[deps] Vault: Update form-data to v4.0.4 [SECURITY] #15712
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This PR contains the following updates:
4.0.2
->4.0.4
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2025-7783
Summary
form-data uses
Math.random()
to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker:Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request.
This is largely the same vulnerability as was recently found in
undici
byparrot409
-- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to give credit where credit is due! My PoC is largely based on their work.Details
The culprit is this line here: https://github.com/form-data/form-data/blob/426ba9ac440f95d1998dac9a5cd8d738043b048f/lib/form_data.js#L347
An attacker who is able to predict the output of Math.random() can predict this boundary value, and craft a payload that contains the boundary value, followed by another, fully attacker-controlled field. This is roughly equivalent to any sort of improper escaping vulnerability, with the caveat that the attacker must find a way to observe other Math.random() values generated by the application to solve for the state of the PRNG. However, Math.random() is used in all sorts of places that might be visible to an attacker (including by form-data itself, if the attacker can arrange for the vulnerable application to make a request to an attacker-controlled server using form-data, such as a user-controlled webhook -- the attacker could observe the boundary values from those requests to observe the Math.random() outputs). A common example would be a
x-request-id
header added by the server. These sorts of headers are often used for distributed tracing, to correlate errors across the frontend and backend.Math.random()
is a fine place to get these sorts of IDs (in fact, opentelemetry uses Math.random for this purpose)PoC
PoC here: https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc
Instructions are in that repo. It's based on the PoC from https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 but simplified somewhat; the vulnerable application has a more direct side-channel from which to observe Math.random() values (a separate endpoint that happens to include a randomly-generated request ID).
Impact
For an application to be vulnerable, it must:
form-data
to send data including user-controlled data to some other system. The attacker must be able to do something malicious by adding extra parameters (that were not intended to be user-controlled) to this request. Depending on the target system's handling of repeated parameters, the attacker might be able to overwrite values in addition to appending values (some multipart form handlers deal with repeats by overwriting values instead of representing them as an array)If an application is vulnerable, this allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests to internal systems.
Release Notes
form-data/form-data (form-data)
v4.0.4
Compare Source
Commits
auto-changelog
811f682
1d11a76
crypto
random for boundary values3d17230
5e34080
316c82b
@ljharb/eslint-config
58c25d7
2300ca1
v4.0.3
Compare Source
Fixed
append
: avoid a crash on nullish values#577
Commits
426ba9a
2094191
hasown
81ab41b
setBoundary()
method8d8e469
getBoundary
with non-strings837b8a1
870e4e6
e6e83cc
eslint
4066fd6
c4bbb13
Configuration
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