build(dev-deps): update dependency openpgp to v6.1.1 [security] #197
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This PR contains the following updates:
6.1.0
->6.1.1
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2025-47934
Impact
A maliciously modified message can be passed to either
openpgp.verify
oropenpgp.decrypt
, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed.This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using
openpgp.verify
) and signed-and-encrypted messages (usingopenpgp.decrypt
withverificationKeys
) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case.In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js.
In other words. any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature.
Both OpenPGP.js v6 and v5 are affected. OpenPGP.js v4 is not affected.
Patches
The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1.
Workarounds
openpgp.readMessage
, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created usingopenpgp.createMessage
) toopenpgp.verify
.openpgp.decrypt
withoutverificationKeys
, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created usingopenpgp.createMessage
) toopenpgp.verify
.Acknowledgements
We would like to thank:
Release Notes
openpgpjs/openpgpjs (openpgp)
v6.1.1
: - Security PatchCompare Source
Configuration
📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" in timezone Europe/Paris, Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).
🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.
♻ Rebasing: Never, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
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