Pac4j token validation bypass if OpenID Connect provider supports none algorithm
High severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
Jan 8, 2022
to the GitHub Advisory Database
•
Updated Sep 26, 2023
Package
Affected versions
< 4.5.5
>= 5.0, < 5.3.1
Patched versions
4.5.5
5.3.1
Description
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
Jan 6, 2022
Reviewed
Jan 7, 2022
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Jan 8, 2022
Last updated
Sep 26, 2023
If an OpenID Connect provider supports the “none” algorithm (i.e., tokens with no signature), pac4j v5.3.0 (and prior) does not refuse it without an explicit configuration on its side or for the “idtoken” response type which is not secure and violates the OpenID Core Specification. The "none" algorithm does not require any signature verification when validating the ID tokens, which allows the attacker to bypass the token validation by injecting a malformed ID token using "none" as the value of "alg" key in the header with an empty signature value.
References