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[CONC-654] Stop leaking client identifying information to the server before the TLS handshake
The server implementation here was incorrect as well, unnecessarily
reading—and TRUSTING—client identifying information sent before the TLS
handshake. That's in MDEV-31585.
As a result of the server's mishandling of this information, it's not
possible for the client to fix this in a way that's backwards-compatible
with old servers.
We rely on the server sending a capability bit to indicate that the
server-side bug has been fixed:
/* This capability is set if:
*
* - The CLIENT knows how to send a truncated 2-byte SSLRequest
* packet, containing no information other than the CLIENT_SSL flag
* which is necessary to trigger the TLS handshake, and to send its
* complete capability flags and other identifying information after
* the TLS handshake.
* - The SERVER knows how to receive this truncated 2-byte SSLRequest
* packet, and to receive the client's complete capability bits
* after the TLS handshake.
*
*/
#define CLIENT_CAN_SSL_V2 (1ULL << 37)
All new code of the whole pull request, including one or several files
that are either new files or modified ones, are contributed under the
BSD-new license. I am contributing on behalf of my employer Amazon Web
Services, Inc.
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