Automate management of firewall rules for Docker containers.
Linux with a recent kernel, around 5.10 or newer.
Docker by default creates iptables rules to handle container traffic that override almost all user-set rules. There are two main ways to get around this:
- Prevent Docker from creating any iptables rules by setting
"iptables": false
in/etc/docker/daemon.json
- This is the nuclear approach. It will break most networking for containers, and require that you manage iptables for containers manually, which can be a very involved process.
- Add rules to the
DOCKER-USER
iptables chain- Docker ensures that rules in this chain are processed before any rules Docker creates.
Adding rules to the DOCKER-USER
chain is what whalewall does to avoid managing more firewall rules
than it needs to. You may be wondering if whalewall is necessary, after all it is very easy to add
firewall rules to the DOCKER-USER
chain yourself. Well, Docker containers and networks are ephemeral,
meaning every time a container or network is destroyed and recreated, the IP address and subnet
respectively will be randomized. Whalewall takes care of creating or deleting rules when containers
are created or killed, which would be very tedious and error-prone manually. Finally, as well as
managing firewall rules to limit traffic to and from localhost and external interfaces, whalewall
can also enforce container network isolation by limiting traffic between containers.
Whalewall listens for Docker container start
and die
events and creates or deletes
nftables
rules appropriately. Why is nftables used instead of iptables? A few reasons:
- nftables can be configured programmatically unlike iptables, removing the need for whalewall to execute any binaries
- nftables allows for first-class sets and maps in firewall rules which can greatly speed up traffic matching in the kernel
- In most distros, iptables rules are translated to nftables rules under the hood, making iptables rules compatible with nftables rules
Whalewall stores details of containers it is managing rules for in a SQLite database. If containers are started or stopped while whalewall isn't running, whalewall will compare currently running containers to what was last saved to the database and create/delete firewall rules appropriately.
Whalewall needs the NET_ADMIN
capability to manage nftables rules. It also needs to be a member
of the docker
group in order to use /var/run/docker/docker.sock
to receive events from the
local Docker daemon.
To reduce attack surface, landlock and seccomp are leveraged to ensure only files and syscalls required by whalewall can be accessed and called respectively. This vastly limits what whalewall is able to do in the event an attacker is able to execute code in the context of its process. However, this will not prevent said attacker from taking advantage of the Docker socket whalewall has access to which can trivially lead to privilege escalation.
Download the Docker image:
docker pull ghcr.io/capnspacehook/whalewall:0.2.0
Ensure whalewall is given necessary permissions, and that it is using host
network mode. This
allows the whalewall container to modify host firewall rules.
Example Docker compose file:
version: "3"
services:
whalewall:
cap_add:
- NET_ADMIN
image: ghcr.io/capnspacehook/whalewall
network_mode: host
volumes:
- whalewall_data:/data
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
volumes:
whalewall_data:
If you want to run whalewall natively, download a release binary.
Or if you want to compile from source, assuming you have Go 1.19 installed:
go install github.com/capnspacehook/whalewall/cmd/whalewall@latest
After installing whalewall, grant it required permissions by running:
# this must be run first, it will erase any set capabilities
chgrp docker whalewall
setcap 'cap_net_admin=+ep' whalewall
Whalewall uses Docker labels for configuration:
whalewall.enabled
is used to enable or disable firewall rules for a container. If this label is not present and set totrue
for a container, whalewall will not create any firewall rules for it.whalewall.rules
specifies the firewall rules for a container. If this label is not specified butwhalewall.enabled=true
is, no traffic will be allowed to or from the container (unless another container has an output rule for this container).
The contents of the whalewall.rules
label is a yaml config.
Whalewall creates rules with a default drop policy, meaning any traffic not explicitly allowed will be dropped.
Below is an example Docker compose file that configures Miniflux, a feed reader. Miniflux needs to connect to a Postgresql database to store state and make outbound HTTPS connections to fetch articles, so that's only what is allowed.
version: "3"
services:
miniflux:
depends_on:
- miniflux_db
environment:
- DATABASE_URL=postgres://miniflux:secret@miniflux_db/miniflux?sslmode=disable
- RUN_MIGRATIONS=1
- CREATE_ADMIN=1
- ADMIN_USERNAME=admin
- ADMIN_PASSWORD=password
image: miniflux/miniflux:latest
labels:
whalewall.enabled: true
whalewall.rules: |
mapped_ports:
# allow traffic to port 80 from localhost
localhost:
allow: true
# allow traffic to port 80 from LAN
external:
allow: true
ips:
- "192.168.1.0/24"
output:
# allow postgres connections
- network: default
container: miniflux_db
proto: tcp
dst_ports:
- 5432
# allow DNS requests
- log_prefix: "dns"
proto: udp
dst_ports:
- 53
# allow HTTPS requests
- log_prefix: "https"
proto: tcp
dst_ports:
- 443
ports:
- "80:8080/tcp"
miniflux_db:
environment:
- POSTGRES_USER=miniflux
- POSTGRES_PASSWORD=secret
image: postgres:alpine
labels:
# no rules specified, drop all traffic
whalewall.enabled: true
Note to make this Docker compose config as concise as possible, best practices were not followed. This is merely intended to be an example of whalewall rules, not how to setup Miniflux securely.
