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+
+@article{duursma_he_2019,
+	title = {He who pays the piper, calls the tune? {Non}-{African} involvement in {Sudan}’s {African}-led mediation processes},
+	volume = {13},
+	issn = {1753-1055, 1753-1063},
+	shorttitle = {He who pays the piper, calls the tune?},
+	url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2019.1599246},
+	doi = {10.1080/17531055.2019.1599246},
+	abstract = {In spite of a strong preference for African solutions to African conflicts within the African system of states, non-African third parties are frequently involved in mediation in Africa, most frequently in cooperation with African third parties. Yet, the factors that explain the outcomes of non-African involvement remain largely understudied. This article addresses this gap in research through employing a comparative case study between the Naivasha peace process between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and the Abuja peace process between the Government of Sudan and the Darfurian rebels that led to the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006. These cases suggest that non-African leverage coordinated by African third parties enhances the prospects for mediation success, while uncoordinated non-African leverage seems to supplant efforts of African third parties. The phrase African solutions to African challenges should therefore be understood as a division of labour, rather than an excuse for non-African third parties to ignore Africa’s problems or African third parties acting on their own. While African third parties should take the lead in resolving civil wars in Africa, non-African third parties should support these processes by lending additional strength.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {3},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {Journal of Eastern African Studies},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	month = jul,
+	year = {2019},
+	pages = {428--444},
+}
+
+@article{brosche_hurdles_2018,
+	title = {Hurdles to peace: a level-of-analysis approach to resolving {Sudan}’s civil wars},
+	volume = {39},
+	issn = {0143-6597, 1360-2241},
+	shorttitle = {Hurdles to peace},
+	url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2017.1333417},
+	doi = {10.1080/01436597.2017.1333417},
+	abstract = {Why do some peace agreements end armed conflicts whereas others do not? Previous studies have primarily focused on the relation between warring parties and the provisions included in peace agreements. Prominent mediators, however, have emphasised the importance of stakeholders at various levels for the outcome of peace agreements. To match the experience of these negotiators we apply a level-of-analysis approach to examine the contextual circumstances under which peace agreements are concluded. While prominent within the causes of war literature, level-of-analysis approaches are surprisingly scant in research about conflict resolution. This article compares two Sudanese Peace Agreements: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) that ended the North–South war and led to the independence of South Sudan, and the Darfur Peace Agreement (2006) which failed to end fighting in Darfur. We find that factors at the local, national and international level explain the different outcomes of the two agreements. Hence, the two case studies illustrate the merit of employing a level-of-analysis approach to study the outcome of peace agreements. The main contribution of this article is that it presents a new theoretical framework to understand why some peace agreements terminate armed conflict whereas others do not.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {3},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {Third World Quarterly},
+	author = {Brosché, Johan and Duursma, Allard},
+	month = mar,
+	year = {2018},
+	pages = {560--576},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_counting_2017,
+	title = {Counting {Deaths} {While} {Keeping} {Peace}: {An} {Assessment} of the {JMAC}'s {Field} {Information} and {Analysis} {Capacity} in {Darfur}},
+	volume = {24},
+	issn = {1353-3312, 1743-906X},
+	shorttitle = {Counting {Deaths} {While} {Keeping} {Peace}},
+	url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2017.1383567},
+	doi = {10.1080/13533312.2017.1383567},
+	abstract = {This article assesses the Joint Mission Analysis Centre’s (JMAC) field information and analysis capacity through systematically comparing JMAC’s data collection in Darfur to an event-level conflict dataset based on open-source information. This comparison shows that JMAC’s data collection in Darfur over the studied period is much more comprehensive and precise than any publicly available data on conflict events currently available. In addition, this article demonstrates how peacekeeping data could be used to guide the leadership of peacekeeping missions.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {5},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {International Peacekeeping},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	month = oct,
+	year = {2017},
+	pages = {823--847},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_information_2018,
+	title = {Information {Processing} {Challenges} in {Peacekeeping} {Operations}: {A} {Case} {Study} on {Peacekeeping} {Information} {Collection} {Efforts} in {Mali}},
+	volume = {25},
+	issn = {1353-3312, 1743-906X},
+	shorttitle = {Information {Processing} {Challenges} in {Peacekeeping} {Operations}},
+	url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2018.1446757},
+	doi = {10.1080/13533312.2018.1446757},
+	abstract = {Information analysts are often hindered by uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity, and equivocality when trying to support peacekeeping operations. This article puts forward a conceptual framework that explains what each of these information challenges entails and how uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity, and equivocality hamper peacekeeping efforts. To assess the conceptual value of linking these information challenges to peacekeeping efforts, this article zooms in on the information support system within the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), though other cases are also considered. The peacekeeping information collection and analysis efforts in Mali illustrate that peacekeeping missions ideally should be equipped with the capacity to overcome information challenges related to uncertainty and complexity in order to support the tactical and operational level of peacekeeping missions. In order to understand decision-making context and support the strategic level, it is also important that information analysts within peacekeeping mission can reduce information challenges related to ambiguity and equivocality. The importance of understanding the decision-making context speaks to the emphasis on sequenced mandates in the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report. In order to timely adjust the mandate of a peacekeeping mission, the leadership of a peacekeeping mission needs to be alerted of any changes in the decision-making context.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {3},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {International Peacekeeping},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	month = may,
+	year = {2018},
+	pages = {446--468},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_current_2014,
+	title = {A current literature review of international mediation},
+	volume = {25},
+	issn = {1044-4068},
+	url = {https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IJCMA-02-2012-0020/full/html},
+	doi = {10.1108/IJCMA-02-2012-0020},
+	abstract = {Purpose – A rapidly expanding body of literature on international mediation, as well as the central role international mediation plays in modern-day conflict resolution, make it necessary to review and analyze this vastly evolving field of study. This study seeks to review the most significant trends and debates in the literature on international mediation, with an emphasis on the literature of the past six years.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {1},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {International Journal of Conflict Management},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	month = feb,
+	year = {2014},
+	pages = {81--98},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_when_2017,
+	title = {When to {Get} {Out} of the {Trench}? {Using} {Smart} {Pressure} to {Resolve} {Civil} {Wars}},
+	volume = {19},
+	issn = {1369-8249, 1743-968X},
+	shorttitle = {When to {Get} {Out} of the {Trench}?},
+	url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698249.2017.1342440},
+	doi = {10.1080/13698249.2017.1342440},
