t3; \ + \ + MOVQ t0, h0; \ + MOVQ t1, h1; \ + MOVQ t2, h2; \ + ANDQ $3, h2; \ + MOVQ t2, t0; \ + ANDQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC, t0; \ + ADDQ t0, h0; \ + ADCQ t3, h1; \ + ADCQ $0, h2; \ + SHRQ $2, t3, t2; \ + SHRQ $2, t3; \ + ADDQ t2, h0; \ + ADCQ t3, h1; \ + ADCQ $0, h2 + +// func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte) +TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32 + MOVQ state+0(FP), DI + MOVQ msg_base+8(FP), SI + MOVQ msg_len+16(FP), R15 + + MOVQ 0(DI), R8 // h0 + MOVQ 8(DI), R9 // h1 + MOVQ 16(DI), R10 // h2 + MOVQ 24(DI), R11 // r0 + MOVQ 32(DI), R12 // r1 + + CMPQ R15, $16 + JB bytes_between_0_and_15 + +loop: + POLY1305_ADD(SI, R8, R9, R10) + +multiply: + POLY1305_MUL(R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, BX, CX, R13, R14) + SUBQ $16, R15 + CMPQ R15, $16 + JAE loop + +bytes_between_0_and_15: + TESTQ R15, R15 + JZ done + MOVQ $1, BX + XORQ CX, CX + XORQ R13, R13 + ADDQ R15, SI + +flush_buffer: + SHLQ $8, BX, CX + SHLQ $8, BX + MOVB -1(SI), R13 + XORQ R13, BX + DECQ SI + DECQ R15 + JNZ flush_buffer + + ADDQ BX, R8 + ADCQ CX, R9 + ADCQ $0, R10 + MOVQ $16, R15 + JMP multiply + +done: + MOVQ R8, 0(DI) + MOVQ R9, 8(DI) + MOVQ R10, 16(DI) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e041da5e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,309 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// This file provides the generic implementation of Sum and MAC. Other files +// might provide optimized assembly implementations of some of this code. + +package poly1305 + +import "encoding/binary" + +// Poly1305 [RFC 7539] is a relatively simple algorithm: the authentication tag +// for a 64 bytes message is approximately +// +// s + m[0:16] * r⁴ + m[16:32] * r³ + m[32:48] * r² + m[48:64] * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5 +// +// for some secret r and s. It can be computed sequentially like +// +// for len(msg) > 0: +// h += read(msg, 16) +// h *= r +// h %= 2¹³⁰ - 5 +// return h + s +// +// All the complexity is about doing performant constant-time math on numbers +// larger than any available numeric type. + +func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) { + h := newMACGeneric(key) + h.Write(msg) + h.Sum(out) +} + +func newMACGeneric(key *[32]byte) macGeneric { + m := macGeneric{} + initialize(key, &m.macState) + return m +} + +// macState holds numbers in saturated 64-bit little-endian limbs. That is, +// the value of [x0, x1, x2] is x[0] + x[1] * 2⁶⁴ + x[2] * 2¹²⁸. +type macState struct { + // h is the main accumulator. It is to be interpreted modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5, but + // can grow larger during and after rounds. It must, however, remain below + // 2 * (2¹³⁰ - 5). + h [3]uint64 + // r and s are the private key components. + r [2]uint64 + s [2]uint64 +} + +type macGeneric struct { + macState + + buffer [TagSize]byte + offset int +} + +// Write splits the incoming message into TagSize chunks, and passes them to +// update. It buffers incomplete chunks. +func (h *macGeneric) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) + if h.offset > 0 { + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < TagSize { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil + } + p = p[n:] + h.offset = 0 + updateGeneric(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } + if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 { + updateGeneric(&h.macState, p[:n]) + p = p[n:] + } + if len(p) > 0 { + h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + } + return nn, nil +} + +// Sum flushes the last incomplete chunk from the buffer, if any, and generates +// the MAC output. It does not modify its state, in order to allow for multiple +// calls to Sum, even if no Write is allowed after Sum. +func (h *macGeneric) Sum(out *[TagSize]byte) { + state := h.macState + if h.offset > 0 { + updateGeneric(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset]) + } + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) +} + +// [rMask0, rMask1] is the specified Poly1305 clamping mask in little-endian. It +// clears some bits of the secret coefficient to make it possible to implement +// multiplication more efficiently. +const ( + rMask0 = 0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF + rMask1 = 0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC +) + +// initialize loads the 256-bit key into the two 128-bit secret values r and s. +func initialize(key *[32]byte, m *macState) { + m.r[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[0:8]) & rMask0 + m.r[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[8:16]) & rMask1 + m.s[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[16:24]) + m.s[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[24:32]) +} + +// uint128 holds a 128-bit number as two 64-bit limbs, for use with the +// bits.Mul64 and bits.Add64 intrinsics. +type uint128 struct { + lo, hi uint64 +} + +func mul64(a, b uint64) uint128 { + hi, lo := bitsMul64(a, b) + return uint128{lo, hi} +} + +func add128(a, b uint128) uint128 { + lo, c := bitsAdd64(a.lo, b.lo, 0) + hi, c := bitsAdd64(a.hi, b.hi, c) + if c != 0 { + panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow") + } + return uint128{lo, hi} +} + +func shiftRightBy2(a uint128) uint128 { + a.lo = a.lo>>2 | (a.hi&3)<<62 + a.hi = a.hi >> 2 + return a +} + +// updateGeneric absorbs msg into the state.h accumulator. For each chunk m of +// 128 bits of message, it computes +// +// h₊ = (h + m) * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5 +// +// If the msg length is not a multiple of TagSize, it assumes the last +// incomplete chunk is the final one. +func updateGeneric(state *macState, msg []byte) { + h0, h1, h2 := state.h[0], state.h[1], state.h[2] + r0, r1 := state.r[0], state.r[1] + + for len(msg) > 0 { + var c uint64 + + // For the first step, h + m, we use a chain of bits.Add64 intrinsics. + // The resulting value of h might exceed 2¹³⁰ - 5, but will be partially + // reduced at the end of the multiplication below. + // + // The spec requires us to set a bit just above the message size, not to + // hide leading zeroes. For full chunks, that's 1 << 128, so we can just + // add 1 to the most significant (2¹²⁸) limb, h2. + if len(msg) >= TagSize { + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(msg[0:8]), 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(msg[8:16]), c) + h2 += c + 1 + + msg = msg[TagSize:] + } else { + var buf [TagSize]byte + copy(buf[:], msg) + buf[len(msg)] = 1 + + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[0:8]), 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[8:16]), c) + h2 += c + + msg = nil + } + + // Multiplication of big number limbs is similar to elementary school + // columnar multiplication. Instead of digits, there are 64-bit limbs. + // + // We are multiplying a 3 limbs number, h, by a 2 limbs number, r. + // + // h2 h1 h0 x + // r1 r0 = + // ---------------- + // h2r0 h1r0 h0r0 <-- individual 128-bit products + // + h2r1 h1r1 h0r1 + // ------------------------ + // m3 m2 m1 m0 <-- result in 128-bit overlapping limbs + // ------------------------ + // m3.hi m2.hi m1.hi m0.hi <-- carry propagation + // + m3.lo m2.lo m1.lo m0.lo + // ------------------------------- + // t4 t3 t2 t1 t0 <-- final result in 64-bit limbs + // + // The main difference from pen-and-paper multiplication is that we do + // carry propagation in a separate step, as if we wrote two digit sums + // at first (the 128-bit limbs), and then carried the tens all at once. + + h0r0 := mul64(h0, r0) + h1r0 := mul64(h1, r0) + h2r0 := mul64(h2, r0) + h0r1 := mul64(h0, r1) + h1r1 := mul64(h1, r1) + h2r1 := mul64(h2, r1) + + // Since h2 is known to be at most 7 (5 + 1 + 1), and r0 and r1 have their + // top 4 bits cleared by rMask{0,1}, we know that their product is not going + // to overflow 64 bits, so we can ignore the high part of the products. + // + // This also means that the product doesn't have a fifth limb (t4). + if h2r0.hi != 0 { + panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow") + } + if h2r1.hi != 0 { + panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow") + } + + m0 := h0r0 + m1 := add128(h1r0, h0r1) // These two additions don't overflow thanks again + m2 := add128(h2r0, h1r1) // to the 4 masked bits at the top of r0 and r1. + m3 := h2r1 + + t0 := m0.lo + t1, c := bitsAdd64(m1.lo, m0.hi, 0) + t2, c := bitsAdd64(m2.lo, m1.hi, c) + t3, _ := bitsAdd64(m3.lo, m2.hi, c) + + // Now we have the result as 4 64-bit limbs, and we need to reduce it + // modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5. The special shape of this Crandall prime lets us do + // a cheap partial reduction according to the reduction identity + // + // c * 2¹³⁰ + n = c * 5 + n mod 2¹³⁰ - 5 + // + // because 2¹³⁰ = 5 mod 2¹³⁰ - 5. Partial reduction since the result is + // likely to be larger than 2¹³⁰ - 5, but still small enough to fit the + // assumptions we make about h in the rest of the code. + // + // See also https://speakerdeck.com/gtank/engineering-prime-numbers?slide=23 + + // We split the final result at the 2¹³⁰ mark into h and cc, the carry. + // Note that the carry bits are effectively shifted left by 2, in other + // words, cc = c * 4 for the c in the reduction identity. + h0, h1, h2 = t0, t1, t2&maskLow2Bits + cc := uint128{t2 & maskNotLow2Bits, t3} + + // To add c * 5 to h, we first add cc = c * 4, and then add (cc >> 2) = c. + + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, cc.lo, 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, cc.hi, c) + h2 += c + + cc = shiftRightBy2(cc) + + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, cc.lo, 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, cc.hi, c) + h2 += c + + // h2 is at most 3 + 1 + 1 = 5, making the whole of h at most + // + // 5 * 2¹²⁸ + (2¹²⁸ - 1) = 6 * 2¹²⁸ - 1 + } + + state.h[0], state.h[1], state.h[2] = h0, h1, h2 +} + +const ( + maskLow2Bits uint64 = 0x0000000000000003 + maskNotLow2Bits uint64 = ^maskLow2Bits +) + +// select64 returns x if v == 1 and y if v == 0, in constant time. +func select64(v, x, y uint64) uint64 { return ^(v-1)&x | (v-1)&y } + +// [p0, p1, p2] is 2¹³⁰ - 5 in little endian order. +const ( + p0 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFB + p1 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF + p2 = 0x0000000000000003 +) + +// finalize completes the modular reduction of h and computes +// +// out = h + s mod 2¹²⁸ +func finalize(out *[TagSize]byte, h *[3]uint64, s *[2]uint64) { + h0, h1, h2 := h[0], h[1], h[2] + + // After the partial reduction in updateGeneric, h might be more than + // 2¹³⁰ - 5, but will be less than 2 * (2¹³⁰ - 5). To complete the reduction + // in constant time, we compute t = h - (2¹³⁰ - 5), and select h as the + // result if the subtraction underflows, and t otherwise. + + hMinusP0, b := bitsSub64(h0, p0, 0) + hMinusP1, b := bitsSub64(h1, p1, b) + _, b = bitsSub64(h2, p2, b) + + // h = h if h < p else h - p + h0 = select64(b, h0, hMinusP0) + h1 = select64(b, h1, hMinusP1) + + // Finally, we compute the last Poly1305 step + // + // tag = h + s mod 2¹²⁸ + // + // by just doing a wide addition with the 128 low bits of h and discarding + // the overflow. + h0, c := bitsAdd64(h0, s[0], 0) + h1, _ = bitsAdd64(h1, s[1], c) + + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[0:8], h0) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[8:16], h1) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4a069941 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +package poly1305 + +//go:noescape +func update(state *macState, msg []byte) + +// mac is a wrapper for macGeneric that redirects calls that would have gone to +// updateGeneric to update. +// +// Its Write and Sum methods are otherwise identical to the macGeneric ones, but +// using function pointers would carry a major performance cost. +type mac struct{ macGeneric } + +func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) + if h.offset > 0 { + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < TagSize { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil + } + p = p[n:] + h.offset = 0 + update(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } + if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 { + update(&h.macState, p[:n]) + p = p[n:] + } + if len(p) > 0 { + h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + } + return nn, nil +} + +func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) { + state := h.macState + if h.offset > 0 { + update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset]) + } + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..58422aad --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +// This was ported from the amd64 implementation. + +#define POLY1305_ADD(msg, h0, h1, h2, t0, t1, t2) \ + MOVD (msg), t0; \ + MOVD 8(msg), t1; \ + MOVD $1, t2; \ + ADDC t0, h0, h0; \ + ADDE t1, h1, h1; \ + ADDE t2, h2; \ + ADD $16, msg + +#define POLY1305_MUL(h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5) \ + MULLD r0, h0, t0; \ + MULLD r0, h1, t4; \ + MULHDU r0, h0, t1; \ + MULHDU r0, h1, t5; \ + ADDC t4, t1, t1; \ + MULLD r0, h2, t2; \ + ADDZE t5; \ + MULHDU r1, h0, t4; \ + MULLD r1, h0, h0; \ + ADD t5, t2, t2; \ + ADDC h0, t1, t1; \ + MULLD h2, r1, t3; \ + ADDZE t4, h0; \ + MULHDU r1, h1, t5; \ + MULLD r1, h1, t4; \ + ADDC t4, t2, t2; \ + ADDE t5, t3, t3; \ + ADDC h0, t2, t2; \ + MOVD $-4, t4; \ + MOVD t0, h0; \ + MOVD t1, h1; \ + ADDZE t3; \ + ANDCC $3, t2, h2; \ + AND t2, t4, t0; \ + ADDC t0, h0, h0; \ + ADDE t3, h1, h1; \ + SLD $62, t3, t4; \ + SRD $2, t2; \ + ADDZE h2; \ + OR t4, t2, t2; \ + SRD $2, t3; \ + ADDC t2, h0, h0; \ + ADDE t3, h1, h1; \ + ADDZE h2 + +DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF +DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC +GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16 + +// func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte) +TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32 + MOVD state+0(FP), R3 + MOVD msg_base+8(FP), R4 + MOVD msg_len+16(FP), R5 + + MOVD 0(R3), R8 // h0 + MOVD 8(R3), R9 // h1 + MOVD 16(R3), R10 // h2 + MOVD 24(R3), R11 // r0 + MOVD 32(R3), R12 // r1 + + CMP R5, $16 + BLT bytes_between_0_and_15 + +loop: + POLY1305_ADD(R4, R8, R9, R10, R20, R21, R22) + +multiply: + POLY1305_MUL(R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R16, R17, R18, R14, R20, R21) + ADD $-16, R5 + CMP R5, $16 + BGE loop + +bytes_between_0_and_15: + CMP R5, $0 + BEQ done + MOVD $0, R16 // h0 + MOVD $0, R17 // h1 + +flush_buffer: + CMP R5, $8 + BLE just1 + + MOVD $8, R21 + SUB R21, R5, R21 + + // Greater than 8 -- load the rightmost remaining bytes in msg + // and put into R17 (h1) + MOVD (R4)(R21), R17 + MOVD $16, R22 + + // Find the offset to those bytes + SUB R5, R22, R22 + SLD $3, R22 + + // Shift to get only the bytes in msg + SRD R22, R17, R17 + + // Put 1 at high end + MOVD $1, R23 + SLD $3, R21 + SLD R21, R23, R23 + OR R23, R17, R17 + + // Remainder is 8 + MOVD $8, R5 + +just1: + CMP R5, $8 + BLT less8 + + // Exactly 8 + MOVD (R4), R16 + + CMP R17, $0 + + // Check if we've already set R17; if not + // set 1 to indicate end of msg. + BNE carry + MOVD $1, R17 + BR carry + +less8: + MOVD $0, R16 // h0 + MOVD $0, R22 // shift count + CMP R5, $4 + BLT less4 + MOVWZ (R4), R16 + ADD $4, R4 + ADD $-4, R5 + MOVD $32, R22 + +less4: + CMP R5, $2 + BLT less2 + MOVHZ (R4), R21 + SLD R22, R21, R21 + OR R16, R21, R16 + ADD $16, R22 + ADD $-2, R5 + ADD $2, R4 + +less2: + CMP R5, $0 + BEQ insert1 + MOVBZ (R4), R21 + SLD R22, R21, R21 + OR R16, R21, R16 + ADD $8, R22 + +insert1: + // Insert 1 at end of msg + MOVD $1, R21 + SLD R22, R21, R21 + OR R16, R21, R16 + +carry: + // Add new values to h0, h1, h2 + ADDC R16, R8 + ADDE R17, R9 + ADDZE R10, R10 + MOVD $16, R5 + ADD R5, R4 + BR multiply + +done: + // Save h0, h1, h2 in state + MOVD R8, 0(R3) + MOVD R9, 8(R3) + MOVD R10, 16(R3) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ec959668 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +package poly1305 + +import ( + "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" +) + +// updateVX is an assembly implementation of Poly1305 that uses vector +// instructions. It must only be called if the vector facility (vx) is +// available. +// +//go:noescape +func updateVX(state *macState, msg []byte) + +// mac is a replacement for macGeneric that uses a larger buffer and redirects +// calls that would have gone to updateGeneric to updateVX if the vector +// facility is installed. +// +// A larger buffer is required for good performance because the vector +// implementation has a higher fixed cost per call than the generic +// implementation. +type mac struct { + macState + + buffer [16 * TagSize]byte // size must be a multiple of block size (16) + offset int +} + +func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) + if h.offset > 0 { + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < len(h.buffer) { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil + } + p = p[n:] + h.offset = 0 + if cpu.S390X.HasVX { + updateVX(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } else { + updateGeneric(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } + } + + tail := len(p) % len(h.buffer) // number of bytes to copy into buffer + body := len(p) - tail // number of bytes to process now + if body > 0 { + if cpu.S390X.HasVX { + updateVX(&h.macState, p[:body]) + } else { + updateGeneric(&h.macState, p[:body]) + } + } + h.offset = copy(h.buffer[:], p[body:]) // copy tail bytes - can be 0 + return nn, nil +} + +func (h *mac) Sum(out *[TagSize]byte) { + state := h.macState + remainder := h.buffer[:h.offset] + + // Use the generic implementation if we have 2 or fewer blocks left + // to sum. The vector implementation has a higher startup time. + if cpu.S390X.HasVX && len(remainder) > 2*TagSize { + updateVX(&state, remainder) + } else if len(remainder) > 0 { + updateGeneric(&state, remainder) + } + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aa9e0494 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,504 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +// This implementation of Poly1305 uses the vector facility (vx) +// to process up to 2 blocks (32 bytes) per iteration using an +// algorithm based on the one described in: +// +// NEON crypto, Daniel J. Bernstein & Peter Schwabe +// https://cryptojedi.org/papers/neoncrypto-20120320.pdf +// +// This algorithm uses 5 26-bit limbs to represent a 130-bit +// value. These limbs are, for the most part, zero extended and +// placed into 64-bit vector register elements. Each vector +// register is 128-bits wide and so holds 2 of these elements. +// Using 26-bit limbs allows us plenty of headroom to accommodate +// accumulations before and after multiplication without +// overflowing either 32-bits (before multiplication) or 64-bits +// (after multiplication). +// +// In order to parallelise the operations required to calculate +// the sum we use two separate accumulators and then sum those +// in an extra final step. For compatibility with the generic +// implementation we perform this summation at the end of every +// updateVX call. +// +// To use two accumulators we must multiply the message blocks +// by r² rather than r. Only the final message block should be +// multiplied by r. +// +// Example: +// +// We want to calculate the sum (h) for a 64 byte message (m): +// +// h = m[0:16]r⁴ + m[16:32]r³ + m[32:48]r² + m[48:64]r +// +// To do this we split the calculation into the even indices +// and odd indices of the message. These form our SIMD 'lanes': +// +// h = m[ 0:16]r⁴ + m[32:48]r² + <- lane 0 +// m[16:32]r³ + m[48:64]r <- lane 1 +// +// To calculate this iteratively we refactor so that both lanes +// are written in terms of r² and r: +// +// h = (m[ 0:16]r² + m[32:48])r² + <- lane 0 +// (m[16:32]r² + m[48:64])r <- lane 1 +// ^ ^ +// | coefficients for second iteration +// coefficients for first iteration +// +// So in this case we would have two iterations. In the first +// both lanes are multiplied by r². In the second only the +// first lane is multiplied by r² and the second lane is +// instead multiplied by r. This gives use the odd and even +// powers of r that we need from the original equation. +// +// Notation: +// +// h - accumulator +// r - key +// m - message +// +// [a, b] - SIMD register holding two 64-bit values +// [a, b, c, d] - SIMD register holding four 32-bit values +// xᵢ[n] - limb n of variable x with bit width i +// +// Limbs are expressed in little endian order, so for 26-bit +// limbs x₂₆[4] will be the most significant limb and x₂₆[0] +// will be the least significant limb. + +// masking constants +#define MOD24 V0 // [0x0000000000ffffff, 0x0000000000ffffff] - mask low 24-bits +#define MOD26 V1 // [0x0000000003ffffff, 0x0000000003ffffff] - mask low 26-bits + +// expansion constants (see EXPAND macro) +#define EX0 V2 +#define EX1 V3 +#define EX2 V4 + +// key (r², r or 1 depending on context) +#define R_0 V5 +#define R_1 V6 +#define R_2 V7 +#define R_3 V8 +#define R_4 V9 + +// precalculated coefficients (5r², 5r or 0 depending on context) +#define R5_1 V10 +#define R5_2 V11 +#define R5_3 V12 +#define R5_4 V13 + +// message block (m) +#define M_0 V14 +#define M_1 V15 +#define M_2 V16 +#define M_3 V17 +#define M_4 V18 + +// accumulator (h) +#define H_0 V19 +#define H_1 V20 +#define H_2 V21 +#define H_3 V22 +#define H_4 V23 + +// temporary registers (for short-lived values) +#define T_0 V24 +#define T_1 V25 +#define T_2 V26 +#define T_3 V27 +#define T_4 V28 + +GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA, $0x30 +// EX0 +DATA ·constants<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0006050403020100 +DATA ·constants<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x1016151413121110 +// EX1 +DATA ·constants<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x060c0b0a09080706 +DATA ·constants<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x161c1b1a19181716 +// EX2 +DATA ·constants<>+0x20(SB)/8, $0x0d0d0d0d0d0f0e0d +DATA ·constants<>+0x28(SB)/8, $0x1d1d1d1d1d1f1e1d + +// MULTIPLY multiplies each lane of f and g, partially reduced +// modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5. The result, h, consists of partial products +// in each lane that need to be reduced further to produce the +// final result. +// +// h₁₃₀ = (f₁₃₀g₁₃₀) % 2¹³⁰ + (5f₁₃₀g₁₃₀) / 2¹³⁰ +// +// Note that the multiplication by 5 of the high bits is +// achieved by precalculating the multiplication of four of the +// g coefficients by 5. These are g51-g54. +#define MULTIPLY(f0, f1, f2, f3, f4, g0, g1, g2, g3, g4, g51, g52, g53, g54, h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) \ + VMLOF f0, g0, h0 \ + VMLOF f0, g3, h3 \ + VMLOF f0, g1, h1 \ + VMLOF f0, g4, h4 \ + VMLOF f0, g2, h2 \ + VMLOF f1, g54, T_0 \ + VMLOF f1, g2, T_3 \ + VMLOF f1, g0, T_1 \ + VMLOF f1, g3, T_4 \ + VMLOF f1, g1, T_2 \ + VMALOF f2, g53, h0, h0 \ + VMALOF f2, g1, h3, h3 \ + VMALOF f2, g54, h1, h1 \ + VMALOF f2, g2, h4, h4 \ + VMALOF f2, g0, h2, h2 \ + VMALOF f3, g52, T_0, T_0 \ + VMALOF f3, g0, T_3, T_3 \ + VMALOF f3, g53, T_1, T_1 \ + VMALOF f3, g1, T_4, T_4 \ + VMALOF f3, g54, T_2, T_2 \ + VMALOF f4, g51, h0, h0 \ + VMALOF f4, g54, h3, h3 \ + VMALOF f4, g52, h1, h1 \ + VMALOF f4, g0, h4, h4 \ + VMALOF f4, g53, h2, h2 \ + VAG T_0, h0, h0 \ + VAG T_3, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_1, h1, h1 \ + VAG T_4, h4, h4 \ + VAG T_2, h2, h2 + +// REDUCE performs the following carry operations in four +// stages, as specified in Bernstein & Schwabe: +// +// 1: h₂₆[0]->h₂₆[1] h₂₆[3]->h₂₆[4] +// 2: h₂₆[1]->h₂₆[2] h₂₆[4]->h₂₆[0] +// 3: h₂₆[0]->h₂₆[1] h₂₆[2]->h₂₆[3] +// 4: h₂₆[3]->h₂₆[4] +// +// The result is that all of the limbs are limited to 26-bits +// except for h₂₆[1] and h₂₆[4] which are limited to 27-bits. +// +// Note that although each limb is aligned at 26-bit intervals +// they may contain values that exceed 2²⁶ - 1, hence the need +// to carry the excess bits in each limb. +#define REDUCE(h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) \ + VESRLG $26, h0, T_0 \ + VESRLG $26, h3, T_1 \ + VN MOD26, h0, h0 \ + VN MOD26, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_0, h1, h1 \ + VAG T_1, h4, h4 \ + VESRLG $26, h1, T_2 \ + VESRLG $26, h4, T_3 \ + VN MOD26, h1, h1 \ + VN MOD26, h4, h4 \ + VESLG $2, T_3, T_4 \ + VAG T_3, T_4, T_4 \ + VAG T_2, h2, h2 \ + VAG T_4, h0, h0 \ + VESRLG $26, h2, T_0 \ + VESRLG $26, h0, T_1 \ + VN MOD26, h2, h2 \ + VN MOD26, h0, h0 \ + VAG T_0, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_1, h1, h1 \ + VESRLG $26, h3, T_2 \ + VN MOD26, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_2, h4, h4 + +// EXPAND splits the 128-bit little-endian values in0 and in1 +// into 26-bit big-endian limbs and places the results into +// the first and second lane of d₂₆[0:4] respectively. +// +// The EX0, EX1 and EX2 constants are arrays of byte indices +// for permutation. The permutation both reverses the bytes +// in the input and ensures the bytes are copied into the +// destination limb ready to be shifted into their final +// position. +#define EXPAND(in0, in1, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4) \ + VPERM in0, in1, EX0, d0 \ + VPERM in0, in1, EX1, d2 \ + VPERM in0, in1, EX2, d4 \ + VESRLG $26, d0, d1 \ + VESRLG $30, d2, d3 \ + VESRLG $4, d2, d2 \ + VN MOD26, d0, d0 \ // [in0₂₆[0], in1₂₆[0]] + VN MOD26, d3, d3 \ // [in0₂₆[3], in1₂₆[3]] + VN MOD26, d1, d1 \ // [in0₂₆[1], in1₂₆[1]] + VN MOD24, d4, d4 \ // [in0₂₆[4], in1₂₆[4]] + VN MOD26, d2, d2 // [in0₂₆[2], in1₂₆[2]] + +// func updateVX(state *macState, msg []byte) +TEXT ·updateVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + MOVD state+0(FP), R1 + LMG msg+8(FP), R2, R3 // R2=msg_base, R3=msg_len + + // load EX0, EX1 and EX2 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R5 + VLM (R5), EX0, EX2 + + // generate masks + VGMG $(64-24), $63, MOD24 // [0x00ffffff, 0x00ffffff] + VGMG $(64-26), $63, MOD26 // [0x03ffffff, 0x03ffffff] + + // load h (accumulator) and r (key) from state + VZERO T_1 // [0, 0] + VL 0(R1), T_0 // [h₆₄[0], h₆₄[1]] + VLEG $0, 16(R1), T_1 // [h₆₄[2], 0] + VL 24(R1), T_2 // [r₆₄[0], r₆₄[1]] + VPDI $0, T_0, T_2, T_3 // [h₆₄[0], r₆₄[0]] + VPDI $5, T_0, T_2, T_4 // [h₆₄[1], r₆₄[1]] + + // unpack h and r into 26-bit limbs + // note: h₆₄[2] may have the low 3 bits set, so h₂₆[4] is a 27-bit value + VN MOD26, T_3, H_0 // [h₂₆[0], r₂₆[0]] + VZERO H_1 // [0, 0] + VZERO H_3 // [0, 0] + VGMG $(64-12-14), $(63-12), T_0 // [0x03fff000, 0x03fff000] - 26-bit mask with low 12 bits masked out + VESLG $24, T_1, T_1 // [h₆₄[2]<<24, 0] + VERIMG $-26&63, T_3, MOD26, H_1 // [h₂₆[1], r₂₆[1]] + VESRLG $+52&63, T_3, H_2 // [h₂₆[2], r₂₆[2]] - low 12 bits only + VERIMG $-14&63, T_4, MOD26, H_3 // [h₂₆[1], r₂₆[1]] + VESRLG $40, T_4, H_4 // [h₂₆[4], r₂₆[4]] - low 24 bits only + VERIMG $+12&63, T_4, T_0, H_2 // [h₂₆[2], r₂₆[2]] - complete + VO T_1, H_4, H_4 // [h₂₆[4], r₂₆[4]] - complete + + // replicate r across all 4 vector elements + VREPF $3, H_0, R_0 // [r₂₆[0], r₂₆[0], r₂₆[0], r₂₆[0]] + VREPF $3, H_1, R_1 // [r₂₆[1], r₂₆[1], r₂₆[1], r₂₆[1]] + VREPF $3, H_2, R_2 // [r₂₆[2], r₂₆[2], r₂₆[2], r₂₆[2]] + VREPF $3, H_3, R_3 // [r₂₆[3], r₂₆[3], r₂₆[3], r₂₆[3]] + VREPF $3, H_4, R_4 // [r₂₆[4], r₂₆[4], r₂₆[4], r₂₆[4]] + + // zero out lane 1 of h + VLEIG $1, $0, H_0 // [h₂₆[0], 0] + VLEIG $1, $0, H_1 // [h₂₆[1], 0] + VLEIG $1, $0, H_2 // [h₂₆[2], 0] + VLEIG $1, $0, H_3 // [h₂₆[3], 0] + VLEIG $1, $0, H_4 // [h₂₆[4], 0] + + // calculate 5r (ignore least significant limb) + VREPIF $5, T_0 + VMLF T_0, R_1, R5_1 // [5r₂₆[1], 5r₂₆[1], 5r₂₆[1], 5r₂₆[1]] + VMLF T_0, R_2, R5_2 // [5r₂₆[2], 5r₂₆[2], 5r₂₆[2], 5r₂₆[2]] + VMLF T_0, R_3, R5_3 // [5r₂₆[3], 5r₂₆[3], 5r₂₆[3], 5r₂₆[3]] + VMLF T_0, R_4, R5_4 // [5r₂₆[4], 5r₂₆[4], 5r₂₆[4], 5r₂₆[4]] + + // skip r² calculation if we are only calculating one block + CMPBLE R3, $16, skip + + // calculate r² + MULTIPLY(R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R5_1, R5_2, R5_3, R5_4, M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4) + REDUCE(M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4) + VGBM $0x0f0f, T_0 + VERIMG $0, M_0, T_0, R_0 // [r₂₆[0], r²₂₆[0], r₂₆[0], r²₂₆[0]] + VERIMG $0, M_1, T_0, R_1 // [r₂₆[1], r²₂₆[1], r₂₆[1], r²₂₆[1]] + VERIMG $0, M_2, T_0, R_2 // [r₂₆[2], r²₂₆[2], r₂₆[2], r²₂₆[2]] + VERIMG $0, M_3, T_0, R_3 // [r₂₆[3], r²₂₆[3], r₂₆[3], r²₂₆[3]] + VERIMG $0, M_4, T_0, R_4 // [r₂₆[4], r²₂₆[4], r₂₆[4], r²₂₆[4]] + + // calculate 5r² (ignore least significant limb) + VREPIF $5, T_0 + VMLF T_0, R_1, R5_1 // [5r₂₆[1], 5r²₂₆[1], 5r₂₆[1], 5r²₂₆[1]] + VMLF T_0, R_2, R5_2 // [5r₂₆[2], 5r²₂₆[2], 5r₂₆[2], 5r²₂₆[2]] + VMLF T_0, R_3, R5_3 // [5r₂₆[3], 5r²₂₆[3], 5r₂₆[3], 5r²₂₆[3]] + VMLF T_0, R_4, R5_4 // [5r₂₆[4], 5r²₂₆[4], 5r₂₆[4], 5r²₂₆[4]] + +loop: + CMPBLE R3, $32, b2 // 2 or fewer blocks remaining, need to change key coefficients + + // load next 2 blocks from message + VLM (R2), T_0, T_1 + + // update message slice + SUB $32, R3 + MOVD $32(R2), R2 + + // unpack message blocks into 26-bit big-endian limbs + EXPAND(T_0, T_1, M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4) + + // add 2¹²⁸ to each message block value + VLEIB $4, $1, M_4 + VLEIB $12, $1, M_4 + +multiply: + // accumulate the incoming message + VAG H_0, M_0, M_0 + VAG H_3, M_3, M_3 + VAG H_1, M_1, M_1 + VAG H_4, M_4, M_4 + VAG H_2, M_2, M_2 + + // multiply the accumulator by the key coefficient + MULTIPLY(M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4, R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R5_1, R5_2, R5_3, R5_4, H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + + // carry and partially reduce the partial products + REDUCE(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + + CMPBNE R3, $0, loop + +finish: + // sum lane 0 and lane 1 and put the result in lane 1 + VZERO T_0 + VSUMQG H_0, T_0, H_0 + VSUMQG H_3, T_0, H_3 + VSUMQG H_1, T_0, H_1 + VSUMQG H_4, T_0, H_4 + VSUMQG H_2, T_0, H_2 + + // reduce again after summation + // TODO(mundaym): there might be a more efficient way to do this + // now that we only have 1 active lane. For example, we could + // simultaneously pack the values as we reduce them. + REDUCE(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + + // carry h[1] through to h[4] so that only h[4] can exceed 2²⁶ - 1 + // TODO(mundaym): in testing this final carry was unnecessary. + // Needs a proof before it can be removed though. + VESRLG $26, H_1, T_1 + VN MOD26, H_1, H_1 + VAQ T_1, H_2, H_2 + VESRLG $26, H_2, T_2 + VN MOD26, H_2, H_2 + VAQ T_2, H_3, H_3 + VESRLG $26, H_3, T_3 + VN MOD26, H_3, H_3 + VAQ T_3, H_4, H_4 + + // h is now < 2(2¹³⁰ - 5) + // Pack each lane in h₂₆[0:4] into h₁₂₈[0:1]. + VESLG $26, H_1, H_1 + VESLG $26, H_3, H_3 + VO H_0, H_1, H_0 + VO H_2, H_3, H_2 + VESLG $4, H_2, H_2 + VLEIB $7, $48, H_1 + VSLB H_1, H_2, H_2 + VO H_0, H_2, H_0 + VLEIB $7, $104, H_1 + VSLB H_1, H_4, H_3 + VO H_3, H_0, H_0 + VLEIB $7, $24, H_1 + VSRLB H_1, H_4, H_1 + + // update state + VSTEG $1, H_0, 0(R1) + VSTEG $0, H_0, 8(R1) + VSTEG $1, H_1, 16(R1) + RET + +b2: // 2 or fewer blocks remaining + CMPBLE R3, $16, b1 + + // Load the 2 remaining blocks (17-32 bytes remaining). + MOVD $-17(R3), R0 // index of final byte to load modulo 16 + VL (R2), T_0 // load full 16 byte block + VLL R0, 16(R2), T_1 // load final (possibly partial) block and pad with zeros to 16 bytes + + // The Poly1305 algorithm requires that a 1 bit be appended to + // each message block. If the final block is less than 16 bytes + // long then it is easiest to insert the 1 before the message + // block is split into 26-bit limbs. If, on the other hand, the + // final message block is 16 bytes long then we append the 1 bit + // after expansion as normal. + MOVBZ $1, R0 + MOVD $-16(R3), R3 // index of byte in last block to insert 1 at (could be 16) + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) // skip the insertion if the final block is 16 bytes long + VLVGB R3, R0, T_1 // insert 1 into the byte at index R3 + + // Split both blocks into 26-bit limbs in the appropriate lanes. + EXPAND(T_0, T_1, M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4) + + // Append a 1 byte to the end of the second to last block. + VLEIB $4, $1, M_4 + + // Append a 1 byte to the end of the last block only if it is a + // full 16 byte block. + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $12, $1, M_4 + + // Finally, set up the coefficients for the final multiplication. + // We have previously saved r and 5r in the 32-bit even indexes + // of the R_[0-4] and R5_[1-4] coefficient registers. + // + // We want lane 0 to be multiplied by r² so that can be kept the + // same. We want lane 1 to be multiplied by r so we need to move + // the saved r value into the 32-bit odd index in lane 1 by + // rotating the 64-bit lane by 32. + VGBM $0x00ff, T_0 // [0, 0xffffffffffffffff] - mask lane 1 only + VERIMG $32, R_0, T_0, R_0 // [_, r²₂₆[0], _, r₂₆[0]] + VERIMG $32, R_1, T_0, R_1 // [_, r²₂₆[1], _, r₂₆[1]] + VERIMG $32, R_2, T_0, R_2 // [_, r²₂₆[2], _, r₂₆[2]] + VERIMG $32, R_3, T_0, R_3 // [_, r²₂₆[3], _, r₂₆[3]] + VERIMG $32, R_4, T_0, R_4 // [_, r²₂₆[4], _, r₂₆[4]] + VERIMG $32, R5_1, T_0, R5_1 // [_, 5r²₂₆[1], _, 5r₂₆[1]] + VERIMG $32, R5_2, T_0, R5_2 // [_, 5r²₂₆[2], _, 5r₂₆[2]] + VERIMG $32, R5_3, T_0, R5_3 // [_, 5r²₂₆[3], _, 5r₂₆[3]] + VERIMG $32, R5_4, T_0, R5_4 // [_, 5r²₂₆[4], _, 5r₂₆[4]] + + MOVD $0, R3 + BR multiply + +skip: + CMPBEQ R3, $0, finish + +b1: // 1 block remaining + + // Load the final block (1-16 bytes). This will be placed into + // lane 0. + MOVD $-1(R3), R0 + VLL R0, (R2), T_0 // pad to 16 bytes with zeros + + // The Poly1305 algorithm requires that a 1 bit be appended to + // each message block. If the final block is less than 16 bytes + // long then it is easiest to insert the 1 before the message + // block is split into 26-bit limbs. If, on the other hand, the + // final message block is 16 bytes long then we append the 1 bit + // after expansion as normal. + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, T_0 + + // Set the message block in lane 1 to the value 0 so that it + // can be accumulated without affecting the final result. + VZERO T_1 + + // Split the final message block into 26-bit limbs in lane 0. + // Lane 1 will be contain 0. + EXPAND(T_0, T_1, M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4) + + // Append a 1 byte to the end of the last block only if it is a + // full 16 byte block. + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $4, $1, M_4 + + // We have previously saved r and 5r in the 32-bit even indexes + // of the R_[0-4] and R5_[1-4] coefficient registers. + // + // We want lane 0 to be multiplied by r so we need to move the + // saved r value into the 32-bit odd index in lane 0. We want + // lane 1 to be set to the value 1. This makes multiplication + // a no-op. We do this by setting lane 1 in every register to 0 + // and then just setting the 32-bit index 3 in R_0 to 1. + VZERO T_0 + MOVD $0, R0 + MOVD $0x10111213, R12 + VLVGP R12, R0, T_1 // [_, 0x10111213, _, 0x00000000] + VPERM T_0, R_0, T_1, R_0 // [_, r₂₆[0], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R_1, T_1, R_1 // [_, r₂₆[1], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R_2, T_1, R_2 // [_, r₂₆[2], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R_3, T_1, R_3 // [_, r₂₆[3], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R_4, T_1, R_4 // [_, r₂₆[4], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R5_1, T_1, R5_1 // [_, 5r₂₆[1], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R5_2, T_1, R5_2 // [_, 5r₂₆[2], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R5_3, T_1, R5_3 // [_, 5r₂₆[3], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R5_4, T_1, R5_4 // [_, 5r₂₆[4], _, 0] + + // Set the value of lane 1 to be 1. + VLEIF $3, $1, R_0 // [_, r₂₆[0], _, 1] + + MOVD $0, R3 + BR multiply diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cf3eeb15 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160.go @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package ripemd160 implements the RIPEMD-160 hash algorithm. +// +// Deprecated: RIPEMD-160 is a legacy hash and should not be used for new +// applications. Also, this package does not and will not provide an optimized +// implementation. Instead, use a modern hash like SHA-256 (from crypto/sha256). +package ripemd160 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160" + +// RIPEMD-160 is designed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers, and Bart +// Preneel with specifications available at: +// http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~cosicart/pdf/AB-9601/AB-9601.pdf. + +import ( + "crypto" + "hash" +) + +func init() { + crypto.RegisterHash(crypto.RIPEMD160, New) +} + +// The size of the checksum in bytes. +const Size = 20 + +// The block size of the hash algorithm in bytes. +const BlockSize = 64 + +const ( + _s0 = 0x67452301 + _s1 = 0xefcdab89 + _s2 = 0x98badcfe + _s3 = 0x10325476 + _s4 = 0xc3d2e1f0 +) + +// digest represents the partial evaluation of a checksum. +type digest struct { + s [5]uint32 // running context + x [BlockSize]byte // temporary buffer + nx int // index into x + tc uint64 // total count of bytes processed +} + +func (d *digest) Reset() { + d.s[0], d.s[1], d.s[2], d.s[3], d.s[4] = _s0, _s1, _s2, _s3, _s4 + d.nx = 0 + d.tc = 0 +} + +// New returns a new hash.Hash computing the checksum. +func New() hash.Hash { + result := new(digest) + result.Reset() + return result +} + +func (d *digest) Size() int { return Size } + +func (d *digest) BlockSize() int { return BlockSize } + +func (d *digest) Write(p []byte) (nn int, err error) { + nn = len(p) + d.tc += uint64(nn) + if d.nx > 0 { + n := len(p) + if n > BlockSize-d.nx { + n = BlockSize - d.nx + } + for i := 0; i < n; i++ { + d.x[d.nx+i] = p[i] + } + d.nx += n + if d.nx == BlockSize { + _Block(d, d.x[0:]) + d.nx = 0 + } + p = p[n:] + } + n := _Block(d, p) + p = p[n:] + if len(p) > 0 { + d.nx = copy(d.x[:], p) + } + return +} + +func (d0 *digest) Sum(in []byte) []byte { + // Make a copy of d0 so that caller can keep writing and summing. + d := *d0 + + // Padding. Add a 1 bit and 0 bits until 56 bytes mod 64. + tc := d.tc + var tmp [64]byte + tmp[0] = 0x80 + if tc%64 < 56 { + d.Write(tmp[0 : 56-tc%64]) + } else { + d.Write(tmp[0 : 64+56-tc%64]) + } + + // Length in bits. + tc <<= 3 + for i := uint(0); i < 8; i++ { + tmp[i] = byte(tc >> (8 * i)) + } + d.Write(tmp[0:8]) + + if d.nx != 0 { + panic("d.nx != 0") + } + + var digest [Size]byte + for i, s := range d.s { + digest[i*4] = byte(s) + digest[i*4+1] = byte(s >> 8) + digest[i*4+2] = byte(s >> 16) + digest[i*4+3] = byte(s >> 24) + } + + return append(in, digest[:]...) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160block.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160block.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e0edc02f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160block.go @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// RIPEMD-160 block step. +// In its own file so that a faster assembly or C version +// can be substituted easily. + +package ripemd160 + +import ( + "math/bits" +) + +// work buffer indices and roll amounts for one line +var _n = [80]uint{ + 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, + 7, 4, 13, 1, 10, 6, 15, 3, 12, 0, 9, 5, 2, 14, 11, 8, + 3, 10, 14, 4, 9, 15, 8, 1, 2, 7, 0, 6, 13, 11, 5, 12, + 1, 9, 11, 10, 0, 8, 12, 4, 13, 3, 7, 15, 14, 5, 6, 2, + 4, 0, 5, 9, 7, 12, 2, 10, 14, 1, 3, 8, 11, 6, 15, 13, +} + +var _r = [80]uint{ + 11, 14, 15, 12, 5, 8, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 6, 7, 9, 8, + 7, 6, 8, 13, 11, 9, 7, 15, 7, 12, 15, 9, 11, 7, 13, 12, + 11, 13, 6, 7, 14, 9, 13, 15, 14, 8, 13, 6, 5, 12, 7, 5, + 11, 12, 14, 15, 14, 15, 9, 8, 9, 14, 5, 6, 8, 6, 5, 12, + 9, 15, 5, 11, 6, 8, 13, 12, 5, 12, 13, 14, 11, 8, 5, 6, +} + +// same for the other parallel one +var n_ = [80]uint{ + 5, 14, 7, 0, 9, 2, 11, 4, 13, 6, 15, 8, 1, 10, 3, 12, + 6, 11, 3, 7, 0, 13, 5, 10, 14, 15, 8, 12, 4, 9, 1, 2, + 15, 5, 1, 3, 7, 14, 6, 9, 11, 8, 12, 2, 10, 0, 4, 13, + 8, 6, 4, 1, 3, 11, 15, 0, 5, 12, 2, 13, 9, 7, 10, 14, + 12, 15, 10, 4, 1, 5, 8, 7, 6, 2, 13, 14, 0, 3, 9, 11, +} + +var r_ = [80]uint{ + 8, 9, 9, 11, 13, 15, 15, 5, 7, 7, 8, 11, 14, 14, 12, 6, + 9, 13, 15, 7, 12, 8, 9, 11, 7, 7, 12, 7, 6, 15, 13, 11, + 9, 7, 15, 11, 8, 6, 6, 14, 12, 13, 5, 14, 13, 13, 7, 5, + 15, 5, 8, 11, 14, 14, 6, 14, 6, 9, 12, 9, 12, 5, 15, 8, + 8, 5, 12, 9, 12, 5, 14, 6, 8, 13, 6, 5, 15, 13, 11, 11, +} + +func _Block(md *digest, p []byte) int { + n := 0 + var x [16]uint32 + var alpha, beta uint32 + for len(p) >= BlockSize { + a, b, c, d, e := md.s[0], md.s[1], md.s[2], md.s[3], md.s[4] + aa, bb, cc, dd, ee := a, b, c, d, e + j := 0 + for i := 0; i < 16; i++ { + x[i] = uint32(p[j]) | uint32(p[j+1])<<8 | uint32(p[j+2])<<16 | uint32(p[j+3])<<24 + j += 4 + } + + // round 1 + i := 0 + for i < 16 { + alpha = a + (b ^ c ^ d) + x[_n[i]] + s := int(_r[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + e + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(c, 10) + a, b, c, d, e = e, alpha, b, beta, d + + // parallel line + alpha = aa + (bb ^ (cc | ^dd)) + x[n_[i]] + 0x50a28be6 + s = int(r_[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + ee + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(cc, 10) + aa, bb, cc, dd, ee = ee, alpha, bb, beta, dd + + i++ + } + + // round 2 + for i < 32 { + alpha = a + (b&c | ^b&d) + x[_n[i]] + 0x5a827999 + s := int(_r[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + e + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(c, 10) + a, b, c, d, e = e, alpha, b, beta, d + + // parallel line + alpha = aa + (bb&dd | cc&^dd) + x[n_[i]] + 0x5c4dd124 + s = int(r_[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + ee + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(cc, 10) + aa, bb, cc, dd, ee = ee, alpha, bb, beta, dd + + i++ + } + + // round 3 + for i < 48 { + alpha = a + (b | ^c ^ d) + x[_n[i]] + 0x6ed9eba1 + s := int(_r[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + e + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(c, 10) + a, b, c, d, e = e, alpha, b, beta, d + + // parallel line + alpha = aa + (bb | ^cc ^ dd) + x[n_[i]] + 0x6d703ef3 + s = int(r_[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + ee + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(cc, 10) + aa, bb, cc, dd, ee = ee, alpha, bb, beta, dd + + i++ + } + + // round 4 + for i < 64 { + alpha = a + (b&d | c&^d) + x[_n[i]] + 0x8f1bbcdc + s := int(_r[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + e + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(c, 10) + a, b, c, d, e = e, alpha, b, beta, d + + // parallel line + alpha = aa + (bb&cc | ^bb&dd) + x[n_[i]] + 0x7a6d76e9 + s = int(r_[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + ee + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(cc, 10) + aa, bb, cc, dd, ee = ee, alpha, bb, beta, dd + + i++ + } + + // round 5 + for i < 80 { + alpha = a + (b ^ (c | ^d)) + x[_n[i]] + 0xa953fd4e + s := int(_r[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + e + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(c, 10) + a, b, c, d, e = e, alpha, b, beta, d + + // parallel line + alpha = aa + (bb ^ cc ^ dd) + x[n_[i]] + s = int(r_[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + ee + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(cc, 10) + aa, bb, cc, dd, ee = ee, alpha, bb, beta, dd + + i++ + } + + // combine results + dd += c + md.s[1] + md.s[1] = md.s[2] + d + ee + md.s[2] = md.s[3] + e + aa + md.s[3] = md.s[4] + a + bb + md.s[4] = md.s[0] + b + cc + md.s[0] = dd + + p = p[BlockSize:] + n += BlockSize + } + return n +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/doc.