Address Crypto Panel review comments #330
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Wind4Greg
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Dec 17, 2024
Wind4Greg
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Dec 17, 2024
Wind4Greg
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Wind4Greg
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Wind4Greg
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Wind4Greg
reviewed
Dec 18, 2024
Wind4Greg
reviewed
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Wind4Greg
reviewed
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Wind4Greg
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Wind4Greg
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Wind4Greg
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Wind4Greg
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Wind4Greg
approved these changes
Dec 18, 2024
Co-authored-by: Andrew Whitehead <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Andrew Whitehead <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Andrew Whitehead <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Andrew Whitehead <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Andrew Whitehead <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Andrew Whitehead <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Andrew Whitehead <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Andrew Whitehead <[email protected]>
Addressed the comments! Thank you 🙏 |
draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures.md
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| @@ -601,7 +608,7 @@ Furthermore, all core operations accept the Signer's public key (`PK`) as well a | |||
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| ### CoreSign | |||
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| This operation computes a deterministic signature from a secret key (`SK`), a set of `generators` (points of G1) and optionally a `header` and a vector of `messages`. | |||
| This operation computes a deterministic signature from a secret key (`SK`), a set of `generators` (points of G1) and optionally a `header` and a vector of `messages`. Note that signature generation is deterministic, in contrast to the academic literature, where signature generation, and more specifically the calculation of the `e` value (Procedure step 2 below), is randomized (i.e., the `e` value is drawn at random, instead of been deterministically calculated by hashing the Signer's secret key and the list of messages). This alteration not only protects the scheme (at least the signature generation part) from vulnerabilities related to bad entropy sources, it also makes testing of the `CoreSign` operation easier. | |||
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Note that signature generation is deterministic, in contrast to the academic literature
Maybe we should reference Revisiting BBS Signatures here where they suggest it may have better security properties?
Wind4Greg
approved these changes
Feb 11, 2025
Co-authored-by: Andrew Whitehead <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Andrew Whitehead <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Andrew Whitehead <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Andrew Whitehead <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Andrew Whitehead <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Andrew Whitehead <[email protected]>
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Editorial updates to address the CFRG Crypto Panel review: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/crypto-panel/Vk5O4h_U3-QcWrm22KWwRFmSl7E/