+	abstract = {This article puts forward a theory of smart pressure, which emphasises that thirdparty pressure only works if the conflict parties under pressure can agree with the endpoint of this pressure. Hence, a potential mutually acceptable agreement needs to be formulated before a mediator starts to apply pressure. To this argument, this article employs two case studies: the mediation efforts leading up to the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement concluded in 2005 and the Darfur Peace Agreement concluded in 2006. These cases support the smart pressure theory and suggest that mediators need to be modest about what they can accomplish using pressure.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {1},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {Civil Wars},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	year = {2017},
+	pages = {46--64},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_voted_2019,
+	title = {Voted out: {Regime} type, elections and contributions to {United} {Nations} peacekeeping operations},
+	volume = {25},
+	issn = {1354-0661, 1460-3713},
+	shorttitle = {Voted out},
+	url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354066119830773},
+	doi = {10.1177/1354066119830773},
+	abstract = {Previous research has suggested that leaders of democratic regimes are particularly willing to contribute troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations because backing ‘liberal’ peacekeeping allows them to support the diffusion of liberal institutions. However, evidence used to sustain this argument is based on contribution patterns during the decade of peacekeeping that followed the Cold War. In this article, we argue that there has been a reversal in the relative willingness of democratic and non-democratic governments to provide the United Nations with peacekeepers since then. Specifically, we propose that the introduction of more ‘robust’ forms of peacekeeping during the 1990s has rendered democratic governments reluctant to contribute large numbers of peacekeepers to United Nations operations because elected leaders are now concerned that voters may object to the deployment of national troops to high-risk humanitarian missions in which there is no clear national interest. By contrast, non-democratic leaders partly discount public opinion because they are less reliant on popular support to retain power. Thus, when non-democrats see that contributing troops to United Nations peacekeeping will bring them reputational and/or resource benefits, they are willing to contribute peacekeepers — and on a large scale. We test our claims quantitatively. We find that since the 1990s, democratic governments have remained more likely than non-democrats to contribute some troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations, but non-democratic governments have been more likely to make large-scale contributions. We also find that governments have been especially reluctant to make sizeable contributions to peacekeeping when elections have been on the horizon.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {4},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {European Journal of International Relations},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and Gledhill, John},
+	month = dec,
+	year = {2019},
+	pages = {1157--1185},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_icc_2019,
+	title = {The {ICC} indictment against {Al}-{Bashir} and its repercussions for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in {Darfur}},
+	volume = {40},
+	issn = {0143-6597, 1360-2241},
+	url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2019.1579640},
+	doi = {10.1080/01436597.2019.1579640},
+	abstract = {The impact of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on peace processes has received much scholarly attention. We argue, based on the ICC arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, that ICC indictments against government officials not only can be detrimental to the prospects for peace, but can also negatively affect everyday practices of peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. We draw on a combination of quantitative and qualitative data in order to develop our argument. We interrogate some measurable consequences of the indictment in relation to the work of the United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) as well as humanitarian actors in Darfur. We do so using a data set compiled to support the work of UNAMID. We also draw on interviews with UN and UNAMID staff, aid workers, and representatives of the conflict parties. Our analysis shows that the indictment of President al-Bashir was perceived by the Sudanese government as the continuation of a confrontational approach pursued by the international community. We further show that the indictment accelerated patterns of obstruction and intimidation of peacekeeping actors, other third-party actors, and local staff associated with these. This complicated the everyday activities of peacekeepers and humanitarian efforts.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {5},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {Third World Quarterly},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and Müller, Tanja R.},
+	month = may,
+	year = {2019},
+	pages = {890--907},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_pursuing_2020,
+	title = {Pursuing justice, obstructing peace: the impact of {ICC} arrest warrants on resolving civil wars},
+	volume = {20},
+	issn = {1467-8802, 1478-1174},
+	shorttitle = {Pursuing justice, obstructing peace},
+	url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2020.1741934},
+	doi = {10.1080/14678802.2020.1741934},
+	abstract = {The question of how International Criminal Court (ICC) involvement affects civil war peace processes has attracted considerable debate. Systematic assessments of the impact of ICC arrest warrants have begun to emerge, but the evidence is mixed. Based on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) on intrastate conflicts between 2002 and 2018, this article presents evidence that suggests that ICC arrest warrants do not inhibit the onset of mediation. Neither do ICC arrest warrants seem to prevent peace agreements from being concluded. Crucially, however, ICC arrest warrants do seem to undermine the prospects for conflict resolution, defined as the termination of a conflict through a negotiated settlement. A closer look at mediation efforts in Uganda, Sudan, and the DRC reveals some of the causal mechanisms that underlie the finding that ICC involvement undermines the prospects for conflict resolution.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {3},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {Conflict, Security & Development},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	month = may,
+	year = {2020},
+	pages = {335--354},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_fueling_2021,
+	title = {Fueling {Factionalism}? {The} {Impact} of {Peace} {Processes} on {Rebel} {Group} {Fragmentation} in {Civil} {Wars}},
+	volume = {65},
+	issn = {0022-0027, 1552-8766},
+	shorttitle = {Fueling {Factionalism}?},
+	url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002720958062},
+	doi = {10.1177/0022002720958062},
+	abstract = {While peace processes increase the likelihood that a civil war is resolved, they can also complicate peace by increasing the risk of rebel fragmentation. In this article, we argue that negotiations exacerbate pre-existing structural and substantial divisions within rebel organizations, therefore increasing the likelihood of a rebel split. More specifically, we put forward a theoretical framework that specifies why factions within a rebel group may disagree with the onset of negotiations, the conclusion of a peace agreement, or the implementation of an agreement—and thus break away during the peace process. We empirically assess the merit of this framework by systematically comparing the impact of these phases in a peace process on the fragmentation of rebel organizations. Using data that more accurately reflect the moment a rebel split takes place than earlier studies, we find that peace processes have a greater substantial impact on rebel fragmentation than previously assumed.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {4},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and Fliervoet, Feike},
+	month = apr,
+	year = {2021},
+	pages = {788--812},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_making_2021,
+	title = {Making disorder more manageable: {The} short-term effectiveness of local mediation in {Darfur}},
+	volume = {58},
+	issn = {0022-3433, 1460-3578},
+	shorttitle = {Making disorder more manageable},
+	url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343319898241},
+	doi = {10.1177/0022343319898241},
