RISC-V privileged architecture cite:[ISA] defines execution mode for supervisor software called S-mode. S-mode software may optionally enable Hypervisor extension to host virtual machines. Typically, there is a single supervisor domain of execution with access to all physical memory. This document describes Supervisor Domain Access Protection - a RISC-V privileged architecture extension to support physical address space (memory and devices) isolation for more than one supervisor domain. Supervisor domains enable trusted execution use cases for RISC-V platforms. Supervisor domains may also be used to reduce the supervisor Trusted Computing Base (TCB), with differential access to memory and other platform resources e.g. in Confidential Computing, TEE Security Services, Secure Devices etc.
Tenant (application or VM) workloads on multi-tenant platforms rely on hardware-based isolation primitives that are managed by the host/privileged software. Traditional host software (operating systems and virtual machine monitors) have unfettered access to system memory, devices and hardware isolation mechanisms such as the memory management unit (MMU) or physical memory protection (PMP) registers. Typical multi-tenant platforms also have a very large Trusted Computing Base (TCB) and have many threat actors that influence the TCB. For example, in a multi-tenant data-center environment, the host software, devices and device drivers, cloud operators, orchestration services, other tenant workloads etc. are all considered threat vectors. Additional threats originate due to deployment models, for example, an embedded platform deployed in the field is exposed to physical threat vectors. Hence, in many scenarios isolated supervisor domains are desired to be able to express differentiated trust models and secure access to platform resources. A supervisor domain uses resources (such as memory/IO regions, processing elements, devices and interrupts) to perform their function.
A supervisor domain is associated with a set of physical address regions that
are isolated from other supervisor domains on the same platform, with only the
Root Domain Security Manager (RDSM) with access to all of the physical address
space. A supervisor domain identifier (SDID) is associated with the hart
operating in the context of a supervisor domain to facilitate physical address
protection fences on a per supervisor domain basis. Supervisor domains must rely
on a TCB which consists of the RDSM (software) and hardware (hart, SoC,
Root-of-trust) that enforces the isolation properties for the supervisor domain.
The RDSM may utilize PMP/ Smepmp and/or the Smmpt (Machine-level Memory Protection Tables)
extension described in this specification to isolate physical memory between
supervisor domains. Isolation of the workloads within a supervisor domain is the
responsibility of the OS/hypervisor managing the supervisor domain, here
referred to as the Supervisor Domain Security Manager (SDSM).
A key goal of using multiple domains is to be able to reduce the common TCB across domains, and should enable the attestation cite:[CCC] of each domain independently from other domains. Sensitive data may be entrusted to a particular domain after verifying the trust properties statically (via boot) or dynamically (via attestation). These trust properties are established as part of the hardware and software supply chain, system configuration and may be additionally evaluated using attestation mechanisms. The security certification of the RDSM is desirable but out of scope of this specification.
Use cases for supervisor domain isolation range from embedded to application/server-class platforms. Some examples where supervisor domains can be used are:
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A trusted execution environment domain that isolates security services/applications.
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A confidential computing cite:[CCC] domain which enforces confidentiality and integrity for workload data-in-use from the host/untrusted hypervisor, along with attestation of the TCB.
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A host (operator) domain that manages resources on the platform, and may assign resources to other domains.
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A service-provider domain that has exclusive access to some devices.
In order to avoid re-factoring of deployed software, workloads and applications, new hardware primitives are required to support flexible isolation of data in caches and memory. The new primitives are also required to isolate resources such as interrupts, IO, QoS mechanisms and debug/trace mechanisms for robust isolation of supervisor domains. The hardware primitives must support performant and scalable physical memory isolation at a page-level to support rich-OS memory management models. This specification describes the set of architecture extensions to support the requirements for supervisor domain isolation for RISC-V processor-based platforms.
Supervisor Domain Access Protection extensions are used by M-mode RDSM to
program access policies for supervisor domain operation. The Smmpt extension
enables the RDSM to program permissions for physically-addressed memory (or
device-mapped regions) by a hart/device operating within a supervisor domain.
Associating a hart/device with a supervisor domain implies that any
physical-addressable region access occurring in the context of the supervisor
domain is subject to access-checks for that domain. Hence, software or hardware
accesses that originate from supervisor domains other than the allowed
supervisor domain can be explicitly prevented/allowed. The RDSM has access to
physical memory for all supervisor domains. In typical security usages, write
accesses to the MPT structures must be restricted and managed by the RDSM.
Memory regions may be accessed by harts or by other devices on the platform. When harts and devices are assigned to a supervisor domain, the hart/device is said to perform memory accesses in the context of that supervisor domain. For all accesses using a physical address, the SDID is the supervisor domain identifier programmed into a CSR. This CSR is programmed on the hart by the Root Domain Security Manager (RDSM). The assignment of the hart/device to a supervisor domain may be static (e.g. device assignment to a VM) or dynamic (e.g. scheduling a VM virtual cpu within a domain). The MPT for the supervisor domain active on the hart is programmed on the hart along with the supervisor domain identifier. The MPT does not perform any address translation; it simply provides access permissions for the physically addressed regions/pages to enforce the isolation properties per the use case requirements (see Figure 2 for a high-level illustration and section [Smmpt] for normative details).