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/doc.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..decd8cf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/doc.go @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package sha3 implements the SHA-3 fixed-output-length hash functions and +// the SHAKE variable-output-length hash functions defined by FIPS-202. +// +// Both types of hash function use the "sponge" construction and the Keccak +// permutation. For a detailed specification see http://keccak.noekeon.org/ +// +// # Guidance +// +// If you aren't sure what function you need, use SHAKE256 with at least 64 +// bytes of output. The SHAKE instances are faster than the SHA3 instances; +// the latter have to allocate memory to conform to the hash.Hash interface. +// +// If you need a secret-key MAC (message authentication code), prepend the +// secret key to the input, hash with SHAKE256 and read at least 32 bytes of +// output. +// +// # Security strengths +// +// The SHA3-x (x equals 224, 256, 384, or 512) functions have a security +// strength against preimage attacks of x bits. Since they only produce "x" +// bits of output, their collision-resistance is only "x/2" bits. +// +// The SHAKE-256 and -128 functions have a generic security strength of 256 and +// 128 bits against all attacks, provided that at least 2x bits of their output +// is used. Requesting more than 64 or 32 bytes of output, respectively, does +// not increase the collision-resistance of the SHAKE functions. +// +// # The sponge construction +// +// A sponge builds a pseudo-random function from a public pseudo-random +// permutation, by applying the permutation to a state of "rate + capacity" +// bytes, but hiding "capacity" of the bytes. +// +// A sponge starts out with a zero state. To hash an input using a sponge, up +// to "rate" bytes of the input are XORed into the sponge's state. The sponge +// is then "full" and the permutation is applied to "empty" it. This process is +// repeated until all the input has been "absorbed". The input is then padded. +// The digest is "squeezed" from the sponge in the same way, except that output +// is copied out instead of input being XORed in. +// +// A sponge is parameterized by its generic security strength, which is equal +// to half its capacity; capacity + rate is equal to the permutation's width. +// Since the KeccakF-1600 permutation is 1600 bits (200 bytes) wide, this means +// that the security strength of a sponge instance is equal to (1600 - bitrate) / 2. +// +// # Recommendations +// +// The SHAKE functions are recommended for most new uses. They can produce +// output of arbitrary length. SHAKE256, with an output length of at least +// 64 bytes, provides 256-bit security against all attacks. The Keccak team +// recommends it for most applications upgrading from SHA2-512. (NIST chose a +// much stronger, but much slower, sponge instance for SHA3-512.) +// +// The SHA-3 functions are "drop-in" replacements for the SHA-2 functions. +// They produce output of the same length, with the same security strengths +// against all attacks. This means, in particular, that SHA3-256 only has +// 128-bit collision resistance, because its output length is 32 bytes. +package sha3 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/sha3" diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/hashes.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/hashes.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d8043fd --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/hashes.go @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package sha3 + +// This file provides functions for creating instances of the SHA-3 +// and SHAKE hash functions, as well as utility functions for hashing +// bytes. + +import ( + "hash" +) + +// New224 creates a new SHA3-224 hash. +// Its generic security strength is 224 bits against preimage attacks, +// and 112 bits against collision attacks. +func New224() hash.Hash { + if h := new224Asm(); h != nil { + return h + } + return &state{rate: 144, outputLen: 28, dsbyte: 0x06} +} + +// New256 creates a new SHA3-256 hash. +// Its generic security strength is 256 bits against preimage attacks, +// and 128 bits against collision attacks. +func New256() hash.Hash { + if h := new256Asm(); h != nil { + return h + } + return &state{rate: 136, outputLen: 32, dsbyte: 0x06} +} + +// New384 creates a new SHA3-384 hash. +// Its generic security strength is 384 bits against preimage attacks, +// and 192 bits against collision attacks. +func New384() hash.Hash { + if h := new384Asm(); h != nil { + return h + } + return &state{rate: 104, outputLen: 48, dsbyte: 0x06} +} + +// New512 creates a new SHA3-512 hash. +// Its generic security strength is 512 bits against preimage attacks, +// and 256 bits against collision attacks. +func New512() hash.Hash { + if h := new512Asm(); h != nil { + return h + } + return &state{rate: 72, outputLen: 64, dsbyte: 0x06} +} + +// NewLegacyKeccak256 creates a new Keccak-256 hash. +// +// Only use this function if you require compatibility with an existing cryptosystem +// that uses non-standard padding. All other users should use New256 instead. +func NewLegacyKeccak256() hash.Hash { return &state{rate: 136, outputLen: 32, dsbyte: 0x01} } + +// NewLegacyKeccak512 creates a new Keccak-512 hash. +// +// Only use this function if you require compatibility with an existing cryptosystem +// that uses non-standard padding. All other users should use New512 instead. +func NewLegacyKeccak512() hash.Hash { return &state{rate: 72, outputLen: 64, dsbyte: 0x01} } + +// Sum224 returns the SHA3-224 digest of the data. +func Sum224(data []byte) (digest [28]byte) { + h := New224() + h.Write(data) + h.Sum(digest[:0]) + return +} + +// Sum256 returns the SHA3-256 digest of the data. +func Sum256(data []byte) (digest [32]byte) { + h := New256() + h.Write(data) + h.Sum(digest[:0]) + return +} + +// Sum384 returns the SHA3-384 digest of the data. +func Sum384(data []byte) (digest [48]byte) { + h := New384() + h.Write(data) + h.Sum(digest[:0]) + return +} + +// Sum512 returns the SHA3-512 digest of the data. +func Sum512(data []byte) (digest [64]byte) { + h := New512() + h.Write(data) + h.Sum(digest[:0]) + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/hashes_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/hashes_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c74fc20f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/hashes_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !gc || purego || !s390x +// +build !gc purego !s390x + +package sha3 + +import ( + "hash" +) + +// new224Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-224 if available, +// otherwise it returns nil. +func new224Asm() hash.Hash { return nil } + +// new256Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-256 if available, +// otherwise it returns nil. +func new256Asm() hash.Hash { return nil } + +// new384Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-384 if available, +// otherwise it returns nil. +func new384Asm() hash.Hash { return nil } + +// new512Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-512 if available, +// otherwise it returns nil. +func new512Asm() hash.Hash { return nil } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e5faa375 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf.go @@ -0,0 +1,415 @@ +// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !amd64 || purego || !gc +// +build !amd64 purego !gc + +package sha3 + +import "math/bits" + +// rc stores the round constants for use in the ι step. +var rc = [24]uint64{ + 0x0000000000000001, + 0x0000000000008082, + 0x800000000000808A, + 0x8000000080008000, + 0x000000000000808B, + 0x0000000080000001, + 0x8000000080008081, + 0x8000000000008009, + 0x000000000000008A, + 0x0000000000000088, + 0x0000000080008009, + 0x000000008000000A, + 0x000000008000808B, + 0x800000000000008B, + 0x8000000000008089, + 0x8000000000008003, + 0x8000000000008002, + 0x8000000000000080, + 0x000000000000800A, + 0x800000008000000A, + 0x8000000080008081, + 0x8000000000008080, + 0x0000000080000001, + 0x8000000080008008, +} + +// keccakF1600 applies the Keccak permutation to a 1600b-wide +// state represented as a slice of 25 uint64s. +func keccakF1600(a *[25]uint64) { + // Implementation translated from Keccak-inplace.c + // in the keccak reference code. + var t, bc0, bc1, bc2, bc3, bc4, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4 uint64 + + for i := 0; i < 24; i += 4 { + // Combines the 5 steps in each round into 2 steps. + // Unrolls 4 rounds per loop and spreads some steps across rounds. + + // Round 1 + bc0 = a[0] ^ a[5] ^ a[10] ^ a[15] ^ a[20] + bc1 = a[1] ^ a[6] ^ a[11] ^ a[16] ^ a[21] + bc2 = a[2] ^ a[7] ^ a[12] ^ a[17] ^ a[22] + bc3 = a[3] ^ a[8] ^ a[13] ^ a[18] ^ a[23] + bc4 = a[4] ^ a[9] ^ a[14] ^ a[19] ^ a[24] + d0 = bc4 ^ (bc1<<1 | bc1>>63) + d1 = bc0 ^ (bc2<<1 | bc2>>63) + d2 = bc1 ^ (bc3<<1 | bc3>>63) + d3 = bc2 ^ (bc4<<1 | bc4>>63) + d4 = bc3 ^ (bc0<<1 | bc0>>63) + + bc0 = a[0] ^ d0 + t = a[6] ^ d1 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 44) + t = a[12] ^ d2 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 43) + t = a[18] ^ d3 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 21) + t = a[24] ^ d4 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 14) + a[0] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) ^ rc[i] + a[6] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[12] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[18] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[24] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[10] ^ d0 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 3) + t = a[16] ^ d1 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 45) + t = a[22] ^ d2 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 61) + t = a[3] ^ d3 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 28) + t = a[9] ^ d4 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 20) + a[10] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[16] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[22] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[3] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[9] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[20] ^ d0 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 18) + t = a[1] ^ d1 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 1) + t = a[7] ^ d2 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 6) + t = a[13] ^ d3 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 25) + t = a[19] ^ d4 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 8) + a[20] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[1] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[7] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[13] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[19] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[5] ^ d0 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 36) + t = a[11] ^ d1 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 10) + t = a[17] ^ d2 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 15) + t = a[23] ^ d3 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 56) + t = a[4] ^ d4 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 27) + a[5] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[11] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[17] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[23] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[4] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[15] ^ d0 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 41) + t = a[21] ^ d1 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 2) + t = a[2] ^ d2 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 62) + t = a[8] ^ d3 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 55) + t = a[14] ^ d4 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 39) + a[15] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[21] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[2] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[8] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[14] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + // Round 2 + bc0 = a[0] ^ a[5] ^ a[10] ^ a[15] ^ a[20] + bc1 = a[1] ^ a[6] ^ a[11] ^ a[16] ^ a[21] + bc2 = a[2] ^ a[7] ^ a[12] ^ a[17] ^ a[22] + bc3 = a[3] ^ a[8] ^ a[13] ^ a[18] ^ a[23] + bc4 = a[4] ^ a[9] ^ a[14] ^ a[19] ^ a[24] + d0 = bc4 ^ (bc1<<1 | bc1>>63) + d1 = bc0 ^ (bc2<<1 | bc2>>63) + d2 = bc1 ^ (bc3<<1 | bc3>>63) + d3 = bc2 ^ (bc4<<1 | bc4>>63) + d4 = bc3 ^ (bc0<<1 | bc0>>63) + + bc0 = a[0] ^ d0 + t = a[16] ^ d1 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 44) + t = a[7] ^ d2 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 43) + t = a[23] ^ d3 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 21) + t = a[14] ^ d4 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 14) + a[0] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) ^ rc[i+1] + a[16] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[7] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[23] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[14] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[20] ^ d0 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 3) + t = a[11] ^ d1 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 45) + t = a[2] ^ d2 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 61) + t = a[18] ^ d3 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 28) + t = a[9] ^ d4 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 20) + a[20] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[11] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[2] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[18] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[9] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[15] ^ d0 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 18) + t = a[6] ^ d1 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 1) + t = a[22] ^ d2 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 6) + t = a[13] ^ d3 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 25) + t = a[4] ^ d4 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 8) + a[15] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[6] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[22] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[13] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[4] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[10] ^ d0 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 36) + t = a[1] ^ d1 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 10) + t = a[17] ^ d2 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 15) + t = a[8] ^ d3 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 56) + t = a[24] ^ d4 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 27) + a[10] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[1] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[17] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[8] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[24] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[5] ^ d0 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 41) + t = a[21] ^ d1 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 2) + t = a[12] ^ d2 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 62) + t = a[3] ^ d3 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 55) + t = a[19] ^ d4 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 39) + a[5] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[21] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[12] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[3] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[19] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + // Round 3 + bc0 = a[0] ^ a[5] ^ a[10] ^ a[15] ^ a[20] + bc1 = a[1] ^ a[6] ^ a[11] ^ a[16] ^ a[21] + bc2 = a[2] ^ a[7] ^ a[12] ^ a[17] ^ a[22] + bc3 = a[3] ^ a[8] ^ a[13] ^ a[18] ^ a[23] + bc4 = a[4] ^ a[9] ^ a[14] ^ a[19] ^ a[24] + d0 = bc4 ^ (bc1<<1 | bc1>>63) + d1 = bc0 ^ (bc2<<1 | bc2>>63) + d2 = bc1 ^ (bc3<<1 | bc3>>63) + d3 = bc2 ^ (bc4<<1 | bc4>>63) + d4 = bc3 ^ (bc0<<1 | bc0>>63) + + bc0 = a[0] ^ d0 + t = a[11] ^ d1 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 44) + t = a[22] ^ d2 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 43) + t = a[8] ^ d3 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 21) + t = a[19] ^ d4 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 14) + a[0] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) ^ rc[i+2] + a[11] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[22] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[8] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[19] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[15] ^ d0 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 3) + t = a[1] ^ d1 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 45) + t = a[12] ^ d2 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 61) + t = a[23] ^ d3 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 28) + t = a[9] ^ d4 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 20) + a[15] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[1] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[12] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[23] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[9] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[5] ^ d0 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 18) + t = a[16] ^ d1 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 1) + t = a[2] ^ d2 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 6) + t = a[13] ^ d3 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 25) + t = a[24] ^ d4 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 8) + a[5] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[16] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[2] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[13] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[24] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[20] ^ d0 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 36) + t = a[6] ^ d1 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 10) + t = a[17] ^ d2 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 15) + t = a[3] ^ d3 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 56) + t = a[14] ^ d4 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 27) + a[20] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[6] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[17] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[3] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[14] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[10] ^ d0 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 41) + t = a[21] ^ d1 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 2) + t = a[7] ^ d2 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 62) + t = a[18] ^ d3 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 55) + t = a[4] ^ d4 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 39) + a[10] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[21] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[7] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[18] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[4] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + // Round 4 + bc0 = a[0] ^ a[5] ^ a[10] ^ a[15] ^ a[20] + bc1 = a[1] ^ a[6] ^ a[11] ^ a[16] ^ a[21] + bc2 = a[2] ^ a[7] ^ a[12] ^ a[17] ^ a[22] + bc3 = a[3] ^ a[8] ^ a[13] ^ a[18] ^ a[23] + bc4 = a[4] ^ a[9] ^ a[14] ^ a[19] ^ a[24] + d0 = bc4 ^ (bc1<<1 | bc1>>63) + d1 = bc0 ^ (bc2<<1 | bc2>>63) + d2 = bc1 ^ (bc3<<1 | bc3>>63) + d3 = bc2 ^ (bc4<<1 | bc4>>63) + d4 = bc3 ^ (bc0<<1 | bc0>>63) + + bc0 = a[0] ^ d0 + t = a[1] ^ d1 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 44) + t = a[2] ^ d2 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 43) + t = a[3] ^ d3 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 21) + t = a[4] ^ d4 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 14) + a[0] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) ^ rc[i+3] + a[1] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[2] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[3] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[4] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[5] ^ d0 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 3) + t = a[6] ^ d1 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 45) + t = a[7] ^ d2 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 61) + t = a[8] ^ d3 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 28) + t = a[9] ^ d4 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 20) + a[5] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[6] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[7] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[8] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[9] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[10] ^ d0 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 18) + t = a[11] ^ d1 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 1) + t = a[12] ^ d2 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 6) + t = a[13] ^ d3 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 25) + t = a[14] ^ d4 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 8) + a[10] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[11] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[12] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[13] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[14] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[15] ^ d0 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 36) + t = a[16] ^ d1 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 10) + t = a[17] ^ d2 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 15) + t = a[18] ^ d3 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 56) + t = a[19] ^ d4 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 27) + a[15] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[16] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[17] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[18] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[19] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + + t = a[20] ^ d0 + bc3 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 41) + t = a[21] ^ d1 + bc4 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 2) + t = a[22] ^ d2 + bc0 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 62) + t = a[23] ^ d3 + bc1 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 55) + t = a[24] ^ d4 + bc2 = bits.RotateLeft64(t, 39) + a[20] = bc0 ^ (bc2 &^ bc1) + a[21] = bc1 ^ (bc3 &^ bc2) + a[22] = bc2 ^ (bc4 &^ bc3) + a[23] = bc3 ^ (bc0 &^ bc4) + a[24] = bc4 ^ (bc1 &^ bc0) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf_amd64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf_amd64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..248a3824 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf_amd64.go @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build amd64 && !purego && gc +// +build amd64,!purego,gc + +package sha3 + +// This function is implemented in keccakf_amd64.s. + +//go:noescape + +func keccakF1600(a *[25]uint64) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf_amd64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4cfa5438 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf_amd64.s @@ -0,0 +1,391 @@ +// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build amd64 && !purego && gc +// +build amd64,!purego,gc + +// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public +// domain sources at https://github.com/gvanas/KeccakCodePackage + +// Offsets in state +#define _ba (0*8) +#define _be (1*8) +#define _bi (2*8) +#define _bo (3*8) +#define _bu (4*8) +#define _ga (5*8) +#define _ge (6*8) +#define _gi (7*8) +#define _go (8*8) +#define _gu (9*8) +#define _ka (10*8) +#define _ke (11*8) +#define _ki (12*8) +#define _ko (13*8) +#define _ku (14*8) +#define _ma (15*8) +#define _me (16*8) +#define _mi (17*8) +#define _mo (18*8) +#define _mu (19*8) +#define _sa (20*8) +#define _se (21*8) +#define _si (22*8) +#define _so (23*8) +#define _su (24*8) + +// Temporary registers +#define rT1 AX + +// Round vars +#define rpState DI +#define rpStack SP + +#define rDa BX +#define rDe CX +#define rDi DX +#define rDo R8 +#define rDu R9 + +#define rBa R10 +#define rBe R11 +#define rBi R12 +#define rBo R13 +#define rBu R14 + +#define rCa SI +#define rCe BP +#define rCi rBi +#define rCo rBo +#define rCu R15 + +#define MOVQ_RBI_RCE MOVQ rBi, rCe +#define XORQ_RT1_RCA XORQ rT1, rCa +#define XORQ_RT1_RCE XORQ rT1, rCe +#define XORQ_RBA_RCU XORQ rBa, rCu +#define XORQ_RBE_RCU XORQ rBe, rCu +#define XORQ_RDU_RCU XORQ rDu, rCu +#define XORQ_RDA_RCA XORQ rDa, rCa +#define XORQ_RDE_RCE XORQ rDe, rCe + +#define mKeccakRound(iState, oState, rc, B_RBI_RCE, G_RT1_RCA, G_RT1_RCE, G_RBA_RCU, K_RT1_RCA, K_RT1_RCE, K_RBA_RCU, M_RT1_RCA, M_RT1_RCE, M_RBE_RCU, S_RDU_RCU, S_RDA_RCA, S_RDE_RCE) \ + /* Prepare round */ \ + MOVQ rCe, rDa; \ + ROLQ $1, rDa; \ + \ + MOVQ _bi(iState), rCi; \ + XORQ _gi(iState), rDi; \ + XORQ rCu, rDa; \ + XORQ _ki(iState), rCi; \ + XORQ _mi(iState), rDi; \ + XORQ rDi, rCi; \ + \ + MOVQ rCi, rDe; \ + ROLQ $1, rDe; \ + \ + MOVQ _bo(iState), rCo; \ + XORQ _go(iState), rDo; \ + XORQ rCa, rDe; \ + XORQ _ko(iState), rCo; \ + XORQ _mo(iState), rDo; \ + XORQ rDo, rCo; \ + \ + MOVQ rCo, rDi; \ + ROLQ $1, rDi; \ + \ + MOVQ rCu, rDo; \ + XORQ rCe, rDi; \ + ROLQ $1, rDo; \ + \ + MOVQ rCa, rDu; \ + XORQ rCi, rDo; \ + ROLQ $1, rDu; \ + \ + /* Result b */ \ + MOVQ _ba(iState), rBa; \ + MOVQ _ge(iState), rBe; \ + XORQ rCo, rDu; \ + MOVQ _ki(iState), rBi; \ + MOVQ _mo(iState), rBo; \ + MOVQ _su(iState), rBu; \ + XORQ rDe, rBe; \ + ROLQ $44, rBe; \ + XORQ rDi, rBi; \ + XORQ rDa, rBa; \ + ROLQ $43, rBi; \ + \ + MOVQ rBe, rCa; \ + MOVQ rc, rT1; \ + ORQ rBi, rCa; \ + XORQ rBa, rT1; \ + XORQ rT1, rCa; \ + MOVQ rCa, _ba(oState); \ + \ + XORQ rDu, rBu; \ + ROLQ $14, rBu; \ + MOVQ rBa, rCu; \ + ANDQ rBe, rCu; \ + XORQ rBu, rCu; \ + MOVQ rCu, _bu(oState); \ + \ + XORQ rDo, rBo; \ + ROLQ $21, rBo; \ + MOVQ rBo, rT1; \ + ANDQ rBu, rT1; \ + XORQ rBi, rT1; \ + MOVQ rT1, _bi(oState); \ + \ + NOTQ rBi; \ + ORQ rBa, rBu; \ + ORQ rBo, rBi; \ + XORQ rBo, rBu; \ + XORQ rBe, rBi; \ + MOVQ rBu, _bo(oState); \ + MOVQ rBi, _be(oState); \ + B_RBI_RCE; \ + \ + /* Result g */ \ + MOVQ _gu(iState), rBe; \ + XORQ rDu, rBe; \ + MOVQ _ka(iState), rBi; \ + ROLQ $20, rBe; \ + XORQ rDa, rBi; \ + ROLQ $3, rBi; \ + MOVQ _bo(iState), rBa; \ + MOVQ rBe, rT1; \ + ORQ rBi, rT1; \ + XORQ rDo, rBa; \ + MOVQ _me(iState), rBo; \ + MOVQ _si(iState), rBu; \ + ROLQ $28, rBa; \ + XORQ rBa, rT1; \ + MOVQ rT1, _ga(oState); \ + G_RT1_RCA; \ + \ + XORQ rDe, rBo; \ + ROLQ $45, rBo; \ + MOVQ rBi, rT1; \ + ANDQ rBo, rT1; \ + XORQ rBe, rT1; \ + MOVQ rT1, _ge(oState); \ + G_RT1_RCE; \ + \ + XORQ rDi, rBu; \ + ROLQ $61, rBu; \ + MOVQ rBu, rT1; \ + ORQ rBa, rT1; \ + XORQ rBo, rT1; \ + MOVQ rT1, _go(oState); \ + \ + ANDQ rBe, rBa; \ + XORQ rBu, rBa; \ + MOVQ rBa, _gu(oState); \ + NOTQ rBu; \ + G_RBA_RCU; \ + \ + ORQ rBu, rBo; \ + XORQ rBi, rBo; \ + MOVQ rBo, _gi(oState); \ + \ + /* Result k */ \ + MOVQ _be(iState), rBa; \ + MOVQ _gi(iState), rBe; \ + MOVQ _ko(iState), rBi; \ + MOVQ _mu(iState), rBo; \ + MOVQ _sa(iState), rBu; \ + XORQ rDi, rBe; \ + ROLQ $6, rBe; \ + XORQ rDo, rBi; \ + ROLQ $25, rBi; \ + MOVQ rBe, rT1; \ + ORQ rBi, rT1; \ + XORQ rDe, rBa; \ + ROLQ $1, rBa; \ + XORQ rBa, rT1; \ + MOVQ rT1, _ka(oState); \ + K_RT1_RCA; \ + \ + XORQ rDu, rBo; \ + ROLQ $8, rBo; \ + MOVQ rBi, rT1; \ + ANDQ rBo, rT1; \ + XORQ rBe, rT1; \ + MOVQ rT1, _ke(oState); \ + K_RT1_RCE; \ + \ + XORQ rDa, rBu; \ + ROLQ $18, rBu; \ + NOTQ rBo; \ + MOVQ rBo, rT1; \ + ANDQ rBu, rT1; \ + XORQ rBi, rT1; \ + MOVQ rT1, _ki(oState); \ + \ + MOVQ rBu, rT1; \ + ORQ rBa, rT1; \ + XORQ rBo, rT1; \ + MOVQ rT1, _ko(oState); \ + \ + ANDQ rBe, rBa; \ + XORQ rBu, rBa; \ + MOVQ rBa, _ku(oState); \ + K_RBA_RCU; \ + \ + /* Result m */ \ + MOVQ _ga(iState), rBe; \ + XORQ rDa, rBe; \ + MOVQ _ke(iState), rBi; \ + ROLQ $36, rBe; \ + XORQ rDe, rBi; \ + MOVQ _bu(iState), rBa; \ + ROLQ $10, rBi; \ + MOVQ rBe, rT1; \ + MOVQ _mi(iState), rBo; \ + ANDQ rBi, rT1; \ + XORQ rDu, rBa; \ + MOVQ _so(iState), rBu; \ + ROLQ $27, rBa; \ + XORQ rBa, rT1; \ + MOVQ rT1, _ma(oState); \ + M_RT1_RCA; \ + \ + XORQ rDi, rBo; \ + ROLQ $15, rBo; \ + MOVQ rBi, rT1; \ + ORQ rBo, rT1; \ + XORQ rBe, rT1; \ + MOVQ rT1, _me(oState); \ + M_RT1_RCE; \ + \ + XORQ rDo, rBu; \ + ROLQ $56, rBu; \ + NOTQ rBo; \ + MOVQ rBo, rT1; \ + ORQ rBu, rT1; \ + XORQ rBi, rT1; \ + MOVQ rT1, _mi(oState); \ + \ + ORQ rBa, rBe; \ + XORQ rBu, rBe; \ + MOVQ rBe, _mu(oState); \ + \ + ANDQ rBa, rBu; \ + XORQ rBo, rBu; \ + MOVQ rBu, _mo(oState); \ + M_RBE_RCU; \ + \ + /* Result s */ \ + MOVQ _bi(iState), rBa; \ + MOVQ _go(iState), rBe; \ + MOVQ _ku(iState), rBi; \ + XORQ rDi, rBa; \ + MOVQ _ma(iState), rBo; \ + ROLQ $62, rBa; \ + XORQ rDo, rBe; \ + MOVQ _se(iState), rBu; \ + ROLQ $55, rBe; \ + \ + XORQ rDu, rBi; \ + MOVQ rBa, rDu; \ + XORQ rDe, rBu; \ + ROLQ $2, rBu; \ + ANDQ rBe, rDu; \ + XORQ rBu, rDu; \ + MOVQ rDu, _su(oState); \ + \ + ROLQ $39, rBi; \ + S_RDU_RCU; \ + NOTQ rBe; \ + XORQ rDa, rBo; \ + MOVQ rBe, rDa; \ + ANDQ rBi, rDa; \ + XORQ rBa, rDa; \ + MOVQ rDa, _sa(oState); \ + S_RDA_RCA; \ + \ + ROLQ $41, rBo; \ + MOVQ rBi, rDe; \ + ORQ rBo, rDe; \ + XORQ rBe, rDe; \ + MOVQ rDe, _se(oState); \ + S_RDE_RCE; \ + \ + MOVQ rBo, rDi; \ + MOVQ rBu, rDo; \ + ANDQ rBu, rDi; \ + ORQ rBa, rDo; \ + XORQ rBi, rDi; \ + XORQ rBo, rDo; \ + MOVQ rDi, _si(oState); \ + MOVQ rDo, _so(oState) \ + +// func keccakF1600(state *[25]uint64) +TEXT ·keccakF1600(SB), 0, $200-8 + MOVQ state+0(FP), rpState + + // Convert the user state into an internal state + NOTQ _be(rpState) + NOTQ _bi(rpState) + NOTQ _go(rpState) + NOTQ _ki(rpState) + NOTQ _mi(rpState) + NOTQ _sa(rpState) + + // Execute the KeccakF permutation + MOVQ _ba(rpState), rCa + MOVQ _be(rpState), rCe + MOVQ _bu(rpState), rCu + + XORQ _ga(rpState), rCa + XORQ _ge(rpState), rCe + XORQ _gu(rpState), rCu + + XORQ _ka(rpState), rCa + XORQ _ke(rpState), rCe + XORQ _ku(rpState), rCu + + XORQ _ma(rpState), rCa + XORQ _me(rpState), rCe + XORQ _mu(rpState), rCu + + XORQ _sa(rpState), rCa + XORQ _se(rpState), rCe + MOVQ _si(rpState), rDi + MOVQ _so(rpState), rDo + XORQ _su(rpState), rCu + + mKeccakRound(rpState, rpStack, $0x0000000000000001, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpStack, rpState, $0x0000000000008082, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpState, rpStack, $0x800000000000808a, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpStack, rpState, $0x8000000080008000, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpState, rpStack, $0x000000000000808b, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpStack, rpState, $0x0000000080000001, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpState, rpStack, $0x8000000080008081, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpStack, rpState, $0x8000000000008009, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpState, rpStack, $0x000000000000008a, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpStack, rpState, $0x0000000000000088, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpState, rpStack, $0x0000000080008009, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpStack, rpState, $0x000000008000000a, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpState, rpStack, $0x000000008000808b, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpStack, rpState, $0x800000000000008b, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpState, rpStack, $0x8000000000008089, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpStack, rpState, $0x8000000000008003, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpState, rpStack, $0x8000000000008002, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpStack, rpState, $0x8000000000000080, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpState, rpStack, $0x000000000000800a, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpStack, rpState, $0x800000008000000a, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpState, rpStack, $0x8000000080008081, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpStack, rpState, $0x8000000000008080, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpState, rpStack, $0x0000000080000001, MOVQ_RBI_RCE, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBA_RCU, XORQ_RT1_RCA, XORQ_RT1_RCE, XORQ_RBE_RCU, XORQ_RDU_RCU, XORQ_RDA_RCA, XORQ_RDE_RCE) + mKeccakRound(rpStack, rpState, $0x8000000080008008, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP, NOP) + + // Revert the internal state to the user state + NOTQ _be(rpState) + NOTQ _bi(rpState) + NOTQ _go(rpState) + NOTQ _ki(rpState) + NOTQ _mi(rpState) + NOTQ _sa(rpState) + + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/register.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/register.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8b4453aa --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/register.go @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build go1.4 +// +build go1.4 + +package sha3 + +import ( + "crypto" +) + +func init() { + crypto.RegisterHash(crypto.SHA3_224, New224) + crypto.RegisterHash(crypto.SHA3_256, New256) + crypto.RegisterHash(crypto.SHA3_384, New384) + crypto.RegisterHash(crypto.SHA3_512, New512) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4884d172 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3.go @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package sha3 + +// spongeDirection indicates the direction bytes are flowing through the sponge. +type spongeDirection int + +const ( + // spongeAbsorbing indicates that the sponge is absorbing input. + spongeAbsorbing spongeDirection = iota + // spongeSqueezing indicates that the sponge is being squeezed. + spongeSqueezing +) + +const ( + // maxRate is the maximum size of the internal buffer. SHAKE-256 + // currently needs the largest buffer. + maxRate = 168 +) + +type state struct { + // Generic sponge components. + a [25]uint64 // main state of the hash + buf []byte // points into storage + rate int // the number of bytes of state to use + + // dsbyte contains the "domain separation" bits and the first bit of + // the padding. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of [1] separate the outputs of the + // SHA-3 and SHAKE functions by appending bitstrings to the message. + // Using a little-endian bit-ordering convention, these are "01" for SHA-3 + // and "1111" for SHAKE, or 00000010b and 00001111b, respectively. Then the + // padding rule from section 5.1 is applied to pad the message to a multiple + // of the rate, which involves adding a "1" bit, zero or more "0" bits, and + // a final "1" bit. We merge the first "1" bit from the padding into dsbyte, + // giving 00000110b (0x06) and 00011111b (0x1f). + // [1] http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/fips-202/fips_202_draft.pdf + // "Draft FIPS 202: SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and + // Extendable-Output Functions (May 2014)" + dsbyte byte + + storage storageBuf + + // Specific to SHA-3 and SHAKE. + outputLen int // the default output size in bytes + state spongeDirection // whether the sponge is absorbing or squeezing +} + +// BlockSize returns the rate of sponge underlying this hash function. +func (d *state) BlockSize() int { return d.rate } + +// Size returns the output size of the hash function in bytes. +func (d *state) Size() int { return d.outputLen } + +// Reset clears the internal state by zeroing the sponge state and +// the byte buffer, and setting Sponge.state to absorbing. +func (d *state) Reset() { + // Zero the permutation's state. + for i := range d.a { + d.a[i] = 0 + } + d.state = spongeAbsorbing + d.buf = d.storage.asBytes()[:0] +} + +func (d *state) clone() *state { + ret := *d + if ret.state == spongeAbsorbing { + ret.buf = ret.storage.asBytes()[:len(ret.buf)] + } else { + ret.buf = ret.storage.asBytes()[d.rate-cap(d.buf) : d.rate] + } + + return &ret +} + +// permute applies the KeccakF-1600 permutation. It handles +// any input-output buffering. +func (d *state) permute() { + switch d.state { + case spongeAbsorbing: + // If we're absorbing, we need to xor the input into the state + // before applying the permutation. + xorIn(d, d.buf) + d.buf = d.storage.asBytes()[:0] + keccakF1600(&d.a) + case spongeSqueezing: + // If we're squeezing, we need to apply the permutation before + // copying more output. + keccakF1600(&d.a) + d.buf = d.storage.asBytes()[:d.rate] + copyOut(d, d.buf) + } +} + +// pads appends the domain separation bits in dsbyte, applies +// the multi-bitrate 10..1 padding rule, and permutes the state. +func (d *state) padAndPermute(dsbyte byte) { + if d.buf == nil { + d.buf = d.storage.asBytes()[:0] + } + // Pad with this instance's domain-separator bits. We know that there's + // at least one byte of space in d.buf because, if it were full, + // permute would have been called to empty it. dsbyte also contains the + // first one bit for the padding. See the comment in the state struct. + d.buf = append(d.buf, dsbyte) + zerosStart := len(d.buf) + d.buf = d.storage.asBytes()[:d.rate] + for i := zerosStart; i < d.rate; i++ { + d.buf[i] = 0 + } + // This adds the final one bit for the padding. Because of the way that + // bits are numbered from the LSB upwards, the final bit is the MSB of + // the last byte. + d.buf[d.rate-1] ^= 0x80 + // Apply the permutation + d.permute() + d.state = spongeSqueezing + d.buf = d.storage.asBytes()[:d.rate] + copyOut(d, d.buf) +} + +// Write absorbs more data into the hash's state. It panics if any +// output has already been read. +func (d *state) Write(p []byte) (written int, err error) { + if d.state != spongeAbsorbing { + panic("sha3: Write after Read") + } + if d.buf == nil { + d.buf = d.storage.asBytes()[:0] + } + written = len(p) + + for len(p) > 0 { + if len(d.buf) == 0 && len(p) >= d.rate { + // The fast path; absorb a full "rate" bytes of input and apply the permutation. + xorIn(d, p[:d.rate]) + p = p[d.rate:] + keccakF1600(&d.a) + } else { + // The slow path; buffer the input until we can fill the sponge, and then xor it in. + todo := d.rate - len(d.buf) + if todo > len(p) { + todo = len(p) + } + d.buf = append(d.buf, p[:todo]...) + p = p[todo:] + + // If the sponge is full, apply the permutation. + if len(d.buf) == d.rate { + d.permute() + } + } + } + + return +} + +// Read squeezes an arbitrary number of bytes from the sponge. +func (d *state) Read(out []byte) (n int, err error) { + // If we're still absorbing, pad and apply the permutation. + if d.state == spongeAbsorbing { + d.padAndPermute(d.dsbyte) + } + + n = len(out) + + // Now, do the squeezing. + for len(out) > 0 { + n := copy(out, d.buf) + d.buf = d.buf[n:] + out = out[n:] + + // Apply the permutation if we've squeezed the sponge dry. + if len(d.buf) == 0 { + d.permute() + } + } + + return +} + +// Sum applies padding to the hash state and then squeezes out the desired +// number of output bytes. It panics if any output has already been read. +func (d *state) Sum(in []byte) []byte { + if d.state != spongeAbsorbing { + panic("sha3: Sum after Read") + } + + // Make a copy of the original hash so that caller can keep writing + // and summing. + dup := d.clone() + hash := make([]byte, dup.outputLen, 64) // explicit cap to allow stack allocation + dup.Read(hash) + return append(in, hash...) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ec26f147 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,289 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +package sha3 + +// This file contains code for using the 'compute intermediate +// message digest' (KIMD) and 'compute last message digest' (KLMD) +// instructions to compute SHA-3 and SHAKE hashes on IBM Z. + +import ( + "hash" + + "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" +) + +// codes represent 7-bit KIMD/KLMD function codes as defined in +// the Principles of Operation. +type code uint64 + +const ( + // function codes for KIMD/KLMD + sha3_224 code = 32 + sha3_256 = 33 + sha3_384 = 34 + sha3_512 = 35 + shake_128 = 36 + shake_256 = 37 + nopad = 0x100 +) + +// kimd is a wrapper for the 'compute intermediate message digest' instruction. +// src must be a multiple of the rate for the given function code. +// +//go:noescape +func kimd(function code, chain *[200]byte, src []byte) + +// klmd is a wrapper for the 'compute last message digest' instruction. +// src padding is handled by the instruction. +// +//go:noescape +func klmd(function code, chain *[200]byte, dst, src []byte) + +type asmState struct { + a [200]byte // 1600 bit state + buf []byte // care must be taken to ensure cap(buf) is a multiple of rate + rate int // equivalent to block size + storage [3072]byte // underlying storage for buf + outputLen int // output length for full security + function code // KIMD/KLMD function code + state spongeDirection // whether the sponge is absorbing or squeezing +} + +func newAsmState(function code) *asmState { + var s asmState + s.function = function + switch function { + case sha3_224: + s.rate = 144 + s.outputLen = 28 + case sha3_256: + s.rate = 136 + s.outputLen = 32 + case sha3_384: + s.rate = 104 + s.outputLen = 48 + case sha3_512: + s.rate = 72 + s.outputLen = 64 + case shake_128: + s.rate = 168 + s.outputLen = 32 + case shake_256: + s.rate = 136 + s.outputLen = 64 + default: + panic("sha3: unrecognized function code") + } + + // limit s.buf size to a multiple of s.rate + s.resetBuf() + return &s +} + +func (s *asmState) clone() *asmState { + c := *s + c.buf = c.storage[:len(s.buf):cap(s.buf)] + return &c +} + +// copyIntoBuf copies b into buf. It will panic if there is not enough space to +// store all of b. +func (s *asmState) copyIntoBuf(b []byte) { + bufLen := len(s.buf) + s.buf = s.buf[:len(s.buf)+len(b)] + copy(s.buf[bufLen:], b) +} + +// resetBuf points buf at storage, sets the length to 0 and sets cap to be a +// multiple of the rate. +func (s *asmState) resetBuf() { + max := (cap(s.storage) / s.rate) * s.rate + s.buf = s.storage[:0:max] +} + +// Write (via the embedded io.Writer interface) adds more data to the running hash. +// It never returns an error. +func (s *asmState) Write(b []byte) (int, error) { + if s.state != spongeAbsorbing { + panic("sha3: Write after Read") + } + length := len(b) + for len(b) > 0 { + if len(s.buf) == 0 && len(b) >= cap(s.buf) { + // Hash the data directly and push any remaining bytes + // into the buffer. + remainder := len(b) % s.rate + kimd(s.function, &s.a, b[:len(b)-remainder]) + if remainder != 0 { + s.copyIntoBuf(b[len(b)-remainder:]) + } + return length, nil + } + + if len(s.buf) == cap(s.buf) { + // flush the buffer + kimd(s.function, &s.a, s.buf) + s.buf = s.buf[:0] + } + + // copy as much as we can into the buffer + n := len(b) + if len(b) > cap(s.buf)-len(s.buf) { + n = cap(s.buf) - len(s.buf) + } + s.copyIntoBuf(b[:n]) + b = b[n:] + } + return length, nil +} + +// Read squeezes an arbitrary number of bytes from the sponge. +func (s *asmState) Read(out []byte) (n int, err error) { + n = len(out) + + // need to pad if we were absorbing + if s.state == spongeAbsorbing { + s.state = spongeSqueezing + + // write hash directly into out if possible + if len(out)%s.rate == 0 { + klmd(s.function, &s.a, out, s.buf) // len(out) may be 0 + s.buf = s.buf[:0] + return + } + + // write hash into buffer + max := cap(s.buf) + if max > len(out) { + max = (len(out)/s.rate)*s.rate + s.rate + } + klmd(s.function, &s.a, s.buf[:max], s.buf) + s.buf = s.buf[:max] + } + + for len(out) > 0 { + // flush the buffer + if len(s.buf) != 0 { + c := copy(out, s.buf) + out = out[c:] + s.buf = s.buf[c:] + continue + } + + // write hash directly into out if possible + if len(out)%s.rate == 0 { + klmd(s.function|nopad, &s.a, out, nil) + return + } + + // write hash into buffer + s.resetBuf() + if cap(s.buf) > len(out) { + s.buf = s.buf[:(len(out)/s.rate)*s.rate+s.rate] + } + klmd(s.function|nopad, &s.a, s.buf, nil) + } + return +} + +// Sum appends the current hash to b and returns the resulting slice. +// It does not change the underlying hash state. +func (s *asmState) Sum(b []byte) []byte { + if s.state != spongeAbsorbing { + panic("sha3: Sum after Read") + } + + // Copy the state to preserve the original. + a := s.a + + // Hash the buffer. Note that we don't clear it because we + // aren't updating the state. + klmd(s.function, &a, nil, s.buf) + return append(b, a[:s.outputLen]...) +} + +// Reset resets the Hash to its initial state. +func (s *asmState) Reset() { + for i := range s.a { + s.a[i] = 0 + } + s.resetBuf() + s.state = spongeAbsorbing +} + +// Size returns the number of bytes Sum will return. +func (s *asmState) Size() int { + return s.outputLen +} + +// BlockSize returns the hash's underlying block size. +// The Write method must be able to accept any amount +// of data, but it may operate more efficiently if all writes +// are a multiple of the block size. +func (s *asmState) BlockSize() int { + return s.rate +} + +// Clone returns a copy of the ShakeHash in its current state. +func (s *asmState) Clone() ShakeHash { + return s.clone() +} + +// new224Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-224 if available, +// otherwise it returns nil. +func new224Asm() hash.Hash { + if cpu.S390X.HasSHA3 { + return newAsmState(sha3_224) + } + return nil +} + +// new256Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-256 if available, +// otherwise it returns nil. +func new256Asm() hash.Hash { + if cpu.S390X.HasSHA3 { + return newAsmState(sha3_256) + } + return nil +} + +// new384Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-384 if available, +// otherwise it returns nil. +func new384Asm() hash.Hash { + if cpu.S390X.HasSHA3 { + return newAsmState(sha3_384) + } + return nil +} + +// new512Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-512 if available, +// otherwise it returns nil. +func new512Asm() hash.Hash { + if cpu.S390X.HasSHA3 { + return newAsmState(sha3_512) + } + return nil +} + +// newShake128Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHAKE-128 if available, +// otherwise it returns nil. +func newShake128Asm() ShakeHash { + if cpu.S390X.HasSHA3 { + return newAsmState(shake_128) + } + return nil +} + +// newShake256Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHAKE-256 if available, +// otherwise it returns nil. +func newShake256Asm() ShakeHash { + if cpu.S390X.HasSHA3 { + return newAsmState(shake_256) + } + return nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a0e051b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +// func kimd(function code, chain *[200]byte, src []byte) +TEXT ·kimd(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0-40 + MOVD function+0(FP), R0 + MOVD chain+8(FP), R1 + LMG src+16(FP), R2, R3 // R2=base, R3=len + +continue: + WORD $0xB93E0002 // KIMD --, R2 + BVS continue // continue if interrupted + MOVD $0, R0 // reset R0 for pre-go1.8 compilers + RET + +// func klmd(function code, chain *[200]byte, dst, src []byte) +TEXT ·klmd(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0-64 + // TODO: SHAKE support + MOVD function+0(FP), R0 + MOVD chain+8(FP), R1 + LMG dst+16(FP), R2, R3 // R2=base, R3=len + LMG src+40(FP), R4, R5 // R4=base, R5=len + +continue: + WORD $0xB93F0024 // KLMD R2, R4 + BVS continue // continue if interrupted + MOVD $0, R0 // reset R0 for pre-go1.8 compilers + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/shake.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/shake.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bb699840 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/shake.go @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package sha3 + +// This file defines the ShakeHash interface, and provides +// functions for creating SHAKE and cSHAKE instances, as well as utility +// functions for hashing bytes to arbitrary-length output. +// +// +// SHAKE implementation is based on FIPS PUB 202 [1] +// cSHAKE implementations is based on NIST SP 800-185 [2] +// +// [1] https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf +// [2] https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185 + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "hash" + "io" +) + +// ShakeHash defines the interface to hash functions that support +// arbitrary-length output. When used as a plain [hash.Hash], it +// produces minimum-length outputs that provide full-strength generic +// security. +type ShakeHash interface { + hash.Hash + + // Read reads more output from the hash; reading affects the hash's + // state. (ShakeHash.Read is thus very different from Hash.Sum) + // It never returns an error, but subsequent calls to Write or Sum + // will panic. + io.Reader + + // Clone returns a copy of the ShakeHash in its current state. + Clone() ShakeHash +} + +// cSHAKE specific context +type cshakeState struct { + *state // SHA-3 state context and Read/Write operations + + // initBlock is the cSHAKE specific initialization set of bytes. It is initialized + // by newCShake function and stores concatenation of N followed by S, encoded + // by the method specified in 3.3 of [1]. + // It is stored here in order for Reset() to be able to put context into + // initial state. + initBlock []byte +} + +// Consts for configuring initial SHA-3 state +const ( + dsbyteShake = 0x1f + dsbyteCShake = 0x04 + rate128 = 168 + rate256 = 136 +) + +func bytepad(input []byte, w int) []byte { + // leftEncode always returns max 9 bytes + buf := make([]byte, 0, 9+len(input)+w) + buf = append(buf, leftEncode(uint64(w))...) + buf = append(buf, input...) + padlen := w - (len(buf) % w) + return append(buf, make([]byte, padlen)...) +} + +func leftEncode(value uint64) []byte { + var b [9]byte + binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(b[1:], value) + // Trim all but last leading zero bytes + i := byte(1) + for i < 8 && b[i] == 0 { + i++ + } + // Prepend number of encoded bytes + b[i-1] = 9 - i + return b[i-1:] +} + +func newCShake(N, S []byte, rate, outputLen int, dsbyte byte) ShakeHash { + c := cshakeState{state: &state{rate: rate, outputLen: outputLen, dsbyte: dsbyte}} + + // leftEncode returns max 9 bytes + c.initBlock = make([]byte, 0, 9*2+len(N)+len(S)) + c.initBlock = append(c.initBlock, leftEncode(uint64(len(N)*8))...) + c.initBlock = append(c.initBlock, N...) + c.initBlock = append(c.initBlock, leftEncode(uint64(len(S)*8))...) + c.initBlock = append(c.initBlock, S...) + c.Write(bytepad(c.initBlock, c.rate)) + return &c +} + +// Reset resets the hash to initial state. +func (c *cshakeState) Reset() { + c.state.Reset() + c.Write(bytepad(c.initBlock, c.rate)) +} + +// Clone returns copy of a cSHAKE context within its current state. +func (c *cshakeState) Clone() ShakeHash { + b := make([]byte, len(c.initBlock)) + copy(b, c.initBlock) + return &cshakeState{state: c.clone(), initBlock: b} +} + +// Clone returns copy of SHAKE context within its current state. +func (c *state) Clone() ShakeHash { + return c.clone() +} + +// NewShake128 creates a new SHAKE128 variable-output-length ShakeHash. +// Its generic security strength is 128 bits against all attacks if at +// least 32 bytes of its output are used. +func NewShake128() ShakeHash { + if h := newShake128Asm(); h != nil { + return h + } + return &state{rate: rate128, outputLen: 32, dsbyte: dsbyteShake} +} + +// NewShake256 creates a new SHAKE256 variable-output-length ShakeHash. +// Its generic security strength is 256 bits against all attacks if +// at least 64 bytes of its output are used. +func NewShake256() ShakeHash { + if h := newShake256Asm(); h != nil { + return h + } + return &state{rate: rate256, outputLen: 64, dsbyte: dsbyteShake} +} + +// NewCShake128 creates a new instance of cSHAKE128 variable-output-length ShakeHash, +// a customizable variant of SHAKE128. +// N is used to define functions based on cSHAKE, it can be empty when plain cSHAKE is +// desired. S is a customization byte string used for domain separation - two cSHAKE +// computations on same input with different S yield unrelated outputs. +// When N and S are both empty, this is equivalent to NewShake128. +func NewCShake128(N, S []byte) ShakeHash { + if len(N) == 0 && len(S) == 0 { + return NewShake128() + } + return newCShake(N, S, rate128, 32, dsbyteCShake) +} + +// NewCShake256 creates a new instance of cSHAKE256 variable-output-length ShakeHash, +// a customizable variant of SHAKE256. +// N is used to define functions based on cSHAKE, it can be empty when plain cSHAKE is +// desired. S is a customization byte string used for domain separation - two cSHAKE +// computations on same input with different S yield unrelated outputs. +// When N and S are both empty, this is equivalent to NewShake256. +func NewCShake256(N, S []byte) ShakeHash { + if len(N) == 0 && len(S) == 0 { + return NewShake256() + } + return newCShake(N, S, rate256, 64, dsbyteCShake) +} + +// ShakeSum128 writes an arbitrary-length digest of data into hash. +func ShakeSum128(hash, data []byte) { + h := NewShake128() + h.Write(data) + h.Read(hash) +} + +// ShakeSum256 writes an arbitrary-length digest of data into hash. +func ShakeSum256(hash, data []byte) { + h := NewShake256() + h.Write(data) + h.Read(hash) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/shake_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/shake_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5c0710ef --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/shake_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !gc || purego || !s390x +// +build !gc purego !s390x + +package sha3 + +// newShake128Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHAKE-128 if available, +// otherwise it returns nil. +func newShake128Asm() ShakeHash { + return nil +} + +// newShake256Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHAKE-256 if available, +// otherwise it returns nil. +func newShake256Asm() ShakeHash { + return nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..59c8eb94 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor.go @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (!amd64 && !386 && !ppc64le) || purego +// +build !amd64,!386,!ppc64le purego + +package sha3 + +// A storageBuf is an aligned array of maxRate bytes. +type storageBuf [maxRate]byte + +func (b *storageBuf) asBytes() *[maxRate]byte { + return (*[maxRate]byte)(b) +} + +var ( + xorIn = xorInGeneric + copyOut = copyOutGeneric + xorInUnaligned = xorInGeneric + copyOutUnaligned = copyOutGeneric +) + +const xorImplementationUnaligned = "generic" diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8d947711 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package sha3 + +import "encoding/binary" + +// xorInGeneric xors the bytes in buf into the state; it +// makes no non-portable assumptions about memory layout +// or alignment. +func xorInGeneric(d *state, buf []byte) { + n := len(buf) / 8 + + for i := 0; i < n; i++ { + a := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf) + d.a[i] ^= a + buf = buf[8:] + } +} + +// copyOutGeneric copies uint64s to a byte buffer. +func copyOutGeneric(d *state, b []byte) { + for i := 0; len(b) >= 8; i++ { + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(b, d.a[i]) + b = b[8:] + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor_unaligned.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor_unaligned.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1ce60624 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor_unaligned.go @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (amd64 || 386 || ppc64le) && !purego +// +build amd64 386 ppc64le +// +build !purego + +package sha3 + +import "unsafe" + +// A storageBuf is an aligned array of maxRate bytes. +type storageBuf [maxRate / 8]uint64 + +func (b *storageBuf) asBytes() *[maxRate]byte { + return (*[maxRate]byte)(unsafe.Pointer(b)) +} + +// xorInUnaligned uses unaligned reads and writes to update d.a to contain d.a +// XOR buf. +func xorInUnaligned(d *state, buf []byte) { + n := len(buf) + bw := (*[maxRate / 8]uint64)(unsafe.Pointer(&buf[0]))[: n/8 : n/8] + if n >= 72 { + d.a[0] ^= bw[0] + d.a[1] ^= bw[1] + d.a[2] ^= bw[2] + d.a[3] ^= bw[3] + d.a[4] ^= bw[4] + d.a[5] ^= bw[5] + d.a[6] ^= bw[6] + d.a[7] ^= bw[7] + d.a[8] ^= bw[8] + } + if n >= 104 { + d.a[9] ^= bw[9] + d.a[10] ^= bw[10] + d.a[11] ^= bw[11] + d.a[12] ^= bw[12] + } + if n >= 136 { + d.a[13] ^= bw[13] + d.a[14] ^= bw[14] + d.a[15] ^= bw[15] + d.a[16] ^= bw[16] + } + if n >= 144 { + d.a[17] ^= bw[17] + } + if n >= 168 { + d.a[18] ^= bw[18] + d.a[19] ^= bw[19] + d.a[20] ^= bw[20] + } +} + +func copyOutUnaligned(d *state, buf []byte) { + ab := (*[maxRate]uint8)(unsafe.Pointer(&d.a[0])) + copy(buf, ab[:]) +} + +var ( + xorIn = xorInUnaligned + copyOut = copyOutUnaligned +) + +const xorImplementationUnaligned = "unaligned" diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_aix_ppc64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_aix_ppc64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..269e173c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_aix_ppc64.s @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc + +#include "textflag.h" + +// +// System calls for ppc64, AIX are implemented in runtime/syscall_aix.go +// + +TEXT ·syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-88 + JMP syscall·syscall6(SB) + +TEXT ·rawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-88 + JMP syscall·rawSyscall6(SB) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/byteorder.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/byteorder.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..271055be --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/byteorder.go @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +import ( + "runtime" +) + +// byteOrder is a subset of encoding/binary.ByteOrder. +type byteOrder interface { + Uint32([]byte) uint32 + Uint64([]byte) uint64 +} + +type littleEndian struct{} +type bigEndian struct{} + +func (littleEndian) Uint32(b []byte) uint32 { + _ = b[3] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808 + return uint32(b[0]) | uint32(b[1])<<8 | uint32(b[2])<<16 | uint32(b[3])<<24 +} + +func (littleEndian) Uint64(b []byte) uint64 { + _ = b[7] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808 + return uint64(b[0]) | uint64(b[1])<<8 | uint64(b[2])<<16 | uint64(b[3])<<24 | + uint64(b[4])<<32 | uint64(b[5])<<40 | uint64(b[6])<<48 | uint64(b[7])<<56 +} + +func (bigEndian) Uint32(b []byte) uint32 { + _ = b[3] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808 + return uint32(b[3]) | uint32(b[2])<<8 | uint32(b[1])<<16 | uint32(b[0])<<24 +} + +func (bigEndian) Uint64(b []byte) uint64 { + _ = b[7] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808 + return uint64(b[7]) | uint64(b[6])<<8 | uint64(b[5])<<16 | uint64(b[4])<<24 | + uint64(b[3])<<32 | uint64(b[2])<<40 | uint64(b[1])<<48 | uint64(b[0])<<56 +} + +// hostByteOrder returns littleEndian on little-endian machines and +// bigEndian on big-endian machines. +func hostByteOrder() byteOrder { + switch runtime.GOARCH { + case "386", "amd64", "amd64p32", + "alpha", + "arm", "arm64", + "loong64", + "mipsle", "mips64le", "mips64p32le", + "nios2", + "ppc64le", + "riscv", "riscv64", + "sh": + return littleEndian{} + case "armbe", "arm64be", + "m68k", + "mips", "mips64", "mips64p32", + "ppc", "ppc64", + "s390", "s390x", + "shbe", + "sparc", "sparc64": + return bigEndian{} + } + panic("unknown architecture") +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4756ad5f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu.go @@ -0,0 +1,290 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package cpu implements processor feature detection for +// various CPU architectures. +package cpu + +import ( + "os" + "strings" +) + +// Initialized reports whether the CPU features were initialized. +// +// For some GOOS/GOARCH combinations initialization of the CPU features depends +// on reading an operating specific file, e.g. /proc/self/auxv on linux/arm +// Initialized will report false if reading the file fails. +var Initialized bool + +// CacheLinePad is used to pad structs to avoid false sharing. +type CacheLinePad struct{ _ [cacheLineSize]byte } + +// X86 contains the supported CPU features of the +// current X86/AMD64 platform. If the current platform +// is not X86/AMD64 then all feature flags are false. +// +// X86 is padded to avoid false sharing. Further the HasAVX +// and HasAVX2 are only set if the OS supports XMM and YMM +// registers in addition to the CPUID feature bit being set. +var X86 struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasAES bool // AES hardware implementation (AES NI) + HasADX bool // Multi-precision add-carry instruction extensions + HasAVX bool // Advanced vector extension + HasAVX2 bool // Advanced vector extension 2 + HasAVX512 bool // Advanced vector extension 512 + HasAVX512F bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Foundation Instructions + HasAVX512CD bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Conflict Detection Instructions + HasAVX512ER bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Exponential and Reciprocal Instructions + HasAVX512PF bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Prefetch Instructions + HasAVX512VL bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Vector Length Extensions + HasAVX512BW bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Byte and Word Instructions + HasAVX512DQ bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Doubleword and Quadword Instructions + HasAVX512IFMA bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Integer Fused Multiply Add + HasAVX512VBMI bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Vector Byte Manipulation Instructions + HasAVX5124VNNIW bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Vector Neural Network Instructions Word variable precision + HasAVX5124FMAPS bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Fused Multiply Accumulation Packed Single precision + HasAVX512VPOPCNTDQ bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Double and quad word population count instructions + HasAVX512VPCLMULQDQ bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Vector carry-less multiply operations + HasAVX512VNNI bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Vector Neural Network Instructions + HasAVX512GFNI bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Galois field New Instructions + HasAVX512VAES bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Vector AES instructions + HasAVX512VBMI2 bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Vector Byte Manipulation Instructions 2 + HasAVX512BITALG bool // Advanced vector extension 512 Bit Algorithms + HasAVX512BF16 