+	abstract = {Much of the quantitative conflict resolution literature focuses on mediation between states or on efforts to end a civil war through a comprehensive peace agreement that brings peace to the entire country. This article instead analyses the effectiveness of mediation between a wide range of armed actors on a subnational level. Utilizing unique data on Darfur covering the January 2008–August 2009 period, this article finds that mediation efforts following armed clashes in a given area significantly prolong local lulls in fighting in this area. This finding remains robust when controlling for the presence of a peacekeeping base, battle-deaths and the type of armed actors engaged in armed clashes. In addition, the finding remains robust when accounting for the non-random assignment of mediation efforts through matching similar observations in the dataset. Finally, anecdotal evidence from sites of armed conflict beyond Darfur suggest that the findings from this study might also hold in other armed conflicts.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {3},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {Journal of Peace Research},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	month = may,
+	year = {2021},
+	pages = {554--567},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_pinioning_2020,
+	title = {Pinioning the {Peacekeepers}: {Sovereignty}, {Host}-{State} {Resistance} against {Peacekeeping} {Missions}, and {Violence} against {Civilians}},
+	issn = {1521-9488, 1468-2486},
+	shorttitle = {Pinioning the {Peacekeepers}},
+	url = {https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa063/5899224},
+	doi = {10.1093/isr/viaa063},
+	abstract = {Abstract Why and how do host-states resist contemporary peacekeeping missions? This article puts forward the argument that host-state resistance against peacekeepers is a strategy to balance challenges to the internal and external faces of a civil war state's sovereignty. Government officials might see an intense counter-insurgency campaign as an effective way to regain the monopoly on violence and thus strengthen the internal sovereignty of the state, but this will often lead to criticism from the international community and thus also lead to an erosion of the external sovereignty of the state. Conversely, the acceptance of a peacekeeping mission can strengthen a civil war state's external sovereignty as this acceptance signals a willingness to manage armed violence, but the deployment of peacekeepers is at the expense of internal sovereignty as it often limits the ability of government troops to conduct their counter-insurgency efforts. States can resolve this dilemma by accepting a peacekeeping mission to prop up their external sovereignty, but at the same time trying to limit the effectiveness of peacekeepers in those areas where peacekeeping activities potentially interfere with the efforts of government troops to regain the monopoly on the use of violence. The article zooms in on how the Sudanese government accepted the deployment of the United Nations–African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), but at the same undermined its civilian protection efforts, though other cases are considered as well.},
+	language = {en},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {International Studies Review},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	month = aug,
+	year = {2020},
+	pages = {viaa063},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_african_2020,
+	title = {African {Solutions} to {African} {Challenges}: {The} {Role} of {Legitimacy} in {Mediating} {Civil} {Wars} in {Africa}},
+	volume = {74},
+	issn = {0020-8183, 1531-5088},
+	shorttitle = {African {Solutions} to {African} {Challenges}},
+	url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0020818320000041/type/journal_article},
+	doi = {10.1017/S0020818320000041},
+	abstract = {The current scholarly literature on the international mediation of civil wars draws predominantly on a rationalist-materialist perspective. This perspective suggests that the ticket to mediation success is the material manipulation of the bargaining environment by third parties with a high degree of economic and military resources. I argue that legitimacy also determines outcomes of mediation because if a mediator has legitimacy, it can continue to look for a mutually satisfactory outcome and try to pull the conflict parties toward compliance. I show that legitimacy matters by systematically comparing the effectiveness of African and non-African third parties. African third parties are typically considered ineffective because of a low degree of economic and military capacity. However, they effectively mediate civil wars in Africa because of a high degree of legitimacy, which is a result of a strong conviction within the African society of states that African mediation is the most desirable type in conflicts there. Drawing on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program supplemented with unique data, which together cover all mediation efforts in Africa between 1960 and 2017, I find quantitative evidence supporting the effectiveness of African third parties. Compared to non-African ones, African third parties are far more likely to conclude negotiated settlements that are more likely to be durable. African third parties are especially effective if the conflict parties are highly committed to the African solutions norm. Theoretically, this study deviates from much of the literature that puts forward solely rationalist-materialist explanations of mediation success. By bringing legitimacy to the forefront, this article supplements the current mediation literature that emphasizes material sources of power and ignores social structures.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {2},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {International Organization},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	year = {2020},
+	pages = {295--330},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_mediating_2019,
+	title = {Mediating {Solutions} to {Territorial} {Civil} {Wars} in {Africa}: {Norms}, {Interests}, and {Major} {Power} {Leverage}},
+	volume = {62},
+	issn = {0002-0206, 1555-2462},
+	shorttitle = {Mediating {Solutions} to {Territorial} {Civil} {Wars} in {Africa}},
+	url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0002020618001038/type/journal_article},
+	doi = {10.1017/asr.2018.103},
+	abstract = {This article draws on the concept of “identity interests” to explain why commitment to the territorial integrity norm in the context of African peace processes has persisted over such a long period of time, even as continental and international contexts have changed. One major implication of this commitment to the territorial integrity norm is that third parties involved in peacemaking in Africa have consistently refrained from promoting a negotiated settlement that might pave the way for independence; they have only pushed for a territorial revision in a few instances. The role of major powers has been crucial with regard to the few successful territorial changes in Africa since 1960. An overview of all outcomes of mediation in territorial intrastate conflicts in Africa—as well as seven case studies—support this argument.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {3},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {African Studies Review},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	month = sep,
+	year = {2019},
+	pages = {65--88},
+}
+
+@incollection{duursma_technologies_2021,
+	title = {Technologies of {Peace}},
+	isbn = {978-0-19-090441-8},
+	url = {https://oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190904418.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190904418-e-28},
+	abstract = {This chapter examines the effects of the digital revolution and new information and communication technologies on peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The chapter is concerned with how digital and web-based information and communication technologies can be used to prevent and manage armed violence, foster inclusive societies, and ensure a durable and high-quality peace. The UN is increasingly adopting new technologies, particularly within the field of peacekeeping. To increase situational awareness, UN peacekeeping staff have crowdsourced information and used drones and satellite imagery. In addition, the analysis of peacekeeping data holds great potential for early warning. New technological tools can help foster collaboration, transform attitudes, and give a stronger voice to local communities. Online platforms have been used to monitor elections, document human rights abuses, and facilitate communication between members of different sides in a conflict. However, since one cannot simply assume that technology will change everything for the better, it is crucial to be aware of the ethical implications of the use of new peace technologies. The UN needs to be careful that early warning is translated into early action. Peacekeepers and peacebuilders should also be vigilant when it comes to mitigating the possible abuse and negative side effects of the use of peace technologies. The chapter concludes that peace technologies significantly influence the prospects for peacekeeping and peacebuilding, particularly when the use of technology helps peacekeepers and peacebuilders be more people-centric.},
