Gas Griefing Vulnerability when withdrawing native ETH

[zeroknots]

In the "fill on targetChain first, claim on origin later" workflow using TheCompact, ensuring solvers can successfully claim resource-locked funds is critical.

A vulnerability arises when claiming ETH as the underlying asset: if any recipient in a split claim implements a gas-griefing or reentrant receive function, it could block the entire split claim process. This would prevent all other recipients in the split from receiving their funds, even if only one recipient acts maliciously.

I suggest adding a gas stipend:

- to.safeTransferETH(amount);
+ to.trySafeTransferETH(amount, SafeTransferLib.GAS_STIPEND_NO_GRIEF);

Note: This PR is currently a draft because I’m uncertain whether this fix might introduce unintended side effects. I’d greatly appreciate feedback on the approach and potential risks.