The MPT checker is a functional block that looks up the MPT using the physical
address of the access as an index to retrieve the access permissions for the
supervisor domain. This checker thus enforces that for a load initiated by the
hart, the physical address is readable, and for a store initiated by the hart,
the physical address is also writable, else reports a fault. An MPT access
violation is always reported as a trap to the M-mode RDSM. The MPT checker may
be implemented as an MMU extension in the hart, and/or in the IO interconnect to
check device accesses. The MPT checker is designed to work together with the
page-based virtual memory (MMU, IOMMU) systems and Physical Memory Protection
(PMP, Smepmp, IOPMP) mechanisms. Read and Write permissions for memory are
derived from the page table, the PMP and the MPT - an access is allowed only
when all protection mechanisms allow the access.
MPT may be used to provide permissions for physical memory addresses that hold regular main memory or IO memory. Memory may be assigned to the RDSM to bootstrap the subsequent run-time lookup structures for MPT. All memory should be covered by the MPT, though some memory may not be eligible to be qualified for assignment to a specific supervisor domain. This limitation may arise due to platform configuration and security policies - for example, if the platform security policy requires memory for a domain to be encrypted and some memory access paths are not enforced via an inline memory encryption engine. It is expected that the RDSM can use trusted platform-specific methods to enumerate which regions can be designated as access-controlled via the MPT.
MPT must support both static and run-time configurability. A memory region (consisting of one or more pages) may be (re)assigned from one domain to another at run-time e.g. this is done by revoking the permission for one domain and assigning permissions to another domain. Run-time configuration may be performed via M-mode CSRs and/or in-memory structures. The in-memory structures used for MPT must themselves be access-limited to the RDSM by use of the MPT structures to disallow any supervisor domain from accessing the structures unless explicitly delegated by the Root Domain Security Manager (RDSM) to a particular domain (per use case policies). To support MPT dynamic reconfiguration, an interface is expected to be provided to set the attributes by passing requests to a trusted driver (in the RDSM) that can reconfigure the memory region assignment. Converting memory regions assignment from one domain to another might involve platform-specific operations based on the enforcement mechanism, such as TLB/cache flushes, that must be enforced by the RDSM and hardware. The RDSM is expected to change the settings and flush caches if necessary, so the system is only incoherent during the transition between domain assignment settings. This transitory state should not be visible to lower privilege levels (i.e. supervisor domains). There are also security aspects to be considered during (re)configuration, e.g., clearing memory used by the current SD before assigning it to another SD. Refer to the RISC-V CoVE cite:[CoVE] ABI and threat model as a reference.
A hart/device may perform accesses to memory exclusively accessible to its supervisor domain, or to memory shared globally with one or more supervisor domains. Memory sharing between supervisor domains is achieved by simply making the physical memory region accessible to the supervisor domains via the MPT structure associated with the hart or device. Access to physical addresses initiated from a hart or a device assigned a supervisor domain identifier may be denied by virtue of the permissions in the MPT lookup - such disallowed accesses from a hart cause a trap to the RDSM to report a fault. In the case of a device access disallowed by the MPT, the IO sub-system may log an error for the RDSM which may delegeate it to a supervisor domain.
The intra-domain isolation of memory between two harts/devices belonging to the same supervisor domain, but different tenant workloads, may be achieved via the use of MMU, PMP/Smepmp, SPMP, IOMMU and IOPMP depending on the type of platform and the type of access. To successfully achieve this isolation, the page table structures for a domain’s workloads must be managed by the Supervisor Domain Security Manager (SDSM) and the paging structures must be located in memory exclusively-accessible only to the supervisor domain. Additional security properties may be enforced based on type (data fetch, instruction fetch, etc.) and locality (hart supervisor domain identifier) of memory accesses as required for the security policy specific to usages. An example policy may be to require certain accesses to target only exclusively-owned domain memory. The MPT checker may utilize the supervisor domain identifier or additional metadata for the access to enforce such policies. The description of different types of supervisor domain policies possible is outside the scope of this document.
Additional protection/isolation for memory associated with a supervisor domain
is orthogonal (and usage-specific). Such additional protection for memory may
be derived by the use of cryptography and/or access-control mechanisms. The
mechanisms chosen for these additional protection methods are independent of
Smmpt and may be platform-specific. The TCB of a particular supervisor domain
(and devices that are bound to it) may be independently evaluated via
attestation of the HW and SW TCB by a relying party using standard Public-Key
Infrastructure-based mechanisms.