objects: Remove ConsoleAuthToken.to_dict

This is only used in three places now, each of which can be removed.

Part of blueprint remove-consoleauth

Change-Id: I89df8f8fa111b730ddd0aa73ae09a8cd5d152dad
Signed-off-by: Stephen Finucane <[email protected]>

nova/api/openstack/compute/console_auth_tokens.py

@@ -49,24 +49,25 @@ def _show(self, req, id, rdp_only):
         # with one instance, which can only be in one cell.
         for result in results.values():
             if not nova_context.is_cell_failure_sentinel(result):
-                connect_info = result.to_dict()
+                connect_info = result
                 break
 
         if not connect_info:
             raise webob.exc.HTTPNotFound(explanation=_("Token not found"))
 
-        console_type = connect_info.get('console_type')
+        console_type = connect_info.console_type
 
         if rdp_only and console_type != "rdp-html5":
             raise webob.exc.HTTPUnauthorized(
                 explanation=_("The requested console type details are not "
                               "accessible"))
 
-        return {'console':
-                {i: connect_info[i]
-                 for i in ['instance_uuid', 'host', 'port',
-                           'internal_access_path']
-                 if i in connect_info}}
+        return {'console': {
+            'instance_uuid': connect_info.instance_uuid,
+            'host': connect_info.host,
+            'port': connect_info.port,
+            'internal_access_path': connect_info.internal_access_path,
+        }}
 
     @wsgi.Controller.api_version("2.1", "2.30")
     @wsgi.expected_errors((400, 401, 404))

nova/console/websocketproxy.py

@@ -95,13 +95,14 @@ def address_string(self):
         # deployments due to DNS configuration and break VNC access completely
         return str(self.client_address[0])
 
-    def verify_origin_proto(self, connection_info, origin_proto):
-        access_url = connection_info.get('access_url')
-        if not access_url:
-            detail = _("No access_url in connection_info. "
-                        "Cannot validate protocol")
+    def verify_origin_proto(self, connect_info, origin_proto):
+        if 'access_url_base' not in connect_info:
+            detail = _("No access_url_base in connect_info. "
+                       "Cannot validate protocol")
             raise exception.ValidationError(detail=detail)
-        expected_protos = [urlparse.urlparse(access_url).scheme]
+
+        expected_protos = [
+            urlparse.urlparse(connect_info.access_url_base).scheme]
         # NOTE: For serial consoles the expected protocol could be ws or
         # wss which correspond to http and https respectively in terms of
         # security.
@@ -129,11 +130,11 @@ def _get_connect_info(self, ctxt, token):
         # NOTE(PaulMurray) ConsoleAuthToken.validate validates the token.
         # We call the compute manager directly to check the console port
         # is correct.
-        connect_info = objects.ConsoleAuthToken.validate(ctxt, token).to_dict()
+        connect_info = objects.ConsoleAuthToken.validate(ctxt, token)
 
         valid_port = self._check_console_port(
-            ctxt, connect_info['instance_uuid'], connect_info['port'],
-            connect_info['console_type'])
+            ctxt, connect_info.instance_uuid, connect_info.port,
+            connect_info.console_type)
 
         if not valid_port:
             raise exception.InvalidToken(token='***')
@@ -216,29 +217,30 @@ def new_websocket_client(self):
                 raise exception.ValidationError(detail=detail)
 
         self.msg(_('connect info: %s'), str(connect_info))
-        host = connect_info['host']
-        port = int(connect_info['port'])
+        host = connect_info.host
+        port = connect_info.port
 
         # Connect to the target
         self.msg(_("connecting to: %(host)s:%(port)s") % {'host': host,
                                                           'port': port})
         tsock = self.socket(host, port, connect=True)
 
         # Handshake as necessary
-        if connect_info.get('internal_access_path'):
-            tsock.send(encodeutils.safe_encode(
-                "CONNECT %s HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n" %
-                connect_info['internal_access_path']))
-            end_token = "\r\n\r\n"
-            while True:
-                data = tsock.recv(4096, socket.MSG_PEEK)
-                token_loc = data.find(end_token)
-                if token_loc != -1:
-                    if data.split("\r\n")[0].find("200") == -1:
-                        raise exception.InvalidConnectionInfo()
-                    # remove the response from recv buffer
-                    tsock.recv(token_loc + len(end_token))
-                    break
+        if 'internal_access_path' in connect_info:
+            path = connect_info.internal_access_path
+            if path:
+                tsock.send(encodeutils.safe_encode(
+                    'CONNECT %s HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n' % path))
+                end_token = "\r\n\r\n"
+                while True:
+                    data = tsock.recv(4096, socket.MSG_PEEK)
+                    token_loc = data.find(end_token)
+                    if token_loc != -1:
+                        if data.split("\r\n")[0].find("200") == -1:
+                            raise exception.InvalidConnectionInfo()
+                        # remove the response from recv buffer
+                        tsock.recv(token_loc + len(end_token))
+                        break
 
         if self.server.security_proxy is not None:
             tenant_sock = TenantSock(self)

nova/objects/console_auth_token.py

@@ -77,24 +77,6 @@ def _from_db_object(context, obj, db_obj):
         obj.obj_reset_changes()
         return obj
 
-    def to_dict(self):
-        """Convert to a dict representation."""
-        # NOTE(PaulMurray) For compatibility while there is code that
-        # expects the dict representation returned by consoleauth.
-        # TODO(PaulMurray) Remove this function when the code no
-        # longer expects the consoleauth dict representation
-        connect_info = {}
-        connect_info['token'] = self.token,
-        connect_info['instance_uuid'] = self.instance_uuid
-        connect_info['console_type'] = self.console_type
-        connect_info['host'] = self.host
-        connect_info['port'] = self.port
-        if 'internal_access_path' in self:
-            connect_info['internal_access_path'] = self.internal_access_path
-        if 'access_url_base' in self:
-            connect_info['access_url'] = self.access_url
-        return connect_info
-
     @base.remotable
     def authorize(self, ttl):
         """Authorise the console token and store in the database.

nova/vnc/xvp_proxy.py

@@ -64,15 +64,15 @@ def one_way_proxy(self, source, dest):
 
     def handshake(self, req, connect_info, sockets):
         """Execute hypervisor-specific vnc auth handshaking (if needed)."""
-        host = connect_info['host']
-        port = int(connect_info['port'])
+        host = connect_info.host
+        port = connect_info.port
 
         server = eventlet.connect((host, port))
 
         # Handshake as necessary
-        if connect_info.get('internal_access_path'):
-            server.sendall("CONNECT %s HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n" %
-                        connect_info['internal_access_path'])
+        if 'internal_access_path' in connect_info:
+            path = connect_info.internal_access_path
+            server.sendall('CONNECT %s HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n' % path)
 
             data = ""
             while True:
@@ -132,8 +132,7 @@ def __call__(self, environ, start_response):
             ctxt = context.get_admin_context()
 
             try:
-                connect_info = objects.ConsoleAuthToken.validate(
-                    ctxt, token).to_dict()
+                connect_info = objects.ConsoleAuthToken.validate(ctxt, token)
             except exception.InvalidToken:
                 LOG.info("Request made with invalid token: %s", req)
                 start_response('401 Not Authorized',