Recumbent Lead Crane - `endAuction()` might suffer from donation attack

[sherlock-admin2]

Recumbent Lead Crane

Medium

endAuction() might suffer from donation attack

Summary

endAuction() function in Auction.sol rely on totalSellReserveAmount >= (IERC20(sellReserveToken).balanceOf(pool) * poolSaleLimit) / 100 condition to set auction state to FAILED_POOL_SALE_LIMIT, this expose this fuction to donnation attack since attacker can send some sellReserveToken to pool to make this condition validated and get auction state set to FAILED_POOL_SALE_LIMIT.

Root Cause

In Auction.sol:341-342
https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-12-plaza-finance/blob/main/plaza-evm/src/Auction.sol#L341-L342
auction state FAILED_POOL_SALE_LIMIT condition

In Auction.sol:356
https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-12-plaza-finance/blob/main/plaza-evm/src/Auction.sol#L356

Internal Pre-conditions

No response

External Pre-conditions

No response

Attack Path

No response

Impact

This will cause claimBid() to revert AuctionFailed()

PoC

No response

Mitigation

Use internal tracking of sellReserveToken balance.