+	language = {en},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	booktitle = {The {Oxford} {Handbook} of {Peacebuilding}, {Statebuilding}, and {Peace} {Formation}},
+	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and Karlsrud, John},
+	editor = {Richmond, Oliver P. and Visoka, Gëzim},
+	month = jul,
+	year = {2021},
+	doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190904418.013.28},
+	pages = {413--428},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_obstruction_2019,
+	title = {Obstruction and intimidation of peacekeepers: {How} armed actors undermine civilian protection efforts},
+	volume = {56},
+	issn = {0022-3433, 1460-3578},
+	shorttitle = {Obstruction and intimidation of peacekeepers},
+	url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343318800522},
+	doi = {10.1177/0022343318800522},
+	abstract = {While recent research focuses on why conflict parties attack peacekeepers, little attention has been given to other types of resistance against peacekeeping missions, such as intimidation and obstruction. It is argued in this article that one reason why peacekeepers are obstructed and intimidated is that armed actors that target civilians want to maintain the operational space to carry out attacks against civilians and want to prevent peacekeepers from monitoring human rights violations. A spatially and temporally disaggregated analysis on resistance against peacekeepers in Darfur between January 2008 and April 2009 indeed suggests that the intimidation and obstruction of peacekeepers is more likely to take place in areas with higher levels of violence against civilians. The findings hold when taking into account the non-random occurrence of violence against civilians through matching the data. Finally, anecdotal evidence from other sites of armed conflict than Darfur suggests that resistance against peacekeepers in these cases is also likely to be related to the targeting of civilians. This suggest that in order to be effective in protecting civilians, peace missions should not only be robust as highlighted in previous research, but peace missions should also develop an effective strategy to deal with armed groups that try to prevent peacekeepers from fulfilling their mandate.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {2},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {Journal of Peace Research},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	month = mar,
+	year = {2019},
+	pages = {234--248},
+}
+
+@incollection{duursma_third_2020,
+	title = {Third {Party} {Legitimacy} and {International} {Mediation}: {Peacemaking} through {Pan}-{Africanism} in {Sudan}},
+	isbn = {null},
+	url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctv177thnz.14},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	booktitle = {Local {Legitimacy} and {International} {Peace} {Intervention}},
+	publisher = {Edinburgh University Press},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	editor = {RICHMOND, OLIVER P. and GINTY, ROGER MAC},
+	year = {2020},
+	pages = {199--214},
+}
+
+@incollection{toft_globalization_2018,
+	title = {Globalization and {Security}},
+	isbn = {978-0-19-063057-7},
+	url = {http://oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190630577.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190630577-e-36},
+	abstract = {This chapter provides an overview of how globalization has changed what security is and how security can be achieved most effectively. The first section provides a brief overview of the literature on globalization and security, highlighting a disconnect between the state-centric security literature and the focus on transnational linkages within the literature on globalization. The second section shows the importance of accounting for the effects of globalization when studying security. Globalization has made the threat environment more diverse and complicated for understanding the dynamics of the states system. The third section addresses the interaction of core issues at the domestic, international, and transnational levels highlighting how these interactions challenge or reinforce the traditional basis of legitimacy and authority of states and the state system. The final section concludes with a discussion of implications of the impact of globalization on security.},
+	language = {en},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	booktitle = {The {Oxford} {Handbook} of {Global} {Studies}},
+	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
+	author = {Toft, Monica Duffy and Duursma, Allard},
+	editor = {Juergensmeyer, Mark and Sassen, Saskia and Steger, Manfred B. and Faessel, Victor},
+	month = dec,
+	year = {2018},
+	doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190630577.013.36},
+	pages = {398--414},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_mediation_2011,
+	title = {Mediation with muscles or minds?’ {Lessons} from a conflict sensitive mediation style in {Darfur}},
+	number = {4},
+	journal = {Conflict Trends},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	year = {2011},
+	pages = {11--19},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_partnering_2017,
+	title = {Partnering to {Make} {Peace}: {The} {Effectiveness} of {Joint} {African} and {Non}-{African} {Mediation} {Efforts}},
+	volume = {24},
+	issn = {1353-3312, 1743-906X},
+	shorttitle = {Partnering to {Make} {Peace}},
+	url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2017.1345312},
+	doi = {10.1080/13533312.2017.1345312},
+	abstract = {This article systematically examines the varying effectiveness of African and nonAfrican third parties in mediating civil wars in Africa. Drawing on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, supplemented with unique data on mediation efforts, which together cover all mediation efforts in civil wars in Africa between 1960 and 2012, this article presents quantitative evidence supporting the effectiveness of African third parties. Compared to non-African third parties, African third parties are far more likely to conclude peace agreements and these peace agreements are more likely to be durable. Most effective, however, are mixed mediation efforts in which there is coordination between African and non-African third parties, but in which African third parties take the lead. The phrase, ‘African solutions to African challenges’ should thus be understood as a division of labour and responsibilities, rather than an excuse for non-African third parties to ignore Africa’s problems or African third parties acting on their own. Indeed, whilst African third parties should take the lead in mediation processes in African civil wars, non-African third parties should support these processes by lending additional strength. Through supplementing each other’s comparative advantages, African and non-African third parties can more effectively resolve civil wars in Africa.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {4},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {International Peacekeeping},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	month = aug,
+	year = {2017},
+	pages = {590--615},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_modelling_2017,
+	title = {Modelling {Violence} as {Disease}? {Exploring} the {Possibilities} of {Epidemiological} {Analysis} for {Peacekeeping} {Data} in {Darfur}},
+	volume = {24},
+	issn = {1353-3312, 1743-906X},
+	shorttitle = {Modelling {Violence} as {Disease}?},
+	url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2017.1383563},
+	doi = {10.1080/13533312.2017.1383563},
+	abstract = {This article explores the potential and limitations of epidemiological analyses of violence. We draw on an 18-month sample of Joint Mission Analysis Centres data to identify clusters of armed violence in Darfur and model the risk of armed clashes in space and time. We illustrate the merit of using methods from both descriptive epidemiology and analytical epidemiology to study armed conflict. We observe three interesting correlations. Firstly, that violence in one locality means it is more likely that there will be violence in a neighbouring locality in the next month. Secondly, that the presence of peacekeepers in a locality where violence has occurred means it is less likely that violence will occur in a neighbouring locality, than if peacekeepers were not present. Finally, our third observation is that the presence of peacekeepers in a given locality means it is more likely that violence will occur in that locality. Understanding how conflict occurs in space and time could contribute to the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. This touches upon the major commonality between the efforts of peacekeeping missions and epidemiology: both are fundamentally concerned with the well-being of defined populations and both rely on data to design effective interventions.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {5},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {International Peacekeeping},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and Read, Róisín},
