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fix: ignore RUSTSEC-2025-0046 #6156
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WalkthroughAdded an advisory ignore entry to deny.toml for RUSTSEC-2023-0071, documenting RSA-related concerns and ongoing migration to a constant-time implementation. No code or API changes. Changes
Estimated code review effort🎯 1 (Trivial) | ⏱️ ~3 minutes Suggested reviewers
Pre-merge checks and finishing touches❌ Failed checks (3 warnings)
✅ Passed checks (2 passed)
✨ Finishing touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Actionable comments posted: 0
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
deny.toml (1)
9-10
: Remove stale RSA advisory ignore and update PR description
- Drop
"RUSTSEC-2023-0071"
fromdeny.toml
if thersa
crate isn’t invoked.- Align PR title/description with the actual advisory being ignored.
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
📒 Files selected for processing (1)
deny.toml
(1 hunks)
⏰ Context from checks skipped due to timeout of 90000ms. You can increase the timeout in your CodeRabbit configuration to a maximum of 15 minutes (900000ms). (7)
- GitHub Check: tests
- GitHub Check: tests-release
- GitHub Check: Build forest binaries on Linux AMD64
- GitHub Check: All lint checks
- GitHub Check: Build MacOS
- GitHub Check: cargo-publish-dry-run
- GitHub Check: Build Ubuntu
Summary of changes
Ignore RUSTSEC-2025-0046 for now.
Impact
Due to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.
Patches
No patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation.
Workarounds
The only currently available workaround is to avoid using the rsa crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.
Changes introduced in this pull request:
Reference issue to close (if applicable)
Closes #6155
Other information and links
Change checklist
Summary by CodeRabbit