Fix Blackhole implementation for e2e tests #18641
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[APPROVALNOTIFIER] This PR is NOT APPROVED This pull-request has been approved by: henrybear327 The full list of commands accepted by this bot can be found here.
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/cc @serathius This PR only contains the L7 forward proxy code. After merging #18640, this PR will be a lot cleaner to review. (As I can't set this PR to be based on #18640, thus there are quite some duplicated commits.) |
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## main #18641 +/- ##
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- Coverage 68.77% 68.72% -0.05%
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Files 420 420
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+ Misses 9668 9659 -9
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Part of the patches to fix etcd-io#17737 During the development of etcd-io#17938, we agreed that during the transition to L7 forward proxy, unused features and features targeting L4 reverse proxy will be dropped. This feature falls under the unused feature. Signed-off-by: Chun-Hung Tseng <[email protected]>
Part of the patches to fix etcd-io#17737 During the development of etcd-io#17938, we agreed that during the transition to L7 forward proxy, unused features and features targeting L4 reverse proxy will be dropped. This feature falls under the unused feature. Signed-off-by: Chun-Hung Tseng <[email protected]>
Part of the patches to fix etcd-io#17737 During the development of etcd-io#17938, we agreed that during the transition to L7 forward proxy, unused features and features targeting L4 reverse proxy will be dropped. This feature falls under the unused feature. Also, the initial implementation has a bug: if connections are not created continuously, the latency accept will not work. Consider the following case: a) set latency accept b) put latency accept into effect c) latency accept will start idling the goroutine d) block-wait at accept() - waiting for new connections e) new connection comes in - establish it f) go to c -> as we can see, if the request come every x seconds, where x is larger than the latency accept time we set, we can see that the latency accept has no effect. Signed-off-by: Chun-Hung Tseng <[email protected]>
Part of the patches to fix etcd-io#17737 During the development of etcd-io#17938, we agreed that during the transition to L7 forward proxy, unused features and features targeting L4 reverse proxy will be dropped. This feature falls under the unused feature. Signed-off-by: Chun-Hung Tseng <[email protected]>
Based on the ideas discussed in the issues [1] and PRs [2][3][6], it's been decided to switch from using an L4 reverse proxy to an L7 forward proxy to properly block peer network traffic, without the need to use external tools. The design aims to implement only the minimal required features that satisfy blocking incoming and outgoing peer traffic. Complicated features such as packet reordering, packet delivery delay, etc. to a future container-based solution. A peer will (a) receive traffic from its peers (b) initiate connections to its peers (via stream and pipeline). Thus, the current mechanism of only blocking peer traffic via the peer's existing reverse proxy is insufficient, since only scenario (a) is handled, and network traffic in scenario (b) is not blocked at all. We introduce an L7 forward proxy for each peer, which will be proxying all the connections initiated from a peer to its peers. We will remove the current use of the L4 reverse proxy, as the L7 forward proxy holds the information of the destination, we can block all incoming and outgoing traffic that is initiated from a peer to others, without having to resort to external tools, such as iptables. The modified architecture will look something like this: ``` A --- A's forward proxy --- B ^ newly introduced ``` The main subtasks are - redesigned as an L7 forward proxy - introduce a new environment variable `E2E_TEST_FORWARD_PROXY_IP` to bypass the limitation of `http.ProxyFromEnvironment` - implement an L7 forward proxy Known limitations are - Doesn't support unix socket, as L7 HTTP transport proxy only supports HTTP/HTTPS/and socks5 -> Although the e2e test supports unix sockets for peer communication, only a few of the e2e test cases use unix sockets as the majority of e2e test cases use HTTP/HTTPS. It's been discussed and decided that it is ok for now without the unix socket support. - it's L7 so we need to send a perfectly crafted HTTP request - doesn’t support reordering, dropping, or manipulating packets on the fly - `make gofail-enable && make build && make gofail-disable && go test -timeout 60s -run ^TestBlackholeByMockingPartitionLeader$ go.etcd.io/etcd/tests/v3/e2e -v -count=1` - `make gofail-enable && make build && make gofail-disable && go test -timeout 60s -run ^TestBlackholeByMockingPartitionFollower$ go.etcd.io/etcd/tests/v3/e2e -v -count=1` - `go test -timeout 30s -run ^TestServer_ go.etcd.io/etcd/pkg/v3/proxy -v -failfast` [1] issue etcd-io#17737 [2] PR (V1) https://github.com/henrybear327/etcd/tree/fix/e2e_blackhole [3] PR (V2) etcd-io#17891 [4] etcd-io#17938 (comment) [5] etcd-io#17985 (comment) [6] etcd-io#17938 Please read https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#contribution-flow. Signed-off-by: Siyuan Zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Iván Valdés Castillo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chun-Hung Tseng <[email protected]>
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Based on the ideas discussed in the issues [1] and PRs [2][3][6], we switch from using an L4 reverse proxy to an L7 forward proxy to properly block peer network traffic, without the need to use external tools.
The design aims to implement only the minimal required features that satisfy blocking incoming and outgoing peer traffic. Complicated features such as packet reordering, packet delivery delay, etc. to a future container-based solution.
Background
A peer will
(a) receive traffic from its peers
(b) initiate connections to its peers (via stream and pipeline).
Thus, the current mechanism of only blocking peer traffic via the peer's existing reverse proxy is insufficient, since only scenario (a) is handled, and network traffic in scenario (b) is not blocked at all.
Proposed solution
We introduce an L7 forward proxy for each peer, which will be proxying all the connections initiated from a peer to its peers.
We will remove the current use of the L4 reverse proxy, as the L7 forward proxy holds the information of the destination, we can block all incoming and outgoing traffic that is initiated from a peer to others, without having to resort to external tools, such as iptables.
The modified architecture will look something like this:
Implementation
The main subtasks are
E2E_TEST_FORWARD_PROXY_IPto bypass the limitation ofhttp.ProxyFromEnvironmentKnown limitations are
Testing
make gofail-enable && make build && make gofail-disable && go test -timeout 60s -run ^TestBlackholeByMockingPartitionLeader$ go.etcd.io/etcd/tests/v3/e2e -v -count=1make gofail-enable && make build && make gofail-disable && go test -timeout 60s -run ^TestBlackholeByMockingPartitionFollower$ go.etcd.io/etcd/tests/v3/e2e -v -count=1go test -timeout 30s -run ^TestServer_ go.etcd.io/etcd/pkg/v3/proxy -v -failfastReferences
[1] issue #17737
[2] PR (V1) https://github.com/henrybear327/etcd/tree/fix/e2e_blackhole
[3] PR (V2) #17891
[4] #17938 (comment)
[5] #17985 (comment)
[6] #17938
Please read https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#contribution-flow.