+	month = oct,
+	year = {2017},
+	pages = {733--755},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_introducing_2019,
+	title = {Introducing an {Agenda}-based {Measurement} of {Mediation} {Success}: {The} {Divergent} {Effects} of the {Manipulation} {Strategy} in {African} {Civil} {Wars}},
+	volume = {24},
+	issn = {1382-340X, 1571-8069},
+	shorttitle = {Introducing an {Agenda}-based {Measurement} of {Mediation} {Success}},
+	url = {https://brill.com/view/journals/iner/24/2/article-p296_5.xml},
+	doi = {10.1163/15718069-24011175},
+	abstract = {Abstract Previous quantitative mediation research has relied on generalized measurements of “mediation success,” such as agreements, ceasefires or peace durability. However, these measurements of success do not take into account what mediators were mandated to achieve. We propose benchmarking outcomes against the explicit mandates of the interventions, a novel way of conceptualizing mediation success. Utilizing data on the agendas of mediated negotiations in intrastate armed conflicts in Africa between 1990 and 2010 as a proxy for mediation mandates, we examine the relative effectiveness of manipulation as a mediation strategy. The study shows, in contrast to previous research, that third party manipulation does not have a significant effect on whether the goal of a given round of negotiations is achieved and, that under some circumstances, may decrease the likelihood of mediation success. We discuss the opportunities as well as limitations of a mandate-based approach to the study of mediation success.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {2},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {International Negotiation},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and Svensson, Isak},
+	month = apr,
+	year = {2019},
+	pages = {296--323},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_predictive_2019,
+	title = {Predictive {Peacekeeping}: {Strengthening} {Predictive} {Analysis} in {UN} {Peace} {Operations}},
+	volume = {8},
+	issn = {2165-2627},
+	shorttitle = {Predictive {Peacekeeping}},
+	url = {http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.663/},
+	doi = {10.5334/sta.663},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {1},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {Stability: International Journal of Security and Development},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and Karlsrud, John},
+	month = feb,
+	year = {2019},
+	pages = {1},
+}
+
+@article{twagiramungu_re-describing_2019,
+	title = {Re-describing transnational conflict in {Africa}},
+	volume = {57},
+	issn = {0022-278X, 1469-7777},
+	url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0022278X19000107/type/journal_article},
+	doi = {10.1017/S0022278X19000107},
+	abstract = {ABSTRACT This paper discusses the principal findings of a new integrated dataset of transnational armed conflict in Africa. Existing Africa conflict datasets have systematically under-represented the extent of cross-border state support to belligerent parties in internal armed conflicts as well as the number of incidents of covert cross-border armed intervention and incidents of using armed force to threaten a neighbouring state. Based on the method of ‘redescribing’ datapoints in existing datasets, notably the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, the Transnational Conflict in Africa (TCA) data include numerous missing incidents of transnational armed conflict and reclassify many more. The data indicate that (i) trans-nationality is a major feature of armed conflict in Africa, (ii) most so-called ‘civil wars’ are internationalised and (iii) the dominant definitions of ‘interstate conflict’ and ‘civil war’ are too narrow to capture the particularities of Africa's wars. While conventional interstate war remains rare, interstate rivalry using military means is common. The dataset opens up a research agenda for studying the drivers, patterns and instruments of African interstate rivalries. These findings have important implications for conflict prevention, management and resolution policies.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {3},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {The Journal of Modern African Studies},
+	author = {Twagiramungu, Noel and Duursma, Allard and Berhe, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot and de Waal, Alex},
+	month = sep,
+	year = {2019},
+	pages = {377--391},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_not_2021,
+	title = {Not {All} {Ceasefires} {Are} {Created} {Equal}: {The} {Role} of {Third} {Party} {Manipulation} in {Sudan}’s {Major} {Ceasefire} {Agreements}},
+	issn = {1382-340X, 1571-8069},
+	shorttitle = {Not {All} {Ceasefires} {Are} {Created} {Equal}},
+	url = {https://brill.com/view/journals/iner/aop/article-10.1163-15718069-BJA10024/article-10.1163-15718069-BJA10024.xml},
+	doi = {10.1163/15718069-BJA10024},
+	abstract = {Past research has found that third party pressure makes the signing of a ceasefire more likely, but also more likely to break down. What explains this variation? I argue that third party pressure is more likely to lead to a durable ceasefire if pressure is applied to persuade the conflict parties to continue to negotiate and produce a detailed ceasefire document, whereas pressure solely aimed at making the conflict parties sign a ceasefire document undermines the durability of the ceasefire. A comparison of four ceasefires concluded in Sudan supports this argument. Third party pressure that led to the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire and the Agreement on Security Arrangements helped move the negotiations on security arrangements forward. By contrast, the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the Darfur Peace Agreement were imposed on the parties without regard for political and technical aspects of the ceasefire. This explains why violence soon resumed.},
+	language = {en},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {International Negotiation},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	month = may,
+	year = {2021},
+	pages = {1--30},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_mutual_2021,
+	title = {Mutual {Interventions} in {Africa}},
+	issn = {0020-8833, 1468-2478},
+	url = {https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article/doi/10.1093/isq/sqab023/6188495},
+	doi = {10.1093/isq/sqab023},
+	abstract = {Abstract Global datasets on interstate armed conflict suggest that African states clash with each other rarely and only for short periods. This research note shows that existing datasets paint a misleading picture. In fact, African states fight each other more often and for longer than is commonly thought, but they do so by mutually intervening in each other's intrastate conflicts. Instead of relying solely on their own armed forces, they support their rival's armed opposition groups. Such mutual interventions—most prevalent in Africa but also evident in other regions—thus span the boundaries of interstate and intrastate conflict. As a result, they have been largely overlooked by conflict scholars. Our note conceptualizes mutual intervention as a distinct form of interstate conflict, comparing and contrasting it with concepts like proxy war, competitive intervention, and international rivalry. The note then presents the first systematic survey of mutual interventions across the African continent. We identify twenty-three cases between 1960 and 2010 and demonstrate that they typically ended independently of their associated intrastate conflicts. We conclude with a research agenda that involves studying the onset, duration, termination, and consequences of mutual interventions, including collecting data on mutual interventions outside Africa to explore cross-regional differences.},
+	language = {en},
+	urldate = {2021-07-29},
+	journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and Tamm, Henning},
+	month = mar,
+	year = {2021},
+	pages = {sqab023},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_non-state_2022,
+	title = {Non-state conflicts, peacekeeping, and the conclusion of local agreements},
+	issn = {2164-7259, 2164-7267},
+	url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21647259.2022.2032946},
+	doi = {10.1080/21647259.2022.2032946},