bool // Advanced vector extension 512 BFloat16 Instructions + HasAMXTile bool // Advanced Matrix Extension Tile instructions + HasAMXInt8 bool // Advanced Matrix Extension Int8 instructions + HasAMXBF16 bool // Advanced Matrix Extension BFloat16 instructions + HasBMI1 bool // Bit manipulation instruction set 1 + HasBMI2 bool // Bit manipulation instruction set 2 + HasCX16 bool // Compare and exchange 16 Bytes + HasERMS bool // Enhanced REP for MOVSB and STOSB + HasFMA bool // Fused-multiply-add instructions + HasOSXSAVE bool // OS supports XSAVE/XRESTOR for saving/restoring XMM registers. + HasPCLMULQDQ bool // PCLMULQDQ instruction - most often used for AES-GCM + HasPOPCNT bool // Hamming weight instruction POPCNT. + HasRDRAND bool // RDRAND instruction (on-chip random number generator) + HasRDSEED bool // RDSEED instruction (on-chip random number generator) + HasSSE2 bool // Streaming SIMD extension 2 (always available on amd64) + HasSSE3 bool // Streaming SIMD extension 3 + HasSSSE3 bool // Supplemental streaming SIMD extension 3 + HasSSE41 bool // Streaming SIMD extension 4 and 4.1 + HasSSE42 bool // Streaming SIMD extension 4 and 4.2 + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// ARM64 contains the supported CPU features of the +// current ARMv8(aarch64) platform. If the current platform +// is not arm64 then all feature flags are false. +var ARM64 struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasFP bool // Floating-point instruction set (always available) + HasASIMD bool // Advanced SIMD (always available) + HasEVTSTRM bool // Event stream support + HasAES bool // AES hardware implementation + HasPMULL bool // Polynomial multiplication instruction set + HasSHA1 bool // SHA1 hardware implementation + HasSHA2 bool // SHA2 hardware implementation + HasCRC32 bool // CRC32 hardware implementation + HasATOMICS bool // Atomic memory operation instruction set + HasFPHP bool // Half precision floating-point instruction set + HasASIMDHP bool // Advanced SIMD half precision instruction set + HasCPUID bool // CPUID identification scheme registers + HasASIMDRDM bool // Rounding double multiply add/subtract instruction set + HasJSCVT bool // Javascript conversion from floating-point to integer + HasFCMA bool // Floating-point multiplication and addition of complex numbers + HasLRCPC bool // Release Consistent processor consistent support + HasDCPOP bool // Persistent memory support + HasSHA3 bool // SHA3 hardware implementation + HasSM3 bool // SM3 hardware implementation + HasSM4 bool // SM4 hardware implementation + HasASIMDDP bool // Advanced SIMD double precision instruction set + HasSHA512 bool // SHA512 hardware implementation + HasSVE bool // Scalable Vector Extensions + HasASIMDFHM bool // Advanced SIMD multiplication FP16 to FP32 + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// ARM contains the supported CPU features of the current ARM (32-bit) platform. +// All feature flags are false if: +// 1. the current platform is not arm, or +// 2. the current operating system is not Linux. +var ARM struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasSWP bool // SWP instruction support + HasHALF bool // Half-word load and store support + HasTHUMB bool // ARM Thumb instruction set + Has26BIT bool // Address space limited to 26-bits + HasFASTMUL bool // 32-bit operand, 64-bit result multiplication support + HasFPA bool // Floating point arithmetic support + HasVFP bool // Vector floating point support + HasEDSP bool // DSP Extensions support + HasJAVA bool // Java instruction set + HasIWMMXT bool // Intel Wireless MMX technology support + HasCRUNCH bool // MaverickCrunch context switching and handling + HasTHUMBEE bool // Thumb EE instruction set + HasNEON bool // NEON instruction set + HasVFPv3 bool // Vector floating point version 3 support + HasVFPv3D16 bool // Vector floating point version 3 D8-D15 + HasTLS bool // Thread local storage support + HasVFPv4 bool // Vector floating point version 4 support + HasIDIVA bool // Integer divide instruction support in ARM mode + HasIDIVT bool // Integer divide instruction support in Thumb mode + HasVFPD32 bool // Vector floating point version 3 D15-D31 + HasLPAE bool // Large Physical Address Extensions + HasEVTSTRM bool // Event stream support + HasAES bool // AES hardware implementation + HasPMULL bool // Polynomial multiplication instruction set + HasSHA1 bool // SHA1 hardware implementation + HasSHA2 bool // SHA2 hardware implementation + HasCRC32 bool // CRC32 hardware implementation + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// MIPS64X contains the supported CPU features of the current mips64/mips64le +// platforms. If the current platform is not mips64/mips64le or the current +// operating system is not Linux then all feature flags are false. +var MIPS64X struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasMSA bool // MIPS SIMD architecture + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// PPC64 contains the supported CPU features of the current ppc64/ppc64le platforms. +// If the current platform is not ppc64/ppc64le then all feature flags are false. +// +// For ppc64/ppc64le, it is safe to check only for ISA level starting on ISA v3.00, +// since there are no optional categories. There are some exceptions that also +// require kernel support to work (DARN, SCV), so there are feature bits for +// those as well. The struct is padded to avoid false sharing. +var PPC64 struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasDARN bool // Hardware random number generator (requires kernel enablement) + HasSCV bool // Syscall vectored (requires kernel enablement) + IsPOWER8 bool // ISA v2.07 (POWER8) + IsPOWER9 bool // ISA v3.00 (POWER9), implies IsPOWER8 + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// S390X contains the supported CPU features of the current IBM Z +// (s390x) platform. If the current platform is not IBM Z then all +// feature flags are false. +// +// S390X is padded to avoid false sharing. Further HasVX is only set +// if the OS supports vector registers in addition to the STFLE +// feature bit being set. +var S390X struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasZARCH bool // z/Architecture mode is active [mandatory] + HasSTFLE bool // store facility list extended + HasLDISP bool // long (20-bit) displacements + HasEIMM bool // 32-bit immediates + HasDFP bool // decimal floating point + HasETF3EH bool // ETF-3 enhanced + HasMSA bool // message security assist (CPACF) + HasAES bool // KM-AES{128,192,256} functions + HasAESCBC bool // KMC-AES{128,192,256} functions + HasAESCTR bool // KMCTR-AES{128,192,256} functions + HasAESGCM bool // KMA-GCM-AES{128,192,256} functions + HasGHASH bool // KIMD-GHASH function + HasSHA1 bool // K{I,L}MD-SHA-1 functions + HasSHA256 bool // K{I,L}MD-SHA-256 functions + HasSHA512 bool // K{I,L}MD-SHA-512 functions + HasSHA3 bool // K{I,L}MD-SHA3-{224,256,384,512} and K{I,L}MD-SHAKE-{128,256} functions + HasVX bool // vector facility + HasVXE bool // vector-enhancements facility 1 + _ CacheLinePad +} + +func init() { + archInit() + initOptions() + processOptions() +} + +// options contains the cpu debug options that can be used in GODEBUG. +// Options are arch dependent and are added by the arch specific initOptions functions. +// Features that are mandatory for the specific GOARCH should have the Required field set +// (e.g. SSE2 on amd64). +var options []option + +// Option names should be lower case. e.g. avx instead of AVX. +type option struct { + Name string + Feature *bool + Specified bool // whether feature value was specified in GODEBUG + Enable bool // whether feature should be enabled + Required bool // whether feature is mandatory and can not be disabled +} + +func processOptions() { + env := os.Getenv("GODEBUG") +field: + for env != "" { + field := "" + i := strings.IndexByte(env, ',') + if i < 0 { + field, env = env, "" + } else { + field, env = env[:i], env[i+1:] + } + if len(field) < 4 || field[:4] != "cpu." { + continue + } + i = strings.IndexByte(field, '=') + if i < 0 { + print("GODEBUG sys/cpu: no value specified for \"", field, "\"\n") + continue + } + key, value := field[4:i], field[i+1:] // e.g. "SSE2", "on" + + var enable bool + switch value { + case "on": + enable = true + case "off": + enable = false + default: + print("GODEBUG sys/cpu: value \"", value, "\" not supported for cpu option \"", key, "\"\n") + continue field + } + + if key == "all" { + for i := range options { + options[i].Specified = true + options[i].Enable = enable || options[i].Required + } + continue field + } + + for i := range options { + if options[i].Name == key { + options[i].Specified = true + options[i].Enable = enable + continue field + } + } + + print("GODEBUG sys/cpu: unknown cpu feature \"", key, "\"\n") + } + + for _, o := range options { + if !o.Specified { + continue + } + + if o.Enable && !*o.Feature { + print("GODEBUG sys/cpu: can not enable \"", o.Name, "\", missing CPU support\n") + continue + } + + if !o.Enable && o.Required { + print("GODEBUG sys/cpu: can not disable \"", o.Name, "\", required CPU feature\n") + continue + } + + *o.Feature = o.Enable + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_aix.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_aix.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9bf0c32e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_aix.go @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build aix + +package cpu + +const ( + // getsystemcfg constants + _SC_IMPL = 2 + _IMPL_POWER8 = 0x10000 + _IMPL_POWER9 = 0x20000 +) + +func archInit() { + impl := getsystemcfg(_SC_IMPL) + if impl&_IMPL_POWER8 != 0 { + PPC64.IsPOWER8 = true + } + if impl&_IMPL_POWER9 != 0 { + PPC64.IsPOWER8 = true + PPC64.IsPOWER9 = true + } + + Initialized = true +} + +func getsystemcfg(label int) (n uint64) { + r0, _ := callgetsystemcfg(label) + n = uint64(r0) + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..301b752e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm.go @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 32 + +// HWCAP/HWCAP2 bits. +// These are specific to Linux. +const ( + hwcap_SWP = 1 << 0 + hwcap_HALF = 1 << 1 + hwcap_THUMB = 1 << 2 + hwcap_26BIT = 1 << 3 + hwcap_FAST_MULT = 1 << 4 + hwcap_FPA = 1 << 5 + hwcap_VFP = 1 << 6 + hwcap_EDSP = 1 << 7 + hwcap_JAVA = 1 << 8 + hwcap_IWMMXT = 1 << 9 + hwcap_CRUNCH = 1 << 10 + hwcap_THUMBEE = 1 << 11 + hwcap_NEON = 1 << 12 + hwcap_VFPv3 = 1 << 13 + hwcap_VFPv3D16 = 1 << 14 + hwcap_TLS = 1 << 15 + hwcap_VFPv4 = 1 << 16 + hwcap_IDIVA = 1 << 17 + hwcap_IDIVT = 1 << 18 + hwcap_VFPD32 = 1 << 19 + hwcap_LPAE = 1 << 20 + hwcap_EVTSTRM = 1 << 21 + + hwcap2_AES = 1 << 0 + hwcap2_PMULL = 1 << 1 + hwcap2_SHA1 = 1 << 2 + hwcap2_SHA2 = 1 << 3 + hwcap2_CRC32 = 1 << 4 +) + +func initOptions() { + options = []option{ + {Name: "pmull", Feature: &ARM.HasPMULL}, + {Name: "sha1", Feature: &ARM.HasSHA1}, + {Name: "sha2", Feature: &ARM.HasSHA2}, + {Name: "swp", Feature: &ARM.HasSWP}, + {Name: "thumb", Feature: &ARM.HasTHUMB}, + {Name: "thumbee", Feature: &ARM.HasTHUMBEE}, + {Name: "tls", Feature: &ARM.HasTLS}, + {Name: "vfp", Feature: &ARM.HasVFP}, + {Name: "vfpd32", Feature: &ARM.HasVFPD32}, + {Name: "vfpv3", Feature: &ARM.HasVFPv3}, + {Name: "vfpv3d16", Feature: &ARM.HasVFPv3D16}, + {Name: "vfpv4", Feature: &ARM.HasVFPv4}, + {Name: "half", Feature: &ARM.HasHALF}, + {Name: "26bit", Feature: &ARM.Has26BIT}, + {Name: "fastmul", Feature: &ARM.HasFASTMUL}, + {Name: "fpa", Feature: &ARM.HasFPA}, + {Name: "edsp", Feature: &ARM.HasEDSP}, + {Name: "java", Feature: &ARM.HasJAVA}, + {Name: "iwmmxt", Feature: &ARM.HasIWMMXT}, + {Name: "crunch", Feature: &ARM.HasCRUNCH}, + {Name: "neon", Feature: &ARM.HasNEON}, + {Name: "idivt", Feature: &ARM.HasIDIVT}, + {Name: "idiva", Feature: &ARM.HasIDIVA}, + {Name: "lpae", Feature: &ARM.HasLPAE}, + {Name: "evtstrm", Feature: &ARM.HasEVTSTRM}, + {Name: "aes", Feature: &ARM.HasAES}, + {Name: "crc32", Feature: &ARM.HasCRC32}, + } + +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f3eb993b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +import "runtime" + +// cacheLineSize is used to prevent false sharing of cache lines. +// We choose 128 because Apple Silicon, a.k.a. M1, has 128-byte cache line size. +// It doesn't cost much and is much more future-proof. +const cacheLineSize = 128 + +func initOptions() { + options = []option{ + {Name: "fp", Feature: &ARM64.HasFP}, + {Name: "asimd", Feature: &ARM64.HasASIMD}, + {Name: "evstrm", Feature: &ARM64.HasEVTSTRM}, + {Name: "aes", Feature: &ARM64.HasAES}, + {Name: "fphp", Feature: &ARM64.HasFPHP}, + {Name: "jscvt", Feature: &ARM64.HasJSCVT}, + {Name: "lrcpc", Feature: &ARM64.HasLRCPC}, + {Name: "pmull", Feature: &ARM64.HasPMULL}, + {Name: "sha1", Feature: &ARM64.HasSHA1}, + {Name: "sha2", Feature: &ARM64.HasSHA2}, + {Name: "sha3", Feature: &ARM64.HasSHA3}, + {Name: "sha512", Feature: &ARM64.HasSHA512}, + {Name: "sm3", Feature: &ARM64.HasSM3}, + {Name: "sm4", Feature: &ARM64.HasSM4}, + {Name: "sve", Feature: &ARM64.HasSVE}, + {Name: "crc32", Feature: &ARM64.HasCRC32}, + {Name: "atomics", Feature: &ARM64.HasATOMICS}, + {Name: "asimdhp", Feature: &ARM64.HasASIMDHP}, + {Name: "cpuid", Feature: &ARM64.HasCPUID}, + {Name: "asimrdm", Feature: &ARM64.HasASIMDRDM}, + {Name: "fcma", Feature: &ARM64.HasFCMA}, + {Name: "dcpop", Feature: &ARM64.HasDCPOP}, + {Name: "asimddp", Feature: &ARM64.HasASIMDDP}, + {Name: "asimdfhm", Feature: &ARM64.HasASIMDFHM}, + } +} + +func archInit() { + switch runtime.GOOS { + case "freebsd": + readARM64Registers() + case "linux", "netbsd", "openbsd": + doinit() + default: + // Many platforms don't seem to allow reading these registers. + setMinimalFeatures() + } +} + +// setMinimalFeatures fakes the minimal ARM64 features expected by +// TestARM64minimalFeatures. +func setMinimalFeatures() { + ARM64.HasASIMD = true + ARM64.HasFP = true +} + +func readARM64Registers() { + Initialized = true + + parseARM64SystemRegisters(getisar0(), getisar1(), getpfr0()) +} + +func parseARM64SystemRegisters(isar0, isar1, pfr0 uint64) { + // ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1 + switch extractBits(isar0, 4, 7) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasAES = true + case 2: + ARM64.HasAES = true + ARM64.HasPMULL = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 8, 11) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasSHA1 = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 12, 15) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasSHA2 = true + case 2: + ARM64.HasSHA2 = true + ARM64.HasSHA512 = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 16, 19) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasCRC32 = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 20, 23) { + case 2: + ARM64.HasATOMICS = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 28, 31) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasASIMDRDM = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 32, 35) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasSHA3 = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 36, 39) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasSM3 = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 40, 43) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasSM4 = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar0, 44, 47) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasASIMDDP = true + } + + // ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1 + switch extractBits(isar1, 0, 3) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasDCPOP = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar1, 12, 15) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasJSCVT = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar1, 16, 19) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasFCMA = true + } + + switch extractBits(isar1, 20, 23) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasLRCPC = true + } + + // ID_AA64PFR0_EL1 + switch extractBits(pfr0, 16, 19) { + case 0: + ARM64.HasFP = true + case 1: + ARM64.HasFP = true + ARM64.HasFPHP = true + } + + switch extractBits(pfr0, 20, 23) { + case 0: + ARM64.HasASIMD = true + case 1: + ARM64.HasASIMD = true + ARM64.HasASIMDHP = true + } + + switch extractBits(pfr0, 32, 35) { + case 1: + ARM64.HasSVE = true + } +} + +func extractBits(data uint64, start, end uint) uint { + return (uint)(data>>start) & ((1 << (end - start + 1)) - 1) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fcb9a388 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm64.s @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc + +#include "textflag.h" + +// func getisar0() uint64 +TEXT ·getisar0(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-8 + // get Instruction Set Attributes 0 into x0 + // mrs x0, ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1 = d5380600 + WORD $0xd5380600 + MOVD R0, ret+0(FP) + RET + +// func getisar1() uint64 +TEXT ·getisar1(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-8 + // get Instruction Set Attributes 1 into x0 + // mrs x0, ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1 = d5380620 + WORD $0xd5380620 + MOVD R0, ret+0(FP) + RET + +// func getpfr0() uint64 +TEXT ·getpfr0(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-8 + // get Processor Feature Register 0 into x0 + // mrs x0, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1 = d5380400 + WORD $0xd5380400 + MOVD R0, ret+0(FP) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a8acd3e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc + +package cpu + +func getisar0() uint64 +func getisar1() uint64 +func getpfr0() uint64 diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c8ae6ddc --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc + +package cpu + +// haveAsmFunctions reports whether the other functions in this file can +// be safely called. +func haveAsmFunctions() bool { return true } + +// The following feature detection functions are defined in cpu_s390x.s. +// They are likely to be expensive to call so the results should be cached. +func stfle() facilityList +func kmQuery() queryResult +func kmcQuery() queryResult +func kmctrQuery() queryResult +func kmaQuery() queryResult +func kimdQuery() queryResult +func klmdQuery() queryResult diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..910728fb --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.go @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (386 || amd64 || amd64p32) && gc + +package cpu + +// cpuid is implemented in cpu_x86.s for gc compiler +// and in cpu_gccgo.c for gccgo. +func cpuid(eaxArg, ecxArg uint32) (eax, ebx, ecx, edx uint32) + +// xgetbv with ecx = 0 is implemented in cpu_x86.s for gc compiler +// and in cpu_gccgo.c for gccgo. +func xgetbv() (eax, edx uint32) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7f194678 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gccgo + +package cpu + +func getisar0() uint64 { return 0 } +func getisar1() uint64 { return 0 } +func getpfr0() uint64 { return 0 } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9526d2ce --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gccgo + +package cpu + +// haveAsmFunctions reports whether the other functions in this file can +// be safely called. +func haveAsmFunctions() bool { return false } + +// TODO(mundaym): the following feature detection functions are currently +// stubs. See https://golang.org/cl/162887 for how to fix this. +// They are likely to be expensive to call so the results should be cached. +func stfle() facilityList { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func kmQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func kmcQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func kmctrQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func kmaQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func kimdQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func klmdQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.c b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3f73a05d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.c @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (386 || amd64 || amd64p32) && gccgo + +#include +#include +#include + +// Need to wrap __get_cpuid_count because it's declared as static. +int +gccgoGetCpuidCount(uint32_t leaf, uint32_t subleaf, + uint32_t *eax, uint32_t *ebx, + uint32_t *ecx, uint32_t *edx) +{ + return __get_cpuid_count(leaf, subleaf, eax, ebx, ecx, edx); +} + +#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wunknown-pragmas" +#pragma GCC push_options +#pragma GCC target("xsave") +#pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("xsave"))), apply_to=function) + +// xgetbv reads the contents of an XCR (Extended Control Register) +// specified in the ECX register into registers EDX:EAX. +// Currently, the only supported value for XCR is 0. +void +gccgoXgetbv(uint32_t *eax, uint32_t *edx) +{ + uint64_t v = _xgetbv(0); + *eax = v & 0xffffffff; + *edx = v >> 32; +} + +#pragma clang attribute pop +#pragma GCC pop_options diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..99c60fe9 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_x86.go @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (386 || amd64 || amd64p32) && gccgo + +package cpu + +//extern gccgoGetCpuidCount +func gccgoGetCpuidCount(eaxArg, ecxArg