# controls traffic from localhost or external networks to a container on mapped ports
mapped_ports:
# controls traffic from localhost
localhost:
# required; allow traffic from localhost or not
allow: false
# optional; log new inbound traffic that this rule will match
log_prefix: ""
# optional; settings that allow you to filter traffic further if desired
verdict:
# optional; a chain to jump to after matching traffic. This applies to new and established
# inbound traffic, and established outbound traffic
chain: ""
# optional; the userspace nfqueue to send new outbound packets to
queue: 0
# optional; the userspace nfqueue to send established inbound packets to. Required if
# 'output_est_queue' is set
input_est_queue: 0
# optional; the userspace nfqueue to send established inbound packets to. Required if
# 'input_est_queue' is set
output_est_queue: 0
# controls traffic from external networks (from any non-loopback network interface)
external:
# required; allow external traffic or not
allow: false
# optional; log new inbound traffic that this rule will match
log_prefix: ""
# optional; a list of IP addresses, CIDRs, or ranges of IP addresses to allow traffic from
ips: []
# optional; settings that allow you to filter traffic further if desired
verdict:
# optional; a chain to jump to after matching traffic. This applies to new and established
# inbound traffic, and established outbound traffic
chain: ""
# optional; the userspace nfqueue to send new outbound packets to
queue: 0
# optional; the userspace nfqueue to send established inbound packets to. Required if
# 'output_est_queue' is set
input_est_queue: 0
# optional; the userspace nfqueue to send established inbound packets to. Required if
# 'input_est_queue' is set
output_est_queue: 0
# controls traffic from a container to localhost, another container, or the internet
output:
# optional; log new outbound traffic that this rule will match
- log_prefix: ""
# optional; a Docker network traffic will be allowed out of. If unset, will default to all
# networks the container is a member of. Required if 'container' is set
network: ""
# optional; a list of IP addresses, CIDRs, or ranges of IP addresses to allow traffic to
ips: []
# optional; a container to allow traffic to. This can be either the name of the container or
# the service name of the container is docker compose is used
container: ""
# required; either 'tcp' or 'udp'
proto: ""
# optional; a list of source ports to allow traffic to. Can be a single port or a
# range of ports.
src_ports: []
# optional; a list of destination ports to allow traffic to. Can be a single port or a
# range of ports.
dst_ports: []
# optional; settings that allow you to filter traffic further if desired
verdict:
# optional; a chain to jump to after matching traffic. This applies to new and established
# inbound traffic, and established outbound traffic
chain: ""
# optional; the userspace nfqueue to send new outbound packets to
queue: 0
# optional; the userspace nfqueue to send established inbound packets to. Required if
# 'output_est_queue' is set
input_est_queue: 0
# optional; the userspace nfqueue to send established inbound packets to. Required if
# 'input_est_queue' is set
output_est_queue: 0
Port and IP ranges are inclusive. Examples:
4000-5000
will match all ports between and including port 4000 and port 50001.1.1.1-2.2.2.2
will match all IPs between and including 1.1.1.1 and 2.2.2.2
Whalewall accepts several environmental variables that can be used to configure how it connects to a Docker server:
DOCKER_HOST
to set the URL to the Docker server.DOCKER_API_VERSION
to set the version of the Docker API to use, leave empty for latest.DOCKER_CERT_PATH
to specify the directory from which to load the TLS certificates (ca.pem, cert.pem, key.pem).DOCKER_TLS_VERIFY
to enable or disable TLS verification (off by default).
- Logged traffic is sent to the kernel log file, typically
/var/log/kern.log
for Debian based distros and/var/log/messages
for RHEL based distros - If you want a container to only be allowed outbound access on a port to localhost, use the IP
of the
docker0
network interface, which is often172.17.0.1
- If no Docker networks are explicitly created, use the
default
network when creating container to container rules
Starting from v0.2.0, all Docker images and binary checksum files are signed. You can verify images or released binaries to ensure they were not tampered with in transit.
Verifying Docker images or binaries both require cosign
.
Simply check the signature of the image with cosign
:
cosign verify ghcr.io/capnspacehook/whalewall:<version> | jq
You can verify the image was built by Github Actions by inspecting the Issuer
and Subject
fields of the output.
Download the checksums file, certificate, signature and the archive to the same directory.
Extract the binary from the archive, verify the checksums file and verify the contents of the binary:
tar xfs whalewall_<version>_linux_amd64.tar.gz
cosign verify-blob --certificate checksums.txt.crt --signature checksums.txt.sig checksums.txt
sha256sum -c checksums.txt
You can also reproduce the released binaries to verify that they were built from this unmodified
source code. Verifying binaries requires gorepro
.
First, download the release archive and extract it. Clone this repro and go into it.
Install gorepro
and run it on the extracted release binary. gorepro
will tell you if reproducing
the binary was successful. Don't worry about checking out the correct tag or commit, gorepro will
handle that for you.
If you don't trust gorepro
you can run it again additionally passing the -d
flag. This will
print the commands gorepro
generated to reproduce the release binary. You can run the printed commands
and verify for yourself that the reproduced binary is bit for bit identical to the released one.
tar fxs whalewall_<version>_linux_amd64.tar.gz
git clone https://github.com/capnspacehook/whalewall whalewall-src
cd whalewall-src
# reproduce binary
go install github.com/capnspacehook/gorepro@latest
gorepro -b="-ldflags=-s -w -X main.version <version>" ../whalewall
# reproduce by manually running command from gorepro
BUILD_CMD="$(gorepro -d -b='-ldflags=-s -w -X main.version <version>' ../whalewall)"
echo "$BUILD_CMD"
"$BUILD_CMD"
sha256sum whalewall whalewall.repro