+	abstract = {Much of the quantitative conflict resolution literature focuses on peacemaking efforts aimed at resolving international conflict or civil wars that involve state forces, while ignoring non-state conflict between communal groups, rebel groups, or militias. This article aims to contribute to filling this gap in research. I first put forward a typology of non-state conflicts, based on two dimensions: (1) whether the conflict issues are local or national; and (2) whether the conflict parties receive external support or not. Next, I provide some descrip­ tive statistics on the conclusion of peace agreements in non-state conflicts, which suggest that in locations of peacekeeping operations, the involvement of peacekeeping staff in negotiations makes these negotiations more likely to end in the conclusion of an agreement. The article considers several possible causal mechanisms that drive this effectiveness, including the arranging of logistics, the provision of security, and mitigating biases of relevant stakeholders.},
+	language = {en},
+	urldate = {2022-03-18},
+	journal = {Peacebuilding},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	month = feb,
+	year = {2022},
+	pages = {1--18},
+}
+
+@article{karlen_forum_2021,
+	title = {Forum: {Conflict} {Delegation} in {Civil} {Wars}},
+	volume = {23},
+	issn = {1521-9488, 1468-2486},
+	shorttitle = {Forum},
+	url = {https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/23/4/2048/6419778},
+	doi = {10.1093/isr/viab053},
+	abstract = {Abstract This forum provides an outlet for an assessment of research on the delegation of war to non-state armed groups in civil wars. Given the significant growth of studies concerned with this phenomenon over the last decade, this forum critically engages with the present state of the field. First, we canvass some of the most important theoretical developments to demonstrate the heterogeneity of the debate. Second, we expand on the theme of complexity and investigate its multiple facets as a window into pushing the debate forward. Third, we draw the contours of a future research agenda by highlighting some contemporary problems, puzzles, and challenges to empirical data collection. In essence, we seek to connect two main literatures that have been talking past each other: external support in civil wars and proxy warfare. The forum bridges this gap at a critical juncture in this new and emerging scholarship by offering space for scholarly dialogue across conceptual labels.},
+	language = {en},
+	number = {4},
+	urldate = {2022-03-18},
+	journal = {International Studies Review},
+	author = {Karlén, Niklas and Rauta, Vladimir and Salehyan, Idean and Mumford, Andrew and San-Akca, Belgin and Stark, Alexandra and Wyss, Michel and Moghadam, Assaf and Duursma, Allard and Tamm, Henning and Jenne, Erin K and Popovic, Milos and Siroky, David S and Meier, Vanessa and Chinchilla, Alexandra and Rickard, Kit and Spatafora, Giuseppe},
+	month = dec,
+	year = {2021},
+	pages = {2048--2078},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_why_2022,
+	title = {Why {Peace} {Does} {Not} {Trickle} {Down}: {State} {Weakness}, a {Fragmented} {Patronage}-{Based} {System}, and {Protracted} {Local} {Conflict} in the {Central} {African} {Republic}},
+	abstract = {There is an academic consensus that addressing the local cleavages that drive armed conflict through local peacemaking is crucial to building peace. However, several studies also suggest that local peacemaking is often unsustainable without the conclusion of a national-level elite pact. This article moves this debate forward by arguing that even if an elite-level pact is in place, a lack of connections between national-level elites and local conflict parties can prevent peace from trickling down from the national level to the local level. This argument is demonstrated by looking at national-level and local peacemaking efforts in the Central African Republic. Although several national-level peace agreements have been concluded in the Central African Republic, extreme state weakness and a highly fragmented patronage-based system have prevented national-level peacemaking efforts from having a positive impact on local peacemaking efforts in the Central African Republic. Accordingly, this article contributes to the literature on conflict resolution in Africa. Many studies have focused on local peace process, yet the national-level context in which these local peace processes take place are only rarely considered.},
+	journal = {African Affairs},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	year = {2022},
+}
+
+@article{gledhill_glee_2022,
+	title = {Glee and {Grievance}: {Emotive} {Events} and {Campaign} {Escalation} in {Nonviolent} {Resistance}},
+	journal = {Journal of Global Security Studies},
+	author = {Gledhill, John and Duursma, Allard and Shay, Christopher},
+	year = {2022},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_crises_nodate,
+	title = {Crises and {Negotiations} in {Mutual} {Interventions}},
+	volume = {0},
+	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241309299},
+	doi = {10.1177/00220027241309299},
+	abstract = {Why do states that simultaneously support rebel groups in each other’s intrastate conflicts enter negotiations to resolve such mutual interventions? This is an important question, as negotiations between interveners typically lead to negotiated settlements, which in turn tend to make their intrastate conflicts far less deadly. We argue that international crises make negotiations more likely. Crises raise the costs of intervention and often lead potential mediators to put pressure on states to negotiate. Using new monthly data on mutual interventions in Africa, the article shows that crises are indeed significantly associated with the likelihood that negotiations will occur. This finding is robust to using fixed effects and matching. The article contributes to the literature by investigating a widespread though little-studied type of conflict, as well as by studying the impact of state leaders’ crisis perception using a quantitative research design, which helps overcome a methodological limitation seen in previous studies.},
+	number = {0},
+	journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and Tamm, Henning},
+	note = {\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241309299},
+	pages = {00220027241309299},
+}
+
+@article{abbs_tracing_2024,
+	title = {Tracing the {Footsteps} of {Peace}: {Examining} the {Locations} of {UN} {Peacekeeping} {Patrols}},
+	volume = {50},
+	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2024.2413566},
+	doi = {10.1080/03050629.2024.2413566},
+	number = {6},
+	journal = {International Interactions},
+	author = {Abbs, Luke and and, Allard Duursma},
+	year = {2024},
+	note = {Publisher: Routledge
+\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2024.2413566},
+	pages = {975--1004},
+}
+
+@article{kilroy_civilian_2024,
+	title = {Civilian {Protection} in {Theory} and {Practice}},
+	volume = {26},
+	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2024.2332160},
+	doi = {10.1080/13698249.2024.2332160},
+	number = {1},
+	journal = {Civil Wars},
+	author = {Kilroy, Walt and Podder, Sukanya and and, Allard Duursma},
+	year = {2024},
+	note = {Publisher: Routledge
+\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2024.2332160},
+	pages = {1--15},
+}
+
+@article{karlsrud_norm_2023,
+	title = {Norm {Fixation}: {The} {Role} of {Implementation} {Practices} in the {Development} of the {Protection} of {Civilians} {Norm}},
+	volume = {29},
+	url = {https://brill.com/view/journals/gg/29/4/article-p460_3.xml},
+	doi = {10.1163/19426720-02904008},
+	number = {4},
+	journal = {Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations},
+	author = {Karlsrud, John and Duursma, Allard},
+	year = {2023},
+	note = {Place: Leiden, The Netherlands
+Publisher: Brill {\textbar} Nijhoff},
+	pages = {460 -- 480},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_peacekeeping_2023,
+	title = {{UN} {Peacekeeping} at 75: {Achievements}, {Challenges}, and {Prospects}},
+	volume = {30},
+	issn = {1353-3312},
+	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2023.2263178},
+	doi = {10.1080/13533312.2023.2263178},
+	number = {4},
+	journal = {International Peacekeeping},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and , Corinne, Bara and , Nina, Wilén and , Sara, Hellmüller and , John, Karlsrud and , Kseniya, Oksamytna and , Janek, Bruker and , Susanna, Campbell and , Salvator, Cusimano and , Marco, Donati and , Han, Dorussen and , Dirk, Druet and , Valentin, Geier and , Marine, Epiney and , Valentin, Geier and , Linnéa, Gelot and , Dennis, Gyllensporre and , Annick, Hiensch and , Lisa, Hultman and , Charles T., Hunt and , Rajkumar Cheney, Krishnan and , Patryk I., Labuda and , Sascha, Langenbach and , Annika Hilding, Norberg and , Alexandra, Novosseloff and , Daniel, Oriesek and , Emily Paddon, Rhoads and , Francesco, Re and , Jenna, Russo and , Melanie, Sauter and , Hannah, Smidt and , Ueli, Staeger and and Wenger, Andreas},
+	month = aug,
+	year = {2023},
+	note = {Publisher: Routledge},
+	pages = {415--476},
+	annote = {doi: 10.1080/13533312.2023.2263178},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_blurred_2023,
+	title = {Blurred {Lines} or {Spatial} {Clustering}? {Assessing} the {Association} between {Peacekeeping} {Presence} and {Attacks} against {Humanitarians} in {Darfur}},