uint32, eax, ebx, ecx, edx *uint32) + +func cpuid(eaxArg, ecxArg uint32) (eax, ebx, ecx, edx uint32) { + var a, b, c, d uint32 + gccgoGetCpuidCount(eaxArg, ecxArg, &a, &b, &c, &d) + return a, b, c, d +} + +//extern gccgoXgetbv +func gccgoXgetbv(eax, edx *uint32) + +func xgetbv() (eax, edx uint32) { + var a, d uint32 + gccgoXgetbv(&a, &d) + return a, d +} + +// gccgo doesn't build on Darwin, per: +// https://github.com/Homebrew/homebrew-core/blob/HEAD/Formula/gcc.rb#L76 +func darwinSupportsAVX512() bool { + return false +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..743eb543 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux.go @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !386 && !amd64 && !amd64p32 && !arm64 + +package cpu + +func archInit() { + if err := readHWCAP(); err != nil { + return + } + doinit() + Initialized = true +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2057006d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm.go @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +func doinit() { + ARM.HasSWP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SWP) + ARM.HasHALF = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_HALF) + ARM.HasTHUMB = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_THUMB) + ARM.Has26BIT = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_26BIT) + ARM.HasFASTMUL = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_FAST_MULT) + ARM.HasFPA = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_FPA) + ARM.HasVFP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_VFP) + ARM.HasEDSP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_EDSP) + ARM.HasJAVA = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_JAVA) + ARM.HasIWMMXT = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_IWMMXT) + ARM.HasCRUNCH = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_CRUNCH) + ARM.HasTHUMBEE = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_THUMBEE) + ARM.HasNEON = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_NEON) + ARM.HasVFPv3 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_VFPv3) + ARM.HasVFPv3D16 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_VFPv3D16) + ARM.HasTLS = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_TLS) + ARM.HasVFPv4 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_VFPv4) + ARM.HasIDIVA = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_IDIVA) + ARM.HasIDIVT = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_IDIVT) + ARM.HasVFPD32 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_VFPD32) + ARM.HasLPAE = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_LPAE) + ARM.HasEVTSTRM = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_EVTSTRM) + ARM.HasAES = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_AES) + ARM.HasPMULL = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_PMULL) + ARM.HasSHA1 = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_SHA1) + ARM.HasSHA2 = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_SHA2) + ARM.HasCRC32 = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_CRC32) +} + +func isSet(hwc uint, value uint) bool { + return hwc&value != 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a968b80f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +import ( + "strings" + "syscall" +) + +// HWCAP/HWCAP2 bits. These are exposed by Linux. +const ( + hwcap_FP = 1 << 0 + hwcap_ASIMD = 1 << 1 + hwcap_EVTSTRM = 1 << 2 + hwcap_AES = 1 << 3 + hwcap_PMULL = 1 << 4 + hwcap_SHA1 = 1 << 5 + hwcap_SHA2 = 1 << 6 + hwcap_CRC32 = 1 << 7 + hwcap_ATOMICS = 1 << 8 + hwcap_FPHP = 1 << 9 + hwcap_ASIMDHP = 1 << 10 + hwcap_CPUID = 1 << 11 + hwcap_ASIMDRDM = 1 << 12 + hwcap_JSCVT = 1 << 13 + hwcap_FCMA = 1 << 14 + hwcap_LRCPC = 1 << 15 + hwcap_DCPOP = 1 << 16 + hwcap_SHA3 = 1 << 17 + hwcap_SM3 = 1 << 18 + hwcap_SM4 = 1 << 19 + hwcap_ASIMDDP = 1 << 20 + hwcap_SHA512 = 1 << 21 + hwcap_SVE = 1 << 22 + hwcap_ASIMDFHM = 1 << 23 +) + +// linuxKernelCanEmulateCPUID reports whether we're running +// on Linux 4.11+. Ideally we'd like to ask the question about +// whether the current kernel contains +// https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=77c97b4ee21290f5f083173d957843b615abbff2 +// but the version number will have to do. +func linuxKernelCanEmulateCPUID() bool { + var un syscall.Utsname + syscall.Uname(&un) + var sb strings.Builder + for _, b := range un.Release[:] { + if b == 0 { + break + } + sb.WriteByte(byte(b)) + } + major, minor, _, ok := parseRelease(sb.String()) + return ok && (major > 4 || major == 4 && minor >= 11) +} + +func doinit() { + if err := readHWCAP(); err != nil { + // We failed to read /proc/self/auxv. This can happen if the binary has + // been given extra capabilities(7) with /bin/setcap. + // + // When this happens, we have two options. If the Linux kernel is new + // enough (4.11+), we can read the arm64 registers directly which'll + // trap into the kernel and then return back to userspace. + // + // But on older kernels, such as Linux 4.4.180 as used on many Synology + // devices, calling readARM64Registers (specifically getisar0) will + // cause a SIGILL and we'll die. So for older kernels, parse /proc/cpuinfo + // instead. + // + // See golang/go#57336. + if linuxKernelCanEmulateCPUID() { + readARM64Registers() + } else { + readLinuxProcCPUInfo() + } + return + } + + // HWCAP feature bits + ARM64.HasFP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_FP) + ARM64.HasASIMD = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ASIMD) + ARM64.HasEVTSTRM = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_EVTSTRM) + ARM64.HasAES = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_AES) + ARM64.HasPMULL = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_PMULL) + ARM64.HasSHA1 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SHA1) + ARM64.HasSHA2 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SHA2) + ARM64.HasCRC32 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_CRC32) + ARM64.HasATOMICS = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ATOMICS) + ARM64.HasFPHP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_FPHP) + ARM64.HasASIMDHP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ASIMDHP) + ARM64.HasCPUID = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_CPUID) + ARM64.HasASIMDRDM = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ASIMDRDM) + ARM64.HasJSCVT = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_JSCVT) + ARM64.HasFCMA = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_FCMA) + ARM64.HasLRCPC = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_LRCPC) + ARM64.HasDCPOP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_DCPOP) + ARM64.HasSHA3 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SHA3) + ARM64.HasSM3 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SM3) + ARM64.HasSM4 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SM4) + ARM64.HasASIMDDP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ASIMDDP) + ARM64.HasSHA512 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SHA512) + ARM64.HasSVE = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SVE) + ARM64.HasASIMDFHM = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ASIMDFHM) +} + +func isSet(hwc uint, value uint) bool { + return hwc&value != 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_mips64x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_mips64x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4686c1d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_mips64x.go @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build linux && (mips64 || mips64le) + +package cpu + +// HWCAP bits. These are exposed by the Linux kernel 5.4. +const ( + // CPU features + hwcap_MIPS_MSA = 1 << 1 +) + +func doinit() { + // HWCAP feature bits + MIPS64X.HasMSA = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_MIPS_MSA) +} + +func isSet(hwc uint, value uint) bool { + return hwc&value != 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_noinit.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_noinit.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cd63e733 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_noinit.go @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build linux && !arm && !arm64 && !mips64 && !mips64le && !ppc64 && !ppc64le && !s390x + +package cpu + +func doinit() {} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_ppc64x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_ppc64x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..197188e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_ppc64x.go @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build linux && (ppc64 || ppc64le) + +package cpu + +// HWCAP/HWCAP2 bits. These are exposed by the kernel. +const ( + // ISA Level + _PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_2_07 = 0x80000000 + _PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_3_00 = 0x00800000 + + // CPU features + _PPC_FEATURE2_DARN = 0x00200000 + _PPC_FEATURE2_SCV = 0x00100000 +) + +func doinit() { + // HWCAP2 feature bits + PPC64.IsPOWER8 = isSet(hwCap2, _PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_2_07) + PPC64.IsPOWER9 = isSet(hwCap2, _PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_3_00) + PPC64.HasDARN = isSet(hwCap2, _PPC_FEATURE2_DARN) + PPC64.HasSCV = isSet(hwCap2, _PPC_FEATURE2_SCV) +} + +func isSet(hwc uint, value uint) bool { + return hwc&value != 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1517ac61 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +const ( + // bit mask values from /usr/include/bits/hwcap.h + hwcap_ZARCH = 2 + hwcap_STFLE = 4 + hwcap_MSA = 8 + hwcap_LDISP = 16 + hwcap_EIMM = 32 + hwcap_DFP = 64 + hwcap_ETF3EH = 256 + hwcap_VX = 2048 + hwcap_VXE = 8192 +) + +func initS390Xbase() { + // test HWCAP bit vector + has := func(featureMask uint) bool { + return hwCap&featureMask == featureMask + } + + // mandatory + S390X.HasZARCH = has(hwcap_ZARCH) + + // optional + S390X.HasSTFLE = has(hwcap_STFLE) + S390X.HasLDISP = has(hwcap_LDISP) + S390X.HasEIMM = has(hwcap_EIMM) + S390X.HasETF3EH = has(hwcap_ETF3EH) + S390X.HasDFP = has(hwcap_DFP) + S390X.HasMSA = has(hwcap_MSA) + S390X.HasVX = has(hwcap_VX) + if S390X.HasVX { + S390X.HasVXE = has(hwcap_VXE) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..55863585 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.go @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build loong64 + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 64 + +func initOptions() { +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mips64x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mips64x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fedb00cc --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mips64x.go @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build mips64 || mips64le + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 32 + +func initOptions() { + options = []option{ + {Name: "msa", Feature: &MIPS64X.HasMSA}, + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mipsx.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mipsx.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ffb4ec7e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mipsx.go @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build mips || mipsle + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 32 + +func initOptions() {} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_netbsd_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_netbsd_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ebfb3fc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_netbsd_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +import ( + "syscall" + "unsafe" +) + +// Minimal copy of functionality from x/sys/unix so the cpu package can call +// sysctl without depending on x/sys/unix. + +const ( + _CTL_QUERY = -2 + + _SYSCTL_VERS_1 = 0x1000000 +) + +var _zero uintptr + +func sysctl(mib []int32, old *byte, oldlen *uintptr, new *byte, newlen uintptr) (err error) { + var _p0 unsafe.Pointer + if len(mib) > 0 { + _p0 = unsafe.Pointer(&mib[0]) + } else { + _p0 = unsafe.Pointer(&_zero) + } + _, _, errno := syscall.Syscall6( + syscall.SYS___SYSCTL, + uintptr(_p0), + uintptr(len(mib)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(old)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(oldlen)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(new)), + uintptr(newlen)) + if errno != 0 { + return errno + } + return nil +} + +type sysctlNode struct { + Flags uint32 + Num int32 + Name [32]int8 + Ver uint32 + __rsvd uint32 + Un [16]byte + _sysctl_size [8]byte + _sysctl_func [8]byte + _sysctl_parent [8]byte + _sysctl_desc [8]byte +} + +func sysctlNodes(mib []int32) ([]sysctlNode, error) { + var olen uintptr + + // Get a list of all sysctl nodes below the given MIB by performing + // a sysctl for the given MIB with CTL_QUERY appended. + mib = append(mib, _CTL_QUERY) + qnode := sysctlNode{Flags: _SYSCTL_VERS_1} + qp := (*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&qnode)) + sz := unsafe.Sizeof(qnode) + if err := sysctl(mib, nil, &olen, qp, sz); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Now that we know the size, get the actual nodes. + nodes := make([]sysctlNode, olen/sz) + np := (*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&nodes[0])) + if err := sysctl(mib, np, &olen, qp, sz); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return nodes, nil +} + +func nametomib(name string) ([]int32, error) { + // Split name into components. + var parts []string + last := 0 + for i := 0; i < len(name); i++ { + if name[i] == '.' { + parts = append(parts, name[last:i]) + last = i + 1 + } + } + parts = append(parts, name[last:]) + + mib := []int32{} + // Discover the nodes and construct the MIB OID. + for partno, part := range parts { + nodes, err := sysctlNodes(mib) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + for _, node := range nodes { + n := make([]byte, 0) + for i := range node.Name { + if node.Name[i] != 0 { + n = append(n, byte(node.Name[i])) + } + } + if string(n) == part { + mib = append(mib, int32(node.Num)) + break + } + } + if len(mib) != partno+1 { + return nil, err + } + } + + return mib, nil +} + +// aarch64SysctlCPUID is struct aarch64_sysctl_cpu_id from NetBSD's +type aarch64SysctlCPUID struct { + midr uint64 /* Main ID Register */ + revidr uint64 /* Revision ID Register */ + mpidr uint64 /* Multiprocessor Affinity Register */ + aa64dfr0 uint64 /* A64 Debug Feature Register 0 */ + aa64dfr1 uint64 /* A64 Debug Feature Register 1 */ + aa64isar0 uint64 /* A64 Instruction Set Attribute Register 0 */ + aa64isar1 uint64 /* A64 Instruction Set Attribute Register 1 */ + aa64mmfr0 uint64 /* A64 Memory Model Feature Register 0 */ + aa64mmfr1 uint64 /* A64 Memory Model Feature Register 1 */ + aa64mmfr2 uint64 /* A64 Memory Model Feature Register 2 */ + aa64pfr0 uint64 /* A64 Processor Feature Register 0 */ + aa64pfr1 uint64 /* A64 Processor Feature Register 1 */ + aa64zfr0 uint64 /* A64 SVE Feature ID Register 0 */ + mvfr0 uint32 /* Media and VFP Feature Register 0 */ + mvfr1 uint32 /* Media and VFP Feature Register 1 */ + mvfr2 uint32 /* Media and VFP Feature Register 2 */ + pad uint32 + clidr uint64 /* Cache Level ID Register */ + ctr uint64 /* Cache Type Register */ +} + +func sysctlCPUID(name string) (*aarch64SysctlCPUID, error) { + mib, err := nametomib(name) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + out := aarch64SysctlCPUID{} + n := unsafe.Sizeof(out) + _, _, errno := syscall.Syscall6( + syscall.SYS___SYSCTL, + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&mib[0])), + uintptr(len(mib)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&out)), + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&n)), + uintptr(0), + uintptr(0)) + if errno != 0 { + return nil, errno + } + return &out, nil +} + +func doinit() { + cpuid, err := sysctlCPUID("machdep.cpu0.cpu_id") + if err != nil { + setMinimalFeatures() + return + } + parseARM64SystemRegisters(cpuid.aa64isar0, cpuid.aa64isar1, cpuid.aa64pfr0) + + Initialized = true +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85b64d5c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +import ( + "syscall" + "unsafe" +) + +// Minimal copy of functionality from x/sys/unix so the cpu package can call +// sysctl without depending on x/sys/unix. + +const ( + // From OpenBSD's sys/sysctl.h. + _CTL_MACHDEP = 7 + + // From OpenBSD's machine/cpu.h. + _CPU_ID_AA64ISAR0 = 2 + _CPU_ID_AA64ISAR1 = 3 +) + +// Implemented in the runtime package (runtime/sys_openbsd3.go) +func syscall_syscall6(fn, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6 uintptr) (r1, r2 uintptr, err syscall.Errno) + +//go:linkname syscall_syscall6 syscall.syscall6 + +func sysctl(mib []uint32, old *byte, oldlen *uintptr, new *byte, newlen uintptr) (err error) { + _, _, errno := syscall_syscall6(libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&mib[0])), uintptr(len(mib)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(old)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(oldlen)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(new)), uintptr(newlen)) + if errno != 0 { + return errno + } + return nil +} + +var libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr uintptr + +//go:cgo_import_dynamic libc_sysctl sysctl "libc.so" + +func sysctlUint64(mib []uint32) (uint64, bool) { + var out uint64 + nout := unsafe.Sizeof(out) + if err := sysctl(mib, (*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&out)), &nout, nil, 0); err != nil { + return 0, false + } + return out, true +} + +func doinit() { + setMinimalFeatures() + + // Get ID_AA64ISAR0 and ID_AA64ISAR1 from sysctl. + isar0, ok := sysctlUint64([]uint32{_CTL_MACHDEP, _CPU_ID_AA64ISAR0}) + if !ok { + return + } + isar1, ok := sysctlUint64([]uint32{_CTL_MACHDEP, _CPU_ID_AA64ISAR1}) + if !ok { + return + } + parseARM64SystemRegisters(isar0, isar1, 0) + + Initialized = true +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..054ba05d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_openbsd_arm64.s @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +#include "textflag.h" + +TEXT libc_sysctl_trampoline<>(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-0 + JMP libc_sysctl(SB) + +GLOBL ·libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr(SB), RODATA, $8 +DATA ·libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr(SB)/8, $libc_sysctl_trampoline<>(SB) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e9ecf2a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm.go @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !linux && arm + +package cpu + +func archInit() {} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5341e7f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !linux && !netbsd && !openbsd && arm64 + +package cpu + +func doinit() {} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_mips64x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_mips64x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f8f2419 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_mips64x.go @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !linux && (mips64 || mips64le) + +package cpu + +func archInit() { + Initialized = true +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_ppc64x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_ppc64x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..89608fba --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_ppc64x.go @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !aix && !linux && (ppc64 || ppc64le) + +package cpu + +func archInit() { + PPC64.IsPOWER8 = true + Initialized = true +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_riscv64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_riscv64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5ab87808 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_riscv64.go @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !linux && riscv64 + +package cpu + +func archInit() { + Initialized = true +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_ppc64x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_ppc64x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c14f12b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_ppc64x.go @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build ppc64 || ppc64le + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 128 + +func initOptions() { + options = []option{ + {Name: "darn", Feature: &PPC64.HasDARN}, + {Name: "scv", Feature: &PPC64.HasSCV}, + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_riscv64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_riscv64.