ci: fix shell injection in backport workflow #13052
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AudricV
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Found a potential shell injection point in
backport-pr.yml. The workflow was directly interpolatinggithub.event.comment.bodyinto a run script, which is a bit risky if a comment contains backticks or other shell-sensitive characters.I've refactored the "Get backport metadata" step to pass the comment body through an environment variable. This ensures the shell treats the input as a literal string and follows the official GitHub Actions security recommendations.