+	volume = {25},
+	url = {https://brill.com/view/journals/joup/25/4/article-p363_003.xml},
+	doi = {10.1163/18754112-25040003},
+	number = {4},
+	journal = {Journal of International Peacekeeping},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and Fast, Larissa and Read, Róisín},
+	year = {2023},
+	note = {Place: Leiden, The Netherlands
+Publisher: Brill {\textbar} Nijhoff},
+	pages = {363 -- 387},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_peacekeepers_2024,
+	title = {Peacekeepers {Without} {Helmets}: {How} {Violence} {Shapes} {Local} {Peacebuilding} by {Civilian} {Peacekeepers}},
+	volume = {57},
+	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231178740},
+	doi = {10.1177/00104140231178740},
+	abstract = {While United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations are increasingly deployed during ongoing violent conflict, they are also increasingly staffed with civilian personnel tasked with peacebuilding at the local level. How does violent conflict affect civilian peacekeepers’ peacebuilding efforts locally? Shifting the research focus from military to civilian peacekeepers, we argue that the latter have various incentives and the capacity to concentrate their local-level peacebuilding efforts in violence-affected areas. We test our argument using novel, georeferenced data on peacebuilding by “Civil Affairs” personnel of the peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic. Consistent with our expectation, violence positively correlates with civilian peacekeepers’ peacebuilding interventions both within and across localities. Furthermore, mediation analyses suggest that this correlation is not merely due to greater UN military deployments in violence-affected areas. Instrumental variable regression supports a causal interpretation: violence leads to more efforts by civilian peacekeepers. These findings inform expectations and assessments of peacekeeping effectiveness.},
+	number = {5},
+	journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and Smidt, Hannah},
+	year = {2024},
+	note = {\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231178740},
+	pages = {778--817},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_impact_2024,
+	title = {The {Impact} of {Host}-{State} {Consent} on the {Protection} of {Civilians} in {UN} {Peacekeeping}},
+	volume = {26},
+	issn = {1369-8249},
+	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2023.2196185},
+	doi = {10.1080/13698249.2023.2196185},
+	number = {1},
+	journal = {Civil Wars},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and , Sara, Lindberg Bromley and and Gorur, Aditi},
+	month = jan,
+	year = {2024},
+	note = {Publisher: Routledge},
+	pages = {16--40},
+	annote = {doi: 10.1080/13698249.2023.2196185},
+}
+
+@article{tamm_combat_2023,
+	title = {Combat, commitment, and the termination of {Africa}’s mutual interventions},
+	volume = {29},
+	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661221112612},
+	doi = {10.1177/13540661221112612},
+	abstract = {African states fight each other far more often by simultaneously supporting rebels in each other’s intrastate conflicts than by engaging in direct warfare. While nearly half of these mutual interventions between 1960 and 2010 were resolved via bilateral negotiated settlements, the majority of cases ended due to events in, or actions by, only one of the two states. What explains this variation? We argue that different combinations of combat outcomes in the two intrastate conflicts determine the severity of interstate commitment concerns and, therefore, the likelihood of a successful settlement. Specifically, we hypothesize that commitment problems are likely to be overcome only when both states experience stalemates or successes in their battles with rebels. By contrast, if both states suffer combat defeats, major commitment concerns on both sides make a settlement very unlikely. Finally, a combination of defeats and stalemates or successes also makes a settlement unlikely, as the state with the upper hand is likely both unwilling and unable to commit credibly to a settlement. We use several cases to illustrate our theory and then demonstrate how its causal mechanism works by leveraging within-case variation from the Chad–Sudan mutual intervention. We show that the two states reached a settlement only once both were winning at home while their rebel clients were losing abroad. Three alternative explanations—third-party threats, pressure, and security guarantees—cannot explain the settlement. Overall, our study extends bargaining theory to a new empirical domain and contributes to theorizing how its information and commitment logics interact.},
+	number = {1},
+	journal = {European Journal of International Relations},
+	author = {Tamm, Henning and Duursma, Allard},
+	year = {2023},
+	note = {\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661221112612},
+	pages = {3--28},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_russias_2022,
+	title = {Russia’s return to {Africa} in a historical and global context: {Anti}-imperialism, patronage, and opportunism},
+	volume = {29},
+	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2022.2136236},
+	doi = {10.1080/10220461.2022.2136236},
+	number = {4},
+	journal = {South African Journal of International Affairs},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and and, Niklas Masuhr},
+	year = {2022},
+	note = {Publisher: Routledge
+\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2022.2136236},
+	pages = {407--423},
+}
+
+@article{hirblinger_forum_2023,
+	title = {Forum: {Making} {Peace} with {Un}-{Certainty}: {Reflections} on the {Role} of {Digital} {Technology} in {Peace} {Processes} beyond the {Data} {Hype}},
+	volume = {25},
+	issn = {1528-3577},
+	url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekad004},
+	doi = {10.1093/isp/ekad004},
+	abstract = {Recent years have seen the acceleration of data- and evidence-based approaches in support of peace processes, creating a renewed confidence that conflicts can be predicted, known, and resolved, based on objective information about the world. However, new technologies employed by conflict parties, stakeholders, and those who aim to make or build peace have also made peace processes less ascertainable, intelligible, and predictable. Technology can thus create both more certainty and uncertainty in (and about) peace processes. This forum article presents a first collaborative attempt to explore how the use of technology by conflict parties and peacebuilding actors influences these dynamics. We examine various fields of engagement, ranging from conflict prevention to peace mediation, peacekeeping, and longer-term peacebuilding. Our discussion engages with a variety of related activities, including predictive analysis and foresight, conflict analysis, cease-fire monitoring, early warning and early action, and problem-solving and trust-building dialogues. We suggest approaching un-certainty as a spectrum between uncertainty and certainty that can be studied across epistemic, ontological, and normative dimensions, thus inviting further academic research and policy reflection. The article is coauthored by scholars and current or former practitioners and underlines the necessity, benefits, and feasibility of research–practice exchanges on this topic.},
+	number = {2},
+	journal = {International Studies Perspectives},
+	author = {Hirblinger, Andreas T and Wählisch, Martin and Keator, Kate and McNaboe, Chris and Duursma, Allard and Karlsrud, John and Sticher, Valerie and Verjee, Aly and Kyselova, Tetiana and Kwaja, Chris M A and Perera, Suda},
+	month = mar,
+	year = {2023},
+	note = {\_eprint: https://academic.oup.com/isp/article-pdf/25/2/185/57417526/ekad004.pdf},
+	pages = {185--225},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_peacekeeping_2023-1,
+	title = {Peacekeeping, {Mediation}, and the {Conclusion} of {Local} {Ceasefires} in {Non}-{State} {Conflicts}},
+	volume = {67},
+	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221148132},
+	doi = {10.1177/00220027221148132},
+	abstract = {This article theorizes on how military and civilian components of peacekeeping operations contribute to the conclusion of local ceasefires in non-state conflicts involving armed opposition groups or communal groups. A mediation-based logic suggests that civilian peacekeeping staff can provide technical support aimed at resolving the conflict issues and engage with state officials to promote peace. A capabilities-based logic suggest that military peacekeepers can provide security during the negotiations, arrange logistics, and put military pressure on the conflict parties, which all should make the conclusion of a ceasefire more likely. The analysis supports both the capabilities-based and the mediation-based logic. An instrumental variable estimation helps to account for endogeneity. This article contributes to the literature on peacekeeping, mediation, and ceasefires through shifting the focus to non-state conflicts.},
