One-Time Pad (OTP): Issues in current implementation

[kobby-pentangeli]

1. Panic Conditions:

• The program panics if the key and the plaintext/ciphertext lengths do not match. An attacker might exploit this to cause denial of service by crafting inputs that trigger panics.

2. Error Handling:

• Lack of proper error handling can potentially leak information about the plaintext or key. For instance, by returning an error instead of panicking when lengths do not match, we could prevent potential denial of service attacks.

3. Key Generation:

• If there are any weaknesses in the rand::rngs::OsRng random number generator used for key generation, these could potentially be exploited to predict keys.

4. Memory Safety:

• The unsafe block in the testing section (String::from_utf8_unchecked) could potentially lead to undefined behaviour if misused. While it seems safe in our current test setup, in a larger codebase or with modifications, it might introduce vulnerabilities.

5. Key Transmission and Storage:

• While not explicitly part of our implementation, the transmission and storage of keys are critical points of vulnerability. If keys are not transmitted and stored securely, they could be intercepted or accessed by attackers.

6. Chosen Plaintext or Ciphertext Attack:

• If an attacker can somehow influence or choose the plaintexts or ciphertexts, they might be able to exploit this to learn information about the key or other plaintexts.

7. Side-Channel Attacks:

• While not a flaw in the algorithm itself, attackers might exploit side channels (like timing information, power consumption, etc.) to learn information about the key or plaintext.