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7f0c79c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_riscv64.go @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build riscv64 + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 64 + +func initOptions() {} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5881b883 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 256 + +func initOptions() { + options = []option{ + {Name: "zarch", Feature: &S390X.HasZARCH, Required: true}, + {Name: "stfle", Feature: &S390X.HasSTFLE, Required: true}, + {Name: "ldisp", Feature: &S390X.HasLDISP, Required: true}, + {Name: "eimm", Feature: &S390X.HasEIMM, Required: true}, + {Name: "dfp", Feature: &S390X.HasDFP}, + {Name: "etf3eh", Feature: &S390X.HasETF3EH}, + {Name: "msa", Feature: &S390X.HasMSA}, + {Name: "aes", Feature: &S390X.HasAES}, + {Name: "aescbc", Feature: &S390X.HasAESCBC}, + {Name: "aesctr", Feature: &S390X.HasAESCTR}, + {Name: "aesgcm", Feature: &S390X.HasAESGCM}, + {Name: "ghash", Feature: &S390X.HasGHASH}, + {Name: "sha1", Feature: &S390X.HasSHA1}, + {Name: "sha256", Feature: &S390X.HasSHA256}, + {Name: "sha3", Feature: &S390X.HasSHA3}, + {Name: "sha512", Feature: &S390X.HasSHA512}, + {Name: "vx", Feature: &S390X.HasVX}, + {Name: "vxe", Feature: &S390X.HasVXE}, + } +} + +// bitIsSet reports whether the bit at index is set. The bit index +// is in big endian order, so bit index 0 is the leftmost bit. +func bitIsSet(bits []uint64, index uint) bool { + return bits[index/64]&((1<<63)>>(index%64)) != 0 +} + +// facility is a bit index for the named facility. +type facility uint8 + +const ( + // mandatory facilities + zarch facility = 1 // z architecture mode is active + stflef facility = 7 // store-facility-list-extended + ldisp facility = 18 // long-displacement + eimm facility = 21 // extended-immediate + + // miscellaneous facilities + dfp facility = 42 // decimal-floating-point + etf3eh facility = 30 // extended-translation 3 enhancement + + // cryptography facilities + msa facility = 17 // message-security-assist + msa3 facility = 76 // message-security-assist extension 3 + msa4 facility = 77 // message-security-assist extension 4 + msa5 facility = 57 // message-security-assist extension 5 + msa8 facility = 146 // message-security-assist extension 8 + msa9 facility = 155 // message-security-assist extension 9 + + // vector facilities + vx facility = 129 // vector facility + vxe facility = 135 // vector-enhancements 1 + vxe2 facility = 148 // vector-enhancements 2 +) + +// facilityList contains the result of an STFLE call. +// Bits are numbered in big endian order so the +// leftmost bit (the MSB) is at index 0. +type facilityList struct { + bits [4]uint64 +} + +// Has reports whether the given facilities are present. +func (s *facilityList) Has(fs ...facility) bool { + if len(fs) == 0 { + panic("no facility bits provided") + } + for _, f := range fs { + if !bitIsSet(s.bits[:], uint(f)) { + return false + } + } + return true +} + +// function is the code for the named cryptographic function. +type function uint8 + +const ( + // KM{,A,C,CTR} function codes + aes128 function = 18 // AES-128 + aes192 function = 19 // AES-192 + aes256 function = 20 // AES-256 + + // K{I,L}MD function codes + sha1 function = 1 // SHA-1 + sha256 function = 2 // SHA-256 + sha512 function = 3 // SHA-512 + sha3_224 function = 32 // SHA3-224 + sha3_256 function = 33 // SHA3-256 + sha3_384 function = 34 // SHA3-384 + sha3_512 function = 35 // SHA3-512 + shake128 function = 36 // SHAKE-128 + shake256 function = 37 // SHAKE-256 + + // KLMD function codes + ghash function = 65 // GHASH +) + +// queryResult contains the result of a Query function +// call. Bits are numbered in big endian order so the +// leftmost bit (the MSB) is at index 0. +type queryResult struct { + bits [2]uint64 +} + +// Has reports whether the given functions are present. +func (q *queryResult) Has(fns ...function) bool { + if len(fns) == 0 { + panic("no function codes provided") + } + for _, f := range fns { + if !bitIsSet(q.bits[:], uint(f)) { + return false + } + } + return true +} + +func doinit() { + initS390Xbase() + + // We need implementations of stfle, km and so on + // to detect cryptographic features. + if !haveAsmFunctions() { + return + } + + // optional cryptographic functions + if S390X.HasMSA { + aes := []function{aes128, aes192, aes256} + + // cipher message + km, kmc := kmQuery(), kmcQuery() + S390X.HasAES = km.Has(aes...) + S390X.HasAESCBC = kmc.Has(aes...) + if S390X.HasSTFLE { + facilities := stfle() + if facilities.Has(msa4) { + kmctr := kmctrQuery() + S390X.HasAESCTR = kmctr.Has(aes...) + } + if facilities.Has(msa8) { + kma := kmaQuery() + S390X.HasAESGCM = kma.Has(aes...) + } + } + + // compute message digest + kimd := kimdQuery() // intermediate (no padding) + klmd := klmdQuery() // last (padding) + S390X.HasSHA1 = kimd.Has(sha1) && klmd.Has(sha1) + S390X.HasSHA256 = kimd.Has(sha256) && klmd.Has(sha256) + S390X.HasSHA512 = kimd.Has(sha512) && klmd.Has(sha512) + S390X.HasGHASH = kimd.Has(ghash) // KLMD-GHASH does not exist + sha3 := []function{ + sha3_224, sha3_256, sha3_384, sha3_512, + shake128, shake256, + } + S390X.HasSHA3 = kimd.Has(sha3...) && klmd.Has(sha3...) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1fb4b701 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc + +#include "textflag.h" + +// func stfle() facilityList +TEXT ·stfle(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-32 + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 + MOVD $3, R0 // last doubleword index to store + XC $32, (R1), (R1) // clear 4 doublewords (32 bytes) + WORD $0xb2b01000 // store facility list extended (STFLE) + RET + +// func kmQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·kmQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KM-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xB92E0024 // cipher message (KM) + RET + +// func kmcQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·kmcQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KMC-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xB92F0024 // cipher message with chaining (KMC) + RET + +// func kmctrQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·kmctrQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KMCTR-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xB92D4024 // cipher message with counter (KMCTR) + RET + +// func kmaQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·kmaQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KMA-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xb9296024 // cipher message with authentication (KMA) + RET + +// func kimdQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·kimdQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KIMD-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xB93E0024 // compute intermediate message digest (KIMD) + RET + +// func klmdQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·klmdQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KLMD-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xB93F0024 // compute last message digest (KLMD) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_wasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_wasm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..384787ea --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_wasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build wasm + +package cpu + +// We're compiling the cpu package for an unknown (software-abstracted) CPU. +// Make CacheLinePad an empty struct and hope that the usual struct alignment +// rules are good enough. + +const cacheLineSize = 0 + +func initOptions() {} + +func archInit() {} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c29f5e4c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.go @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build 386 || amd64 || amd64p32 + +package cpu + +import "runtime" + +const cacheLineSize = 64 + +func initOptions() { + options = []option{ + {Name: "adx", Feature: &X86.HasADX}, + {Name: "aes", Feature: &X86.HasAES}, + {Name: "avx", Feature: &X86.HasAVX}, + {Name: "avx2", Feature: &X86.HasAVX2}, + {Name: "avx512", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512}, + {Name: "avx512f", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512F}, + {Name: "avx512cd", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512CD}, + {Name: "avx512er", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512ER}, + {Name: "avx512pf", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512PF}, + {Name: "avx512vl", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512VL}, + {Name: "avx512bw", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512BW}, + {Name: "avx512dq", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512DQ}, + {Name: "avx512ifma", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512IFMA}, + {Name: "avx512vbmi", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512VBMI}, + {Name: "avx512vnniw", Feature: &X86.HasAVX5124VNNIW}, + {Name: "avx5124fmaps", Feature: &X86.HasAVX5124FMAPS}, + {Name: "avx512vpopcntdq", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512VPOPCNTDQ}, + {Name: "avx512vpclmulqdq", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512VPCLMULQDQ}, + {Name: "avx512vnni", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512VNNI}, + {Name: "avx512gfni", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512GFNI}, + {Name: "avx512vaes", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512VAES}, + {Name: "avx512vbmi2", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512VBMI2}, + {Name: "avx512bitalg", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512BITALG}, + {Name: "avx512bf16", Feature: &X86.HasAVX512BF16}, + {Name: "amxtile", Feature: &X86.HasAMXTile}, + {Name: "amxint8", Feature: &X86.HasAMXInt8}, + {Name: "amxbf16", Feature: &X86.HasAMXBF16}, + {Name: "bmi1", Feature: &X86.HasBMI1}, + {Name: "bmi2", Feature: &X86.HasBMI2}, + {Name: "cx16", Feature: &X86.HasCX16}, + {Name: "erms", Feature: &X86.HasERMS}, + {Name: "fma", Feature: &X86.HasFMA}, + {Name: "osxsave", Feature: &X86.HasOSXSAVE}, + {Name: "pclmulqdq", Feature: &X86.HasPCLMULQDQ}, + {Name: "popcnt", Feature: &X86.HasPOPCNT}, + {Name: "rdrand", Feature: &X86.HasRDRAND}, + {Name: "rdseed", Feature: &X86.HasRDSEED}, + {Name: "sse3", Feature: &X86.HasSSE3}, + {Name: "sse41", Feature: &X86.HasSSE41}, + {Name: "sse42", Feature: &X86.HasSSE42}, + {Name: "ssse3", Feature: &X86.HasSSSE3}, + + // These capabilities should always be enabled on amd64: + {Name: "sse2", Feature: &X86.HasSSE2, Required: runtime.GOARCH == "amd64"}, + } +} + +func archInit() { + + Initialized = true + + maxID, _, _, _ := cpuid(0, 0) + + if maxID < 1 { + return + } + + _, _, ecx1, edx1 := cpuid(1, 0) + X86.HasSSE2 = isSet(26, edx1) + + X86.HasSSE3 = isSet(0, ecx1) + X86.HasPCLMULQDQ = isSet(1, ecx1) + X86.HasSSSE3 = isSet(9, ecx1) + X86.HasFMA = isSet(12, ecx1) + X86.HasCX16 = isSet(13, ecx1) + X86.HasSSE41 = isSet(19, ecx1) + X86.HasSSE42 = isSet(20, ecx1) + X86.HasPOPCNT = isSet(23, ecx1) + X86.HasAES = isSet(25, ecx1) + X86.HasOSXSAVE = isSet(27, ecx1) + X86.HasRDRAND = isSet(30, ecx1) + + var osSupportsAVX, osSupportsAVX512 bool + // For XGETBV, OSXSAVE bit is required and sufficient. + if X86.HasOSXSAVE { + eax, _ := xgetbv() + // Check if XMM and YMM registers have OS support. + osSupportsAVX = isSet(1, eax) && isSet(2, eax) + + if runtime.GOOS == "darwin" { + // Darwin doesn't save/restore AVX-512 mask registers correctly across signal handlers. + // Since users can't rely on mask register contents, let's not advertise AVX-512 support. + // See issue 49233. + osSupportsAVX512 = false + } else { + // Check if OPMASK and ZMM registers have OS support. + osSupportsAVX512 = osSupportsAVX && isSet(5, eax) && isSet(6, eax) && isSet(7, eax) + } + } + + X86.HasAVX = isSet(28, ecx1) && osSupportsAVX + + if maxID < 7 { + return + } + + _, ebx7, ecx7, edx7 := cpuid(7, 0) + X86.HasBMI1 = isSet(3, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX2 = isSet(5, ebx7) && osSupportsAVX + X86.HasBMI2 = isSet(8, ebx7) + X86.HasERMS = isSet(9, ebx7) + X86.HasRDSEED = isSet(18, ebx7) + X86.HasADX = isSet(19, ebx7) + + X86.HasAVX512 = isSet(16, ebx7) && osSupportsAVX512 // Because avx-512 foundation is the core required extension + if X86.HasAVX512 { + X86.HasAVX512F = true + X86.HasAVX512CD = isSet(28, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX512ER = isSet(27, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX512PF = isSet(26, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX512VL = isSet(31, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX512BW = isSet(30, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX512DQ = isSet(17, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX512IFMA = isSet(21, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX512VBMI = isSet(1, ecx7) + X86.HasAVX5124VNNIW = isSet(2, edx7) + X86.HasAVX5124FMAPS = isSet(3, edx7) + X86.HasAVX512VPOPCNTDQ = isSet(14, ecx7) + X86.HasAVX512VPCLMULQDQ = isSet(10, ecx7) + X86.HasAVX512VNNI = isSet(11, ecx7) + X86.HasAVX512GFNI = isSet(8, ecx7) + X86.HasAVX512VAES = isSet(9, ecx7) + X86.HasAVX512VBMI2 = isSet(6, ecx7) + X86.HasAVX512BITALG = isSet(12, ecx7) + + eax71, _, _, _ := cpuid(7, 1) + X86.HasAVX512BF16 = isSet(5, eax71) + } + + X86.HasAMXTile = isSet(24, edx7) + X86.HasAMXInt8 = isSet(25, edx7) + X86.HasAMXBF16 = isSet(22, edx7) +} + +func isSet(bitpos uint, value uint32) bool { + return value&(1<> 63)) +) + +// For those platforms don't have a 'cpuid' equivalent we use HWCAP/HWCAP2 +// These are initialized in cpu_$GOARCH.go +// and should not be changed after they are initialized. +var hwCap uint +var hwCap2 uint + +func readHWCAP() error { + // For Go 1.21+, get auxv from the Go runtime. + if a := getAuxv(); len(a) > 0 { + for len(a) >= 2 { + tag, val := a[0], uint(a[1]) + a = a[2:] + switch tag { + case _AT_HWCAP: + hwCap = val + case _AT_HWCAP2: + hwCap2 = val + } + } + return nil + } + + buf, err := os.ReadFile(procAuxv) + if err != nil { + // e.g. on android /proc/self/auxv is not accessible, so silently + // ignore the error and leave Initialized = false. On some + // architectures (e.g. arm64) doinit() implements a fallback + // readout and will set Initialized = true again. + return err + } + bo := hostByteOrder() + for len(buf) >= 2*(uintSize/8) { + var tag, val uint + switch uintSize { + case 32: + tag = uint(bo.Uint32(buf[0:])) + val = uint(bo.Uint32(buf[4:])) + buf = buf[8:] + case 64: + tag = uint(bo.Uint64(buf[0:])) + val = uint(bo.Uint64(buf[8:])) + buf = buf[16:] + } + switch tag { + case _AT_HWCAP: + hwCap = val + case _AT_HWCAP2: + hwCap2 = val + } + } + return nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/parse.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/parse.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..762b63d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/parse.go @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +import "strconv" + +// parseRelease parses a dot-separated version number. It follows the semver +// syntax, but allows the minor and patch versions to be elided. +// +// This is a copy of the Go runtime's parseRelease from +// https://golang.org/cl/209597. +func parseRelease(rel string) (major, minor, patch int, ok bool) { + // Strip anything after a dash or plus. + for i := 0; i < len(rel); i++ { + if rel[i] == '-' || rel[i] == '+' { + rel = rel[:i] + break + } + } + + next := func() (int, bool) { + for i := 0; i < len(rel); i++ { + if rel[i] == '.' { + ver, err := strconv.Atoi(rel[:i]) + rel = rel[i+1:] + return ver, err == nil + } + } + ver, err := strconv.Atoi(rel) + rel = "" + return ver, err == nil + } + if major, ok = next(); !ok || rel == "" { + return + } + if minor, ok = next(); !ok || rel == "" { + return + } + patch, ok = next() + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/proc_cpuinfo_linux.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/proc_cpuinfo_linux.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4cd64c70 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/proc_cpuinfo_linux.go @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build linux && arm64 + +package cpu + +import ( + "errors" + "io" + "os" + "strings" +) + +func readLinuxProcCPUInfo() error { + f, err := os.Open("/proc/cpuinfo") + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer f.Close() + + var buf [1 << 10]byte // enough for first CPU + n, err := io.ReadFull(f, buf[:]) + if err != nil && err != io.ErrUnexpectedEOF { + return err + } + in := string(buf[:n]) + const features = "\nFeatures : " + i := strings.Index(in, features) + if i == -1 { + return errors.New("no CPU features found") + } + in = in[i+len(features):] + if i := strings.Index(in, "\n"); i != -1 { + in = in[:i] + } + m := map[string]*bool{} + + initOptions() // need it early here; it's harmless to call twice + for _, o := range options { + m[o.Name] = o.Feature + } + // The EVTSTRM field has alias "evstrm" in Go, but Linux calls it "evtstrm". + m["evtstrm"] = &ARM64.HasEVTSTRM + + for _, f := range strings.Fields(in) { + if p, ok := m[f]; ok { + *p = true + } + } + return nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f92ac9a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv.go @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// Copyright 2023 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +// getAuxvFn is non-nil on Go 1.21+ (via runtime_auxv_go121.go init) +// on platforms that use auxv. +var getAuxvFn func() []uintptr + +func getAuxv() []uintptr { + if getAuxvFn == nil { + return nil + } + return getAuxvFn() +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv_go121.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv_go121.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4c9788ea --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/runtime_auxv_go121.go @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +// Copyright 2023 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build go1.21 + +package cpu + +import ( + _ "unsafe" // for linkname +) + +//go:linkname runtime_getAuxv runtime.getAuxv +func runtime_getAuxv() []uintptr + +func init() { + getAuxvFn = runtime_getAuxv +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_gccgo.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_gccgo.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1b9ccb09 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_gccgo.go @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Recreate a getsystemcfg syscall handler instead of +// using the one provided by x/sys/unix to avoid having +// the dependency between them. (See golang.org/issue/32102) +// Moreover, this file will be used during the building of +// gccgo's libgo and thus must not used a CGo method. + +//go:build aix && gccgo + +package cpu + +import ( + "syscall" +) + +//extern getsystemcfg +func gccgoGetsystemcfg(label uint32) (r uint64) + +func callgetsystemcfg(label int) (r1 uintptr, e1 syscall.Errno) { + r1 = uintptr(gccgoGetsystemcfg(uint32(label))) + e1 = syscall.GetErrno() + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_ppc64_gc.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_ppc64_gc.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e8b6cdbe --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_ppc64_gc.go @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Minimal copy of x/sys/unix so the cpu package can make a +// system call on AIX without depending on x/sys/unix. +// (See golang.org/issue/32102) + +//go:build aix && ppc64 && gc + +package cpu + +import ( + "syscall" + "unsafe" +) + +//go:cgo_import_dynamic libc_getsystemcfg getsystemcfg "libc.a/shr_64.o" + +//go:linkname libc_getsystemcfg libc_getsystemcfg + +type syscallFunc uintptr + +var libc_getsystemcfg syscallFunc + +type errno = syscall.Errno + +// Implemented in runtime/syscall_aix.go. +func rawSyscall6(trap, nargs, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6 uintptr) (r1, r2 uintptr, err errno) +func syscall6(trap, nargs, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6 uintptr) (r1, r2 uintptr, err errno) + +func callgetsystemcfg(label int) (r1 uintptr, e1 errno) { + r1, _, e1 = syscall6(uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&libc_getsystemcfg)), 1, uintptr(label), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) + return +} diff --git a/vendor/modules.txt b/vendor/modules.txt index d8d45ce1..14b481fb 100644 --- a/vendor/modules.txt +++ b/vendor/modules.txt @@ -156,6 +156,25 @@ github.com/spf13/pflag # github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.0 ## explicit; go 1.13 github.com/stretchr/testify/assert +# github.com/tjfoc/gmsm v1.4.2-0.20220114090716-36b992c51540 +## explicit; go 1.14 +github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls +github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2 +github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm3 +github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm4 +github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/x509 +# golang.org/x/crypto v0.14.0 +## explicit; go 1.17 +golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20 +golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305 +golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte +golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1 +golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519 +golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field +golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias +golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305 +golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160 +golang.org/x/crypto/sha3 # golang.org/x/net v0.17.0 ## explicit; go 1.17 golang.org/x/net/context @@ -177,6 +196,7 @@ golang.org/x/oauth2/internal golang.org/x/sync/errgroup # golang.org/x/sys v0.14.0 ## explicit; go 1.18 +golang.org/x/sys/cpu golang.org/x/sys/plan9 golang.org/x/sys/unix golang.org/x/sys/windows