+	number = {7-8},
+	journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	year = {2023},
+	note = {\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221148132},
+	pages = {1405--1429},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_state_2022,
+	title = {State {Weakness}, a {Fragmented} {Patronage}-{Based} {System}, and {Protracted} {Local} {Conflict} in the {Central} {African} {Republic}},
+	volume = {121},
+	issn = {0001-9909},
+	url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adac012},
+	doi = {10.1093/afraf/adac012},
+	abstract = {There is an academic consensus that addressing the local cleavages that drive armed conflict through local peacemaking is crucial to building peace. However, several studies also suggest that local peacemaking is often unsustainable without the conclusion of a national-level elite pact. This article moves this debate forward by arguing that even if an elite-level pact is in place, a lack of connections between national-level elites and local conflict parties can prevent peace from trickling down from the national level to the local level. This argument is demonstrated by looking at national-level and local peacemaking efforts in the Central African Republic. Although several national-level peace agreements have been concluded in the Central African Republic, extreme state weakness and a highly fragmented patronage-based system have prevented national-level peacemaking efforts from having a positive impact on local peacemaking efforts in the Central African Republic. This article contributes to the literature on conflict resolution in Africa. Many studies have focused on the local peace process, yet the national-level context in which these local peace processes take place is only rarely considered.},
+	number = {483},
+	journal = {African Affairs},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	month = apr,
+	year = {2022},
+	note = {\_eprint: https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-pdf/121/483/251/53665057/adac012.pdf},
+	pages = {251--274},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_introducing_2023,
+	title = {Introducing the {African} {Peace} {Processes} ({APP}) dataset: {Negotiations} and mediation in interstate, intrastate and non-state conflicts in {Africa}},
+	volume = {60},
+	url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221100142},
+	doi = {10.1177/00223433221100142},
+	abstract = {This data feature introduces a new dataset to study peace processes to end organized armed violence in Africa: the African Peace Processes (APP) dataset. The APP dataset includes observations on both mediated and unmediated rounds of negotiations in state-based and non-state conflicts in Africa between 1989 and 2019 and builds on conflict data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The APP dataset covers peacemaking efforts in both active and inactive conflicts. Moreover, the start and end month and year of each observation are specified, giving researchers some flexibility with regard to the temporal unit of analysis they use. In addition to discussing the rationale behind the creation of the APP dataset, we explain the data collection process and show some patterns based on the data. We also illustrate how the data could be used by looking at the association between the no. of peacekeepers deployed and the onset of mediated negotiations in intrastate and non-state conflicts. We find that high no. of peacekeepers are associated with a higher likelihood of negotiations in non-state conflicts, but not in intrastate conflicts. A plausible explanation for this finding is that security concerns play a more important role in the decision to initiate negotiations in non-state conflicts than in intrastate conflicts. Our short analysis thus illustrates the value of having data on both intrastate and non-state conflicts.},
+	number = {6},
+	journal = {Journal of Peace Research},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and Gamez, Samantha Marie},
+	year = {2023},
+	note = {\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221100142},
+	pages = {1010--1020},
+}
+
+@article{gledhill_glee_2022-1,
+	title = {Glee and {Grievance}: {Emotive} {Events} and {Campaign} {Size} in {Nonviolent} {Resistance}},
+	volume = {7},
+	issn = {2057-3170},
+	url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac011},
+	doi = {10.1093/jogss/ogac011},
+	abstract = {While scholars of nonviolent resistance recognize that large-scale campaigns are more likely to be successful campaigns, we currently have little understanding of why some nonviolent protests grow into mass movements while others do not. In this article, we explore campaign size and, in particular, the role of individual and collective motives in facilitating the growth of nonviolent campaigns. We start by assuming that, after campaign onset, barriers to growth emerge because some aggrieved individuals who are sympathetic to the cause are wary of incurring the (opportunity) costs of participating in campaign rallies. On occasion, we argue, organizers respond to this challenge by staging events that generate rewarding emotional experiences for participants and spectators, such as concerts, mass singing, or other collective expressive acts. Since the feelings of empowerment, solidarity, catharsis, or glee that accompany these events can only be enjoyed by those who are physically present at campaign rallies, the provision of such “emotive events” creates an individual-level incentive for passive supporters to mobilize. As this incentive attracts new participants, campaigns can grow—potentially into large-scale phenomena. To assess the plausibility of our argument, we code original data on emotive events and investigate whether the provision of such events in the course of nonviolent campaigns is associated with the size and scale of those campaigns. Finding this to be the case, we conclude that campaigns that are more creative, humorous, cathartic, and/or fun are also more likely to be large-scale campaigns.},
+	number = {4},
+	journal = {Journal of Global Security Studies},
+	author = {Gledhill, John and Duursma, Allard and Shay, Christopher},
+	month = jul,
+	year = {2022},
+	note = {\_eprint: https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article-pdf/7/4/ogac011/45067828/ogac011.pdf},
+	pages = {ogac011},
+}
+
+@article{duursma_non-state_2022-1,
+	title = {Non-state conflicts, peacekeeping, and the conclusion of local agreements},
+	volume = {10},
+	issn = {2164-7259},
+	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2022.2032946},
+	doi = {10.1080/21647259.2022.2032946},
+	number = {2},
+	journal = {Peacebuilding},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	month = apr,
+	year = {2022},
+	note = {Publisher: Routledge},
+	pages = {138--155},
+	annote = {doi: 10.1080/21647259.2022.2032946},
+}
+
+@incollection{duursma_international_2023,
+	title = {International {Mediation} in the {Wake} of a {Failed} {Peace} {Agreement}: {Postagreement} {Mediation} to {Resolve} the {Civil} {War} in {Darfur}},
+	isbn = {978-0-8156-3813-1},
+	url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/jj.7794637.15},
+	abstract = {This chapter zooms in on the various mediation efforts following the failed Abuja peace process between 2004 and 2006, which aimed to resolve the armed conflict in Darfur. The Abuja peace process ended with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), concluded in May 2006. However, the DPA did not hold. Accordingly, mediation aimed at bringing peace to Darfur continued. This chapter examines the following question: To what extent were the mediation efforts following the failure of the Abuja process successful? I show that some follow-up mediation after the DPA’s conclusion focused on getting nonsignatory armed groups on board with the agreement,},
+	urldate = {2025-03-28},
+	booktitle = {Conflict {Mediation} in the {Arab} {World}},
+	publisher = {Syracuse University Press},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and Zartman, I. William},
+	editor = {Fraihat, Ibrahim and Svensson, Isak},
+	year = {2023},
+	doi = {10.2307/jj.7794637.15},
+	pages = {223--244},
+}
+
+@incollection{duursma_when_2022,
+	address = {London},
+	title = {When to {Get} {Out} of the {Trench}? {Using} {Smart} {Pressure} to {Resolve} {Civil} {Wars}},
+	booktitle = {Revisiting the “{Ripeness}” {Debate}},
+	publisher = {Routledge},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard},
+	editor = {Iji, Tetsuro and Vuković, Siniša},
+	year = {2022},
+}
+
+@incollection{duursma_perils_2025,
+	title = {The {Perils} of {Deadline} {Diplomacy} for {Ceasefires}},
+	booktitle = {Ceasefires: {Stopping} the {Violence} and {Negotiating} {Peace}},
+	publisher = {Georgetown University Press},
+	author = {Duursma, Allard and Nathan, Laurie},
+	editor = {Clayton, Govinda and Mason, Simon J. A. and Sticher, Valerie and Wenger, Andreas},
+	year = {2025},
+	pages = {163--187},
+}