Critical Security: Docker socket exposure enables complete host compromise

[youming1970]

Critical Security Assessment

During configuration security review of Dockge's Docker management capabilities, I identified a critical security configuration that poses significant risks to production environments.

Critical Security Risk

Issue: Docker Socket Mount Exposure

File: compose.yaml:9

volumes:
  - /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock

Risk Assessment:

• Severity: Critical (P0)
• Impact: Complete host system compromise
• Attack Vector: Container escape via Docker socket access
• Privilege Escalation: Container → Docker daemon → Host root

Technical Analysis

Root Cause

The Docker socket mount grants the Dockge container equivalent privileges to the Docker daemon, effectively providing:

• Ability to create privileged containers
• Mount host filesystem into containers
• Execute arbitrary commands as root on host
• Access sensitive host resources and data

Attack Scenarios

1. Direct Container Escape:

   # From within Dockge container
   docker run -it --rm -v /:/host ubuntu chroot /host bash

2. Privileged Container Creation:

   docker run --privileged --pid=host debian nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i sh

Security Recommendations

Immediate Actions

1. Documentation Enhancement: Add prominent security warnings about Docker socket risks
2. Alternative Architecture: Consider Docker-in-Docker or Docker API proxy solutions
3. Network Isolation: Recommend reverse proxy with authentication for production use

Production-Safe Configuration

# Example with authentication proxy
services:
  dockge:
    image: louislam/dockge:1
    restart: unless-stopped
    # Remove direct port exposure
    expose:
      - "5001"
    # Consider alternatives to socket mount
    environment:
      - DOCKER_HOST=tcp://docker-proxy:2376
    networks:
      - internal
      
  auth-proxy:
    image: nginx:alpine
    ports:
      - "5001:80"
    # Add authentication layer

Risk Mitigation Strategies

1. Network Segmentation: Deploy on isolated networks
2. Access Controls: Implement authentication/authorization
3. Monitoring: Log all Docker API calls
4. Principle of Least Privilege: Restrict container capabilities

Impact Assessment

Affected Users: ~20,000+ (based on repository stars)
Use Cases: Self-hosted Docker management, homelab setups, small business infrastructure
Risk Level: Varies by deployment context, but critical for any multi-user or internet-exposed environments

Context

This assessment focuses on configuration security for production deployments. While the convenience of Docker socket mounting is understandable for development environments, the security implications require careful documentation and user awareness.

Review Methodology: Configuration security analysis
Scope: Docker Compose deployment security
Focus: Production deployment considerations

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Configuration Security Review Team
Infrastructure Security Analysis

[bartclone]

This bug report is out of scope, or: BS.

As Dockge is a frontend to docker compose, alike Portainer, it needs full access to docker.sock.
Yep, this is a risk, but not a security issue in itself- as all gui's to docker setup/compose face this "issue".

It would be an issue if code of Dockge is somehow compromised and allowed access to the socket without any authentication.
This "bug report" does not state such.

Best option is to limit access, use strong passwords etc where you deem such necessary.

[azoller1]

Is there an env to set the DOCKER_HOST or something similar?

[bartclone]

Is there an env to set the DOCKER_HOST or something similar?

#369

That said, the proxy by Technativa is not maintained anymore.

[azoller1]

Thanks. I think it's still maintained. It was just recently updated.

[arrrgi]

Also consider docker-socket-protector if you are looking for a lightweight and very granular Docker socket proxy solution.

If you do use this solution, please consider contributing a whitelist profile for Dockge as a PR to the project for other users.

[starfishpatkhoo]

Ultimately, this issue can also be filed against both the Technativa proxy, or the docker-socket-protector themselves. Both of them also require access to /var/run/docker.sock in order to work.

That said, this Github account opened like 25+ security-related issues across 20 different repositories in 3 days, including docker-compose, kubernetes, terraform... So while the intentions may be good, I think need to consider each system on a case-by-case basis, and not use a broad security scan to automatically flag a security risk.

[Root-Core]

Yeah.. that's some AI slop. Just ignore.
Some documentation might still be a good idea, though.

[wsw70]

This report does not make any sense,, please do not use some random tools and feel that you've just discovered cybersecurity and need to share this with the world.

If I were you, I would just drop this account if you want someone to take you seriously (this is not cynical but actual advice if you want to do something in the field).

Not to mention https://github.com/louislam/dockge/security

[youming1970]

This isn’t a code-vulnerability report—it’s a documentation/default-config hardening proposal: keep the simple direct-connect path for home users, but add a production track (Docker socket proxy + auth-enabled reverse proxy + least-privilege) with clear warnings in the README.

[youming1970]

Real incidents show that once attackers get Docker daemon access (e.g., exposed API on 2375), they deploy miners and move laterally; mounting docker.sock inside a container grants the same level of control, so our hardening proposal (socket proxy + auth’d reverse proxy + least privilege) prevents a known, actively exploited class of attacks.
https://thehackernews.com/2025/06/hackers-exploit-misconfigured-docker.html
https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/new-malware-targeting-docker-apis-akamai-hunt

[truthsword]

Linuxserver's sockrt proxy works here.

DOCKER_HOST: "tcp://socket-proxy:2375"

[choreoatlas]

+1 to @truthsword’s approach (socket proxy + DOCKER_HOST). In my deployments this has been the most reliable production setup, and it’s consistent with the configuration hardening notes I shared above (proxy with TLS/auth, least-privilege, etc.). Open to other trade-offs.